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During my studies of the Middle East and then of international relations, my primary interest 
was the Middle East relations with Europe. But as my study of the Middle East continued, I 
quickly noticed that my interest was mainly in the broader study of international relations. So, 
after completing my Master’s in Islam in the Modern World, I decided to do another Master’s 
courses study focussing on international relations. It was an interesting and worthwhile choice 
for without following of the international relations Master courses, it would have been 
difficult to understand the plethora of complex issues pertaining to Iran in 1940s. The courses 
on international relations improved my knowledge about the international context and enabled 
me to make this context the basis of my analysis of into Kurdish issues with respect to 
international relations.  
The rise and fall of the Republic of Kurdistan is the theme of this dissertation. To 
analyze the Republic of Kurdistan, four aspects regarding it must be considered within this 
dissertation, namely: 1- ethnicity. 2- autonomy. 3- the Iranian central government, the 
Autonomous Government of Azerbaijan and the role of neighbouring countries, Turkey and 
Iraq. 4- the Great Powers in Iran. This thesis has paid careful attention to these factors, with 
particular focus on the existence of the Great Powers in Iran, which is not only an important 
element in the rise and fall of the Republic of Kurdistan, but also insofar as it relates to the 
origins of the Cold War in the Middle East. As a part of the introduction (chapter I), various 
Kurdish elements were studied, and the internal factors of the Republic of Kurdistan were 
expanded upon in chapter IV. For the research of this significant topic within Kurdish history, 
I did everything in my power to be impartial. Indeed, I regard it to be essential to this 
research. Furthermore, the critical expressions within the dissertation should be seen in a 
positive light as constructive criticism for improving our knowledge on the question of 
Kurdish nationalism for generations to come. 
The strength of this dissertation depends on its primary source materials, such as a: the 
Iranian archives, the parliament records during 1944-1946, and the National Archives of 
Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union archives. Kurdish materials, such as the 
newspaper Kurdistan in 1946, are another significant primary source behind this research, 
without which this study would have been incomplete. An analysis of the autonomous 
Kurdish government in Iraqi Kurdistan from 1991 onward also makes this study unique. 
During this period, a revival of Kurdish literature took place and many books and documents 
in different subject areas were published and disseminated. 
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Abstract  
The invasion of Iran by the Great powers (the Soviet Union and the Great Britain) in 1941 not 
only changed the political setting of the Iranian government but also led to the exile of Reza 
Shah, the leader of the Iranian autocratic regime. Although the presence of the Great Powers 
gave more power to the Iranian parliament -- mainly for political and economic benefit of the 
Powers -- it also split Iranian society into various adversarial factions, such as pro-Soviet, pro-
British, and pro-American groups. Furthermore, during this period, the very idea of Iran’s 
territorial unity was called into question. In the period from 1941 to 1946, some ethnic groups 
prepared to establish their own governments, which led to the break up of relationships 
between the Iranian central government and the representatives of ethnic groups in their 
respective provinces, including the region of the Kurds and Azeris. 
In 1942, Komalay Jiyanway Kurdistan (The Society for the Revival of Kurdistan) or 
Jiyani Kurdistan (Kurdistan Life), commonly referred to as the JK Party, assumed the mantle 
of the nationalist Kurdish political party. By 1945 it evolved into the Kurdistan Democratic 
Party (KDP). The formation and subsequent activities of these two Kurdish political parties 
played a principal role in the establishment of a brief Kurdish polity in Iran.  
The political struggle, especially between 1945 and 1946, that led to the establishment of a 
Kurdish government was made possible in part by one of the Great Powers then active in Iran. 
The Soviet Union, for political and economic purposes of its own, at varying capacities 
encouraged and supported the two breakaway provincial governments of the Kurds and 
Azeris. During the same period, Anglo-American policy favoured the Iranian central 
government. The conflicting interests and subsequently diverging policies of the Great 
Powers contributed significantly to what many authors refer to as the ‘Iranian Crisis’. This 
crisis led to the breakdown of relations between the Iranian central government and its 
peripheral powers, Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. 
Besides the presence and policies of Great Powers in Iran, the unfolding of the Iranian 
Crisis and the formation of two Kurdish political parties, there were a number of other factors 
that influenced the events leading to the establishment of the Kurdish government. Among 
these were the emergence of nation-states in the Middle East following the First World War, 
the after-effects of Reza Shah’s autocratic regime, and the establishment of the Azeri 
autonomous government. This dissertation takes a close look at the developments leading to 
the formation and the overthrow of the Kurdish government of 1946, which at times called 
itself the Republic of Kurdistan.  
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION  
 
1   Introduction  
The twentieth century witnessed many Kurdish uprisings. Several of them succeeded in 
creating self-governing Kurdish areas for varying lengths of time. Three of these Kurdish 
governments took place in Iraqi Kurdistan: the Kurdish government, led by Sheikh Mahmud, 
in Suleymaniyeh in 1920s; the period of Kurdish autonomy from 1970 to 1975, led by Mulla 
Mustafa Barzani; and the period of autonomy that began in 1991 and continues now, which is 
led by the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 
(PUK). The Kurdish movement that led to a Kurdish government was the Republic of 
Kurdistan of 1946, which took place in Iranian Kurdistan and constitutes the subject of this 
dissertation. 
When the Allied Powers (Great Britain and the Soviet Union) entered Iran in August 
1941, the relations between the central government and its peripheries broke down. At the 
centre, the shah was overthrown and the parliament became the most important governmental 
organization representing the Iranian people. In the peripheral province of Azerbaijan, Azeri 
politicians and intellectuals were gradually heading for the formation of an autonomous 
government, which became a reality in 1945. Kurdish inhabitants in West Azerbaijan also 
followed the example of their neighbouring ethnic group to build their own autonomous 
region. The distinct political movements of these two different ethnic groups not only 
challenged the centre to make serious attempts to ensure territorial integrity and sovereignty 
of Iran, but also exacerbated the tensions existing between the peripheral movements. An 
analysis of the tense relationships between the centre and both peripheries as well as the 
relations between these peripheries, that is between Azerbaijan and the Mahabad centred 
Republic of Kurdistan, is an important part of this study. The main goal of this dissertation is 
the description of the northern Iranian Kurdish political movements, which very shortly after 
the Second World War, between 1945 and 1946, established two political institutions, the 
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)1 and consequently ‘the Republic of Kurdistan’.2 
                                               
1 In 1973, the word ‘Iran’ was added to the name, transforming it to the KDPI. 
2 Although the use of the term ‘Republic’ by the Kurdish leaders to define their government raises questions as 
to the aptness of the term as well as their understanding of it, the commonly accepted name of the political entity 
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The Iranian Pahlavi dynasty was established by Reza Shah in 1925 and lasted until 
1979. In 1941, he left his kingdom to his son, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. During his 
reign until his forced abdication in1941, he established a central government and brought all 
provinces under a more strict central control. Reza Shah’s dream was to build a modern 
nation-state that, according to him, would be possible via modernization. One of his main 
policy goals was the transformation of the traditional Iranian society into a modern society. 
His polities’ includeed: modernizing the education system, establishing the University of 
Tehran, sending Iranian students to Europe, initiating a process of industrialization, and 
implementing a policy of forced migration and sedentarization of the nomads and tribes. 
Between the two world wars, the autocratic regime of Reza Shah pursued a hard-line 
assimilation policy towards non-Persian ethnicities including Kurds. Publishing and teaching 
in the Kurdish language were strictly forbidden. These modernization policies were not based 
on democratic principles. On the contrary, they were accomplished by suppressing the 
majority of the Iranian populace.  
From 1941 to 1946, although there was an Iranian central government in place, the 
Allies were the de-facto rulers. This period was marked by a multi-party system, return of 
some elites and tribal leaders from exile and parliamentary elections. It was also a period, 
particularly during 1945 and 1946, of crisis (referred to by many authors as the ‘Iranian 
Crisis’). A multitude of political problems contributed to the Iranian crisis between 1945 and 
1946. Of these, the nation’s sovereignty, geographical integrity, the Cold War, and the 
occupation of the country in 1941 by the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom were the 
most important. The Iranian government was deeply dependent on the Allied Powers, so far 
as its political, economic, and military wellbeing was concerned. Many tribes, particularly in 
the north and northwest of the country, independently managed affairs in their territories – in 
fact many of the significant leaders of the Republic of Kurdistan were also the leaders of such 
tribes. After 1941, the desire of some ethnic groups (Azeris and Kurds) to retain control of 
their territories was bolstered. 
Between 1942 and 1945 Iranian Kurds formed two political parties, a development 
which has been cited as the beginning of a new era of political history in Iranian Kurdistan. 
Komalay Jiyanway Kurdistan (The Society for the Revival of Kurdistan) or Jiyani Kurdistan 
(Kurdistan Life), commonly referred to as the JK Party, was proclaimed in 1942 as a 
                                                                                                                                                   
that was established in Iranian Kurdistan between January December 1946 is in fact the Republic of Kurdistan. 
Thus shall it be used in this thesis, as it is in the official documents of the concerned political entity itself. 
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nationalist Kurdish political party. The urban Middle Class played a considerable role in the 
JK party and its political activities continued until 1945 when the majority of the JK politburo 
accepted the KDP as its new political party. The formation of the KDP in the second half of 
1945 was nearly synchronous with one of the key events in the modern history of Iran, 
namely those centering on events in Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijan Democratic Party (ADP), 
which was founded in September 1945, was proclaimed the Autonomous Government of 
Azerbaijan in December 1945. The central government of Iran saw this event in the periphery 
as a great threat to national sovereignty. This was also a significant event for the Great 
Powers in their ongoing competition for political and economic advantage. It could also be 
argued that the establishment of the Autonomous Government of Azerbaijan was one of the 
central causes of the proclamation of the Republic of Kurdistan. Throughout this thesis, this 
argument will be explored in greater detail. 
The establishment of the Republic of Kurdistan was an essential inspiration of the 
nationalist Kurds in Iran who had, for the first time, the support of a superpower, the Soviet 
Union. However that support that was patchy and unreliable, as shall be more clearly 
explained in the later parts of this thesis. Despite the brevity of the Republic, it enabled a 
remarkable outpouring in Kurdish Letters. Indeed, this was the golden age of the revival of 
the Kurdish language and its literature.3 Several Kurdish journals and newspapers were 
published and Kurdish became the language of education. Although the Republic tried to 
build formal governmental institutions to legitimize its status as a nation state, it retained in 
the end a more tribal character. Religious figures, landlords and particularly chieftains were 
the significant components of policy-making in the Republic of Kurdistan. It was a society 
that still respected the tribal affiliations, kinships, family ties and religious brotherhoods.  
Events in the northern peripheries were largely propelled by the Great Powers’ 
policies in Iran, especially those of the Soviet Union. The presence of the Great Powers in 
Iran changed the political atmosphere in the country. In August 1941, Reza Shah was deposed 
by the Great Powers and Iran was divided into three zones: Soviet troops were in the north, 
British in the south and Tehran and some adjacent central regions remained unoccupied. The 
Allied Forces had created a buffer-zone in Iranian Kurdistan, which was accordingly divided 
into three zones. 1- Northern Kurdistan to Ushnawiyeh and Miyanduab was under the sphere 
of Soviet troops, 2- Southern Kurdistan up to Sanandaj went under the control of the Britain, 
                                               
3 Joyce Blau, ‘The Kurdish Language and Literature’ (February 2010): 
http://www.institutkurde.org/en/language/ 
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and 3- a Kurdish-held territory from Mahabad to Saqqiz was a buffer-zone located between 
the two super powers. The presence of a small Iranian army force during the Second World 
War ended when these Iranian military units were removed by the Kurds. This region became 
the centre of Kurdish political activity, which gave way to the establishment of the Republic 
of Kurdistan in 1946. 
The Allied Forces had promised not to intervene in Iranian internal affairs and to 
withdrawl their troops at the end of the war. Non-intervention was, however, according to 
Homa Katouzian, a myth due to the indirect and questionable intereference that took place in 
practice.4 First, there was the extensive use of Iranian resources, ranging from foodstuff and 
raw materials to roads, railways and telecommunications networks, especially during the 
Battle of Stalingrad, which lasted from August 1942 until February 1943. Secondly, there 
were the practices based on the ‘conflict of interests’ of the Great Powers, which intensified 
further when the United States (US) became the third power in Iran after 1945. The presence 
of Allies in Iran not only thrust Iran onto the international stage and caused a major 
transformation in the country’s external relations, but also opened the way for profound 
internal changes. The British policy was not linked to any Iranian political parties or 
movements but it was oriented towards supporting certain individuals and the central 
government. The Anglo-American policy was simply supporting the Iranian central 
government. Soviet policy, on the other hand, was different. The Soviets aimed to achieve 
their political and economic goals by helping ethnic groups fight the central government. The 
concept of the ‘right of nations to self-determination’ came to guide the Soviet foreign policy 
and led to the apparent ethnic groups rallying around the slogan ‘liberty for the Kurds and the 
Azeris from the oppression of the Persians’. 
These two different approaches caused a diplomatic crisis between the Soviets and the 
British, which only worsened when the US began to exert its influence on the Middle East in 
general and on Iran in particular. In fact, the confrontation between the US and the Soviets 
during the Iranian crisis of 1945-1946 played an important part in the origins of the Cold War 
in the Middle East. All of the Western occupiers were preoccupied with their own interests in 
the region and sought to influence particular ethnic groups, parties and individuals. This 
resulted in exacerbating the problems in Iranian politics, with the Iranian people being split 
among pro-British, pro-American, and pro-Soviet factions. This political polarization not only 
                                               
4 Homa Katouzian, The Political Economy of Modern Iran: Despotism and Pseudo-Modernism, 1926-1979 
(London: Macmillan Press, 1981), 141-2. 
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plunged Iran into a crisis, but, as stated above, was also an important factor in the origins of 
the Cold War. The Cold War was a protracted global political, economic, and ideological 
confrontation between the US and its allies vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and its allies. An 
important part of this dissertation is the analysis of events surrounding the Iranian crisis of 
1946 within thean international relations framework that clarrifies the influence of external 






























2   Kurds: An overview   
This section introduces the Kurds, the target group of this thesis, on the basis of geographic, 
population, linguistic and religious characteristics.  
 
2.1.  Geography 
The Kurds are one of oldest communities to have continuously inhabited Mesopotamia and 
the largely mountainous region of the Near East and the northern boundaries of the Middle 
East.5 According to Elphinston the word Kurd in modern form appears in Arabic sources in 
the ninth century, in the plural form Akrad.6 The term ‘Kurdistan’, as a geographical term, 
was for the first time introduced in the fourteenth century by the Saljuqs Empire.7 McDowall, 
however, claims that the word Kurdistan was introduced in the twelfth century by the 
Saljuqs.8 Given the fact that the Saljuqs reigned between 1037-1157, the twelfth century 
seems to be the period when that imperial people would have introduced the term Kurdistan.  
          The central part of the Kurdish territory is situated among three mountain systems: the 
Armenian extension of Taurus on the north, Inner Taurus and Zagros. Zagros stretches from 
Ararat to the southern point of Khanagin on a northwest – southeast axis.9 Before 1937, Iran 
was traditionally divided into four large ayalat (provinces) and velayat (districts).10 Today 
Iran has twenty-four ostan (provinces). One of these provinces is Kordestan, with Sanandaj as 
its capital. A substantial portion of the waters in the Middle East have their origins in 
Kurdistan. Headwaters of Euphrates, Tigris, Khabur, Great and Small Zab, Diyala, Alwand, 
Aras, Safid-Rud, Kerkhan and Dizful, among others, are all located in the mountains of 
Kurdistan and they flow through Kurdish lands extensively before heading towards 
neighbouring territories.  
Kurds are the biggest ethnic group in the Middle East without a sovereign state of their 
own. Because the borders of Kurdistan are not officially recognized by either the countries in 
which parts of Kurdistan are situated or by other relevant international bodies, it is difficult to 
                                               
5 The Encyclopaedia of Kurdistan. www.kurdistanica.com 
6 W.G. Elphinston, ‘The Kurdish Question’, International Affairs (Vol. 22, No. 1, Jan. 1946), 92. 
7 Abdulrahman Ghassemlou, Kurdistan and the Kurds (London: Publishing House, 1965), 13. 
8 David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (London/New York: I.B. Tauris, 1996), 6. 
9 For more information about the geography of Kurdistan, see Abdullah Ghafor, Coghrafie Kurdistan [The 
Geography of Kurdistan], (5th ed., Hewler Publisher, 2008). 
10 Touraj Atabaki, Ethnicity and Autonomy in Iranian Azerbayjan: The Autonomous Government of Azerbayjan 
1946 (Ph.D. thesis, Utrecht University, 1991), 88. 
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ascertain the exact borders of Kurdish lands. Wthout internationally recognized borders, it is 
also difficult to arrive at an accurate estimate of the Kurdish population. Below, is an attempt 
to draw an estimate of the Kurdish population through the evaluation of various sources.  
 
2.2.  Population 
The extent of the Kurdish population is a subject of much discussion. Here three sources will 
be compared for the estimation of the Kurdish population. The first source is from western 
scholars, Cecil J. Edmonds, Martin van Bruinessen and David McDowall. The period of 
Edmonds’ research was in the middle of the first half of the twentieth century, van 
Bruinessen’s was in the middle of the second half of the twentieth century and McDowall’s in 
the late twentieth century. The second source is from the countries in which Kurdistan has 
been located (Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Soviet Union) and the third source comes from the 
Kurds themselves.  
According to Edmonds,11 when the League of Nations Commission came in 1925 to 
inquire about the dispute between Great Britain and Turkey regarding the Mosul wilayat 
(province), they estimated the Kurdish population at: 
 
Turkey 1,500,000; Persia 700,000; Iraq 500,000; Syria and elsewhere 300,000; making a total of 
3 million.12 
 
Edmonds did not agree with these numbers, however. He believed that the total Kurdish 
population was more than three million and suggested ‘a grand total of between 4 and 4½ 
million.’13  
Fifty years after Edmonds, in 1975, van Bruinessen made the following estimation of 
the Kurdish population, see table 1.14 
 
                                               
11 Edmonds was a British political officer who particularly focused on Iraqi Kurdish issues between 1920-25. He 
served with the British Expeditionary Forces in Mesopotamia. From 1935 to 1945, he was adviser to the 
Ministry of Interior in Iraq. He published a famous book titled: Kurds, Turks, and Arabs: Politics, Travel and 
Research in North-Eastern Iraq, 1919-1925, (1957), which provides detailed notes on social and political 
conditions, personalities and local practices in the districts where he served.  
12 Edmonds 1957, 3. 
13 Ibid., 4. 
14 Van Bruinessen 1978, 22. 
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Countries  Grand Population Kurdish 
Population 
Percentage  
Turkey  40/2 7/5 19 
Iraq  10/5 2-2/5 23 
Iran 34 3/5 10 
Syria  7/3 0/5 8/5 
Soviet Union  -- 0/1 -- 
Total   13/5 to 14  
Table 1: Population estimates for 1975, see Martin van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State: On the Social and 
Political Organization of Kurdistan (Ph.D. thesis, 2nd ed., Rijswijk, 1978), 22.   
 
About twenty years after van Bruinessen, McDowall estimated the total Kurdish population 
between 24-27 million.15 
The second source comes from the countries within which Kurdistan is located, where 
it should be noted that there have never been officiall statistics documenting minority 
populations such as Kurds. These governments then have a tendency to underestimate the size 
of the Kurdish population. Religious statistics of Iran is show that about 90% of the 
populations are Shi’ites and approximately 10% are Sunnis. The majority of the Kurds in Iran 
are Sunnis. However, Shi’ite Kurds are also the majority of the inhabitants of the Kermanshah 
province and a certain portion of the population of Ilam. The Great Soviet Encyclopaedia of 
1952 presents that Kurds are 7 million.16 The third source is from the Kurds themselves. Most 
Kurdish scholars claim that the Kurdish population consists of approximately 30 million or 
more. For example, Kendal Nezan claims that the total number of the Kurdish population, 
including the diaspora, to be around just over 30 million.17  
 
2.3.  Language 
Kurdish is an Indo-European language and belongs to the family of Iranian languages. It is a 
distinct language, in that it has its own historical development, continuity and grammatical 
system. Simply classified, Kurdish can be sub-divided into the following dialects: 1. 
                                               
15 McDowall 1996, 3. 
16 Ghassemlou 1965, 21. 
17 Kendal Nezan, ‘The Kurds: Current Position and Historical Background’, in Philip Kreyenbroek and Christine 
Allison (eds.), Kurdish Culture and Identity (London: University of London, 1996), 7-9. 
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Kurmanji: Also categorized as Northern Kurmanji. It is the dialect spoken by most Kurds in 
Turkey, in northern Iranian-Iraqi Kurdistan, in the Kurdish inhabited north-eastern region of 
Syria, and in the former Soviet Union, especially throughout the Caucasian republics of 
Georgia and Armenia. 2. Sorani: Also categorized as Central Kurdish dialects group. It is 
spoken by most Kurds in and around Arbil, Suleymaniyeh, and Kirkuk in Iraq as well as in 
the region of Mukriyan and Ardalan in Iranian Kurdistan. 3. Pehlewani: It is also categorized 
as Southern Kurdish. It is mostly spoken in Khanaqin and Mandalin districts of Iraqi 
Kurdistan and in the Kermanshah region in Iran. 4. Dimili: Also known as Zazaki or 
Kirmancki. It is spoken by widely-scattered small pockets of communities in Kurdistan in 
Turkey throughout Dersim, Erzincan, Elazig, Diyarbakir, Bingol, Mush, and Urfa. 5. 
Hewrami: It is mostly spoken in the far corners of Southern Kurdistan.18 For writing in 
Kurdish a modified version of Persian-Arabic alphabet is used in Iran, Iraq and Syria. The 
literate Kurdish population in Turkey uses the Latin alphabet. Although Kurds in the former 
Soviet Union adopted the Cyrillic alphabet for the most part of their modern history, there 
were periods during which certain circles used the Latin alphabet.    
The territorial boundaries between the Ottoman and Persian19 empires from the 
sixteenth century to the end of the First World War show similar characteristics as those of 
the Byzantine and Islamic empires. During the Byzantine and Islamic empires, Kurdistan was 
divided between north and south and in the period of the Ottoman-Persian empires Kurdistan 
was divided between north-west and east. The historical division of Kurdistan is one of the 
main reasons for the development of dialectal differences within the Kurdish language, and is 
also a fundamental obstacle to the formation of unified Kurdish nationalism. 
                                               
18 Some sources about the Kurdish language: ‘Kurdish Academy of Language’ at 
http://www.kurdishacademy.org/?q=node/41; see also languages of the World at www.ethnologue.com. For 
several scholarly studies about the Kurdish language, see van Bruinessen, ‘het Koerdisch, een problematische 
taal [Kurdish, a problematic language]’, in  Mahabad B. Qilorî, Nêçîrvan Qilorî (eds.), Woordenboek Koerdisch-
Nederlands (Amsterdam, 2002); Baran Rizgar, Learn Kurdish: A Multi-level Course in Kurmanji (London, 
1996); Hassan Ghazi and Hewa Cardoi, Svensk-sydkurdiskt lexikon (Sweden, 1992); Feryad Fazil Omer, 
Kurdisch-Deutsches Wörterbuch, dem institut für Iranistik der frein universität Berlin und medico international, 
(Berlin, 1992). 
19 Up to 1935 Iran was called Persia by westerners after the manner of the Greeks, who identified all of Iran with 
the name of one of its provinces: Fars, or Persia. In 1935 Reza Shah changed the official name of country to 
‘Iran’ and requested that all countries follow his usage. 
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From the beginning of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the Kurds were oppressed and 
could not speak their own language in governmental institutions. The Turkish government 
does not recognize the status of the Kurds as either as a distinct nation or as an ethnic 
minority group. The institutions of the Turkish government have played prominent roles in 
the design and content of curricula for all Turkish educational institutions from primary 
schools to universities. The speakers of Kurdish are not recognized as a legitimate cultural 
minority and education in Kurdish is considered a manifestation of terrorism as persecuted as 
such. The unresolved Kurdish issue remains one of the main obstacles to the Turkish 
government’s ambition to join the European Union. Since 2002, Turkey has shown a certain 
willingness toward recognizing a number of Kurdish cultural rights. Questions remain, 
however, about the extent of these rights and whether they will actually be upheld or merely 
recognized on paper as a sop to political and diplomatic pressure.  
In Syria, until the end of the French mandate, at the end of the Second World War, 
control over the Kurdish minority was relatively loose. During this period, a number of 
Kurdish intellectuals were able to work on standardizing the Kurmanji dialect and produce 
various Kurdish publications. It was in this period that for the first time Jeladet Ali Badir 
Khan20 adopted the Latin alphabet for Kurdish. Although this was a too short-lived positive 
period for the Kurdish language, works of this era have had significant influence on 
succeeding generations of Kurmanji speakers.21 After the French mandate released the entire 
governmental control to the Arab administration, however, the Syrian Kurds were deprived of 
even the few concessions that they had secured under French mandate. Since then, any 
attempt by the Kurdish population in Syria to assert their cultural or political rights has been 
meet with brutal suppression. 
In Iraq, the government that was constituted under the British mandate recognized the 
basic cultural rights of its Kurdish minority, such as the right to don traditional garb, the use, 
teaching of and publication in Kurdish. Partly due to the fact that the Iraqi government 
                                               
20 Jeladet Ali Badir Khan (1893-1951) was the son of Emín Ali Badir Khan and the grandson of the Emir of 
Badir Khan (Botan emirate). He was a famous politician at the time of the Ottoman Empire. For most of his life, 
Jeladet divided his time between France, Germany, and Syria. He held a master’s degree in law from Istanbul 
University and completed his studies in Munich.  
21 Jeladet printed and published a Kurdish journal, Hawar, in Damascus, based on Latin scripting system which 
is currently used as the standard northern Kurdish alphabet. He published the Kurdish grammar lesson 
‘Bingahína rézimana Kurdí’ through the paper. Hawar was published from 1932 to 1935 and from 1941 to 1943. 
For more short information about Jeladet’s activity, see: http://www.kurdishacademy.org/node/91   
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accepted Sorani as the educational language of the Kurdish minority, from the second half of 
the 1920’son, Kurdish literature in this part of Kurdistan enjoyed the opportunity to develop. 
This situation continued until 1991 with periods of improvements and decline depending on 
which administration led the Iraqi government.  
Kurds in diaspora, especially those in Europe, through tremendously popular Kurdish 
cultural activities, played significant roles in the revival of the Kurdish language and 
literature. Within the last two decades, Kurdish radio and television outlets in Europe have 
played a considerable role in the social mobilization of the Kurdish community. Another 
important element for the revival of the Kurdish language, history and culture since 1991 has 
been the autonomous region of Iraqi Kurdistan. This area may yet continue to play an 
important role for all Kurds in their efforts to preserve their language, culture and politics. 
 
2.4.  Religion  
The majority of the Kurds are Muslims, but there are also a number of religious variations, 
such as Yezidis. It should be noted that some European scholars (e.g. Jacques Waardenburg), 
as well as a number of Arabic and Persian scholars, are under the impression that there is a 
connection between Yezidis and Yezid Ibn Mo’awiye (Umayyad Caliph, 680-83).22 However, 
historical evidence suggests that this is an entirely erroneous conception of Yezidis. Yezidis 
have a distinct religion of their own, predating even the birth of Islam.23   
Alevism is another notable religious variation among Kurds. There is an ongoing 
discussion among Alevis as to whether they should count themselves as Muslims or not.24 
Over the past ten years, a small segment of Alevis began manifesting themselves as a separate 
                                               
22 Jacques Waardenburg (ed.), Islam: Norm, Ideaal en Werkelijkheid (5th ed., Houten: Fibula, 2000), 410; for 
Iranian author, see Safizada Burakayi Ṣadiq, Tarikhi Kurd va Kurdistan [History of Kurds and Kurdistan], 
(Tehran: Nasri Atiya, 1999), 46. 
23 More about Yezidis, see Kreyenbroek 1996, 96-104; John S. Guest, Survival among the Kurds: A History of 
the Yezidis (London: Kegan Paul, 1993).  
24 It is difficult to define what Alevism exactly is. This is because Alevism, unlike other religions as Judaism, 
Christianity and Islam, has no specific source, but over the centuries through various adaptations from other 
religions, cultures and lifestyles it has become what we today observe as ‘Alevism.’ Although Alevism in many 
respects seems to be a different religion, most Alevis for defensive reasons usually call themselves Muslim. 
Throughout the centuries many Islamic principles crept inside Alevism as well. Because of political motives 
related to assimilation purposes, Alevism in Turkey is considered as an Islamic movement. More about the 
Alevis community, see David Shankland, The Alevis in Turkey: The Emergence of a Secular Islamic Tradition 
(London, 2003). 
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ethnic group.25 The majority of the Kurdish population in Kermanshah and Khanaqin are 
Shi’ites. Most of the Kurdish population in and surrounding areas of Dersim (Turkey) are 
Alevis. A number of Sufi orders are also active in all parts of Kurdistan. Naqshbendi and 
Ghadri are the two of the major Sufi-orders. 
 
3   A descriptive framework  
The establishment of the Republic of Kurdistan is the primary field of investigation for this 
study. Accordingly, the problem of this study can be formulated as such: ‘Was the 
establishment of the Republic of Kurdistan based on the principles of modernity and the 
maturation of Kurdish nationalism’s internal dynamics or was it a product of hasty reactions 
to the larger events surrounding it, such as the presence of the Great Powers in the region 
during and after the Second World War, the formation of the Autonomous Government of 
Azerbaijan?’ 
A thorough exploration of this problem requires an investigation of several contextual 
frameworks, as they will enable the reader to better understand the thesis’ question and the 
answer(s) offered throughout this dissertation. 
Any definition of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), which is an interdisciplinary 
approach in the sense that it blends social theories with that of language and discourse, will be 
challenged by most scholars. CDA is an instrument that opens a dialogue between various 
social and linguistic theories. It is, according to Lilie Chouliaraki and Norman Fairclough, a 
method for analysing social practices and focuses more on their discourse moments within the 
linking of the theoretical and practical concerns.26 The CDA framework chosen for this 
research touches upon a number of interrelated social and international relations theories 
within distinct academic fields and methods. The theoretical framework consists of the 




                                               
25 More debate about the Alevis identity, see van Bruinessen, ‘The debate on the ethnic identity of the Kurdish 
Alevis’, unpublished paper, Centre for the Study of Asia & the Middle East (Malvern, Victoria (Australia): 
Deakin University, 1997).  
26 Lilie Chouliaraki and Norman Fairclough, Discourse in late Modernity: Rethinking Critical Discourse 
Analysis (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), 16. 
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3.1.  Ethnic group 
Before Fredrik Barth’s work in 1969, in general, ethnic groups were seen as a cultural 
characteristic that distinguished from other ethnic groups. Barth has made other common 
perspective, he emphasized the social organization of differences and similarities.27 Following 
Barth’s lead, other scholars, such as Thomas Hylland Eriksen, saw ethnic groups as a social 
differentiation within a population or by an expansion of system boundaries bringing hitherto 
discrete groups into contact with each other.28 The diversity of ethnic groups inside a society 
often becomes a loaded source of dispute that sometimes leads to open conflicts. Asia has 
have encountered many of these conflicts, particularly in the Middle East. The mosaic of 
ethnic groups within Iran has not only led to reflection but also to a problem in the country’s 
sense of national identity, which was at its worst when the country was invaded in 1941. 
Considering Kurds as a nation or as an ethnic group depends more on the definition of both of 
these socio-political terms. It should be noted that, there is no agreement among scholars as to 
the definition of either of the abovementioned terms. Can any group of people call themselves 
a nation without its own independent state? If so, then what are the requirements of being 
recognized as a nation? In chapter II, theoretical debate of this framework and related terms 
are described more in detail. 
 
3.2.  Autonomous minority 
John Ogbu classifies minority groups into voluntary (immigrant), involuntary (non-
immigrant) and autonomous minorities. This classification calls attention to an important 
difference in the histories of the peoples who is referred to as minorities. Voluntary minorities 
are those who have more or less willingly moved to another state because they expect better 
opportunities such as better jobs, more political or religious freedom. Involuntary minorities 
are people who have been conquered, colonized, or enslaved.29 In contrast, autonomous 
minorities according to Ogbu, ‘may have a distinctive racial, ethnic, religious, linguistic or 
                                               
27 Fredrik Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference (Long 
Grove/Illinois: Waveland Press, 1969, reissued in 1998), 6. 
28 Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives (London/Colorado: Pluto 
Press, 1993). 
29 John Ogbu, Minority Education and Caste: The American System in Cross-Cultural Perspective (New York: 
Academic Press, 1978). 
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cultural identity that that is guaranteed by a national constitution or by tradition.’30 Voluntary 
and involuntary minority groups are the main topics of Ogbu’s investigation. Autonomous 
minority received little attention in Ogbu’s typology beyond persistent mention. Kurds, as a 
minority, who are ruled by dominant groups of Persian-, Turkish- and Arabic-speakers have a 
similarly distinctive cultural identity and demand, autonomy, its recognition by national 
constitutions.  
This demand for autonomy by various Kurdish movements, which was a hot topic in 
the past century, was a collective response to rapid social transformation. In order to explain 
the concept of political autonomy, Ruth Lapidoth categorized it into five main types: federal 
system, decentralization, self-government, associate statehood and self-administration.31 Out 
of all of these varieties of autonomy, self-government autonomy is the term that most applies 
or could be adapted to the demands of the Kurdish movements. In this study, self-government 
autonomy is defined as a territorial community that manages its own internal affairs, without 
external intervention.32 It does not have a much broader meaning than self-determination 
because self-determination also has both external and internal aspects. The external aspect is 
the international status of the rights of a people, while the internal aspect is the right of a 
people to choose its own system of government and to participate in the political process that 
governs it.33 This internal aspect of self-determination can also be found in the self-
government category of autonomy as described by Lapidoth. This kind of autonomy draws 
attention to the cultural and political rights of the autonomous minority. For the Kurds, 
cultural rights would refer to their ability to determine their education based on indigenous 
language, wear their traditional clothes, and practice their religions freely. Important Kurdish 
political rights would include self-rule free from external control or interference. Autonomous 
self-government was the fundamental aim of the Kurdish movements in the twentieth century. 
Several Kurdish movements and the KDP and their government, the Republic in 1946, are 
                                               
30 John Ogbu, ‘Minority status and schooling in plural societies’, Comparative Education Review (No. 27 (2), 
1983a), 169. 
31 Ruth Lapidoth, Autonomy: Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts (Washington D.C.: United State Institute of 
Peace Press, 1996), 49. For the definition of the various autonomies, see ibid., 50-7. 
32 Ibid., 52. For details on relations between internal and external aspects, see Will Kymlicka, Multicultural 
Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 35-48. 
33 For more on self-determination among several minority groups, see Hurst Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, 
and self-determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1990), 27-49. 
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examples of autonomous minority struggling for self-government, which will be analyzed in 
this dissertation.                     
 
3.3.  Iranian central government, Autonomous Government of Azerbaijan and the role 
of neighbouring countries, Turkey and Iraq.  
Inter-state relations among Iran, Iraq and Turkey relating to the Kurds are described in this 
framework.        
The theory that is most applicable to the inter-state relationships in the Middle East is 
the ‘omni-balancing’ theory.34 It concentrates on third world countries and highlights inter-
state relations with references to internal conflicts and the influence of greater political 
powers in the background. Omni-balancing is the model, according to Robert Olson, that best 
characterizes the Turkish and Iranian foreign and domestic politics, in which the Kurdish 
question plays a dominant role.35 This is one of the significant theoretical approaches related 
to the balance of power theories within the realist and neorealist schools. It has different 
emphasis in the Third World states and particularly on leaders of such states. The essential 
aspect of the omni-balancing theory is that the ties between Middle Eastern states were based 
more on internal threats, which not only caused obstacles for the cooperative relations 
between these states, but also brought into question the continuity and practical application of 
the treaties signed among these states. For example, although the Sa’dabad Treaty, signed in 
1937, between four Muslims countries (Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and Turkey) was about inter-
state relations, the fundamental aspects of this agreement were scarcely adopted due to 
internal threats from the leadership of the various intra-state political actors. The role of these 
internal threats is an essential element of omni-balancing theory, which suggested that the 
leaders in the Middle Eastern states competed against each other for internal policy-making 
capabilities. This kind of political theory is different from that of the realist school, which 
concerned itself with the competition for external or inter-state policy-making capability.36 
Internal threats had been increasing in the Middle East, especially with the formation 
of new states after the First World War. According to Fred Halliday, to protect their 
                                               
34 The omni-balancing theory is the most revered when it comes to explaining Third World issues. For more on 
this, see Steven R. David, ‘Explaining Third World Alignment’, World Politics (Vol. 43, No. 2, 1991), 233-56.  
35 Robert Olson, The Kurdish Question and Turkish-Iranian Relation from World War I to 1998 (Costa 
Mesa/California: Mazda Publishing, 1998), 14. 
36 David, ‘Explaining Third World Alignment’, 1. 
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legitimacy, the leaders from the majority of the Middle Eastern states aligned themselves with 
one of the Great Powers, which led to the latter becoming players in regional politics.37 An 
important example of balance of power theory is the creation of the new Iraqi government by 
Great Britain. Although Great Britain decided not to create a Kurdish state in their mandate 
territory in Iraq, it sometimes supported and encouraged Kurdish nationalism to establish a 
balance of power between ethnic Kurds and the Arabs and between both the religious Sunni 
and Shi’ite communities. This realist theory of balance of power was an instrument for the 
British policy to easily control the territories under their sphere of influence.               
Another aspect of omni-balancing theory holds that states that are driven by internal 
threats are, according to Steven David, ‘likely to be weak, in which case they will not affect 
the global balance of power anyway.’38 With regard to the Kurdish question in the Middle 
East, this argument is controversial for many Middle Eastern experts. For example, due to 
strategic or internal elements, both Turkey and Iran have sufficient power to influence the 
balance of power in the region. According to Olson, Iran and Turkey are not weak states and 
their inability to deter the Kurdish nationalist movements, particularly the formation of an 
independent Kurdish state, would affect the global balance of power.39           
 
3.4.  Presence of Great Powers in Iran   
In order to arrive at a sound comprehension of the political agendas followed by the Great 
Powers during and after the Second World War in Iran, as well as in other parts of the world, 
it is important to evaluate some of the major international relations theories. As necessary 
tools to arrange, analyze and structure reality, theories are, according to Kenneth N. Waltz, 
one of the leading realist scholars, assessed in terms of what they attempt to explain or 
predict.40 In this dissertation, three international relations theories are evaluated: 1- (Neo-
)realism. 2- (Neo-)idealism/liberalism, and 3- Structuralism. Below, these three theories are 
described briefly. In chapter V, they are examined in more detail. Because chapter V 
described the behaviours of political and economic interest of the Great Powers in Iran, 
                                               
37 Fred Halliday, The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 177. 
38 David, ‘Explaining Third World Alignment’, 253. 
39 Olson 1998, 12. 
40 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York, Columbia University: Waveland Press, 1979), 
1-10.   
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however, it would be logical that these international relations theories were also explained in 
the same chapter.    
The fundamental feature of sovereignty is ‘claim’. Others may not ‘respect’ this claim, 
but if the legitimacy of sovereignty is formally ‘recognized’ then the issue is less important. 
In the modern world-system, the legitimacy of sovereignty requires reciprocal recognition.41 
This reciprocal recognition has two dimensions, external state relations and internal state 
operation. The first, which is an important aspect within the realist school and was a 
significant Anglo-Americans policy to holding relations with central governments, such as 
Iran, refers to the sovereignty of a state. This sovereignty recognised by the majority of other 
sovereign states, but it can also be not accepted by some other states. Respecting the 
sovereignty of a state depends on the weakness and strength of a state. Internal sovereign 
reciprocity refers to the relations between a central state and its peripheries, where the local 
peripheries must recognize the sovereign authority of the central state. The central authority 
must, according to Immanuel Wallerstein, also recognize the legitimate authority in the 
peripheries and defend the sphere of their authorities.42 In many democratic countries the 
power is divided between the centre and peripheries and even the political power of the local 
authorities is recognized as independent. When the central government does not recognize the 
political power of local authorities, it could lead to internal conflicts. It could even be 
exacerbated enough to cause a civil war. The breakdown of relations between the central 
government of Iran and its peripheries, such as Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, in 1945 and 1946 is 
a good example. 
Balance of power, an important international relations theory, is the second aspect 
within the (neo)realist and (neo)idealist schools and it can be used to explains the inter-state 
policies that existed amongst the Great Powers. A definition of this theory, by Hans 
Morgenthau, a realist scholar, will suffice to make things clear. According to Morgenthau, 
balance of power refers, ‘to an actual state of affairs in which power is distributed among 
several nations with approximate equality.’43 For Waltz, balance of power is one of the most 
important political theories in international relations. He claimed that ‘if there is any 
                                               
41 Immanuel Wallerstein, World-System Analysis: An Introduction (Durham/London: Duke University Press, 
2004), 44. 
42 Ibid., 45. 
43 Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (4th ed., New York: Alfred A. 
Knope, 1978), 173. 
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distinctively political theory of international politics, balance-of-power theory is it.’44 This 
theory is more a historical generalization than a theoretical concept.45 After the end of the 
First World War, the significance of the balance of power was a hot subject between the Great 
Powers. However, there were obstacles towards realizing the goal due to the instability of the 
international order at Versailles. This was due to the temporary weakness of Germany and 
Russia and meant that the balance of power was essentially artificial and the balance would be 
increasingly threatened if the two countries were to strengthen themselves further. The 
(neo)idealism school takes more the transnational elements of international relations into 
account. Robert O. Keohane emphasizes the importance of studying international institutions 
and how collaboration can take place in world politics without hegemony.46 (Neo)idealism 
also claims that several (inter)national and inter-states organizations, such as the League of 
Nations and the United Nations, must obtain more political power to solve the internal and 
external issues of its member nations.  
The last international theory, structuralism, is concerned with the division within 
societies, between the rich and poor within countries and between the rich and poor 
worldwide. This difference increases the importance of transnational relations and 
intergovernmental links. According to this theory, the structures of world politics are defined 
by economics and the interaction between sovereign states is not important. Structuralists 
emphasize the relationships between classes, both within states and among states. 
Structuralism was an important theory within the Marxism-Leninism political ideology of the 
Soviet Union policy, especially during Joseph Stalin’s regime.47 In this thesis, it would be 
examines to what extent the Soviet policy encouraged an ethnic group within a state, such as 
Kurds in Iran during the Second World War. 
 
While exploring each of the abovementioned frameworks and the research question, many 
sub-contextual questions are delved into: 
 
                                               
44 Waltz 1979, 117. 
45 Ibid., 164. 
46 Robert O. Keohane, Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986). 
47 For a more detailed discussion of the Soviet policy among structuralist theory, see Amitava Krishne Dutt and 
Jaime Ros (ed.), Development Economics and Structuralist Macroeconomics (United Kingdom: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2003).    
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1- In what ways do ethnic communities maintain their identities despite the presence of a 
dominant group?  
2- To what extent did the Kurdish political movements between two world wars affect 
and encourage the Iranian Kurds to mobilise themselves into their own political 
parties?  
3- How much solidarity and national unity existed among different tribes in Iranian 
Kurdistan?  
4- To what extent has religious affinity infiltrated Pan-Kurdism or has tribalism 
infiltrated Kurdistaniness?  
5- Which factors led to the weakening and the eventual fall of the Republic of 1946?  
6- What were the most important friction points between the Iranian central government 
and the Kurdish government?  
7- Did the Iranian government and Autonomous Government of Azerbaijan ever take the 
Kurdish government in Mahabad seriously?  
8- What caused the disagreements between the Azerbaijan and Kurdish governments?  
9- What obstacles were raised by Turkey and Iraq before the Republic of Kurdistan?  
10- What were the policies of the Great Powers, especially those of Soviet Union’s, 
towards the Republic of Kurdistan?  
 
4   Research sources 
In the past three decades, especially after the 1990s, numerous books and articles came out 
concerning the matters of ethnicity and nationalism.48 These provide researchers with better 
opportunities to understand the Kurds’ insistence on ethnically distinguishing themselves 
from such neighbours as Turks, Arabs, Persians and others. The basic literatures of this 
research are the primary sources. Throughout August and September of 2009, I travelled in 
Kurdish areas to conduct archival research and interviews and to find relevant books. During 
                                               
48 Other important books and articles in this category are: Abbas Vali (ed.), Essays on the Origins of Kurdish 
Nationalism (Costa Mesa/California: Mazda Publishers, 2003); Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism: Theory, 
Ideology, History (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001); __, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1986); Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (2th ed., 
London/New York: Verso, 1991); Ernest Gellner, Nations and nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983); Koohi-
Kamali Farideh, The Political Development of the Kurds in Iran: Pastoral Nationalism (Hardcover - Mar 4, 
2004); Wilson N. Howell Jr., The Soviet Union and the Kurdish Question: A study of National Minority 
Problems in Soviet Policy (Virginia: University of Virginia, 1965). 
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my travels, I collected a large body of particularly relevant, useful, and reliable information in 
the form of historical documents, interviews and books. To my knowledge, there is no Ph.D. 
thesis about the Republic of Kurdistan of 1945-46. Although there are a few books, articles 
and masters theses, they are not comprehensive.49 It needs to be remembered that until 1991 
accessing the Soviet archives was difficult or impossible for non-Soviet citizen. Since 1991, 
Dr. Afrasiao Hewrami has translated into Kurdish almost all the Soviet’s archival documents 
that relate to the Kurdish and Azerbaijan issues in Iran during the period of the Second World 
War. Fortunately, in recent years, these important documents have been published in Iraqi 
Kurdistan (Suleymaniyeh and Arbil).50 The presence of these documents furnishes a solid 
foundation for my thesis. Incidentally, this is the first English language Ph.D. research on this 
subject that avails itself of the archives of the former Soviet Union. The Kurds who live in 
diaspora and the Regional Autonomy of Iraqi Kurdistan (1991-present) have played an 
important part in the revival of the Kurdish literatures.51 Along with the primary sources of 
                                               
49 Several secondary sources about the Republic of Kurdistan are: Archie Roosevelt Jr., ‘The Republic of 
Kurdistan of Mahabad’, Middle East Journal (Washington DC, July 1, 1947), 247-69; Noshirwan Mustefa Emin, 
Hekometi Kurdistan, Rebendani 1324-Sermawezy 1325: Kurd le Gemey Soviet da (The Government of 
Kurdistan, 22 Jan-17 Dec 1946: The Kurds in the Soviet Game), (3th ed., Suleymaniyeh Publisher, 2007); 
William Eagleton, The Republic of Kurdistan of 1946 (London: Oxford University Press, 1963). 
50 These primary documents that have been published in couple books are: Afrasiao Hewrami, Rojhalati 
Kurdistan le Sardami Dowem Cangi Cihanida: Be peyi Balgehnamekani Arşivi Yeketi Sovjet (Eastern Kurdistan 
during the Second World War: according to the documents of Soviet Union Archives), (Suleymani: Zheen 
Publishing House, 2008a); __, Peywendyekani Kurdistan u Azerbaijan u Hereshenani Herdula le sali 1946 da: 
Le Belgeh u Sarchawekan da [Kurdistan and Azerbaijan Relations and the fall of both in 1946: in the documents 
and sources], (Suleymani: Sardam Publishing, 2008b); __, Rodawekani Rojhalati Kurdistan le Balgenameyi 
Sovjet da: 1945-47 [the events of the Eastern Kurdistan in the documents of Soviets], (Suleymani: Binkai Zhin, 
2007); __, Mustafa Barzani le Hendek Belgename u Dokumenti Sovjet da: 1945-58 [Mustafa Barzani in several 
Evidence and Documents of the Soviets], (Erbil: Aras Publishing, 2002). 
51 Some of the primary sources for my research are: Ali Karimi (ed.), Nishtiman: Belawkrehweyi biri Komelayi 
Je-K [Nishtiman: dissemination of the ideas of the Society for the Revival of Kurdistan], (Suleymani: Binkai 
zhin, 2008); Himdad Hoesen, Rojnamevani Kurdi: Sardemi Komari Dimokrati Kurdistan 1943-1947 [Kurdish 
journalism: during the Democratic Republic of Kurdistan 1943-47], (Erbil: Aras Publisher, 2008); Mahmud 
Mulla Izzat, Dewlati Cemhori Kurdistan, Name u Document (The Democratic Republic of Kurdistan, 
Correspondence & Documents), (vols. 2, 2th ed., Suleymani: Tishk Publishing, 2003a); __, Cemhori Kurdistan: 
Lekolineweyeki Mejoyi u Siyasi [Kurdistan Republic: political and historical investigation], (2th ed., Suleymani: 
Sardam Publishing, 2003); Rafiq Saleh & Sadiq Saleh (eds.), Rojnameyi Kurdistan: Mahabad 1324-1325 Hetawi 
(1946) [the journal of Kurdistan, Mahabad, 1946], (Suleymani: Binkai zhin, 2007).  
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footnotes 50 and 51, the Iranian parliament records, during 1944-1946), British and US 
archives are also key sources for my research. 
An essential part of my thesis is the role and the influence of the Great Powers in Iran 
during and after World War II. The first major post-WWII international political crisis in the 
Middle East began in Iran. Historians have given much attention to the Cold War. Many 
books and articles have been published about the origins of the Cold War between the United 
States and the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, especially in Poland. However, little interest 
has been shown in the conflict between the US and the Soviet Union in the Middle East, 
particularly in the Iranian crisis (1945-1946).52   
 
5   Construction of the thesis 
Chapter II is concerned with manifestation of ethnic identity. After the collapse of Ottoman 
and Tsarist empires, the concept of the nation and nation-states became the most influential 
factor in determining new geographical borders. The imagining of ethnicity and ethnic 
identity among Kurds are central to the case of the Republic of Kurdistan. Therefore, chapter 
II will address the dynamics and interactions among concepts of ethnic identity, ethnicity and 
nationalism. Several of these theories will be compared in this section, followed by a close 
analysis of Kurdish ethnic identity.         
This dissertation will examine the development of political identity in modern 
Kurdistan in general and especially in Iranian Kurdistan. Kurdish political movements 
between two world wars make up one of the main topics that will be dealt with in chapter III. 
It will discuss the Kurdish political movements between the two world wars, which in turn 
affected and encouraged the Iranian Kurds to mobilise themselves into their own political 
parties. One of the results of these movements is the Republic of Kurdistan of 1945-46, which 
                                               
52 Some secondary literature about the Kurds, the Azeris and the Iranian government in the World War II in 
international policy are: Bruce R. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power 
Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey and Greece (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980); Yassin 1995; 
McDowall 1996; Fred H. Lawson. ‘The Iranian Crisis of 1945-1946 and the Spiral Model of International 
Conflict’, International Journal of Middle East Studies (Vol. 21, No. 3, Aug., 1989); Kerim Yildiz and Tanyel, 
B. Taysi, The Kurds in Iran: The Past, Present, and Future (Hardcover - Mar 22, 2007); Louise L Estrange 
Fawcett, Iran and the Cold War: The Azerbaijan Crisis of 1946 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992); Natalia I. Yegorova, Iran Crisis of 1945-1946: A view from the Russian Archives (Washington DC, 
1996); Olson 1998; Touraj Atabaki, Azerbaijan: Ethnicity and the Struggle for Power in Iran (2nd ed., London: 
I.B. Tauris and Co Ltd, 2000). 
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will be discussed in chapter IV. In order to thoroughly understand the rise and fall of the 
Republic of Kurdistan, it is also necessary to understand the socio-political events during the 
period of 1941-46. The KDP was one of the movements that played an essential role in the 
proclamation and establishment of the Republic of Kurdistan. This political party and its 
relations with other parties and the Iranian government will also be discussed in this chapter. 
Thus chapter IV presents an illustration of the Republic of Kurdistan’s structure as well as its 
socio-political standing. Further, it examines the opinions of the opponents and supporters of 
the Republic who provide insight into the extent of the Republic of Kurdistan’s achievements 
and its shortcomings. 
The final chapter, chapter V, focuses on the role and influence of the Great Powers, 
especially of the Soviet Union, and the countries neighbouring Iran, such as Turkey and Iraq 
on the Republic of Kurdistan. Further the chapter describes the relations between the Great 
Powers in Iran and the governments of Iran and Azerbaijan with the Republic of Kurdistan. 
Within the context of the Cold War, the Superpowers’ struggle to gain hegemony over the 
‘Third World’53 emerges mainly after the second half of the 1950s. In Iran, however, it began 
even before the war had ended. Shortly after the Second World War, the Cold War between 
the two Great Powers (the Soviets and the US) became central to the study of International 
Relations. The specific reasons for the manifestation of the Cold War in Iran will also be 










                                               
53 The term ‘Third World’ was used during the Cold War to define countries that remained non-aligned or 
neutral towards capitalism (First World) or communism (Second World). The term continues to be used 
colloquially to describe the poorest countries in the world. This usage is widely disparaged, because the fall of 
the Soviet Union deprecated the terms ‘First World’ and ‘Second World.’ While there is no identical 
contemporary replacement, common alternatives to the term ‘Third World’ include ‘developing world’. 
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CHAPTER II. ETHNIC GROUP  
 
This chapter intends to offer concise descriptions of and discussions about notions of 
ethnicity, ethnic identity, ethnic group, nation and nationalism. Moreover, general theories 
about ethnicity are also discussed in broad lines within the framework of Kurds as an ethnic 
group. To this end, certain answers will be being begged of their questions, such as: What is a 
particular ethnic identity? In what ways do ethnic communities maintain their identities 
despite the presence of a dominant group?  
 
1   Ethnic definitions 
 
1.1.  Ethnicity 
Since there is no universally agreed-upon definition of ethnicity, social scientists have several 
distinct approaches to using this term. One of the reasons it remains undefined is that 
‘ethnicity seems to be a new term’.54 The term ‘ethnicity’ was first used by the American 
sociologist David Riesman in 1953.55 It was derived from the Greek word ethnos. The word 
‘ethnics’ gradually became common in the United States around the time of the Second World 
War to identify people of non-Anglo race groups, such as Jews and Italians. This term has 
become more popular and was increasingly used after the 1960s. Ethnicity has something to 
do with classification of people and group relationships.56 It refers to aspects of relationships 
among groups that regard themselves as culturally different and are considered by others 
distinct as well. Colloquially, the term ‘ethnicity’ evokes minority issues and race relations. In 
social anthropology, however, it refers to aspects of relationships among groups that consider 
themselves culturally distinctive.57 In Iran, Kurds and Azeris play such a role. Their cultures 
and languages are distinct enough for them to be categorized as different ethnicities who live 
amid the dominant ethnic group of Persians.     
                                               
54 Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan (eds.), Ethnicity: Theory and Experience (Cambridge/Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1975), 1. 
55 Ibid.; Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives (London/Colorado: 
Pluto Press, 1993), 3. 
56 Ibid., 4. 
57 Ibid. 
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Before the celebrated work of Fredrik Barth, ethnic groups were defined as social 
groups that are divided according to their shared origin, history, language and culture. As an 
alternative to this definition, Barth suggested the following:  
 
Ethnicity is a matter of social organization and beyond questions of empirical cultural 
differences: it is about “the social organization of cultural difference”.58   
 
Barth claims that ethnicity stems from contact between two groups that are different from 
each other. He suggests that the self-definition of a group as an ethnic entity in a given 
geography provokes the definition from other groups also living within the concerned 
territory. Consequently the process constructs these entities as groups distinct from each 
other. In situations where there are no developed complementarities, groups tend to grow 
distant from each other and thus we get cultural variation without ethnicity.59 Ethnicity, by 
definition, must arise either from a process of social differentiation within a population, which 
is divided into two or more groups, or by an expansion of system boundaries that create 
contacts with new groups.60 Boundaries are relevant to ethnicity and can change and respond 
‘strongly to the political environment, particularly to the territorial frame in which groups find 
themselves.’61  
Iraqi Kurds, both during the British mandate and since the independence of Iraq, have 
had to resort to armed struggle against the central government in order to take control of their 
territories. The struggle for autonomy in Iraqi Kurdistan originally stemmed from the tribal 
confederation and gradually reached a ‘national unity’ under the leadership of Mulla Mustafa 
Barzani.62 Horowitz called this process of creating a large ethnic accumulation 
‘supertribalism’ or ‘artificial ethnicity’.63 
Another example of supertribalism is the role of several tribes in the Republic of 
Kurdistan. An important component of the Republic of Kurdistan was the existence of and the 
                                               
58 Barth 1969, 6. 
59 Ibid., 6-38. 
60 Eriksen 1993, 79. 
61 Donald L. Horowitz, ‘Structure and Strategy in Ethnic Conflict’, (Paper prepared for the Annual World Bank 
Conference on Development Economics, Washington D.C., April 20–21, 1998), 25.  
62 Mulla Mustafa Barzani in 1961 (shoresha eylole, September uprising) has forged from different tribes a 
national unity against the Iraqi government. 
63 Horowitz 1998, 26. 
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interaction among its tribes. Typically, a Kurdish tribe, according to van Bruinessen, is a 
socio-political and generally also territorial unit based on descent and kinship, real or 
putative, with a characteristic internal structure.64 Van Bruinessen claims that tribe is a ‘social 
organization.’65 Tribes are entities within which aspects of transformation scarcely occur. It is 
a social and cultural conservative. The collective character is an essential principle of tribes. 
They evaluate and decide collectively. There is no place for individual opinion, such as ‘I 
believe’ or ‘I think.’ The ‘we-form’ is the norm: ‘we do this’, ‘we have said this.’66 Tribes 
still play a vital role in the Kurdish society in some parts of Kurdistan. The use of the term 
‘ethnic group’ implies namely the contact and relationships among these groups.67 
Anthony D. Smith believes that there are two distinguishable broad trends in the study 
of ethnicity. The first is represented by the ‘Primordialists’ and ‘Perennialists’ and the second 
trend is Heraclitan.68 The first offers answers to the perennial problems of life: the origins, 
destiny, and the meaning of life.69 This refers to the objective definition of ethnicity that is 
based on the cultural commonness in language, historical background, religion and the 
common territory.70 Smith remarks that the second trend, Heraclitan, is that ethnicity itself is 
a highly variable and disposable resource. He claims that while the masses may in some 
instances be charged by ethnic sentiments, in other cases they may be quite oblivious to any 
collective cultural attachments.71 This second study of ethnicity uses the subjective definition 
of ethnicity that is based on the identity, belonging, solidarity and common interest.72 The 
pioneering work on this definition of ethnicity was done by Joshua Fishman, who claimed 
that ethnicity is a matter of ‘being’, as well as ‘knowing’ and ‘doing’, and that: 
 
Ethnicity has always been experienced as a kinship phenomenon, a continuity within the self 
and within those who share an intergenerational link to common ancestors. Ethnicity is partly 
                                               
64 Van Bruinessen 1978, 40. 
65 Ibid., 39. 
66 My own surname, Nerweyi, is the name of a tribe in northern Iraqi Kurdistan, which may exemplify I - we 
form within a tribal setting. 
67 Eriksen 1993, 9-10. 
68 Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 210. 
69 Eriksen 1993, 45. 
70 Abdollah Ramezanzadeh, Internal and International Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict: The Case of Iran (Ph.D. 
thesis, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 1996), 9. 
71 Smith 1986, 210. 
72 Ramezanzadeh 1996, 9. 
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experienced as being ‘bone of their bone, flesh of their flesh, and blood of their blood’. The 
human body itself is viewed as an expression of ethnicity and ethnicity is commonly felt to be in 
the blood, bones and flesh.73   
 
The study of ethnicity can teach us about how ethnic groups relate to each other, as well as 
about their interactions with broad social organizations such as the nation and the state. This 
is especially relevant for the countries where more than one ethnic group resides. Iran is one 
of such countries with its mosaic of different ethnic groups. Several ethnic relationships have 
their own unique histories. Eriksen identifies some patterns of ethnicity, including the one 
called proto-nation, a term that is applied to Kurds. Eriksen claims that:  
 
Proto-nations (ethnonationalist movements) by definition [refer to] these groups (Kurds, 
Palestinians, Tamils) that have political leaders who claim that they are entitled to their own 
nation-state and should not to be ‘ruled by others’. They are always territorially based, 
differentiated by class and education and are often large groups. It is a kind of ‘nations without a 
state’.74 
 
Ethnicity has long been understood as culture. Barth has offered a different perspective: 
ethnicity is a social organization of differences and similarities. Following Barth, ethnicity 
was studied in terms of situational interaction and transaction where boundaries occupy the 







                                               
73 Joshua Fishman, ‘Social theory and ethnography: neglected perspectives on language and ethnicity in Eastern 
Europe’, in Peter Sugar (ed.), Ethnic Diversity and Conflict in Eastern Europe (Santa Barbara: ABC Clio, 1980), 
84-5. For Eric J. Hobsbawm have also the ‘kinship’ and ‘blood’ obvious advantages in bonding together 
members of the group and excluding outsider. Hobsbawm 1993, 63. 
74 Eriksen describes four typical empirical foci of ethnic studies, these are: (a) urban ethnic minorities (b) 
indigenous peoples (c) proto-nations and (d) ethnic groups in plural societies. Eriksen 1993, 13-4.   
75 Maykel Verkuyten, Etnische Identiteit: Theoretische en Empirische Benaderingen [ethnic identity: theoretical 
and empirical approaches], (Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 1999), 4. 
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1.2.  Ethnic identity 
During the last two decades of the twentieth century, the focus of discussion on ethnicity has 
gradually shifted towards the construction of ethnic identity. Barth describes ethnic identities 
as practical processes. In 1982, however, Anthony P. Cohen claimed that ethnic identities are 
ways of symbolizing community. Unlike Barth, who remains interested in cultural variation, 
Cohen delimits the field to political processes involving informal corporate groups.76 In his 
1993 criticism of Cohen’s position, Eriksen claims that ethnic identity is created through 
political processes and that ethnic identity has a non-instrumental, non-political element. 
What Cohen does not discuss, according to Eriksen, is the nature of the stuff on which these 
groups feed. Eriksen argues that ‘the shared identity of the individuals who eventually form 
an ethnic group is taken for granted in Cohen’s model.’77 Identity should no longer be 
considered as a ‘given’, as Barth claimed, but as a continuous process of social construction. 
Emphasis was placed on how identities, with the assistance of collective representations and 
ideological issues were defined and legitimized.78 
Identity means, in anthropological discourse, ‘being the same as oneself as well as 
being different.’79 This is not a definitive definition, however. There is no consistency among 
social scientists regarding the definition of identity. Scientists have different answers, which 
often converge in a central theme. There are various distinct levels of identity, among which 
the personal and social levels are important. Personal identity refers to the self-concept by 
which a person makes a distinction between him or herself and other individuals or groups. 
Social identity concerns the status of the individual’s presentation of him or herself in social 
interaction.80 Samuel P. Huntington, whose work on identity is influenced by Eriksen, 
explains that identity is the self-image of an individual or a group. It is a product of self-
                                               
76Anthony P. Cohen (ed.), Belonging: Identity and Social Organization in British Rural Cultures (Manchester: 
University of Manchester, 1982). This book examines the nature of belonging, social association within 
localities, and how these may relate to wider appreciations of nation.  
77 Ibid., 55-6. 
78 Verkuyten 1999, 4. 
79 Eriksen 1993, 60. 
80 Jacobson Jessica, Islam in Transition: Religion and Identity among the British Pakistani Youth (London: 
Routledge, 1998), 9; Wasif A. Shadid, Grondslagen van Interculturele Communicatie: Studieveld en 
Werkterrein [Foundations of intercultural communication: Studyarea and workfield], (Houten/Diegem: Bohn 
Stafleu Van Loghum, 1998), 173-5. Ramezanzadeh claims that collective identity is also one of the distinct 
levels of identity. Ramezanzadeh 1996, 10-1. 
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consciousness, where I or we have the disposal of certain qualities which distinguish ‘me’ 
from ‘you’ and ‘us’ from ‘them’.81 The systematic application of identity is the distinction 
between insiders and outsiders and the boundaries between us and them. Two groups can be 
relatively equal and treat each other with respect or they simultaneously are more aware of 
their otherness. Eriksen described these two interethnic relationships complementarisation and 
dichotomisation. 
According to Eriksen, complementarisation refers to ethnic differences as a fact and 
through a process of respect for each other. Dichotomisation on the other hand essentially 
expresses a form of us-them relationship in which cultural differences are emphasized leading 
to repression and often violence. In Eriksen’s words, complementarisation can have two 
directions with relation to power. The subordinate group may use it to acquire a similar 
position with regard to the dominant group or the dominant group can use discrimination and 
assimilation.82 The interethnic interaction within the first option is usually valid for 
democratic states. The relations between Sami ethnic minority and Norse dominant group in 
Norway may be presented as an example of complementarisation. In case of boundary 
conflicts or cultural competition between these groups, a solution is usually achieved without 
resorting to violence.83   
However, if there is dichotomisation, as mentioned above, the dominant group resorts 
to discrimination and forced. This situation is often seen in Africa and Asia. During the post-
World War I period, especially following European decolonization from the 1940s and 1960s, 
a multitude of new states in were formed in Africa and Asia with a markedly and visibly 
multi-ethnic character. Internal ethnic conflicts in many new states in these continents were 
often protracted and violent.  
Following the creation of new boundaries in the Middle East after the First World 
War, Kurdish territories were redistributed among Iraq, Turkey and Syria. Consequently, 
Kurds have carried out a number of secessionist uprisings84 or movements for autonomy to 
                                               
81 Samuel P. Huntington, Who are we? The Challenges to American National Identity (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 2004), 21. 
82 Eriksen 1993, 26-8. 
83 Relations between Sami ethnic group and Norse, see Arja Koskinen, ‘Language policy towards ethnic 
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attain cultural and political rights. A similar example is the conflict between the Sinhalese 
dominated central government and militant Tamil groups fighting for Tamil rights in 
Sinhalese controlled Sri Lanka.85 In order to understand the ethnic conflicts experienced by 
certain proto-nations (Kurds in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria, Tamils in Sri Lanka, the 
Kashmiri Muslim separatists in India), Heraclides describes three characteristics of violent 
separatist conflicts, two of which are: 1., all separatist wars have occurred in settings where 
power is highly centralised and democracy is weak or non-existent; 2., separatist wars involve 
minorities at risk of political and economic discrimination and/or military repression.86  
There are three main approaches to examining the protracted conflicts among various 
groups in the process of defending their economic, political, and social group-interests: Socio-
Political approach, Psycho-Social approach, and Cultural approach.  
The socio-political approach asserts that culture is not the only element that holds 
groups together. According to this approach, the social balance of power within a given 
society is also a significant factor. The socio-political approach regards ethnic groups as 
group-interests and also as political phenomena.87  
Secondly, based on the psycho-social concept of ethnic identity, Huntington claims 
that socio-biology and the theories at the end of the twentieth century about distinctiveness, 
social identity and attribution support the conclusion that at the root of hatred and rivalry is 
the need for enemies. Accordingly, individual and group violence and the tendency toward 
war are inescapable aspects of human nature.88 The social and individual interactions within 
ethnic groups are the components of the psycho-social approach. 
The third approach is the cultural approach, which was originated in early twentieth 
century as a method for studying the population composition in the United States. It became 
known as the cultural approach because it categorized distinct ethnic communities that made 
up the US population as cultural groups. It was utilized as an integral component of the 
melting-pot doctrine, which aimed to assimilate groups over time within the culture of the 
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dominant Anglo-Saxon group.89 Eriksen calls this process of assimilation the ‘melting-pot 
metaphor.’ Following the ‘ethnic revival’ of the 1960s and 1970s, it has become 
commonplace to criticise the notion of the melting-pot. The different ethnic groups do not 
amalgamate with each other. Social mobility of an ethnic group leads to tension in relation to 
another group. If an individual moves through different social strata, it may be due to changes 
in the relative importance of his or her ethnic membership.90  
 
1.3.  Ethnic group  
An ethnic group is can be defined as a collectivity within a larger society with a real or 
supposed common descent, shared historical memories of a past and a cultural focus on one or 
more symbolic elements91, such as kinship, religious affiliation and language. Barth’s 
definition of ethnic group is clearer. He states that an ethnic group (a) is largely biologically 
self-perpetuating, (b) shares fundamental cultural values, realized in overt unity in cultural 
forms, (c) makes up a field of communication and interaction and (d) has a membership 
which identifies itself, and is identified by others, as constituting a category distinguishable 
from other categories of the same order.92  
Eriksen and Barth are the most prominent authors concerned with the definition and 
characteristics of ethnic groups. For both authors ethnic group is a social interaction. For 
Eriksen ethnic group is a social differentiation within a population or by an expansion of 
system boundaries bringing hitherto discrete groups into contact with each other.93 He claims 
that ‘it would therefore be misleading to argue that ethnic boundaries contain ‘cultures’. 
Cultural differences relate to ethnicity if and only if such differences are made relevant in 
social interaction.’94 The social interaction between various ethnic identities is an important 
way to stipulate ethnic boundaries. When the social interaction between two ethnic groups 
take place then the second element, cultural differences, become relevant.  
Barth however focuses on something other than the cultural content of an ethnic group. 
The matter of ethnic groups’ boundaries is the focal point of Barth’s theory. He suggests that 
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the determining element of ethnic group is its ‘boundary’ and that research on boundaries is 
necessary to define a group.95 Ethnic groups are heavily dependent on maintaining their 
boundaries. For the following three reasons, according to Barth, an ethnic group boundary 
maintaining mechanisms must be highly effective:  
 
The complexity [of poly-ethnic systems] is based on the existence of important, complementary 
cultural differences. These differences must be generally standardized within the ethnic group 
[…,] so that inter-ethnic interaction can be based on ethnic identities. The cultural characteristics 
of each ethnic group must be stable, so that the complementary differences on which the systems 
rest can persist in the face of close inter-ethnic contact.96      
 
For Barth, the term ‘boundaries’ goes beyond physical boundaries. It also includes social and 
invisible boundaries between two groups. According to him: 
 
Ethnic groups are not merely or necessarily based on the occupation of exclusive territories. The 
ethnic boundary canalizes social life – it entails a frequently quite complex organization of 
behaviour and social relations.97  
 
In 1998, about thirty years after Barth’s theory on the social interaction of boundaries 
between ethnic groups, Jacobson declared that ethnic boundaries have three dimensions: 
Conceptual dimension, social dimension, and cultural dimension. The conceptual dimension 
refers to individuals’ desire to belong to a group or their consideration of themselves as 
members of a minority group. The social dimension includes the patterns of social 
relationships among the members of an ethnic group. These relationships strengthen their 
sense of belonging to the group. The cultural dimension covers the actions of an ethnic 
group’s members. These actions are related to their culture, tradition, language, social class 
and status. Phenomena such as music, language and dress, which can act as the symbols of an 
ethnic group, help to differentiate members of a minority ethnic group from the majority.98 
By definition, an ethnic minority is numerically fewer than the rest of the population 
in a society. As an ethnic category, they produce identifications for outsiders and insiders of 
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an ethnic group. Identification is seen and accessed by others as a member of an ethnic group. 
Verkuyten claims that identification is a link between individual and group. He believes that 
ethnic identification is discussed in relation to self-esteem, the perception of discrimination 
and cultural differences, intergroup differentiation and interethnic relationship.99 
Ethnic minorities are not dominant groups but in some countries they play a dominant 
political position, such as the religious Alevite Nusayri minority in Syria under the leadership 
of Al-Asad family. In Syria, the majority of the population is actually composed of Sunni 
Muslims. Eriksen has ascertained that the concepts of minority and majority are relative and 
relational. They exist only in relation to each other. He argues that the relationship between 
minority and majority is contingent upon the relevant system of boundaries. Today, this system 
of boundaries is nearly always state boundaries. Eriksen claims that contemporary states use one 
or several of three main strategies in their dealings with minorities. These three strategies are: 1- 
The state may insist on the assimilation of entropy – resistant elements. Although such policies 
of assimilation are often believed to help their target groups to achieve equal rights and social 
status, they often inflict suffering and loss of dignity on the minorities. 2- The state may opt for 
dominance, which means segregation for the minority group. In this case, the minority is 
physically removed from the majority. This is justified by referring to the presumed cultural 
inferiority of the former. 3- The state can transcend ethnic nationalism and adopt a policy of 
multiculturalism, where citizenship and equal rights are independent of cultural identity, or the 
state may implement a decentralized system in which a high degree of local autonomy is made 
possible.100        
Minorities have their own approaches to object to the dominant group within a society 
where generally this dominant group is associated with the state. Minorities have three principal 
ways to respond to state dominance: 1. Assimilate. In some cases this is not an option because 
they are prevented from assimilating by the other group. Such ethnic minorities have often low 
position in the labour market and they are the victims of ethnic segregation. 2. Cooperate with 
the state to seek some form of peaceful co-existence. 3. Seek cessation, which is always against 
the will of the state.101 According to Handelman, groups that are willing to separate are always 
ethnic communities.102       
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The state strategies to deal with minorities and the minority’s self-defense approaches 
will usually lead to a combination of assimilation and segregation, and ethnic incorporation. 
Incorporation, where one group may lose its identity by merging into another group, is one of 
the principal varieties of assimilation. The second variety of assimilation, according to 
Horowitz, is amalgamation. Horowitz defines amalgamation as the unification of two or more 
groups to form a new group.103 Today, the combination of incorporation and amalgamation is 
termed as ‘integration’. It refers to the participation of a minority in the institutions of a 
society and a reproduction of group identity and ethnic boundaries. As it noted above, 
boundaries are one of the important principals of ethnic groups. Boundaries are also one of 
the basic ideological principles for nations and nationalism. The following section is 
formulated to substantiate this statement.   
 
1.4.  Nation and nationalism  
Most celebrated masterworks of the theories of nation and nationalism use Europe as a their 
frame of reference. The most important academic authorities on contemporary theories of 
nation and nationalism include Ernest Gellner, Anthony D. Smith, Benedict Anderson, Eric J. 
Hobsbawm and Thomas Hylland Eriksen. Anderson‘s Imagined Communities (1991) and 
Gellner’s Nations and nationalism (1983), refer mostly to developing countries, where the 
agro-industrial society (Gellner) and print-capital (Anderson) have measured effects on nation 
and nationalism. 
Before a group creates a nation and eventually declares a nation-state, there is the 
presence of strong movement and that is nationalism. Nationalism is a powerful weapon of 
the proto-nation. As Hobsbawm explains, ‘nationalism comes before nations. Nations do not 
make nationalisms but the other way round.’104 Smith claims that ‘nationalism is an ideology 
that places the nation at the centre of its concerns.’105 And if nationalism takes place before 
nation, then it would be logical to first study nationalism and then nation.  
Nationalism is a new subject for anthropology. It became one of its topics of study 
mostly during the 1980s and 1990s. The central determinant of the origin of nationalist 
movements is the definition of the term nationalism. There is no consensus among scholars on 
the definition of nationalism. Smith suggests that nationalism is ‘an ideological movement for 
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attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity for a population which some of its 
members deem to constitute an actual or potential “nation”.’106 From the above definition of 
nationalism, we can deduce that there are three elements that empower the ideological 
movement of nationalism: 1. National autonomy, 2. National unity, and 3. National identity. It 
is necessary to offer descriptions for these three elements as well as for the ideological 
movement of nationalism.  
In the beginning of his famous book on nationalism, Gellner gives the following 
definition: 
 
Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national 
unity should be congruent.107  
 
He begins a new paragraph and continues with the definition of nationalism: 
 
[Nationalism] as a sentiment, or as a movement, can best be defined in term of this principle. 
Nationalist sentiment is the feeling of anger aroused by the violation of the principle, or the 
feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfilment. A nationalist movement is one actuated by 
sentiment of this kind.108               
 
According to Gellner, political and national unities are essential to create a concept of 
nationalism. Gellner sees the national unity as synonymous with the ethnic group. He 
observes that ‘nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic 
boundaries should not cut across political ones.’109 He further clarifies that there is a link 
between ethnic group and the state. Nationalism is an ethnic ideology to attain territorial unity 
or that their group should dominate a state. Hobsbawm does not attempt to go beyond 
Gellner’s definition of nationalism and concludes that nationalism is ‘primarily a principle 
which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent.’110   
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For Anderson nationalism is ‘an imagined political community, and imagined as both 
inherently limited and sovereign.’111 For a large part, Anderson’s perspective on nationalism 
is compatible with Gellner’s. Both Gellner and Anderson argue that nations are ideological 
constructions that create a link between a cultural group and a state, and thus are different 
from a dynastic or kinship-based community. Unlike Gellner, however, and other scholars 
that concentrate on the political aspects of nationalism, Anderson focuses on the force and 
persistence of national identity and sentiment, and underlines three paradoxes that often 
obscure a clear definition of nationalism. Anderson argues that for theorists the definition of 
nationalism is a problematic one due to the following paradoxes:  
 
(1) The objective modernity of nations to the historian’s eye vs. their subjective antiquity in the 
eyes of nationalists. (2) The formal universality of nationality as a socio-cultural concept […] 
vs. the irremediable particularity of its concrete manifestation. (3) The ‘political’ power of 
nationalisms vs. their philosophical poverty and even incoherence.112 
 
Eriksen sees the intensive research and study of ethnic boundaries and identity as a means to 
shed light on paradoxes that are identified by Anderson. The dialog that took place through 
academic articles of Gellner and Anderson on the theory of nationalism inspired Eriksen’s 
work on the topic of nationalism. Eriksen draws parallels between the works of Gellner and 
Anderson. He claims that studies of ethnicity and nationalism demonstrate that ethnic or 
national identities are constructions and are not ‘natural’. Eriksen explains that at the political 
organization level nationalism is ethnic in character and represents the interests of a particular 
ethnic group. Furthermore, according to Eriksen, the state is a form of political legitimacy for 
convincing the popular masses that they represent a cultural unity. The state also has an 
emotional force, which is derived from symbols, because they give people a sense of loyalty. 
In Eriksen’s words, symbols are multifocal and that they have an ‘instrumental’ and a 
‘sensory’.113   
Symbolism and language together compose one of the three main factors to 
understanding the term nationalism. The other two factors are the socio-political movement 
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and the ideology of the nation.114 Nationalism uses symbols that are extracted from cultural 
contexts, such as kinship, which are important for people in everyday life. Therefore, 
nationalism can be seen as a form of symbolic kinship. Smith observed that the symbols and 
language of nationalism are the main elements to awaking the ideals of the nation. The 
descriptions of other the two main factors of nationalism are as follows:  
 
The goals of the socio-political movement are defined not by the activities or the personnel of 
the movement, but by the basic ideals and tenets of the ideology. The ideology of nationalism 
serves to give force and direction to both symbols and movements. [I]t is the ideology that must 
supply us with an initial working definition of the term ‘nationalism’, for its contents are defined 
by the ideologies which place the nation at the centre of their concerns and purposes.115         
 
If there is one point on which there is agreement among some scholars, it is that the 
‘ideology’ is the foundation of nationalism. Nationalism as a political ideology uses the idea 
of ‘the nation’ to achieve political goals. It is not easy to locate nationalism on a left-right 
‘ideological spectrum.’ As Eriksen claims, by placing an emphasis on the equality among 
citizens, nationalism may be an ideology of the left. But by emphasising vertical solidarity, it 
may as easily belong to the right.116 According to Michael Freeden, nationalism is concerned 
with creating or maintaining the very political unit that the left-right ideologies need to 
achieve their political rights.117 When discussing the goals of nationalist ideologies, Smith is 
the prememinent scholar. He claims that nationalist ideologies have ‘collective self-rule, 
territorial unification and cultural identity, and often a clear political and cultural programme 
for achieving these ends.’118 Smith sees ideology as a ‘belief-system’ that is based on three 
components: (i) a set of basic propositions to which most nationalists adhere, (ii) some 
fundamental ideals which are present in every nationalism and (iii) a range of cognate 
concepts that give more concrete meaning to the core abstractions of nationalism.119  
The ideological movement of nationalism will be understood as referring to one or 
more of the last three aspects: national autonomy, national unity and national identity. 
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National autonomy refers to self-regulation and self-determination, having one’s own internal 
laws and free of external constraint. Self-determination can be in the form of a sovereign 
territorial state or it can refer to the internal form of federal self-government. By national 
unity, the group does not seek some objective of cultural uniformity, but rather a social and 
cultural unification of the members of the nation. Feeling an intense bond and solidarity is 
central to the national unity.120 Nationalism and other ethnic ideologies hold that social and 
cultural boundaries should be unambiguous. They should also coincide with political 
boundaries.121 Distinguished from collective character and its historical-cultural basis is the 
ideal of national identity. For the collective character of national identity, Smith refers to the 
Rousseau’s and Herder’s claim that: ‘the first rule which we have to follow is that of national 
character: every people have, or must have, a character.’ As for cultural character, Herder 
claims that each nation possessed, and had to follow, its own peculiar national ‘genius’.122  
Political ideology, for Smith, was the first step to understand the concept of 
nationalism. Of course, there are some other basic elements of nationalism. Smith claims that 
religion is the second element of nationalism. Smith used the Durkheim’s definition of 
religion for understanding the surrogate religion of nationalism. Namely that religion is ‘a 
unified system of beliefs and practices […] which unite into one single moral community 
called a Church, all those who adhere to them.’ Smith says this is particularly evident when a 
great leader dies in the battlefield. For a nationalist group this represents martyrdom wherein 
the ‘glorious dead’sacrifice their lives for their country. The group or nation as a ‘sacred 
communion of citizens’ is a characterization that accords with an interpretation of nationalism 
as ‘surrogate religion.’123 As Anderson suggests that in some ways nationalism is historically 
the ‘successor’ of religion. Anderson sees religious community and the dynastic realm as 
cultural systems and suggests that nationalism must be understood within these cultural 
systems. Further, Anderson states that Christianity and Ummah (community) Islam were 
highly imaginable through the medium of a sacred language and a Scripture.124 Both Eriksen 
and Hobsbawm point out a strong relationship between religion and nationalism. According 
to Eriksen, nationalism lays claim to religious symbols which have great significance for 
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people and represent the nation-state.125 Hobsbawm used Poland and Ireland as two examples 
of countries who demonstrate the close relationship between religion and nationalism. 
Hobsbawm claims that this relationship seems to grow closer where nationalism becomes a 
massive force rather than a phase as a minority ideology and activists’ movement.126           
The industrial social organization is not the only factor impacting nationalism. As 
Gellner points out, other developments, such as the fascinating relationship between 
nationalism and religious reformation, too, have consequences for nationalism. According to 
Gellner, certain aspects of the reform movement laid the groundwork for the nationalist 
period that came afterwards. They include reformers’ emphasis on literacy and adherence to 
the letter of Scripture, an attack on the monopoly of priesthood, celebration of individualism 
and its links with mobile urban populations. He argues that Protestantism has played a major 
role in the development of industrial society. The developments and reforms in the Islamic 
world of the past one hundred years are largely the same story of the progress and victory of 
reform. Gellner calls this a kind of Islamic Protestantism with a strong emphasis on adherence 
to the Scripture.127 The religious echo in nationalism, as well as reformers political, reinforces 
the concept of a nation as a sacred community. 
The third element of the development of nationalism, according to Smith, is cultural 
nationalism or, more broadly, cultural identity. There is a strong link between cultural 
nationalism and the issues of cultural identity, such as solidarity and moral purpose. Smith 
believes that cultural and political forms of nationalism often succeed each other, and 
nationalism may oscillate between these two forms. In case the political nationalism falters in 
its aims, the cultural nationalism muscles in and builds or prepares the community’s common 
cultural assets. Representative cultural nationalism depends on certain techniques to 
consolidate the position of a group or, as Smith points out, to mobilize ‘the people’ to engage 
in the regeneration of the nation, such as by using the ethnic symbols, myths and memories. 
However, there must also be a number of strong institutions behind the cultural nationalism. 
These institutions play a crucial role within a group on its way to becoming a nation. Some of 
such institutions are: rituals and festival organizations, armies, linguistic code,128 schooling 
and education. As Gellner observed, complex and long-standing schooling and education is an 
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important factor within a cultural-industrial community. Gellner also states that the common 
economic infrastructure of the advanced industrial society and its inescapable implications 
will continue to ensure that people depend on culture. Culture requires standardization in very 
broad subject areas and must be preserved and maintained by centralized bodies.129 
Language is one of the most important aspects of cultural nationalism. Scholars are 
unanimous on this point. Hobsbawm points out that languages used by communities of the 
educated became central to the European nationalism of 1880-1914.130 Language is also the 
main focus point of Anderson’s research on nationalism. He argues that nationalism is an 
invention of the print-languages, not of a particular language per se. These print-languages, 
according to Anderson, laid the basis for national consciousnesses in three distinct ways. 
Firstly, they created unified fields of exchange and communication in a language below 
scholarly Latin and yet above the common daily spoken language. These fellow-readers, who 
were connected through print, formed the base of the nationally imagined community. 
Secondly, print-capitalism gave the language a tangible form, which in the long term was a 
factor in the development of that image of antiquity so central to the subjective idea of the 
nation. Thirdly, print-capitalism created languages-of-power of a kind different from the older 
administrative vernaculars.131 For example, the Turkish language became a catalyst for the 
modern Turkish state upheld by the new Turkish nationalism, although Türkiye was not a 
term used before 1914.132 At the expense of any wider Islamic identification, Atatürk imposed 
compulsory Romanization. Atatürk ordered in 1928 a commission to develop a phonetic 
Turkish alphabet using the Latin alphabet in place of the existing Arabic one. In 1932 
legislation, Atatürk made the issuing of the call to prayer in Turkish, instead of Arabic, 
obligatory.133   
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Language is one of the objective factors involved in the definition of nation. Other 
major factors are religion, customs, territory, and institutions. As Hobsbawm has observed, 
language and ethnicity are associated closely with the definition of nation.  
As can be seen below, another central component of the definition of nation is 
sovereignty, which is defined by most scholars as having one’s own state. Nationhood then is 
a ‘community of sentiment that would adequately manifest itself in a state of its own; hence, a 
nation is a community which normally tends to produce a state of its own.’134 In this regard, 
can we categorize Kurds as a nation? If asked, most Kurds without hesitation will give an 
affirmative answer. It may thus be interesting to consider a Kurdish scholar’s take on the 
matter. Hassanpour defines a nation as a:  
 
Historically formed community of people bound together by common language, culture, 
homeland, and community of economic life (i.e., existence of division of labour among various 
parts of the territory, and especially the existence of a middle class)… national development in 
the process of consolidation of ‘ethnic peoples’ or tribal/rural societies into modern nations.135  
 
Interestingly, some Kurdish scholars, such as Hassanpour’s, concept of nation are based on 
Marxism-Leninism, which has had great influence in the Kurdish autonomy movement. Stalin 
claimed that a nation ‘is a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, 
economic life and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture.’136 
According to van Bruinessen, Kurdish nationalist movements, claiming to represent a nation 
by this definition, attempted to secure Soviet support for their cause.137 It ought to be noted 
that Stalin insist on sovereignty as a prerequisite for nationhood, which contrasts starkly with 
some European scholars who consider sovereignty as a fundamental component of the 
definition of nation. 
One of the main characteristics of a nation, according to Anderson, is sovereign 
statehood. Anderson’s definition of the nation is formed on four terms or characters: 
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imagined, limited, community and sovereign. The nation is imagined because the members of 
even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members. Secondly, the nation 
is limited because even the largest of them has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lay 
other nations. Thirdly, the nation is a community because, regardless of the actual inequality 
and exploitation that may prevail therein, it is always understood as a deep, horizontal 
comradeship. Finally, the nation is sovereign because the concept originated in a time when 
the Enlightenment and revolution destroyed the legitimacy of the God-given and hierarchical 
dynastic realm. The result of this liberation from dynasty is the sovereign state.138 According 
to Daniel Philpott, the modern sovereign state began at the Peace of Westphalia (1648)139 and 
formed a system of interstate relations that was based on mutual recognition of the principles 
of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. For Philpott, the Westphalia Peace 
Agreement was a watershed in European history as it marked the beginnings of the forming of 
modern state dominance.140  
Although the previous sections attempted to clarify certain major elements used in 
defining the concept of nationhood, it must be noted that, in Smith’s terms, nationhood is the 
most problematic and contentious term in the field, because there is disagreement among 
scholars about the definition of nation. Smith defines the concept of the nationhood as ‘a 
named human community occupying a homeland, and having common myth and a shared 
history, a common public culture, a single economy and common rights and duties for all 
members.’141 Here, the term ‘occupy’ is approximately the same as Anderson’s ‘sovereignty’ 
for the definition of the nation. Hobsbawm defends the position of Adam Smith who claims 
that nation ‘means no more than a territorial state.’142 Hobsbawm decidedly claims that there 
are only three criteria which allow a people to be firmly classed as a nation: 1. A link between 
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historic association and current state. 2. The existence of long-established cultural elite, 
possessing a written national literary and administrative vernacular. 3. Proven capacity for 
conquest. By the third point, Hobsbawm means that conquest must be provided as Darwinian 
proof of evolutionary success as a social species.143   
The historical influential route for a nation to attain a sovereign state is based on two 
main elements: territorial nation and legal concept of the nation. In Smith’s words “the terms 
‘territorial nation’ and ‘legal concept of the nation’ also signify a route for attaining 
nationhood, for creating or forming nations.”144 Although Kurds have a homeland and 
compose the majority population in their regions, they do not have a sovereign state of their 
own and are dominated by others. As Gellner points out, it is a great injustice for a culturally 
homogenous population not to have their own state. Its members are required to live in one or 
more states that are ruled by other foreign cultural groups.145   
The core concepts of the nation, which relate to practical, cultural, and political 
programmes, are authenticity, continuity, dignity, destiny, attachment and the homeland. Each 
of these aspects examines and evaluates the past and the present state of the nation. For Smith, 
authenticity means to find the ‘authentic’ elements of our being and it refers to the originality 
of the nation. Smith claims that the concept of authenticity overlaps with that of autonomy. 
As for continuity, a nation must have a history that lends itself to the nation’s future as well 
keeps its interests and ideals in sight. It can, according to Smith, also signify a gradual 
movement of transformation or an accumulation of layers of past states, without necessarily 
opposing changes that occur over time. Dignity refers to a nation’s continuous effort to find 
and maintain an inner worth, to realize the dignity of the authentic self. Smith believes that 
dignity can also come from noble pedigree and antiquity, which attract reverence and piety. 
Destiny, for nationalism, always signifies glorious future. Rather than return to the glorious 
past, however, the destiny of each nation is oriented towards recreating its glory in modern 
terms. Attachment essentially refers to a feeling for one’s country or the place where one is 
born, such as falling in love with something special. The final core concept of the nation is 
homeland. One of the main elements of this concept is the need of nations to re-root and re-
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attach themselves to their pristine origins, their authentic self even if they are already residing 
in their homelands.146               
In terms of nationalism, homeland refers to a political claim over an area of land in the 
name of a nation. Nationalism strives to bind the national group together and define its 
members as citizens. It involves more than a simple hyphen between nation and state and is 
often mediated through the idea of homeland. As Alexander C. Diener recently noted, 
homeland itself remains a slippery subject for many reasons.  In his view, the subject eludes 
sustained and focused academic inquiry partially due to the prosaic, accepted nature of 
homeland, and partially because of its multivalent definition.147 There is a strong relationship 
between homeland and diaspora nationalism. Homeland is a central symbol of 
transnationalism. One of the most important political reasons that strengthen the feeling for a 
homeland is the ‘diasporas nationalism.’ Myths about return and imaginings concerning 
ancestors, birth, root and soil all contribute to the power that homelands exert over people 
who live in diasporas around the world. One of the best examples of diaspora nationalism is 
that of the Jewish communities across the world, which eventually succeeded in creating a 
homeland in Palestine in 1948. 
Therefore, the notions of ‘territory’, ‘community’, ‘cultural unity’, ‘language’ are 
crucial elements in defining the term ‘nation’ with the provision that some nations still do not 
have their own state. Many states can be called a nation-state, while other states which 
contain more than one nation within them are appropriately named ‘multinational states’.148 
Can a nation without a state be categorized as a ‘nation’ or should it be categorized 
differently, such as an ethnic group? A stateless ethnic group, such as Kurds, feels compelled 
to stake out claims for self-determination as an aspirant ‘nation’. Smith uses the term ‘triple 
movement’ in reference to such ethnic groups. The term indicates movements ‘from isolation 
to activism, from quietism to mobilization, and from culture to politics.’149 Complementing 
the above discussion about the concept of nation, the following section contains a 
comparative review of ethnic group and nationhood.             
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1.5.  Differences between nation and ethnic group 
In place of the English term ethnic group, Smith uses the French term ethnie150 to indicate 
communities that are not only connected to a homeland and possess common myths of 
ancestry, shared memories, and other elements of shared culture, but also have a measure of 
solidarity, at least among the elites.151 Using this definition of ethnic group we can conclude 
that there is no fundamental difference between nations and ethnic groups. As Smith points 
out, ‘both belong to the same family of phenomena (collective cultural identities).’152 But a 
nation is not an ethnic community. In both Anderson’s and Smith’s definition of nationhood, 
sovereignty composes an important characteristic feature. This is one of the basic differences 
between ethnic groups and nations, for an ethnic community usually has no sovereignty. Even 
if it has territory it is stateless. Smith claims that ethnic community has no political referent, 
whereas a nation must occupy a homeland of its own to constitute itself as a nation.153    
As another major difference between ethnic communities and nations, Smith points to 
the lack of ‘common public culture’ in ethnic communities.154 However, recalling Barth’s 
take on this matter, cultural differentia is a strong determinant of the boundaries of an ethnic 
group. In cultural terms, there are also differences between the personal status of individuals 
according to membership in an ethnic group or a nation. Membership in an ethnic group is 
defined in hereditary terms and is a matter of self-definition, whereas membership in a nation 
is defined in terms of citizenship and political rights.155 Similar to ethnic groups, nations also 
have collective names, common myths, and shared memories. Conversely, nations diverge 
from ethnies by affording their citizens common public culture, homeland, common rights 
and duties, and a single economy.156 In the case of the Kurds, although there is a claim over a 
common history and a large territory as a homeland, van Bruinessen points out that the Kurds’ 
opponents have deprived them of a common economic life. Furthermore, he points to the fact 
that the unity of Kurdish language and culture were also disputed issues.157  
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For some countries that are comprised of different ethnic groups, or certain specific 
regions where different ethnic groups live in close proximity, William H. McNeill uses the 
term polyethnicity.158 Smith, on the other hand, expands the definition of ‘polyethnic nations’ 
by introducing two important components: 1. Forging of a common history, and 2. sharing of 
a political memory.159 Many countries, on some level, are examples of polyethnic nations, 
such as Canada, Switzerland, Spain, and Belgium. In Canada, where English and French are 
the official languages, many political debates have taken place between Anglophone and 
Francophone citizens, who mainly live in the province of Quebec.160 There are four official 
languages in Switzerland: German, French, Italian and Rumantsch or Romansh. However, the 
national identity and political horizon have inspired the Swiss population to define for 
themselves a public culture, a unitary homeland, a single economy and common rights.161 The 
Basque and Catalan national movements, which developed in opposition to the dominance of 
the Castilian Spanish state, are two of the few ethnic groups in Europe who have resorted to 
violence in order to obtain certain political rights. Belgium is divided roughly as north and 
south between its Dutch (Flemish) speakers in Flanders and its French speakers in Wallonia, 
respectively. Consequently, Belgium hosts a parliamentary democracy that is ethnically 
polarized. According to Arend Lijphart, members of the Chamber of Representatives are 
reserved to the Walloons and Flemish. In addition to ideological divisions, political parties in 
Belgium have been divided linguistically and ethnically as well.162 Under what circumstances 
are the harmonization and cohabitation of a polyethnic nation peacefully maintained within a 
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2   Theoretical review of ethnicity  
 
The previous subsections reviewed different approaches to the definition of the concept of 
nation. The following three subsections will analyze three different theoretical approaches to 
ethnicity: Primordialism, Instrumentalism and Structuralism. Just as in the definition of the 
concept of nation, these theories are quite heterogeneous.  
 
2.1.  Primordialism  
Until recently, according to Eriksen, two fundamental theoretical approaches dominated the 
debates within the study of ethnicity. These are: ‘primordialism’ and ‘instrumentalism.’163 
According to some other scholars, however, such as Crawford Young, there is another 
theoretical approach to the definition of ethnicity: ‘constructivism’ or structuralism, which 
focuses on the contingent nature of identity and the dynamic of its construction.164 This 
debate is mainly shaped around the question of whether ethnic identity has a primordial or 
more situational, also referred to as instrumental, character. Both primordial and instrumental 
approaches were largely a reaction to the assimilation processes in the United States. The 
essence of the assimilation policy was the idea that ethnic-cultural differences are temporary 
and over time these differences disappear in the melting-pot.165 
More recently, according to Smith, there is discussion of two kinds of primordialism: 
socio-biological and cultural givens. The first refers to the fact that ‘nations, ethnic groups 
and races can be traced to the underlying genetic reproductive drives of individuals and their 
use of strategies of ‘nepotism’ and ‘inclusive fitness’ to maximize their gene pools.’166 The 
evidence that genes incline people to prefer others who are genetically similar to themselves 
comes from studies of social assortment, differential heritabilities, and the comparison of 
identical and fraternal twins, blood tests, and family bereavements. 167 In this circumstance, 
culture and cultural symbolism (language, religion) served as biological affinity and played an 
important role for a group network. The second kind of primordialism, cultural givens, holds 
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that ethnic groups and nations are formed on the ‘basis of attachments to the cultural givens of 
social existence.’168 As examples of scholars who favour this form of primordialism, Smith 
mentions particularly two names, Clifford James Geertz and Edward Shils.  
According to Geertz, the primordialist view maintains that the participant perceives 
ethnic ties collectively, as an externally given, even coercive, social bond. Geertz argues that 
humans generally attribute an overwhelming power to primordial human ‘givens’ such as 
blood ties, language, territory, and cultural differences. In Geertz’s opinion, ethnicity is not in 
itself primordial but humans perceive it as such because it is embedded in their experience of 
the world.169 In developing countries, ethnic groups are superimposed on the primordial 
realities. Primordialists believe, according to Josep Llobera, that ethnic identity is deeply 
rooted in the historical experience of human being to the point of being practically a given.170 
The history of ethnic groups sometimes conjures up emotions in it members and these 
emotions are the reasons that members maintain their identity. Verkuyten points out that the 
feelings of commitment and connectedness to their own ethnic group, which members believe 
they are descended from, give people a strong and emotional foundation to the question of 
who and what one is.171 
Authenticity and originality of an ethnic group is one of the important elements of 
primordialism. Groups that are formed on the unity of common language, territory and culture 
will be able to keep their authenticity. These groups are created by neighbourhoods and 
families, which Shils called ‘primary groups’. Shils observed that the role of primary groups 
in the society includes three elements: (a) the affinity between political or ideological 
enthusiasm and a tendency to organize into primary groups, (b) the role of the mediating or 
liking person in binding the primary group to the corporate body and (c) the dependence of 
corporate efficiency on primary group morale.172 The main emphasis of primordialists is on 
                                               
168 Smith 2001, 53. 
169 Clifford J. Geertz is seen as one of the most important scholars behind the explanation of the cultural theory 
and his ideas had a strong influence in later twentieth century anthropology. One of his important works is: The 
Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Free Press, 1973).    
170 Josep R. Llobera, ‘Recent Theories of Nationalism’, Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials (WP núm. 164, 
Barcelona 1999).  
171 Verkuyten 1999, 51. 
172 Edward Shils, ‘Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties: Some Particular Observations on the 
Relationships of Sociological Research and Theory’, The British Journal of Sociology (Vol. 8, No. 2, Jun. 1957), 
133-7. 
 63 
the reproduction and modification of society through primary groups. Horowitz also claims 
that the family is the unit that constantly replenishes ethnic group members. It is the first 
group to which individuals belong and, because of the long period of human maturation, its 
influence is extraordinarily durable.173 History and ancestors thus play important roles in the 
primordial community. The primordialist approach argues that ethnic ties are ‘natural’, that 
they are recorded under the same principles as the links that people have with their families 
and other primary groups. Shils remarks that in family attachments there is a significant 
‘relational quality’ that can only be called primordial. And this is because there is an ineffable 
attribute to the ties of blood.174 
This feeling of commitment may be the result of personal affection, practical reasons 
and common interests. Brown refers to the argument that one is born into a particular 
linguistic, racial or homeland community as the ‘primordial bond’.175 Reed C. Eller 
summarizes the primordial bonds in the following three key ideas: 1. Primordial identities or 
bonds are ‘given’. They are fixed, even before any experience of interaction. Primordial social 
ties have no sources. 2. Primordial sentiments are overwhelming and compelling and cannot 
be analyzed in relation to social interaction. When an individual is a member of a group, then 
he necessarily feels of that group. 3. Primordialism is essentially a matter of emotion. 
Primordial identities are qualitatively different from other kinds of identities.176 The 
accumulative influence of community ties based on blood, language, religion, tradition, and 
homeland is strongly felt not only by the members of a given group but also by other groups. 
In the Middle East and most of the developing countries during the 1950s and 1960s, the 
primordialist explanations of ethnic assertions were largely dismissed. The ethnic groups that 
relied on these explanations to build cases for their national liberation movements meet with 
state violence. Especially in the Middle East, this period is highlighted by a secular nation-
building pattern and by the efforts of ethnic groups, such as the Kurds, to manifest and 
proclaim their identities, which was often brutally repressed.177 Primordialists argue that 
ethnic conflicts and the desire for independence or autonomy stem from the systematic denial 
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of minority aspirations. Self-determination is the most fundamental aspiration of the ethnic 
minority. Stephen Ryan writes that ‘structural incompatibilities between the ideology of state-
building and minorities are a key determinant of whether a group will pursue organised 
violence.’178 One of the ten alternative descriptions of ethnic conflicts proposed by Horowitz 
is that ethnicity is a primordial affiliation. Horowitz explains that:  
 
Ethnicity is a primordial affiliation, in the sense that it is connected to the things people cannot 
live without, among them, traditionality, the persistence of the past into the present, and a sense 
of collective self-consciousness. A sense of community of this sort—Gemeinschaft rather than 
Gesellschaft—necessarily generates awareness of other communities, and this spills over (by 
mechanisms unspecified) into conflict and violence. Ethnic affiliations are highly charged and, 
on some accounts, non[-]rational. It seems futile to gainsay the emotive power of ethnic 
affiliations, and a good explanation will have to come to grips with the thick, compelling 
character of group membership.179      
 
A strong emphasis on the responsiveness of ethnic groups to the deep needs of group 
members is not at odds with a keen sense of the variability of ethnic phenomena, as Horowitz 
notes:  
 
It follows that group members may entertain sentiments so intense that theorists identify them as 
primordial, even though group identities are socially constructed, recently constructed, founded 
on relatively little in the way of palpable differences, and mutable as environmental conditions 
change.180 
 
There are many factors that may cause an ethnic conflict to erupt and an ethnic group to claim 
self-determination or self-government. The primordialist approach offers the following three 
explanations: 1 - Ethnic conflicts and the desire for independence stem from the systematic 
denial of the aspirations, goals, and values of minorities by the state. 2 - A transition to 
violence takes place after negation of the separate identities, the absence of security for 
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minorities and the absence of effective participation for this minority. 3 - A lack of confidence 
in the intentions of the state leads minorities towards open conflict by gradual escalation.181  
In general, the control of the territorial resources of the indigenous population by the 
majority also creates potential for conflicts. Many ethno-political movements are struggling to 
protect their rights to these resources. In Iraq, the Kurds provide an example such a struggle. 
They have lost a good deal of territory during the Arabization-politics. Between 1921 and 
2003, from the establishment of the Iraqi state until the occupation of Iraq by the US, and 
especially during the period of the Ba’th regime (1968-2003), hundreds of thousands of Kurds 
as well as Turkmens and Assyrians were forced to leave their homes by governmental actions 
notoriously known as the ‘Arabization campaigns’.  
The Arabic government of Iraq used Arabization to gain the full control of oil fields 
and fertile lands in northern Iraq, especially in Kirkuk region. This campaign changed the 
demographics of certain areas in favour of Arabs by forcefully displacing other ethnic groups 
from these areas. Furthermore, the Ba’th regime continually increased the political violence 
and persecution of local residents in Iraqi Kurdistan. It must be noted that since the 1970s, 
Kirkuk oil revenues represented approximately more than half of the total oil income of Iraq. 
Even, after the formation of the ‘New Iraq’ under the US occupation in 2003, retraction of the 
Arabization-politics has remained one of the main diplomatic issues between the central Iraqi 
government and the Kurdish Regional Government. Additionally, Kurds claim that Kirkuk 
belongs to Kurdistan and Iraqi government constantly raises obstacles before the Kurdish 








                                               
181 Brown, ‘The conceptual language of nationalism’, 2000, 6-12.  
182 For Arabization-politics in Kurdistan under the Ba’th regime see Human Rights Watch, ‘III. Background: 
Forced Displacement and Arabization of Northern Iraq’, (October 2004). For Arabization of Kirkuk region, see 
Nouri Talabany, Arabization of the Kirkuk Region (Uppsala, Sweden: Kurdistan Studies Press, 2001). For a 
detail and general history of Iraq, see Charles Tripp, A History of Irak (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000). 
 66 
2.2.  Instrumentalism 
Instrumentalism, according to Abner Cohen, argues that ethnicity is essentially as an ad-hoc 
resource to be used strategically by interest groups for achieving secondary goals such as 
increasing their wealth, power or status. Cohen sees ethnicity as a stipulated form of informal 
political organization, which creates cultural boundaries to insure the resources and the 
symbolic capital of the group.183 Eriksen criticized Cohen’s position with the argument that, 
‘if ethnic identities are created wholly through political processes, then it should have been 
possible to create any identity at all. Ethnicity must have a non-instrumental, non-political 
element.’184  
The prominence of instrumentalism came from the results of the melting-pot processes 
in US in the second and third decennia of the twentieth century. With respect to certain ethnic 
groups, the melting-pot ideology of the US government has not produced its expected results. 
Afro-Americans and Native Americans, for example, have not melted within the pot of the 
dominant culture. Moreover, in certain circumstances, the efforts to suppress certain ethnic 
groups have ultimately benefited the oppressed groups.185 As Smith pointed out, there was 
debate throughout the 1970s over the degree to which ethnic groups in the US should be seen 
as interest groups behaving instrumentally in the political marketplace. Afterwards, however, 
generations increasingly shed their cultural distinctiveness. Smith points out that the concept 
of melting-pot in the US has been promoted by certain ethnic groups and underlines the 
following: 
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The implication was that ethnic leaders and elites used their cultural groups as sites of mass 
mobilization and as constituencies in their competition for power and resources, because they 
found them more effective than social classes.186         
 
Instrumentalism is an ethno-political instrument which makes use of the benefits associated 
with belonging to a particular ethnic identity. Instrumentalism allowed group demands to be 
shifted away from cultural and religious realm toward political, material and territorial gains, 
which subsequently created the demand for self-determination. From the instrumentalists’ 
perspective, the ethnic identity is a collective action or, as Joane Nagel calls it, the 
‘competition theories’. According to this view, the interpersonal and intergroup relations 
occupy a central role in classical and contemporary social theory. The central definition of 
competition theory is that the collective action of an ethnic group takes place when distinct 
groups compete with each other for the access to relatively scarce resources, such as status, 
jobs, political or economic positions, etc.187 In Carment’s words the ‘political dimensions of 
ethnic group behaviour, including protest, rebellion and non-violent action are either as a way 
of protecting entitlements previously enjoyed or as a way of gaining access to new 
entitlements.’188 Some instrumentalist approaches are based on the suggestion that ethnic 
groups are the product of political, economic and social processes. For example, according to 
Llobera, ethnic groups have no fixed boundaries; they are a collective and change their size 
depending on circumstances. Here ethnicity is seen as dynamic. In other words, not only are 
individuals not assigned permanently to an ethnic group, but they can also be members of 
more than one ethnic group at the same time.189  
Instrumentalists emphasize on the instrumental, pragmatic, situational and variable 
aspects of ethnicity. According to the supporters of instrumentalism, ethnic identity is a 
rational reaction to a stipulated situation or to social pressure within a community or between 
communities. In the instrumentalist perspective ethnicity is sometimes used in reference to 
communities making claims for cultural autonomy, whereas nationalism is used when 
territorial homeland claims are being made. However, since both refer to the political defence 
of rational attachments to the interactive community, the distinction is an unconvincing 
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one.190 For example, the political rationality and cultural and institutional framework of the 
Muslim elite in Pakistan, before partition from India in 1947, mobilized the population to 
create a country based on Islam. According to Paul Brass, Pakistan was created by Muslim 
elites who manipulated Islamic symbolic resources in order to mobilize the Muslim masses of 
northwest India. This is a cultural approach, but using a more political approach, Francis 
Robinson claims that the existing Muslim attachments and ideologies (ummah) persuaded the 
Muslim elites of the need to safeguard the Muslim community and culture by seeking greater 
autonomy for Muslims in India.191 In the first twenty-five years of its existence as a modern 
Muslim state, Pakistan aspired to attain a leadership role in the Islamic world. Subsequently, 
it organized international conferences about Islam and several meetings with Muslim leaders.   
Politics and rationality, for Smith, compose the most significant feature of 
instrumentalism. Politically, Pakistan is seen as an example whereby national units lead by 
Muslim elites, afford convenient instruments for generating mass support in the universal 
struggle for territory, wealth and power. According to this view, Smith proclaims that 
ethnicity is fundamentally ‘instrumental’ because it serves purposes other than the ‘cultural 
goals which its spokesmen proclaim to be its raison d‘être, but it does so by combining 
economic and political interests with cultural affect.’192  
As to political aspect of instrumentalism, to a large degree Verkuyten also agrees with 
Smith. He described two different aspects dimensions of instrumentalism, the background of 
ethnicity and the interests that people have. In the first case, ethnicity depends on existing 
principle orderings in society. The external circumstances and condition which shape ethnic 
boundaries are important. Within this approach ethnic groups were studied as the product of 
political, social, economic and legal conditions. The second accent, interests, focuses on the 
interaction and group relationships in the struggle for such as: goods and position. For 
Verkuyten, the starting point is the socio-cultural conception of the contrast of interests and 
the balance of power.193 
Rationality is the second significant feature of instrumentalism. Some authors consider 
this feature to be a distinct theory and call it the rational choice theory. Within this method, an 
individual’s preferences of ethnic affiliation are more effectual. According to instrumentalists, 
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the affiliation of an individual with a particular community has little to do with emotions and 
it is rather related to its possible practical advantages, which is to say that the connectedness 
of an individual with a community derives from a rational choice. The community is for 
individuals an instrument to achieve their personal goals. This theory, according to Llobera, is 
based on two assumptions: 1) individuals behave with a view to maximise their benefits (in 
term of economic gains and prestige); 2) present actions restrict future choices.194   
  
2.3.  Structuralism 
Structuralism or constructivism is considered by many as a third alternative, next to 
primordialism and instrumentalism. This third theory is broadly similar in principle to 
instrumentalism, such as its emphasis on elites’ role in the society. According to both 
theories, ethnic or nationalist elites attempt to mobilize the masses, mostly for the pursuit of 
their own private interests. This usually happens when social contacts are broken by the state 
and the repression by the state is weakened. However, Brown pointed out that constructivists 
pay more attention to the concept of the language of a community; to the ways in which 
identities and boundaries are historically arbitrary; to how these identities and boundaries are 
often the structures of members of the elite in a group, who seek political power. For 
constructivists, ethnic phenomena do not actually exist but are rather promulgated by 
nationalist-elites with aims to further their personal goals.195 According to John Comaroff, the 
history shows that there are no arbitrary inventions. Further, historical causality not only 
limits the potential option for the construction of identities but also the form of these 
identities. Ethnicity is always created by specific historical forces that are both structural and 
cultural.196 As Gellner argues, constructivists view national and ethnic identities as the 
product of historical forces, often recent, even when the identities are presented as old.197 
The positive or negative ‘interpretations’ of important historical events, that took place 
within a community are necessary for structuralism. By means of interpretation frameworks, 
events and experiences receive significance. As Verkuyten claims, for the extreme 
constructivist approach, the reality is equal to the order of the interpretive framework. 
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Language, however, is not the only medium for the formation of experience. Moreover, 
according to Verkuyten, every situation and experience allows multiple interpretations. Some 
interpretations, for example, are more consistent with the social reality, and actual changes in 
a situation are not always sufficient to change the language.198 Whether the language changes 
or not is an essential question within the structuralist approach.   
For Verkuyten, however, there are three interrelated reasons that make language an 
important factor in ethnic identity. Firstly, verbal expressions form one of the key aspects of 
everyday life. Specification and discussions of situations in the community play an important 
role in how that life is seen and experienced. Nevertheless, language belongs to the social 
reality and is used as a main instrument to shape it. The second reason is the connection 
between language and behaviour. Words have not only a representational or expressive 
function but often also a practical one. Communication among individuals is mainly carried 
out through language and its proceedings have significant impact on social life of a 
community. Finally the notion of ideology itself puts a significant weight on language. The 
functions of language are not limited to interpersonal domain but have wider social 
implications. Language is the main diffuser of ideology.199     
A combination of these three approaches to ethnicity, primordialism, instrumentalism 
and structuralism, helps to address the question of separatism or autonomy movements by 
focusing on the political and economic disparities between minorities and the state centre. At 
least four elements are of crucial importance to the mobilization of a minority against a state: 
1. The degree of economic, social and political differences among groups – highly 
disadvantaged groups are more likely to resort to political activism. 2. Clarity of group 
identity and the degree of cohesion within a group. 3. Regional concentration and 
organizational skills throughout the development of political activism. 4. The degree of 
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3   Reflection on the theoretical understanding of ethnicity among Kurds    
Kurdish nationalism views the Kurds mostly through two main lenses of the primordialist 
theory: socio-biological and sociological. The first asserts that ethnicity is an extension of 
kinship and that kinship is the normal vehicle for the pursuit of collective goals in the struggle 
for survival. The second regards language, religion, race, ethnicity, and territory as the basic 
organizing principles and bonds of human association throughout history.201 Although 
Kurdish nationalism preceded more complex political formations, the question still remains 
whether it is truly primordial. Abbas Vali observed that the ‘mainstream Kurdish nationalist, 
hailing from Diyarbakir, Mahabad or Arbil, is a “primordialist”.’202 Kurdish nationalists stress 
that modern Kurds are descendents and historical representatives of the Medians (Meden). 
Some even go further to claim that the Guti and the Lullubi are among the Kurds’ distant 
ancestors.203 The magnum opus Mam û Zîn of Kurdish scholar Ahmedî Khanî is considered 
by nationalist Kurds to be a national epic in pre-modern history. Many Kurds claim that 
Ahmedî Khanî had a Kurdish ‘nationalist’ agenda.204  
 The formations of pre-modern and modern Kurdish semi-autonomous principalities 
were considered by some Kurdish intellectuals as fundamental political events in the history 
of Kurds and Kurdistan. Amir Hassanpour criticized the argument of Ferhad Shakely that the 
Persian and Ottoman Empires established the Kurdish principalities to the maintain security 
of their borders. According to Hassanpour, from the rise of the Kurdish semi-autonomous 
principalities in the sixteenth century began an important history of Kurdistan: the period of 
the formation of the political organization known as dewlati Kurdi (Kurdish government).205 
Vali criticized the opinion of Hassanpour and believed that the political Kurdish movement 
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was exploited by the Kurds after the fall of the two Middle Eastern empires, Persian and 
Ottoman.206   
The First World War put an end to the highly developed dynastic empires: the 
Ottoman, Qajar, and Habsburgs. In place of the Congress of Berlin, came the League of 
Nations, in which included non-Europeans. From this moment on, nationhood became the 
legitimate international norm. After the Second World War, there was an increase in the 
number of nation-states existing in the world.207 After the First World War, the emergence of 
new nation-states in the Middle East, such as Turkey, Iran, and Iraq, created the political 
identity of the Kurds.208 The formation of these states usually meant the suppression of other 
cultures and ethnic groups and consequently, the Kurds suffered terribly from these policies. 
To defend their identity and state-building aspirations, Kurds organized and established 
several political movements in the twentieth century. Their demands for cultural and political 
were refused by the dominant group in the nation-states of the region.  
According to Vali, the identity politics of the Kurds was formed in the twentieth 
century.209 Identity politics is the political activity of various ethnic groups with the goal of 
gaining economic, social and especially political rights or self-determination. Identity politics 
represents and seeks to advance the interests of particular groups in society, the members of 
which often share and unite around common experiences of actual or perceived social and 
economic injustice, relative to the wider society of which they form a part and exist in. In this 
way, the identity of the suppressed group gives rise to a political basis around which they then 
unite and begin to assert themselves in society.210 Vali stated, those who believed in territorial 
Kurdish nationalism in Iran wanted to have a national identity in the form of rights and 
recognition of a Kurdish nation. Conversely, those who believed in Kurdish autonomy but 
sought rights within the territorial and sovereign political state of Iran, wanted to maintain an 
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ethnic identity.211 Self-identification with a political framework based upon identity is 
exemplified by the Kurdish movements in the twentieth century in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and 
Syria, where the ethnic question of the Kurds has continuously flared up and acted as a source 
of internal conflict. Identity politics was instrumental behind the Iranian crisis of 1945 and 
1946, with different ethnic groups, Kurds and Azeris, demanding political rights. 
The Kurdish ethno-nationalism can be understood within the framework of ethno-
symbolic approaches and it encourages a socio-historical and cultural study of nationalism. 
According to Smith, the use of this approach is an important to understanding the relationship 
of the ethnic past to the modern nation. This approach is, according to Smith, a subjective 
element which focused more on the past: memory, sentiment, myth; and it seeks the inner 
world of ethnicity and nationalism. Using this approach, Smith tried to explain that 
nationalism was rooted in the pre-modern and modern history of ethnicity.212 Van Bruinessen 
wrote an article titled ‘Kurdish Nationalism and Competing Ethnic Loyalties’, in which he 
used Barth’s definition of ethnicity and analyzed the concept of ethnicity utilizing Smith’s 
ethno-symbolic approach. He did so because, for him, Smith’s work is important for a 
thorough understanding of the Kurdish question.213 Van Bruinessen’s article concentrated on 
Kurdish nationalism in the early twentieth century and after the First World War. Van 
Bruinessen argues that in the early twentieth century there were no distinct boundaries 
between Kurds and non-Kurds since the boundaries were defined more on the grounds of 
religion and tribes. He also finds that after the period of nation-building and the subsequent 
repressive policies towards the Kurds in Turkey, Iraq and Iran during the second decade of the 
twentieth century, an interactive movement toward Kurdish nationalist movements.214 The 
following chapter will focus more on the question of whether the Kurdish nationalist 
movements, after the First World War, were ethno-nationalist or not and on the question of 
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CHAPTER III. KURDS BETWEEN TWO WORLD WARS (1918 – 1941)  
 
In general, this chapter discusses the most significant Iranian and Iraqi Kurdish movements 
between the two world wars. During this period, social and political movements erupted in 
Kurdistan and these leading to the formation of political parties, especially by the Iraqi Kurds, 
which in turn, directly, affected and encouraged the Iranian Kurds to mobilise themselves and 
eventually to form their own political parties. This chapter focuses on the movement of 
Simko’s rebellion in Iran, Reza Shah’s policies towards Kurds and Kurdish political parties in 
Iraq. 
 
1. Simko’s rebellion  
Referring to the several significance events and transformations in Iran, before the First 
World War, are crucial to understand the motivation and tribal uprising of Simko’s 
movements in Iran.  
The rivalries and non-cooperation between Shi’a and Sunni Kurds in Iran is an 
example of discord within the Kurdish community. The reign of Karim Khan Zand dynasty 
(1751-94) clearly illustrates this example.215 In the middle of the eighteenth century, Karim 
Khan, a Shi’a Kurd from the Zand tribe near Kermanshah, brought the Iranian government 
under his control. This was the first time since the eleventh century that a non-Turk or non-
Mogul figure was heading the government in Iran. During the period of Karim Khan’s reign, 
Shi’a Kurds came to occupy high leadership positions. This was especially the case in the 
Kurdish regions. They enjoyed much less support among the Iranian Sunni Kurds.216  
After the death of Karim Khan Zand, the tribal Turkic Qajar dynasty (1794-1925) 
came to the power. During the reign of two Qajar Shahs, Fath Ali Shah and Nasir al-Din 
Shah, the central Iranian government coexisted with powerful and largely self-ruling tribal 
authorities. This was also the period when the influence of the European powers began to take 
root in Iran, with Russians encroaching from the north and the British from the south (see 
chapter V).          
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During the reign of Nasir al-Din Shah (1848-1896),217 Iranian military power was 
weak. Iran did not attempt to reform its military, as Egypt and the Ottoman Empire had done. 
Although the Iranian government made attempts to increase role of the formal government, 
ulama still had considerable influence over Iranian society. Because of zakat contribution 
(alms. tithes), the ulama had gotten much richer and financially more independent. They also 
had income from their educational institutions and the Waqf (religious endowment). 
Consequently, Shi’ite religious figures enjoyed a largely independent position within the 
Iranian society. While the Safavid Shahs had claimed to be descendents of the Hidden Imam 
(Mohammad Mahdi)218, the Qajar shahs made no such divine claims, which left the Shi’ite 
ulamas as the main religious authority who enjoyed the exclusive right to ijtihaad (free 
interpretation of the religious sources).  
During the first half of the nineteenth century, the ulama made use of two concepts: 1. 
All Shi’ite Muslims must commit to a mudjtahid, and 2. Accept his rulings as valid on matters 
of religious observance: the rulings of living mudjtahids were preferable to all other existing 
rulings.219 Since there was no longer a link between the state and Shi’a Islam during the Qajar 
Dynasty, the faithful were bound to religious dignitaries. The situation enabled the mudjtahids 
to gain extensive sway over the society. In other words, the ulama maintained the strongest 
voice in Iranian political life. 
The policies of the government of Nasir al-Din, combined with its policy that created a 
permeable situation for the foreign interference and economic exploitation. This led to unrest 
among the Iranian people and ultimately to open revolt. In 1890, the Shah awarded a British 
company the exclusive right to produce and sell Iran’s entire tobacco crop. This led to mass 
protests under the leadership of intellectuals, Bazaris and ulama’s. Additionally, mudjtahid 
used their power to ijtihaad to block the government’s policy via a nationwide boycott of 
tobacco production. The Shah repealed the concession in 1892. The ulama learned from this 
experience that the Iranian people were receptive to calls for political activity based on an 
Islamic framework.220 Towards the end of the nineteenth century, Iran was overwhelmed by 
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its debts to the European states, the situation provoked further anger among the populace. 
Finally, in 1896, Nasir al-Din was assassinated. 
The political and economic policies of the Qajars were based on a tribal structure of 
society. They, therefore, made efforts to preserve the tribal lifestyle. In certain cases, the 
Qajars tried to foster and manage feuds and rivalries, thereby ruling through dependent chiefs 
rather than without them. This was the case of the chieftains of Ardalan, Kermanshah, and 
most Iranian Kurdish regions. Qajars relied on the provocation of hostilities among tribal 
chieftains in order to buy loyalty from certain sides. Khusro Khan Ardalan, for example, was 
brought in to the royal palace to ensure the loyalty of his father, who was the Wali 
(governor).221  
The absorption of some Kurdish tribal leaders into the state system illustrates another 
example of the Qajars’ political structure. Through marriages, the Qajar’s drew some 
chieftains more closely into the reaches of imperial authority. According to McDowall, 
Khusro Khan, who succeeded his father as Wali, married one of Fath Ali Shah’s numerous 
daughters.222 The struggle for power between Mamash and Manguri in the Sawujbulaq 
(present Mahabad) district is another example of the Kurdish tribal feuds. Rivalries among the 
tribal leaders for leadership, as well as the loyalty, of some tribes to the government via 
marital bonds to the Qajar family, were some of the main causes of division among the 
Kurdish community at the time.223 The situation changed in the beginning of the twentieth 
century, when a new movement, generally known as the constitutional revolution, took place 
in Iran. The wave eventually was to inspire Kurds to attempt to build a more coherent 
movement for Kurdish nationalism. 
The Constitutional Revolution had cultural as well as political effects on the Kurdish 
communities in Iran. The combination of several factors in the early twentieth century — a 
decentralized government, a powerful religious organization, merchants and intellectuals — 
sparked in Iran the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-09.224 This revolution provided a 
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foundation for Kurdish nationalism, particularly in Iran. It is, therefore, necessary to analyze 
this event.    
The constitutional revolution is generally viewed as a nationalist religious movement. 
According to Edward G. Browne, the most popular Western scholar of Iranian culture at the 
time, the constitutionalist movement that stood for progress, tolerance and freedom insisted 
that nationalism ‘Persia for the Persians, [Iran for the Iranians]’ was the force that 
characterized the movement.225 During and after the constitutional revolution, the idea of 
‘Persia for the Persians’ compelled Kurds, especially the urban populations, to establish some 
Kurdish associations in Sawujbulaq, Urumiyeh, Saqqiz, Sinna and Kermanshah. The more 
urbanized Kurdish communities and Kurdish intellectuals were mostly supportive of the 
constitutionalist movement, as it offered a hope for relief from the arbitrary and corrupt 
policies of landlords, chieftains, and governors. One of the popular associations was Sedaqat 
(honesty/loyalty), which was created in 1907 by certain intellectuals in Sinna under the 
leadership of Mohammad Mardokh. Nerweyi believes that most fundamentally, the members 
were to swear not to commit falsehood and not to tolerate oppression.226 The Kurdish 
nationalist movement was mainly based on the last point. It was fighting not only for self-rule 
but also against the tribal chieftains, who were deemed responsible for the intertribal rivalries 
and the backwardness of Kurdish communities. 
Unlike the urban intellectuals, Kurdish tribal chieftains and certain Kurdish religious 
figures were against the constitutionalist movement. In general, they identified with the 
monarchy and the existing hierarchical system, which they were a part of. Because of the 
intertwined ideological and political interests of Qajars and tribal leaders, the tribal chiefs 
were not sympathetic to constitutionalism. Although the tribal chiefs had some autonomy 
with their own boundaries, their rule was permitted by and depended on the Shah. This 
situation ensured a certain level of loyalty by the tribal chiefs to the Shah. One of the pillars 
of constitutionalism was secularism, which had an archenemy, the Shi’ite cleric. The 
modernist concept is for Mangol Bayat one of the five conventional views of religion and 
religious leadership in the politics of Iran at the turn of the century. According to Bayat: 
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Modernist concepts and ideas were introduced by the religious dissidents who mobilized the 
masses, preaching the merits of the movement in mosques and religious schools, wrapping their 
innovative thought in the traditional language of the Koran and the holy texts. Far from 
attempting to safeguard Islamic traditions, they called for socio[-]cultural and political changes 
which, they insist[ed], constituted a return to true Islam.227                         
 
The founding leaders of this religious reformation were the two famous political and religious 
figures: Sayyed Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838/39-1897) and his disciple Mohammad Abduh 
(1849-1905). Afghani is known as a quite political and revolutionary figure, who opposed 
imperialism and the corrupt Muslim rulers. Abduh is more known as an advocate of reform 
within the context of Islamic education, particularly in the areas of morality and religion. The 
ideology of Afghani, pan-Islamism against imperialism, became more clearly defined when 
most of the Iranian Kurds cooperated with the Ottoman Empire against the Allies in the First 
World War (Afghani left via Iranian Kurdistan to the Iraqi Kurdistan, when he deported by 
the Iranian Shah in 1891). 228 Some of the most important families in Sawujbulaq, such as 
Ghazi Mohammad’s family, supported the jihad (holy war) of the Ottoman Empire229 against 
the Allies, and especially against the Tsarist Russia, but other Kurds did deals with the 
Russians.            
As above-mentioned, the Constitutional Revolution of Iran in 1905-1909 afforded 
people more freedom to assemble through association. During this period, Kurdish 
intellectuals and religious figures established a range of associations throughout most of the 
Iran’s Kurdish regions. These associations formed the basis for the first modern awakenings 
of the Kurdish national identity in this territory. After the constitutional revolution, Kurds 
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became more responsive to modern political and social movements.230 From the constitutional 
revolution to the end of the Qajar Empire in 1925, which marked the beginning of the Pahlavi 
dynasty, the territorial sovereignty of Iran was vulnerable. The north, south, and west of Iran 
gradually drifted away from the central government. In some parts of the country, relations 
between the centre and the periphery broke down through movements such as the one in 
Gilan in the north, under the leadership of Mirza Kochak Khane Jangali, and the movement in 
the Kurdish area under the leadership of Simko231. The Simko movement, which took place 
right after the First World War, attempted to create an autonomous government in the south-
west areas of Lake Urumiyeh.  
After the First World War the only great tribal uprising in Iranian Kurdistan against 
the central government was that of Simk, a chieftain of the large Shikak tribe and 
confederated his movement with some other Kurdish tribes. He was looking after his own 
wealth and power instead of entertaining national or ethnic Kurdish concerns. Simko, Ahmad 
Kasravi notes, fought the Russians on behalf of the Ottoman Empire, and then shifted his 
alliance to fight in the Russian front against the Azeris. For Kasravi, Simko’s movement had 
tribal character and had nothing to do with nationalism. He refers to Simko as a murderer and 
bandit. In 1917, Simko killed a leader of the Assyrian people in a bilateral negotiation and 
proclaimed later that it done for the sake of Iran.232 For Kasravi and many other Iranian 
writers Simko was a ‘mercenary’, who had no grasp of ‘civilization’. Some Kurdish writers, 
however, reject these ideas about Simko and describe him as a hero. They believe that Simko 
had strong nationalist ideas.233             
Shikak, after Kalhur, was the second largest Kurdish confederacy in Iran. It grew 
further by forming a confederacy with some other small tribes. It had reached its greatest 
autonomy under the leadership of Simko, particularly in the period of 1918-22. In 1919, 
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Simko organized a meeting of the most important chieftains of Iranian Kurdistan, to establish 
an independent Kurdistan -- an open insurrection against the Iranian government.234 The 
majority of Simko’s operational military successes against the central government took place 
between March 1921 until July 1922. During this period, his authority covered all Iranian 
territory west of Lake Urumiyeh and to the south as far as Baneh and Sardasht, as well as the 
northwestern borders of Iraq, where the British and the Kemalists were still competing for 
control.235 Except for the entire Shikak confederacy and the Harki tribe, most of the northern 
tribes of Iranian Kurdistan and some tribes in southern Iranian Kurdistan took part in Simko’s 
movement. In 1921, Simko’s troops occupied Sawujbulaq, according to van Bruinessen, 
unlike Urumiyeh, its inhabitants were mainly Kurds.236 Although the Kurds composed one of 
the largest populations in the Urumiyeh region, in the city centre the Azeri were predominant. 
Perhaps that was why when Simko’s forces occupied the city of Urumiyeh, they did not spare 
the city from plunder. Khalil Fettahi Ghazi, however, cites another possible motive for the 
pillage. According to him, the aggression of Simko’s troops in Urumiyeh was revenge for the 
losses they had suffered while capturing Mahabad. According to Fettahi Ghazi, Simko had 
demanded fifty thousand tomans for his tribesmen killed in Mahabad.237 
Reza Khan after seizing power via a coup d’état in February 1921, had devoted most 
of his energies to the building of a modern, disciplined, and cohesive national army, which 
was hugely instrumental in defeating Simko’s uprising. Similar to Atatürk’s position vis-a-vis 
the uprising of Sheikh Sa’id, the movement of Simko was a great test for the modern army of 
Reza Khan. By 1923, Simko’s ventures had not led to any political solution for himself or his 
followers. He fled to Turkey and then to Iraq. Eventually, Simko was killed in an ambush in 
1930, after being insincerely invited by the Iranian government to be a governor of 
Ushnawiyeh. Throughout the first half of the twentieth century the Kurdish uprisings 
remained largely old-fashioned and tribal in character, as opposed to modern entities with an 
interest in nation building. Although Simko asserted his authority over a wide territory, he 
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established no formal organization, no political party to organize his followers, and no formal 
government or war council.238  
Simko’s movement was essentially a tribal one, but one of the most successful in 
uniting a number of tribal Kurdish leaders against the Iranian government. In an interview in 
1921 with Mustafa Pasha, a nationalist Kurd from Turkey, Simko claimed that at this moment 
there was no organization, and he maintained that they had no need for such a thing as a flag, 
since Shikak has already has its own flag.239 Simko’s resistance, according to Hashem 
Ahmadzadeh and Gareth Stansfield, was inspired mainly by his tribal ambition and lacked 
organization and a nationalist Kurdish agenda. Both academics proclaimed that although 
Simko’s movement was deficient in terms of an intellectual nationalist discourse, it 
nevertheless provided the foundations of the Kurdish nationalist movement in Iran.240 This 
movement was a reaction to the homogenizing policies of Reza Khan, who sought to build a 
nation based on the cultural-linguistic imprint of the dominant Persian ethnic group. At the 
end of Reza Shah’s reign, the Kurds had not only mobilized against the centralistic policies of 
Reza Shah but also found their ambition and activities focused on Kurdish self-determination 
or self-government. Therefore, it is necessary to analyse Reza Shah’s policies in Iran, 
particularly as they relate to the Kurds, in order to understand one of the important motivation 
behind the Iranian Kurds’ mobilization during the Second World War.              
 
2. Iranian Kurds in the period of Reza Shah  
Khosro Mo’tazed remarks, that via the guidance of the British political military officers, a 
union between Reza Khan and Sayyid Zia al-din Tabatabai was formed, which carried out a 
coup d’état and eventually established a strong Iranian government.241 It was essential for the 
British government to halt any Bolshevik penetration into Iran as it was considered a serious 
threat against the British colonial possession of India. As noted by Ervand Abrahamian, the 
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British provided ammunition, supplies and funding for Reza Shah’s troops.242 The coup d’état 
in February 1921 was synchronous with national and international political crises in Iran. 
According to Ali Murshadizad, the Treaty (Anglo-Tsarist) of 1907 was still in effect (and was 
renewed in 1919) and the country was on the threshold of being divided between Great 
Britain and the newly-built Soviet government.243 The Soviet Army had occupied northern 
Iran and there were some insurrections in other parts of the country, such as in Gilan, 
Khorasan, and Kurdistan. During the First World War, as Murshadizad points out, all strata of 
the Iranian society, aristocrats, clerics, merchants, and labours, had tired of waiting for a 
charismatic leader.244 
Mo’tazed observes that Reza Khan established a uniformed army, asserted his 
authority over the state, and used his influence to bring Majlis under his control. He created 
and expanded a modern army. Furthermore, he defeated the uprising that was carried out 
under the leadership of Simko and, via the Qahriyeh (aggressive) forces and by granting 
concessions to some tribal chieftains, such as Bakhtiyari and Lur, established his central 
authority over regions and tribes throughout the country.245 The other effective means used to 
eliminate the tribal character was the construction of a country-wide road and transportation 
network. As Richard Cottam notes, ‘the railroad and new road system enabled the army to 
patrol formerly inaccessible tribal areas and to ensure the collection of taxes.’246 Five years 
into the coup d’état, Reza Khan, having become the decisive authority and appearing as Iran’s 
leader both inside and outside the country, declared himself the king of kings. Reza Shah, 
founder of the Pahlavi dynasty of 1925-1979, not only worked to modernize the Iranian 
administrative, educational and legal systems, but also aimed to shape a centralist and military 
state. Abrahamian observed, ‘for the first time since the Safavids, the state was able to control 
society through extensive instruments of administration, regulation, and domination.’247   
Sedentarization of the nomads was another modernization process encouraged by Reza 
Shah. Between the two world wars, Reza Shah used violence to force Kurdish tribes and 
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nomads into a settled lifestyle. Due to this campaign, whole tribes were often completely 
destroyed. The majority of Jalali tribe, for example, who lived on the frontiers between Iran, 
Turkey and the Soviet Union, were deported to central Iran. Only a small part of the deported 
Jalali population had survived by the time they returned in 1941. Lur and Galbeghi tribes 
were also deported to Hamadan and Isfahan and their lands given to Turkish-speaking 
peoples. Most tribal chieftains were also deported from their homelands. These forced 
migrations, according to Ghassemlou, suited the interests of the Iranian bourgeoisie, who 
needed a settled population to form a significant and dependable market.248 Four important 
motivations determined the forced migration process and sedentarization of Kurdish tribes 
and nomads by Reza Shah. Firstly, it made it easier to control the tribes and nomads, who 
otherwise were inclined to participate in secession movements against the central government. 
Secondly, as Ghassemlou claims, sedentarization was very much to the advantage of both the 
Kurdish and Iranian landowners who were able to exploit the peasants and buy their lands for 
agricultural production.249 Thirdly, sedentary life-style yielded better tax collection, which 
was crucial for the enrichment of Reza Shah’s treasury. Finally, it was easier to recruit young 
people to the modern military service from sedentary communities.  
In a historical context modernization is used to refer to the particular social and 
cultural transformation that has occurred in Europe since the Enlightenment. In the course of 
the nineteenth century and especially during the two world wars, the Islamic world 
increasingly came under the influence of European expansion. As well as causing political 
and economic changes, this influence also transformed the social and cultural dimensions of 
the Islamic world. Atabaki and Zürcher rightly assert that for more than two hundred years the 
model of European modernity has been perceived as the exclusive model for adopting 
modernization in non-European societies such as Turkey and Iran.250 It would be a mistake, 
however, to consider the modernization process in the Islamic world simply as an extension 
of the European modernization. This is because the Islamic world, according to Atabaki and 
Zürcher, did not have an exclusive perception of European modernity as the instrument to 
implement certain changes that they fervently desired, changes such as those that had 
transformed a traditional, rural and agrarian society into an urban, secular and industrial one 
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in Europe. Modernisation in the Middle East was rather a defensive reaction.251 In the Middle 
East, particularly in Iran by Reza Shah and in Turkey by Atatürk, the modernization processes 
were supported and accelerated by three major developments in communication: 1. The 
printing press: the distribution and installation of printing presses. 2. Translations: initially a 
small amount, but later a growing number of books (history, mathematics and novel) 
translated, printed and published in Turkish, Arabic and Persian. 3. Newspapers.252 
In general, Reza Shah’s policy toward Kurds had two phases. 1- Annihilation of 
tribalism, destruction of collective tribal armies, and the establishment of military bases in 
Kurdistan. 2- Prevention of vernacular labour engagements in Kurdistan and prohibition of 
Kurdish language.253 During Reza Shah’s reign, the Ministry of Culture, as Ghassemlou 
points out, had literally asked Rashid Yasemy to write a book titled Kurd ve Piywastigy 
Nijady ve Tarikhi [Kurds and their race and historical union]. The whole purpose of this book 
is to establish a link between the Persian language and culture and the Kurdish language and 
culture, thereby implying that Kurdish is not really different from Persian.254 In 1933, the 
Ministry of Education formed a society named dar al-mo’allimine ‘ali (the teacher-training 
college), with the commission to suggest new Persian terms in the arts and sciences.255     
In the 1930s, the political geography of Iranian Kurdistan was purposefully 
subdivided. As Ghani Bulourian (who participated in the Republic of Kurdistan government 
and was a leader of the KDP) observed, the Kurdish district were transferred into the 
Kordistan and Kermanshah provinces, Ilam was separated from other Kurdish areas, 
Mukriyan and northern Iranian Kurdistan were assigned to the western Azerbaijan province 
and all of the Kurdish place names of these regions were deleted. Azerbaijan was also 
separated into two provinces: west and east Azerbaijan. According to Bulourian, the primary 
objective of the Iranian government was brought to light in the book by General Razmara, 
titled Joghrafiyaye Siyasiye Iran [political geography of Iran]. Razmara claimed that the 
majority of the inhabitants of the Kermanshah and Ilam areas were Shi’ites and therefore are 
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friendly to the central government. He feared Kordestan Province (Sanandaj), because they 
had large Kurdish intellectuals, but he nevertheless identified the Mahabad and Mukriyan 
districts as the centre of Kurdish nationalism and advised officers to be more alert in these 
areas.256 Throughout Iran, Reza Shah reinforced his New Order with a modern state 
bureaucracy. Abrahamian explains how the administration of old provinces, districts and 
counties were changed according to a new administrative structure: 
 
The old division of few large provinces (ayalat) and innumerable small districts (vilayat) was 
abolished. Instead, the ministry was structured into eleven provinces (ostans), forty-nine 
counties (shahrestans), and numerous municipalities by governors-general, counties by 
governors, municipalities by mayors, and some rural districts by official councils appointed by 
the Interior Minister.257  
 
During the twenty years of Reza Shah’s reign, the oppression of some ethnic groups in Iran 
was unprecented. This Persian autocracy, according to Ghassemlou, was the formal political 
organisation of Pahlavi’s regime. The Persian ethnic group became the law-giving and 
dominant group. In an attempt to remove the cultural and historical existence of all ethnic 
groups, Reza Shah gave Persian names to villages and cities, banished some cultural rituals, 
forbade traditional clothing (such as that of the Kurds).258 European dress (uniform clothing 
and the Pahlavian hat) was imposed on the Kurdish people between the late 1920s and 1940. 
This raises the question: To what extent were these policies applied to or considered 
acceptable within Kurdish areas? In his memoir, Bulourian recounts those Kurdish villagers 
who travelled to Mahabad routinely brought along a set of modern trousers, shirts, and hats. 
Right before entering the city, they took off their traditional clothes and wore the ones that 
conformed to the standards of Reza Shah’s dress policy. The police were known to seize those 
walking around in traditional clothing and humiliate them publicly.259 The new dress policy, 
however, was not a success in Kurdish villages260 and in some cities people began to protest. 
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Suppression of customs, such as the traditional costume, led to angryremonstrations 
by the people. Mulla Khalil’s uprising in 1928 against the dress policy of Reza Shah is one 
example of this. The Manguri tribe, under the guidance of its religious leader, rose up in 
rebellion against the Shah’s choice of clothing for them. Borzowi claims that during the 
uprising forces of Mulla Khalil captured members of the military between the Mahabad and 
Sardasht districts, a region inhabited by the Manguri tribe, and punished them by removing 
the tops of their military hats.261 According to Major General Amir Lashker Khza’i, 
commandant of Azerbaijan armies, the uprising spread through the entire Kurdish region, 
including West Azerbaijan. In his telegram to the Shah, he explained that ‘Sunnite clerics 
proclaimed jihad [against dress policy] and they decreed that the dress policy was a kofer 
(blasphemy).’262 Elimination of Mulla Khalil’s movement had two significant consequences: 
1- Government control over Kurds was intensified to the point of centrally appointing tribal 
chiefs, as opposed to the traditional selection of chieftains by the tribes themselves, a policy 
that continuedduring the Qajar period. 2- On the other hand, it emboldened the Kurdish 
clerics and intellectuals to resistance against Reza Shah’s policy.263 Reza Shah’s despotic 
policies might have been one of the reasons behind the rise of Kurdish national aspirations. 
The cruelty of Reza Shah’s regime stimulated antagonism against central control and, after 
the decline of his regime in 1941, led to the formation of the Kurdish nationalist political 
party in Iran, called Jiyani Kurd (Kurdish Life). This party, commonly referred to as the JK, 
will be discussed in more details below. Prior to, however, for a comprehensive overview of 
the situation, it is essential to first review some of the Kurdish political parties in Iraq, which 
they directly affected to the establishment of the JK party. 
 
3. Kurdish political parties in Iraqi Kurdistan  
Political parties are a quintessential product of modern life, having emerged in the nineteenth 
century in Europe and in the twentieth century in the rest of the world. They now serve a 
central role in of all political systems, including communism, liberal democracy, dictatorship, 
and they transcend all religious perspectives whether polytheism, monotheism, or atheism. 
Because political parties arose from pre-existing divisions within a given community, they 
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were often viewed negatively when they made their debut as a political phenomenon. The 
contempt for political parties was a widespread phenomenon. Isaac Lipschits mentions several 
examples where the existences of parties are contrary to the permanent and aggregate interests 
of the community. James Madison, for example, one of the American founding fathers, had 
little interest in political parties. The president tolerated themas a necessary evil.264 Such 
disdain, however, did not stop thethe emergence and spread of political parties. Today, 
moreover, the emergence of competing political parties is seen as an important sign of 
democracy.265   
Political parties in the modern sense were established for the first time in Iran during 
the period of the Constitutional Revolution (1905-09), which ended the reign of absolute 
monarchs in Iranian history. Two major political parties emerged in 1908, the Inqlabi 
(revolutionary) and the I’tedaly (moderate).266 In Kurdistan, prior to the First World War, 
there were no political parties as such. Instead, the period saw the emergence of groups or 
organizations connected with cultural associations. It was during the two world wars that 
Kurdish intellectuals and elites formed political parties within Kurdish communities. The 
emergence of these new Kurdish political parties was actually a consequence of the collapse 
of the old empires (such as the Austro-Hungarian, Russian, Ottoman, and Qajar empires) and 
of the emergence of new nation states (such as Turkey, Iraq, and Syria), which gradually 
divided up Kurdistan among and witin their newly established borders. Below is a discussion 
of some of the significant Kurdish political movements and political parties after the First 
World War.  
Since the Second World War the most successful Kurdish nationalist movements and 
some of the most prominent Kurdish nationalist intellectuals have emerged in Iraqi Kurdistan. 
This shift was, due to events between the two world wars. In this part of Kurdistan, Kurds 
were officially recognized after the First World War as an ethnic minority in possession of 
certain rights, including self-government in matters of language, dress, and education. Kurds 
even served in certain governmental positions. The following factors may have played a role 
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in the exceptional freedom of Iraqi Kurdistan: Woodrow Wilson’s 14 points for World Peace 
was the dominant policy in place after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. It recommended 
autonomy for the minorities formerly under Ottoman rule. In 1919 British policy cited point 
no. 14 as a reason to avoid political commitments in Kurdistan and established a couple semi-
autonomous Kurdish provinces, such as Suleymaniyeh, where Kurdish intellectuals 
introduced Kurdish as the administrative and public language.267 The British policy was also a 
significance part of the plan for the solving of the overall Kurdish issue in the Sèvres 
Conference in August 1920. 
The official recognition of Kurdish national aspirations was one of the major features 
of the Treaty of Sèvres. According to Jwaideh ‘this Treaty [Sèvres], which provided for the 
establishment of a Kurdish national state, is regarded as a milestone in Kurdish history.’268 
For the Ottoman Empire, on the other hand, the treaty marked a dramatic defeat. It is signing 
by the Ottoman delegation, as Atabaki points out, ‘effectively eliminated Turkey’s 
sovereignty.’269 Section III (Articles 62-64) of Part III (Political Clauses) of the Treaty of 
Sèvres dealt with Kurdistan and Article 63 referred to the Turkish government accepting 
article 62. Articles 62 and 64 read as follows: 
 
Article 62: A Commission sitting at Constantinople [...] shall draft within six months from the 
coming into force of the present Treaty a scheme of local autonomy for the predominantly 
Kurdish areas lying east of the Euphrates, south of the southern boundary of Armenia […] north 
of the frontier of Turkey with Syria and Mesopotamia. Article 64: If within one year from the 
coming into force of the present Treaty the Kurdish peoples within the areas defined in Article 
62 shall address themselves to the Council of the League of Nations in such a manner as to show 
that a majority of the population of these areas desires independence from Turkey, and if the 
Council then considers that these peoples are capable of such independence and recommends 
that it should be granted to them, Turkey hereby agrees to execute such a recommendation, and 
to renounce all rights and title over these areas.270   
 
There was no general agreement among Kurds about the borders of Kurdistan because of the 
disparity between the areas of Kurdish settlement and the political and administrative 
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boundaries of the region.271 One of the obstacles facing a Kurdish unity was the Armenian 
frontier that had, in fact, already been determined by the Article 89 of the Sèvres Treaty. 
According to this article, the boundaries between Armenia and Turkey in the Wilayets of 
Erzurum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis were to be subject to the arbitration of the President of 
the US.272 The population of some of these Wilayets was mainly Kurdish and without pausing 
to consult the inhabitants or to determine their ethnic composition, Woodrow Wilson 
allocated these areas to the Armenian state.273 The Kurdish nationalists, such as Emin Ali 
Badir Khan, proposed an alternative map which included Van and an outlet to the sea via 
Turkey’s present Hatay Province.274 At the time, however, ‘the Kurdish nationalists were too 
weak to effectively press their claims.’275 
The Kurds disagreed not only about the borders of Kurdistan but also about the kind 
of autonomy or independence they wanted for themselves. In general, there were four 
different arguments regarding the self-government for Kurdistan. 1. Autonomy for the Kurds 
within Ottoman territories, under the flag of the Ottoman Empire with Turkish as the official 
language, 2. A Kurdish state under the authority of the Iranian government, 3. An independent 
Kurdistan, and 4. An independent Kurdistan with its own flag and Kurdish as the official 
language under the authority of the British Empire.276 However, none of these plans were 
implemented as the Treaty of Sèvres was replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, which 
repeated the provisions for the three Arab states but made no mention of an Armenian or a 
Kurdish state. Since the Lausanne Conference, Kurdish rights have been consistently denied 
and consequently there have been many insurrections and political movements in Kurdish 
landsareas. 
1- Several uprisings by Sheikh Mahmud in Suleymaniyeh against the British mandate 
of Iraq had compelled the British authorities in Iraq to concede to with his demands to a 
certain extent. The unrest caused by Sheikh Mahmud had actually begun in 1919 and 
continued to well up until 1932, when he settled for the terms offered by the newly formed 
Iraqi government. Sheikh Mahmud’s ultimate aspiration was not limited to cultural rights. He 
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had actually aimed for an independent Kurdistan.277 The British refused Sheikh Mahmud’s 
proposal, insisting that the Kurdish region must all fall under direct British administration. 
Although the British mandate in Iraq had promised autonomy to the Kurds, that promise was 
never actually fulfilled by the suceeding Iraqi government. The British had to vigorously 
press the Iraqi government to even recognize Kurds’ cultural rights.278 
2- Between 1920 and 1925, there was a possibility for a Kurdish state in the Wilayet 
Mosul.279 The Mosul issue in 1920s was a hot topic in international politics; the area was 
claimed both by Iraq and Turkey. The political crisis between Turkey and Iraq on the liability 
of Wilayet Mosul necessitated the establishment of a Commission within the League of 
Nations to find a compromise between two new countries. In February 1925, the Commission 
began an investigation into the Wilayet Mosul issue to determine boundaries between the two 
countries. The commission’s study concluded that the majority of the residents were Kurds. 
Eventually, the Commission assigned Wilayet Mosul in 1925 to Iraq under two conditions: 
that Iraq would remain about 25 years under the British mandate and that the Iraqi state would 
recognize the rights of Kurds to self-rule, allowing them to develop their cultural identity 
through their own institutions.280 As Edmonds observed: 
  
In 1925 the League of Nations made it a condition of its Mosul award that ‘regard should be had 
to the desires expressed by the Kurds that officials of Kurdish race should be appointed for the 
administration of their country, the dispensation of justice, and teaching in the schools, and that 
Kurdish should be the official language of all these services’.281 
 
The influence of oil, however, overrode any other reason or argument. The British were no 
more inclined to give up the oil in Iraq than the Turks were willing to see the emergence of a 
Kurdish state in the region. In 1926, the Turkish and the British governments agreed that 10% 
of the oil proceeds, from the disputed region would be given, he former while the British 
promised not to interfere with Kurdish and Armenian issues in the future. In return, Turkey 
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had to forgo anyclaim on Wilayet Mosul.282 The British delivered its end of these promises at 
the treaty that they signed with the Iraqi government in 1930, which also marked the 
establishment of an independent Iraqi state. Unlike the agreement of the League of Nations, 
however, the Anglo-Iraqi treaty included no section on the rights of minorities.283 In 1932, 
under the pressure from the British, the League of Nations recognized the sovereignty of the 
Iraqi state and in the same year Iraq became a member of the League of Nations. According to 
Bert Cornillie, the League of Nations insisted that the Iraqi government provide guarantees 
regarding the recognition of the Kurdish language (Sorani) as the official language in the 
Kurdish areas, alongside the Arabic language. But by the time Iraq had become a member of 
the League of Nations in 1932, Cornillie claims an Arabization policy was already a fact in 
Kurdish schools in Mosul, Kirkuk and Arbil.284 
Kurdish leaders and intellectuals opposed the treaty and the Arabization policy of the 
Iraqi government, but there was no national unity within the Kurdish community. A trans-
national Kurdish political party in Iraqi Kurdistan was not to be formed until well into the late 
1930s, about couple years after the independence of Iraq. There had been virtually no 
manifestation of political Kurdistan nationalism in Iraq.285 This changed drastically in the 
early 1940s, when the new educated group of officers and intellectuals took up the cause of 
Kurdish ethno-nationalism. According to Vali, this period also marked the beginnings of the 
modern nationalism in Iranian Kurdistan.286 This group of officers and intellectuals became 
the main rivals to the traditional Kurdish leadership, the tribal chieftains and Sheikhs. The 
nationalist movement the new men built favored the rights of the peasants and sought to 
liberate them from oppressive landlords.     
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In 1939, under the leadership of Rafiq Hilmi, some of the Kurdish officers and 
patriotic intellectuals in Iraqi Kurdistan established a secret party called Hiva (Hope).287 The 
Hiva was a modern urban-based political organization, surrounded by figures of the 
conservative class.288 The initial branches of this political party were already in existence in 
bigger Kurdish population centres. They focused mainly on urban areas and away from the 
traditional mountainous and tribal environments. The most popular slogans of this party were: 
‘Unity of all four parts of Kurdistan (Greater Kurdistan)’ and ‘Demand an independent 
Kurdish state’. Their reformist slogans were shaped around the appeals for an administration 
by Kurdish representatives, education by Kurdish teachers and scholars, construction of 
hospitals, schools, and railways in the Kurdish region. The ideological framework of the Hiva 
movement was structured around advocacy for agrarian reform, the rights of peasants, and 
opposition to landlords and tribal chieftains.289  
In retrospect the movement’s rhetorical opposition to landlords and tribal chieftains 
seems hollow, however, considering some of their activities and the composition of their 
leadership. According to McDowall, Hiva had more than a few members who were landlords, 
Sheikhs and chieftains, yet there were virtually no peasants.290 At the time, Sheikhs, tribes and 
tribal chiefs had more control over the socio-political situation in Kurdistan. So in spite ofits 
apprent political ideology, Hiva then had no choice but to work together with some tribal 
chiefs. Cooperation with tribal chiefs, according to Edmund Ghareeb, weakened the Hiva 
movement after 1940, causing its leadership to assume more of a tribal character.291 The 
participation of some Hiva members in Mulla Mustafa Barzani’s uprising of 1943-45 is 
considered an example of Hiva’s inclination toward a tribal character. They had chosen 
Barzani as a leader mainly because of Barzani’s strong tribal influence and his ability to 
provide troops. The political polarization of the Hiva party began during the period of Barzani 
rebellion in 1943-45.  
The last significant stage of military conflict between Barzani’s troops and the Iraqi 
government was at the end of the summer of 1945. In this battle, Barzani had enormous 
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military success. The defeat of the Iraqi government was not only a humiliation for Iraqi 
government, a state viewed as an ally and a part of the British sphere of direct influence, but 
also a great political embarrassment for the British reputation in the region. With help from 
the British Air Force and some aghas who had sided with the Iraqi government, the Barzani 
rebellion was eventually defeated. Subsequently, Barzani, with many supporters took refuge 
in Iranian Kurdistan in October 1945. In recognition that some tribes  had joined with 
Barzani, the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs had stated that the Iraqi ‘Ministry of 
Domestic Affairs’ endeavour to separate some tribes [Zebari] from [the Barzani movement] 
ended with result.’292 Departure of Barzani into Iran also marked the end of the Hiva 
movement.     
Two other important reasons explain the polarization that led to the collapse of Hiva: 
members were divided between right- and left-wing ideology and whether or not to support 
the Barzani insurgence. According to Shemzini, the right-wing within the Hiva movement, 
under the leadership of Hilmi, clung to looking forward to assistance from Britain. This wing 
believed that Britain was a great power and that its influence in the region could play a 
decisive role in the question of Iraqi Kurdistan. They argued that the Soviet Union would not 
support the Kurds due to their fear of an independent Kurdistan. According to Shemzini, the 
right-wing, suspecting that it might provoke an angry reaction by the British, did not want 
anything to do with the Barzani movement. The left-wing, on the other hand, as Shemzini 
points out, believed that the Soviets offered rescue, both practically and ideologically, from 
Britain and other overlords. This wing also assisted the Barzani rebellion against the Iraqi 
government.293 In 1944 Hiva organised a conference in Kirkuk. In this conference, the right 
and left wing supporters of the party finally broke ties and the party became officially divided 
into different new political parties.294                          
Kotchera writes, in the summer of 1945 Hiva actually disintegrated into three political 
parties: Shurish (Revolution), Azadi (Freedom), and Rizgari Kurd (Kurdish Liberation). The 
Shurish Party was formed mainly by the Kurdish communist group within the Hiva 
movement, taking its name from its journal, Shurish. The Rizgari Kurd Party, although short-
lived, had greater popular support and preserved the largest number of members, as many as 
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6.000.295 Rizgari Kurd emphasized unity between Kurds and maintained contact with Barzani. 
As the British Security Defence Office in Bagdhad noted, ‘[Rizgari Kurd] claims to embrace 
all Kurdish nationals [and] it has contacts with those Barzans who are now refugees in 
Persia.’296 As the Iraqi government could not eliminate Barzani’s movement on its own, it 
sought British support a fact illustrated by in a letter from Rizgari Kurd to the UN: 
 
When the world war ended in the glorious victory of democracy the Kurdish nation in Iraq 
renewed its political activity to regain its denied rights. But the Iraqi Government supported by 
British imperialism is trying to put down every national movement which draws the Kurds 
nearer to liberation and self-determination.297 
 
In another message to a conference of British, US and Soviet foreign affairs representatives, 
Rizgari Kurd underlined the following points regarding the Kurdish question and peace in the 
Middle East.  
 
1- We support endeavours by our Kurdish brothers and Azeris in Iran to attain autonomy and 
establish a democratic regime; and their struggle against imperialism and its allies. 2- We would 
like to draw attention on the Kurdish situation in Turkey, for the Turkish fascist government 
brutally suppresses Kurds and subjects them to a policy of Turkification. 3- Kurds in Iraq are 
enduring appalling circumstances. British imperialism and the Iraqi fascist government hold fast 
all Kurdish rights, as exampled by Barzan’s destroyed villages and districts and persecuted the 
Kurdish patriots.298  
 
By the last year of the Second World War, the political activities of Hiva Party had spread 
from the Kurdish urban centres throughout Iraqi Kurdistan and even into Iranian Kurdistan 
after the occupation of Iran by the Great Powers. After the party split into various groups, 
however, there was no mother party that could represent itself as the umbrella entity 
encompassing all of its offshoots. Such an entity emerged in Iraqi Kurdistan by 1946 with the 
establishment of the KDP of Iraq. 
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In 1946, while in Iranian Kurdistan, Barzani sent one of his representatives, Hamzeh 
Abdullah, to Iraqi Kurdistan for an eventual establishment of a political party, one that was 
similar to the political party in Iranian Kurdistan. According to Ibrahim Ahmed, Hamzeh 
Abdullah said that the Soviet proposal for a Kurdish political party in Iraq could be based on 
that of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran and under the leadership of Mulla Mustafa 
Barzani.299 Massoud Barzani, however, claims that the formation of the KDP of Iraq was not 
influenced by the Soviets, stating: 
 
In light of the successful founding of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDP) and the 
lesson of the Barzani Revolt of 1943-1945, the Kurdish struggle clearly required the founding of 
the KDP of Iraq, named after its Iranian counterpart.300  
 
Ahmed, together with Abdullah, organized the First Party Conference in Bagdhad in 1946. 
The conference proclaimed the establishment of a new Kurdish political party in Iraq, called 
the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP).301 Thus the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iraq was 
officially established on August 16, 1946. Although not present at the congress, the body also 













                                               
299 Ahmed ‘Le Birehweryekanim’, Gzing, No. 13, autumn 1997, 51-5. 
300 Massoud Barzani, Mustafa Barzani and the Kurdish Liberation Movement: 1931-1961 (USA: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2003), 107. 
301 Ahmed ‘Le Birehweryekanim’, Gzing, No. 13, autumn 1997, 51-5. 
 96 
4   Conclusion 
The Kurdish nationalists were in the process of establishing an internationally recognized 
autonomous government in their territories. This began in the second half of the nineteenth 
century with the concurrent uprisings of Sheikh Ubeydullah and his families and the secular 
family of Badir Khan of Botan. The power struggle between the abovementioned families 
continued until just after the First World War. It is questionable, however, whether Badir 
Khans, Shemdinans and other Kurdish movements could be considered as nationalist 
movements per se prior to World War I, because during that period, religion and religious 
figures were more significant in the region than Kurdayeti (Kurdistaness). After World War I, 
however, Kurdish nationalism emerged as an absolute political movement defined by political 
loyalties with the ultimate aim of establishing a homogeneous nation-state. 
The victorious Great Powers of the First World War organized various international 
conferences after the war, such as those at the Mudros Armistice, San Remo, Sèvres and 
Lausanne. One of the positive outcomes for ethnic minorities in these conferences, as at the 
Sèvres conference, was the recognition of self-determination for ethnic minorities, such as 
Kurds, within the Ottoman Empire. However, at other conferences, like that in Lausanne, 
some little recognition was obtained for ethnic minorities. Therefore, Kurdish areas in 
general, rebelled against the newly formed central governments that were based on nation-
states. There were four large organized Kurdish rebel uprisings in Turkey as well as two in 
Iraq and one in Iran. In Turkey and Iraq there were institutions behind the uprising, including 
political parties such as the Azadi, Khoybun and Hiva. Political activities of these uprisings 
were largely organized by political parties, but mainly the religious figures and elites were the 
ones making policy. The formation of political parties was a new phenomenon for the 
Kurdish community, one which had not occured until the First World War. 
The essential foundation of the Kurdish insurrection was the Kurd’s desire to 
safeguard their rights and preserve their identity. To establish Turkey and Iran as modern 
nation-states, their respective leaders Atatürk and Reza Shah promulgated major 
modernization reforms. This reform and modernization process in both countries led to a 
massive pressure on previously unmolested indigenous peoples. Forced migration, settlement 
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of nomads and semi-nomads and the prohibition of major parts of the ethnic minorities’ 
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CHAPTER IV. THE REPUBLIC OF KURDISTAN 
 
The occupation of Iran by the Allied forces (the Soviet Union and the Great Britain) in 1941 
gave the Iranian people the opportunity to openly establish political parties. In this period, the 
Iranian Kurds also obtained more freedom as an ethnic group to form their own political 
parties. The ultimate aspiration of this movement was the creation of a Kurdish nation-state. 
Like other nations that had built sovereign nation-states, Kurds also wanted to exercise their 
self-government. To what extent, however, was this aspiration accepted by the international 
community?  
This chapter delves into the establishment of a new political party that was based on 
democratic principles and which played a key role in establishing the Republic of Kurdistan. 
The leaders and socio-political circumstances of the Republic of Kurdistan are analyzed 
through the following questions. The Kurds political aspirations were finally realized in the 
form of a self-administered government, but to what extent was this embraced by the whole 
Kurdish community?  How much solidarity and national unity existed among different tribes 
in Iranian Kurdistan? To what extent had Pan-Islamism infiltrated Pan-Kurdism? Similarly, to 
what extent had tribalism infiltrated Kurdistaniness? Which factors led to the weakening and 
the eventual fall of the nascent Republic of 1946? 
 
1   The outbreak of the Second World War in Iran and the emergence of      
      Kurdish political activities  
The Second World War was the amalgamation of several originally separate military conflicts 
that were fought on a global scale among the members of two alliances from 1939 to1945. 
The most dramatic expansion of the conflict took place on June 22, 1941, when Germany 
entered the territory of the Soviet Union. Although this devastating war started in September 
1939 in Europe, it soon spread beyond continental Europe. On August 25, 1941, the Allies 
invaded Iran. On December 7, 1941, Japan bombed the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl 
Harbour, compelling the United States to declare war on Japan, and in February 1943 the 
British Commonwealth Eighth Army crossed the border from Libya into Tunisia, eventually 
transferring the command of the Eighth Army from the Middle East Command to the Allied 
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Joint Command for the Mediterranean. The Middle East remained quiet for the remainder of 
the war.303 
Before the German invasion of the Soviet Union, Germany tried to use Iran as a 
military base against the Soviet Union. The Allies needed Iran as a supply route to the 
Soviets. The British and Soviets had concerns over the presence of the German fifth column 
and they sent a note to the Iranian government demanding the expulsion of Germans.304 
Activities of Germans in Iran were illustrated in a letter by the British War Office to the 
Military Mission, according to which, ‘thousands of Germans with special orders from 
German Legation hold important positions in Iranian industry, to sabotage main sources of 
Iranian revenue when Hitler gives word.’305 Sayyid Mohammadamini Sheikholislami Mukri 
(Hêmin), a famous national Kurdish poet of the twentieth century who was active in the 
formation of the Republic of Kurdistan, described the Germans’ activities through the press in 
Iran in the following words: 
  
Some pictures and youth magazines were published via collaboration of the German 
Ambassador in Tehran. They write favourable articles about Nazism and make propaganda for 
Hitler’s Germany.306  
 
As noted above, eventually the Allies asked the Iranian government to end German activities 
and deport the German personnel from Iran. Their message stated: 
  
We [Britain and Soviets] and you [Iran] both want peace. War prepared by German agents 
brought starvation to rich and prosperous European countries. We come as friend to save Iran’s 
freedom.307 
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Upon Reza Shah’s refusal of their demand, British and Soviet troops invaded Iran. A few 
weeks after the conquest of Iran, the Shah was deported to South Africa, where he died in 
1944.  
The presence of foreign powers in Iran changed the political atmosphere in the 
country. Reza Shah was removed from power and Iran was now divided into three zones: 
Soviet troops were in the north, British in the south and Tehran and other areas that remained 
unoccupied. Meanwhile, some ethnic groups, namely Kurds, were once more aroused with 
hopes of achieving their national aspirations. There were a number of noteworthy factors that 
increased the Iranian Kurds’ ambition to establish a self-ruling government or autonomy. 
Many authors refer to the role of the Great Powers, specially the Soviets, who provided the 
Kurds in Iran with the possibility of autonomy. As McDowall pointed out, ‘it was the power 
vacuum during the Second World War that provided the conditions in which this idea [ethnic 
nationalism] could take powerful root.’308 The Soviets, however, had no such plans for the 
Kurds in Iran and when the Republic of Kurdistan was formed, the Soviet Union was not 
happy (see Chapter V). Some other authors believe that the ‘national suppression’ of the 
Kurds during Reza Shah’s reign was to a ‘great extent’ the reason behind the Iranian Kurds’ 
desire to built ‘national institutions’ after August 1941.309 Farideh Koohi-Kamali, along the 
line of Borzowi’s argument, believes that the situation in the 1940s in Iranian Kurdistan, ‘to a 
great extent, was the result of the social, political, and economic changes which were 
introduced by the new ruler of the country in the 1920s and 1930s.’310 But it must also be 
noted that the political and military activities of the Iraqi Kurds in Iraq and in Iranian 
Kurdistan also had a great effect on the Iranian Kurds.  
During the time of Reza Shah, Kurds were suppressed and their language and some 
cultural customs were prohibited. Kurds in Iraq, on the other hand, under the mandate of the 
British, had relative freedom. This relative freedom not only allowed Kurds to organize 
themselves in various organizations, particularly within political parties such as above 
mentioned Hiva party, but also enabled them to produce literary publications in the Kurdish 
language. Although, from the perspective of the Iraqi government, the Hiva party was 
illegitimate in its orignins, it was able to actively propagate its nationalist activities outside 
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the borders of Iraq, particularly in Iranian Kurdistan. Three Iraqi Kurdish officers who were 
members of the Hiva party worked with some Iranian Kurds to launch the Kurdish nationalist 
party in Mahabad. These officers also played a key role in the organizing and dissemination 
of the political ideology of the JK party in Iranian and Iraqi Kurdistan. Additionally, print 
capital, such as novels, theatre plays, poems, magazines that were published in Iraqi 
Kurdistan, increased Kurdish ethnic nationalism in Iran.311 As Hêmin notes, ‘the Kurdish 
leaders sent people to Iraq to take Kurdish newspapers and magazines.’312 It must also be 
remembered that the political and military participation of Barzani and his followers, when 
they were forced to flee to Iran, in the Republic of Kurdistan had substantial influence over 
the course of affairs at the time. As Massoud Barzani points out, ‘Barzani again played a 
leading role in bringing them [some recalcitrant tribes] under the rule of the republic.’313  
The intervention of the Allied Powers in Iran in August 1941 was seen by many 
Iranian Kurds as an opportunity to gain a measure of autonomy for Kurdistan. In August 
1941, the Allied Forces created a buffer-zone in Iranian Kurdistan, which was divided into 
three zones: Northern Kurdistan until Ushnawiyeh and Miyanduab was under the sphere of 
Soviet troops, southern Kurdistan up to Sanandaj went under the control of the British, and a 
Kurdish-held territory from Mahabad to Saqqiz was located between the two super powers,314 
and contained a small force from the Iranian army. The situation offered a priceless 
opportunity for Kurdish self-government or for obtaining a certain degree of legitimate 
autonomy. A month into the occupation, on September 25, 1941, three officers from the 
Allied Forces, two British and an American, visited Mahabad and meet with Ghazi 
Mohammad, the future president of the Republic of Kurdistan. In this meeting, according to 
Kotchera, Ghazi Mohammad described the ‘map of the Greater Kurdistan’ and asked to be 
put in contact with the British supreme command. The British officers, conversely, 
encouraged him not to pursue the topic of Kurdistan.315 Sir Reader Bullard, the British 
Ambassador in Iran stated in a letter to the Foreign Office: 
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Our [British] resolve not to encourage any Kurdish aspirations which might have unfortunate 
effect in Turkey as well as here [Iran] and in Iraq.316  
 
Disappointed by the British, the Kurds then turned toward the Soviet Union. Seeking an 
alternative in a rather desperate move, Ghazi Mohammad opened the political conversation 
with the Soviets.317    
It was the interest and priority of the Soviet Union to maintain the security of the 
Iranian areas under its protectorate and to respect the Iranian territorial sovereignty. In 
November 25, 1941, in a visit upon the invitation by Mir Jafar Baqirov,318 Prime Minister of 
the Soviet Azerbaijan, Soviet political officers in northern Iranian Kurdistan gathered some 
important Kurdish leaders and brought them to Baku as a delegation. Bullard, in his note 
regarding this journey by the Kurds to Baku, remarks, Soviet political officer collected 
Kurdish chiefs ‘from Saqqiz and Sawujbulaq areas and took them to Tabriz as “guests” and 
sent them to Baku.’319 Besides the fact that the incident had caused an international political 
issue at the time (see chapter V), the meeting of the Kurdish leaders with Baqirov in Baku is 
interesting because it raises some important points. According to Ghassemlou, whose father 
was also a member of the delegation, some 30 Kurdish chiefs, under the leadership of Ghazi 
Mohammad, who at the time was a famous political and religious figure, without a formal 
representative of a Kurdish political party or movement and with an assortment of 
incompatible ideas, visited Baku.320 Kurds in Baku made visits to, as stated by William 
Eagleton, ‘factories, theatres, farms, and cinemas [and meet] Baqirov who spoke in the 
general terms of Soviet friendship and of Kurdish-Azerbaijani brotherhood.’321  
The Kurdish delegate to Baku had discussions with mainly, cultural and political 
themes. Although behind this journey lay a political context, it was ostensibly a cultural 
delegation. In a dialogue with the Soviet Ambassador in Tehran, regarding the Kurdish 
group’s trip to Baku, Bullard notes that the Soviet diplomat affirmed that ‘visit to Baku was 
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purely cultural.’322 The purpose of the trip in actuality, according to Ghassemlou, was more 
for the Kurds and the Soviets to gett to know each other. The Soviets wanted to be acquainted 
with the Kurdish leaders and to extract any information that they could from them. The 
Kurdish leaders, on the other hand, wished to directly observe Soviet society.323 Politically, 
the conversation between Baqirov and some Kurdish leaders was, according to some writers, 
a volatile. Ghassemlou notes that the members of the delegation had returned with gladness 
and with heightened hopes for winning Kurdish rights.324 In his memoir, Haji Baba Sheikh, a 
member of the delegation to Baku and future Prime Minster of the Republic of Kurdistan, 
refers to the following exchange with Baqirov: 
 
We understood each other very well, because we both could speak the Azeri language. In the 
beginning, Ghazi Mohammad spoke of the oppression suffered by Kurds throughout history 
under different foreign authorities and eventually he told that we, as representatives of Kurds, 
expected help from the great Soviet Union. Baqirov replied that as long as the Soviet Union was 
in existence, freedom of Kurds and Azeris in Iran are guaranteed and the Soviets shall back the 
Kurdish uprising and movements. Subsequently, Baqirov announced that Kurdish areas are 
dependent on both Azerbaijan’s provinces. When I heard this statement, I answered quickly: we 
are Kurdish representatives and fight for freedom. Kurdistan is currently dependent on the 
Iranian Shah and now you want us to be a part of Azerbaijan, which is no better than falling out 
of the frying pan into the fire. If Kurds are to remain a subject people, then it is better to live 
under the control of the Shah than that of Azerbaijan. The meeting was terminated following my 
speech and we returned to home without results.325  
      
The areas under the protectorate of the British sphere, intended to protect Iraqi eastern oil 
fields such as Kirkuk, was centred on Kermanshah. For many reasons, this region was 
relatively quiet compared to the northern Iranian Kurdistan in terms of the promotion of and 
mobilization of the Kurdish ethnic nationalism. One of the reasons behind this peacefulness 
was the British policy in Kermanshah. British officers had more experience (Mesopotamia 
and India) in terms of convincing tribal chieftains to submit to the British control. Secondly, 
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Britain had functioned as a link between tribal leaders and the Iranian government and 
ensured some degrees of independence or autonomy for some tribes. This was an important 
reason that the tribes remained loyal to the central government.326 Another reason for the 
aforementioned relative calmness in Kermanshah was the somewhat feeble enthusiasm in the 
region for Kurdish ethnic nationalism. In this region Shi’ites were the predominant population 
and since ancient times Shi’ites have had a strong relationship with the central government in 
Iran. The central government was not overly concerned about the people in Kermanshah as 
they were co-religionists. But shortly after the arrival of the Allies in Iran, the uprising by 
Hama Rashid Khan Baneh spread out into the districts of Baneh, Saqqiz, Sardasht, and in the 
capital of the Kordestan Province (Sanandaj). 
 One of the main events in Iran, after the exile of Reza Shah, was the restoration of the 
tribes.327 Before the exile, many tribal leaders were in prison or had fled outside Iran. One of 
those tribal leaders was Hama Rashid Khan. Hama Rashid, chief of a section of the Baneh 
Begzadeh, had crossed the border of Iraq with some followers and gathered supporters in Iran 
in order to, according to Elphinston, establish his authority as a semi-autonomous chieftain in 
the Sardasht-Baneh-Meriwan region.328 The presence of the Soviet troops in Baneh caused 
concern on the British side. West Azerbaijan, until a line was drawn across from Ushnawiyeh 
to Miyanduab, was occupied by the Soviet forces, according to the agreed-upon borders by 
Soviets and the British. Shortly after the evacuation of the Soviet military forces in September 
1941 Hama Rashid captured Baneh.329 At the same time, the tribal chieftains of the Meriwan 
areas captured the Bashmak frontier post, thus opening the way for an eventual seizure of 
Meriwan.330  
According to Keywan Azad Anwer’s biography of Hama Rashid, in order to institute 
some form of administrative and authoritative order in the city of Baneh, Hama Rashid 
                                               
326 WO 106/5961, ‘Tribal Map 1944-45: main tribes west & north west of Kermanshah’, March 20, 1945. British 
officers spend several weeks collecting information on the socio-political situation of tribes living in 
Kermanshah regions.   
327 Kaveh Bayat, ‘Urumiyeh ve Taharokate Komiteye Najat’, [Urumiyeh and Committee Freedom’s movement], 
Goft-o-gu [dialogue], Journal on Culture and Society (No. 53, August 2009), 8. 
328 W. G. Elphinston, ‘The Kurdish Question’, Royal Institute of International Affairs (Vol. 22, No. 1, Jan. 
1946), 97. 
329 Keywan Azad Anwer, Hama Rashid Khani Baneh [Hama Rashid Khan of Baneh], (Hewler: Badir Khan 
Publishing, 2001), 77-9. 
330 Hassan Arfa, The Kurds: An Historical and Political Study (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), 67. 
 105 
appointed civil servants, including Mulla Rehimi Ghazi as the head of the court, Hama Amin 
Begi Goli as governor and Hama Amin Beg, the brother of Hama Rashid, as the chief of the 
police.331 In his declaration of intent to bring order to the city, some of the points outlined by 
Hama Rashid were as follows:  
 
Our fighters must be withdrawn from the city and beyond its limits, government officials must 
be protected by our fighters, the surrendered soldiers can decide to stay here or transfer to 
another city.332  
 
Furthermore, Hama Rashid similarly attempted to expand his authority to Saqqiz and 
Sardasht. He had captured these cities soon after Baneh. Later he gathered his troops to also 
capture Sanandaj in December 1941. According to McDowall, however, he did not go 
through with this military plan. On his way to the city, British officers strongly advised him 
against the move, and he abided their advice.333 Hama Rashid with the collaboration of 
several tribal leaders in the districts of Sardasht and Meriwan forced the Iranian government 
to formally recognize his governorate, and the weakness of the central government ensured 
the petition’s success. The Iranian government appointed Hama Rashid in May 1942 as an 
official governor of Baneh and the Iranian military units were kept outside Baneh-Sardasht 
districts.334 Actually, the Iranian administration of the time recognized Hama Rashid’s 
authority as a formal tribal semi-autonomy and Iranian government allowed monthly payment 
of thirteen thousand tomans to manage the city of Baneh.335 His governorship was recognized 
until 1944, when Hama Rashid conquered the territorial areas under the authority of Mahmud 
Khan Kanisanan in Meriwan, who had been recognized as governor there in 1941. As some 
Kurdish tribes collaborated with the Iranian army in the offensive against Hama Rashid, he 
                                               
331 Ibid., 80. 
332 Complete manifesto of Hama Rashid, see Anwer 2001, 81. This writer speculates that Hama Rashid is a 
Kurdish hero and argues that Hama Rashid is not a traitor, but that his entire life was spent serving the Kurds and 
Kurdistan. 
333 McDowall 1996, 233. 
334 Arfa 1966, 70. For details concerning the  confrontation of Hama Rashid with the Iranian government, see 
Anwer 2001, 77-109. 
335 Mohammad Hossein Khosro Panah, ‘Hezbe Tudeye Iran ve Tahawolate Kurdistan’, [the Iranian Tudeh Party 
and development in Kurdistan], Goft-o-gu No. 53, 106. 
 106 
burned Baneh and fled to Iraq.336 While Hama Rashid’s power was still expanding in southern 
Iranian Kurdistan, the situation was tumultuous in the northern part of Iranian Kurdistan, also. 
For centuries many different ethnic groups lived together in relative harmony in the 
vast expanse of the Iranian plateau, although at times conflicts broke out among certain of 
them. In the mixed communities of Kurds and Azeris in the Urumiyeh province, for example, 
tensions grew between Azeris and Kurds for three main reasons: 1 – Kurds returning home 
(those who were forcefully displaced during the reign of Reza Shah) wanted to reclaim their 
homes and property. 2 – There were hostilities between some Azeri and Kurdish communities 
that were carried over from previous periods, such as the turbulent years of 1920 and 1921, 
when Simko’s movement was at its height and asserted itself in the region as the dominant 
force, causing violent clashes between Kurdish and Azeri communities. Moreover, as Bayat 
explains, during the First World War varying allegiances between Kurds and Azeris worsened 
the polarization between these two groups.337 Many Sunni Kurdish chieftains and religious 
figures sided with the Ottomans against the Tsarist Russia. Azeris, an overwhelmingly Shi’ite 
population, on the other hand, remained loyal to the Qajar dynasty in Tehran. Due to their 
century’s long distrust and rivalry, Persians did not want to see a powerful and victorious 
Ottoman Empire along their western borders. Considering Sunni Kurds as possible Ottoman 
agents, Azeris did not think that Sunni Kurds deserved to be a part of the Iranian 
commonwealth. 3 - Most importantly, Urumiyeh is considered by many Kurds a part of the 
Kurdish homeland.  
This last point was one of the most significant causes of the crisis between Republic of 
Kurdistan and the Autonomous Government of Azerbaijan (see chapter V). The events that 
took place between 1941 and 1942 were greatly exaggerated by the Iranian media, whose 
organs continuously issued propaganda against Kurds. The Soviet representatives in 
Urumiyeh, on the other hand, tried repeatedly to calm the central government, dismissing the 
propaganda by the Iranian media and some parliament members as inaccurate and 
unnecessary agit-prop. The tribal leaders who returned home tried to regain their former 
power and territory. As Maksimov (Soviet consular in Urumiyeh) pointed out, landlords who 
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had fled the country returned asking for their land back from the tennant.338 In some cases, as 
Maksimov observed, farmers and peasants did not easily consent to returning ownership the 
lands they were living on since the landlords had not managed their properties for a long 
time.339      
 In the first half of 1942, the Urumiyeh question was a hot topic in the Iranian 
newspapers and in the parliament. The Soviet diplomats actively reported onevents 
surrounding Urumiyeh province. In May 1942, Itela’t newspaper published an article under 
the title of ‘Dangerous Situation in Rezaiyeh’. Itela’t was referring to the plundering and 
killings in Urumiyeh that were carried out by certain Kurdish tribes. Parcham newspaper 
published numerous articles about the incidents in Urumiyeh and it consistently portrayed 
Kurds as a danger to the Iranian sovereignty. Many other newspapers, such as Nahid, 
Khusheh, Siyasat, etc., reported about the region along the same line.340 Afshar, Urumiyeh 
representative in parliament, was one of the most active figures denouncing the Kurds. He 
proclaimed in the parliament:  
 
There were a number of Kurdish bands that had plundered Urumiyeh in the First World War. 
They destroyed more than three hundred Afshar villages, pillaging cattle and food. More than 
six thousand villagers had to flee to the city. Many were killed. The city itself was eventually 
surrounded by the Kurdish looters.341                          
 
Kaveh Bayat in his article, ‘Urumiyeh and Moves of Liberty Movement’,342 like many Iranian 
commentators at the time, described the Urumiyeh incidents of 1941-42 mostly from the 
perspective of Iranian media and Iranian archives, where some Kurdish tribes were portrayed 
as plunderers. Unlike the Iranian reports, which predominantly represented reality in a  
distorted and exaggerated manner, Soviet and British diplomats illustrated another perspective 
on the Urumiyeh incidents. For the most part, confidential Soviet statements reported 
Urumiyeh as one of the more peaceful regions, a that although there were some incidents, 
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these were nothing like the Iranian government’s exaggerations. As Maksimov noted in his 
travel report, written after a trip with Urquhart, the British Consul General in Tabriz, to the 
Urumiyeh province in May 1942, villages were not destroyed. We saw no looting. The 
Iranian army, on the other hand, had killed some members of the Kurdish community, who in 
turn retaliated, causing many Azeris to seek refuge in the city.'343 Maksimov and Urquhart, 
along with Marzban, the governor general of Urumiyeh, decided to resettle displaced Azeris 
in their original locations. According to certain sources, most of the trouble was provoked by 
government officers. As Bullard makes it known in a letter to Ernest Bevin, the British 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, ‘the elements of disorder are still there [northern 
Kurdistan], easily provoked by political agitators or corrupt administration.’344 Similarly, in 
one of his reports, Urquhart clearly indicates that the Iranian officers were to blame as the 
instigators of the disturbances in Urumiyeh:  
  
Sarhang (Colonel) Hashemi issued an order that Kurds must not carry arms into the town 
[Rezaiyeh …] and had started to recruit gendarmes from among the local Shi’i population and to 
arm them and the others. Undisciplined men began by killing the first Kurd they tried to disarm. 
There was a series of incidents that made the Kurds think that the Persian officers had made 
attempts to restore tyrannical control over the region.345 
 
Maksimov’s report too, to a large extent, agrees with that of Urquhart.  He additionally 
provides more details on the crisis between Azeris and Kurds. According to Maksimov, a 
group of Azeris fighters and gendarmes of Colonel Hashemi attacked a Kurdish village, 
Tumantar, and murdered six Kurds.346  
After these events the political and (especially) the economic pressures surged in the 
region. Economically, the things were already dire before the disturbances. The retaliation of 
the Kurds and the siege of Urumiyeh worsened the shortage of food supplies and other 
commodities.347 Politically, retaliatory actions, according to the Soviet consulate in 
Urumiyeh, were carried out by Kurds toward the end of April 1942. Zêro Beg Harki 
undertook the first action against the attackers of Tumantar. As the Azeris were backed by the 
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gendarmes, a number of other Kurdish leaders, such as Taher Agha, Ghadir Agha, Sheikh 
Jalil, and Gharani Agha gave support to Zêro Beg. Eventually Azeri fighters and gendarmes 
fell back and consolidated their forces in the city of Urumiyeh, while the Governor General of 
Urmiyeh retreated to Tabriz. In this battle, according to Maksimov, Kurdish fighters captured 
160 prisoners but after disarmament they were without problem released.348 Fortification 
around the town began to give way when other Kurdish leaders sent additional forces to join 
Zêro Beg. By the end of April, the Kurdish troops were estimated to be about ten thousand 
strong. In addition to this number were two hundred Iraqi Harki Kurds. Such a large quantity 
of Kurdish fighters, present around the city and ready to fight, pressured the Iranian 
representatives in Urumiyeh and Tehran to give in to some of the Kurds’ demands.349 
In May 1942, a meeting held at Urumiyeh was attended by the Chief of Police 
(Colonel Jalil), the Soviet Consul-General in Tabriz, and brigadier general Silwanov the vice 
commander of the Fifteen Red Army, as well as some Kurdish leaders. Kurdish 
representatives presented the following essential preconditions for a peace agreement: 
Schooling in Kurdish language, liberty to run their own national affairs, removal of 
gendarmerie posts from the Kurdish region. Some of these demands may be considered 
indications of budding national awareness among Kurds of their ethnic identity. The Kurds’ 
demands, according to the British Foreign Office, were formulated and recognized under the 
following eight points: 
 
1. No gendarmerie posts to exist in the Kurdish region between Khoy and Mahabad. 2. Kurds 
should be allowed to carry arms. 3. The confiscation of 1,200 rifles alleged to have been given 
to Persian villagers in the Urmiyeh district. 4. Kurds should have one representative in each of 
the government departments at Urmiyeh. 5. Kurds should enjoy freedom in their own national 
affairs. 6. The Persian government should provide schools in Kurdistan in which the Kurdish 
language would be used. 7. The return of certain specified lands to their original Kurdish 
owners. 8. The release of twenty Kurdish prisoners.350                       
 
According to the Soviet report, two more points were added to the above mentioned requisites 
by the Kurds: 1. Travel rights of Kurds in an out of the city must be respected, and 2. The 
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protection of roads and motorways must be carried out by Kurdish forces.351 Although after 
the deal was reached following these negotiations a number of small incidents took place, the 
situation in and around Urumiyeh was largely normalized. As a British representative 
remarked, in a report dated July 8, 1942, ‘in [northern] Kurdistan the situation is at present 
well in hand.’352  
The Governor General of Urumiyeh, however, did not take these demands of the 
Kurds seriously after August 1942 because the battle of Stalingrad was exploited in full power 
and the Soviet policy toward Kurds drastically changed (see chapter V). Socio-cultural and 
political activities of the Kurds were closely observed by Soviet representatives and in the 
most severe cases Kurdish political parties were prevented from being established. Therefore, 
the Kurdish nationalist political party in Iranian Kurdistan was founded in secret. The 
following section expands on this Kurdish political party. 
 
2   Formation of the JK Party 
In the first half of the twentieth century, Iranian Kurds had not established political parties or 
organized socio-political institutions that could play a major role in the Kurdish society at the 
time. They were rather politically inactive compared to Kurds in the other parts of Kurdistan. 
During Reza Shah’s period, Iranian Kurds were quiet. Kurds in Iraq and Turkey, to a large 
extent, instigated violent uprisings against newly formed governments. In Iran, however, Reza 
Shah’s policies of modernization, forced migration and settlement were on the way to 
building a territorial sovereign modern nation-state. These new governments (Iraq, Iran, Syria 
and especially Turkey353) were based on the nation-state concept, the modern way to obtain 
sovereignty. These success of these new states inspired Kurdish leaders, intellectuals, 
religious leaders and tribal chieftains to strive towards a Kurdish nation-state.354 Modern 
socio-cultural institutions and political parties are the essential components of a modern state, 
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which the Kurds saw as a necessary condition to become organized within these institutions. 
Iranian Kurds were stripped of all privileges during Reza Shah’s reign, but after the failure of 
the regime, the opportunity arose to organize themselves within certain institutions, for 
example, with the establishment of the JK political party.  
The formation of the JK party depends on several factors, with political and 
sociological factors among the most important. Of the political factors three points are crucial. 
Perhaps the most important political factor in the revival of Kurdish national aspirations was 
the disregard of Kurdish identity by the Iranian government, which gave rise to the impulse to 
assert this identity. As Abbas Vali stated, the Kurdish question in Iran is the negation issue of 
Kurdish identity and Kurdish defence towards this unawareness.355 Secondly, the rise of the 
socialist bloc from the October Revolution in 1917 offered the JK an ideological alternative 
besides capitalism. Although in the beginning the JK was a secret political party, it sought 
attention from both the Great Powers and ultimately from elected leftist politicians. Thirdly, 
the political and military activities of the Iraqi Kurds in Iran and Iraq were also a significant 
factor. Below, these three factors shall be examined more closely.  
The sociological factor that had a great impact on the JK party was the urbanization 
process. For example, in 1950 the urban population of Iran was about 27 percent of the total 
population, but it grew to 60 percent by 1996.356 Reza Shah’s policy to force some parts of the 
population to a more sedentary lifestyle brought about asome degree of increased 
urbanization. Additionally, economic transformation, namely an acceleration in 
industrialization and the subsequent massive migration of peasants and villagers to cities, in 
the beginning of the twentieth century led to an increase in urban populations.357 The rapid 
urbanization led to fundamental changes in the social structure of the Kurdish community. 
Youth, for example, moved to the cities for work and education. This resulted in a significant 
increase in the number of educated Kurds. In towns, tribal chieftains and their families came 
in contact with modern schools based on the European style of education which differed from 
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traditional education at medrese (religious schools). These tribal chieftains and their families 
became a significant component in urban politics, which centralized their political power and 
incorporated tribal chieftains into the provincial state system and economy.358 This 
transformation took place especially after the occupation of Iran by the Allied Forces.  
Predictably, members of this new urban class played a considerable role in the JK 
party, as well. Disagreement still remains among Kurdish scholars about aspects of the JK 
party, such as its date of the proclamation and the identity party’s founders. Through the 
organ journal of the JK, Nishtiman (Motherland), several confidential events could be 
discerned. However, because the JK was an unapproved party, some subjects were 
misrepresented on purpose. Names of contributing writers in Nishtiman were shortened or an 
alias was used. Many Kurdish authors accept 1942 as the foundation year of the JK. In 
confirmation of this date, Nishtiman celebrated the formation of the JK in October 1943, in an 
article titled ‘Anniversary Celebration of Komala [society, referring to the JK].’ According to 
the article ‘on Galaweji 25 [August 16], founding anniversary of the JK was celebrated and 
many members presented their report.’359 As a specific year is not mentioned in the article, 
Bulourian asserts that the JK was established in 1938 in Mahabad and subsequently opened 
several branches throughout the Kurdish region.360 Until 1941, Reza Shah had a strong 
control in Kurdish regions, especially in northern Iranian Kurdistan, where the feeling of 
Kurdishness was stronger and more widely spread. As noted by Bulourian, due to the 
domination of Reza Shah’s military forces in the Kurdish region, the JK was not able initially 
to develop as much it would later.361 On September 13, 1944, in a discussion between 
Abdulrahman Zabihi, the JK secretary, and Hassanov, the Soviet Consul-General in Tabriz, 
suggested the year 1942 as the formation year of the JK. Zabihi claimed that ‘this 
organization [the JK] has been founded approximately two years ago.’362 
The political foundation and maturation of the JK was influenced more by the Kurds 
in Iraq. In 1942, the Hiva Party in Iraqi Kurdistan sent a representative, Captain Mir Haj 
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Ahmed, to Mahabad to study the possibilities of forming a Kurdish political party and start a 
discussion about the Kurdish nation.363 According to Mohammad Shapasandi, who was a 
member of the JK and had a leading role in the distributing printed information during the 
Republic of Kurdistan, Mir Haj had a central role in the formation of the JK. During its first 
two years of the JK, Hussein Zeringeran (Froher) was the president, and Zabihi and Mulla 
Qadri Mudarresi were the important figures within the JK party.364 These city dwellers forged 
a Kurdish political party in modern Iran with an eye toward realizing their dream for an 
independent Kurdish state. In comparison to the Kurdish political parties in Turkey and Iraq 
(Azadi, Khoybun and Hiva), which had emerged from more traditional Kurdish circles with a 
specific regional and tribal orientation, the JK, whose leadership came from the urban Middle 
Class, was unique among Kurdish nationalist movements. In July 1943, the first issue of the 
journal Nishtiman was published in Tabriz by an Armenian bishopric office printing house,365 
as at the time there was no printing press in Mahabad. In this first issue, Nishtiman published 
an article titled ‘oh dear Kurdish Aghas and tribal leaders’ and followed: 
  
Use a little pragmatism and you will realize why the enemy [the Iranian government] gives you 
this money. Is it really for your happiness and freedom? No. You have enough common sense to 
realize what this money is for, and that money is never given away without strings attached. 
They know that this money will result in the postponement of independent Kurdistan. Oh 
Kurdish Aghas and tribal leaders, reject greediness so that independence of Kurdistan is not 
delayed any further.366 
            
Among the founders of the JK were civil servants, merchants, and teachers. Zabihi had a 
crucial role within the JK Party, especially in the printing of the Nishtiman. He came from a 
family of petty traders, surviving on meagre means. Shapasandi, a colleague of Zabihi, tells a 
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story of smuggling tobacco to Tabriz with Zabihi so that they could collect some money to 
print their journal, Nishtiman. As Shapasandi notes in his memoir: 
 
After the bombardment [by the Allies in 1941] of Saqqiz, many tobacco warehouses were 
plundered by local residents and the tobacco was disseminated throughout Kurdistan. At the 
time tobacco was a popular contraband trade. So we [Zabihi, Shapasandi and Mohammad 
Nazemi] decided to smuggle tobacco to Tabriz, but on the way gendarmes seized our tobacco.367 
 
The procedure to become a JK member was based on a relatively new method. According to 
Hamid Gawhari, the JK structure was based on cells, local and central committees, local 
conference and high council meeting of central committees. The JK’s central committee was 
located in Mahabad and local committees were present in: Kermanshah, Bukan, Sardasht, 
Ushnawiyeh, Arbil and Suleymaniyeh.368 The cultural and especially political activities of the 
JK were also being carried out in most cities in Iraqi Kurdistan. Ibrahim Ahmed was, for 
example, the head of the JK local committee in Suleymaniyeh.369 In general, the intra-
organizational relations among the JK the groups and units functioned properly according to 
the party agenda. Monthly meetings of local committees were held regularly, communication 
between central committee and local cells was generally in good order, and the party held its 
annual democratic conference to elect its new executive officers. In April 1943, the JK held 
its first conference near Mahabad and elected its central committee members, who were 
assigned, among other things, to distribute propaganda throughout the entire Kurdish region. 
Although the committee had no permanent chairman, it recognized Zabihi and some other 
members as the central figures within the JK party. The following passage by Eagleton 
illustrates the democratic character of the formation: 
 
The fact that only a few of the founding members of the party were elected to the Central 
Committee was indicative of the transformation of the small group of founders into a dynamic 
organization.370                    
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Ghassemlou criticises the JK’s relationships with non-Kurdish organizations. According to 
Ghassemlou, the JK ideology was ‘limited and gave no opportunity to build friendly 
relationships with non-Kurdish organizations and Iranian progressives.’371 The JK’s 
admission policies for new members were also a point of contention. Membership to the party 
was based on race and ethnic identity. An indication of the intense nationalism of the founders 
can be glimst in the requirement that membership be extended only to persons born of a 
Kurdish father and mother.372 There was actually an exception made for the Assyrians. The 
children of a Kurdish father and an Assyrian mother could also be accepted, an indication, 
according to Archie Roosevelt373, of the good relations between Kurds and Assyrians.374  
All elements within the JK party, according to Mulla Qadri Mudarresi, one of its 
founders, were totally secret. Each individual had to have a fictitious name and a number. 
New memberships had to take place according to the following procedure: the potential new 
members must, in the presence of two central committee personnel, must pledge allegiance to 
the flag, map of Kurdistan and take an oath seven times on the Koran (after performing one’s 
ablution).375 Below are the requisites for membership, which closely corresponded to the JK 
party programme: 1- Do not betray the Kurdish nation. 2- Struggle to obtain Kurdish 
independence. 3- Do not disclose any secrets of the party, either with tongue, pen or signal. 4- 
Remain a member for life. 5- Consider all Kurds, men or women, as brothers and sisters. 6- 
Never join another party or group without permission of the JK.376 The above mentioned 
viewpoints, according to Eagleton, were chosen by the JK’s founding members in 
collaboration with an Iraqi Kurd, Mir Haj.377   
The JK was ready to take a leading role in Iranian Kurdistan, especially in north. The 
rapid expansion of the party into the tribal territory between Mahabad and Saqqiz was 
complete. Most tribal chieftains in Bukan, Naqadeh, Ushnawiyeh, Mukriyan and the 
Kurmanji speaking region, which was dominated by Emer Khan Shikak, became members of 
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the JK. By 1945, as pointed out by Eagleton, the JK’s direction had become more tribal in 
character as the number of members who were tribal chieftains increased.378 Although one of 
its goals was to strive for the freedom of Kurdistan, the JK did not reach a level where it could 
be considered a national Kurdish political party, as such an entity would have had to maintain 
a clear and modern political agenda, which the JK seems to have lacked.379 The main three 
sources used to understand and interpret the JK’s social, cultural, and political ideology and 
activities between 1943-45 are: 1- Nishtiman (the JK’s only official publication), 2- An 
official letter from of the JK to the Iranian government, which was archived by the Soviet 
representatives in Iran, and 3- A letter from the JK to Mulla Mustafa Barzani. What follows is 
a chronological discussion of these three sources.  
One of the tenets of the JK ideology, that is the unity among all Kurdish entities, was 
dealt with in an article that was published in the first issue of Nishtiman. In the article, titled 
Amanji Emeh (Our Goal), the JK underlines the importance of intra-Kurd cooperation towards 
the independence of the Greater Kurdistan. The article continues as follows:  
 
The JK considers hostility among Kurds, disunity, and striving for narrow self-interests as great 
obstacles to progress. Therefore, the JK emphasises unity among Kurds and struggles for the 
liberation of Kurds and Kurdistan.380  
 
Another key position that is revealed by this article is the rejection of armed struggle and an 
emphasis on peaceful solutions for the Kurdish question. The article states: 
 
Many people suggest that the Kurdish nation can be liberated through armed struggle but the JK 
believes that they are mistaken. Kurds must realize that today armed struggle will not liberate 
us. The only way to liberation is peace and civilization, which shall build our freedom.381  
 
Within the party, the religious institution of Islam, based on Koran and Hadith (stories and 
traditions of the Prophet), and its daily ritual was considered as the norm. Bijen, pseudonym 
adopted by Zabihi, states, ‘our main pillar is planted upon the foundation of Islam.’382 The 
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religious Shari’a (Islamic law) of Islam was regarded as the mother-law and common law was 
to be adjusted according to the Shari’a. In terms of Islam as a fundamental principle for the 
JK, Nishtiman declared the following:  
 
In order to remove any misunderstandings that seem to exist about Komala, here we cite one of 
the articles of its constitution: Komala (the JK) is based on four principles: Islamism, 
Kurdishness, civilization, and peace. All laws and ordinances shall be consistent with the holy 
law of Islam, Shari’a.383 
 
The majority of the Kurdish community was and is Muslim. For this reason, Nishtiman 
devoted more attention to Islam. Under the title of ‘some articles of the Komala’s 
constitution’, Nishtiman published three important principles for the JK. Firstly, Nishtiman 
repeated the importance of Islam within the Kurdish society, ‘Komala accepts Islam as the 
official religion of Kurdistan and strives to promote it.’ The second article refers to the 
democratization process of Iran in general and of Kurdistan in particular, and it states, 
‘Komala’s principal is democracy and makes an effort to bring humanity forward.’ Finally, 
the JK sought to bring unity among Kurds and called for equality among tribes, ‘Komala does 
not distinguish among Kurdish tribes, great or small, and strives to further brotherhood among 
all Kurds.’384 The majority of articles in the Nishtiman were concentrated on two significant 
subjects: the religion of Islam and the Kurds’ attempts as an oppressed ethnic group to 
liberate themselves and build an independent Kurdistan.  
The above-discussed social and political prominence of religion and some viewpoints 
that relate to the JK party programme are studied below using following two methods. The 
first method involves the close study of articles published in the Nishtiman. The second 
method is the study of the letter that was sent to the Iranian government by the JK, which was 
archived by the Soviet representatives in Iran. 
During the Second World War, the JK presented a general declaration to the Iranian 
government on the Kurds’ behalf. In 1944, Khalil Fahimi, an advisor to the Iranian Prime 
Ministry, visited the Kurdish region. Mahabad was the most important destination of his visit. 
According to Zabihi, who held a discussion with Hassanov, it was a good occasion to present 
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a petition to Fahimi regarding a peaceful solution for the Kurdish issue. The petition included 
the following formal requests: 
  
1- The official language in Kurdistan must be Kurdish. 2- Education at schools and writing in 
administrative matters in Kurdistan must be based on the Kurdish language. 3- A minimum of 
two hours must be allocated for Kurdish programmes at the Tehran radio.385 
 
According to Qoliyov, the Soviet vice-council in Tabriz, the JK had two aims: a) Autonomy 
for all parts of Kurdistan while the war (WWII) continued, and b) independence for Kurdistan 
after the war.386  
Besides submitting the abovementioned petition to the Iranian government, the JK 
also took initiative and organized its own convention. According to magazine Roji Nuw (new 
day), The Central Committee of the JK held a conference in 1944 and made the following 
decisions:  
 
(a) After the end of the war, the independence of Kurdistan shall be proclaimed. (b) The borders 
of this state shall include Baneh and Saqqiz in the south, the Dalan Per mountain on the border 
of Turkey, and from West Maku to the west and south of Lake Urumiyeh up to the Afshar 
region in the north. (c) The regime of the country shall be republic. (d) In order to protect the 
country, an official military force shall be instituted. (e) The struggle for the liberation of other 
parts of Kurdistan shall continue.387  
 
As part of the effort to implement the last point, the JK signed a treaty with the Hiva Party of 
Iraqi Kurdistan. The treaty, known as Sê Sinor (Three Borders) was one of the most important 
events in the history of Kurdish nationalist movements. It was signed in 1944 after a three-day 
meeting in Dalan Par (a mountain range along the borders of Iraq, Iran, and Turkey). 
Cooperation between both parties, unity among Kurds and the liberation of Kurdistan were 
the essential goals of this assembly. As the Nishtiman pointed out: 
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Long before this the JK and Hiva wanted to hold a conference. After three days of dialogue and 
negotiation we signed an agreement, and called it Sê Sinor. This was intended to increase 
political cooperation between both parties.388 
 
Some authors believe that the presence of representatives from other parts of Kurdistan, 
Turkey389 and Syria390 at the Sê Sinor meeting intensified the feeling of unity among Kurds 
and their commitment to cooperate for the liberation of Kurdistan.391 The JK made another 
attempt at political participation by cooperating with other parts of Kurdistan during the 
Barzani uprising in 1943-45 against the Iraqi government. The JK officially offered its 
support to Barzani’s movement in an article published in Nishtiman, the article states: 
 
This war that is waged under the command of the great Kurdish leader (Mulla Mustafa Barzani), 
is unique because it brings together Kurds of all backgrounds.392   
 
A formal letter from the JK to Barzani, archived at the British National Archives in London, 
makes up the third method through which the JK’s political and ideological line is analyzed in 
this document. The letter consists of nine points but mainly it comprises a series of questions 
to get more information about Barzani’s movement and encouragement to convince Barzani 
to expand his uprising with the aim of the liberation of Greater Kurdistan. This way, the JK 
advised, all Kurds could participate in the uprising of Barzani. A summarized version of the 
letter is as follows: 
 
We [the JK] congratulate the successful struggle for the liberation of Kurdistan and its leader. 
With hopes to establish unity with you as compatriots, we request the following information: I) 
What is the purpose of your uprising? Is it an effort to liberate only Iraqi Kurdistan or the 
Greater Kurdistan? II) What is your position vis-à-vis political outsider [Britain] in Iraq? III) We 
propose that you generalize your uprising, in other words, aim for the liberation of Greater 
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Kurdistan, and form a Kurdish military force, in which all Kurds may take part. For this end, we 
propose that we organize a joint conference in order to come up with a national treaty and draw 
the parameters of joint Kurdish military force. IV) Furthermore please provide us with 
information regarding the situation of your fighters, of the enemy, and of Kurdish tribes that 
collaborate with the enemy. V) To liberate Kurdistan, support from one of the Great Powers is 
important. We [the JK] prefer the Soviets. What is your opinion regarding this matter? VI) What 
is the position of Britain with regard to your uprising? VII) Iranian Kurds are behind you and are 
ready to support your revolt to turn it into a national Kurdish movement.393 
 
Concerning this letter, Noshirwan Mustafa Emin394 expressed his doubts about its 
authenticity, formulated in three questions, and requested that the letter be further analyzed. 
The answers of Mustafa Emin’s three questions, actually, can be found at the British Archives 
and it is very likely that they are for the first time published in this dissertation. Below are the 
questions posed by Mustafa Emin and the corresponding answers found at the British 
Archives.  
1- How did the British Archives get hold of the concerned letter?  
The letter reached the British Embassy in Iraq via the Iraqi Ministry of Interior through 
cooperation of some Kurdish tribal leaders in Iraq and Iran. Below is a description, by the 
then Iraqi Ministry of Interior, of the route that the letter followed:  
 
The letter in question has been sent by Kaka Abdallah ibn Kaka Hamza brother of Qarni Agha 
Chief of Mamish tribe in Persia through a person from Girdi tribe called Hassan. That said 
person brought the letter to Ahmad Beg Girdi resident of Bradost Nahiya and the delivered it to 
the S.H.O. of Sidekan who sent it on to me [Iraqi Ministry of Interior] with Ahmad Beg.395                                  
 
2- How is it that the written language in the letter is different than the dialect of Mukriyan, 
which was used in Nishtiman and in the proclamations of the JK?  
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As mentioned above, many Iraqi Kurdish intellectuals, officers, religious figures, and 
merchants travelled to Iranian Kurdistan. One of the reasons for this inflow was to participate 
in Kurdish political activities under the leadership of the JK. Kurds who were formerly 
officers of the Iraqi government played especially important roles. Likely the letter was 
written by one of these officers. Confirming this ssupposition, the British Ambassador in Iraq 
reported that: 
 
The working of several sentences indicated Arabic phraseology. It is thought that some of the 
renegade Army Officers now with the Komalla [the JK] in Saujbulagh may have assisted in the 
drafting of the letter to Mulla Mustafa.396  
 
3- The letter’s content (questions and arguments) is not consistent with the JK’s ideological 
frame.  
In this regard, the date appearing on the letter must be taken into consideration. The 
letter is dated as 9-6-1324, which corresponds to August 31, 1945, a date more than couple 
months after May 9, 1945, when the Second World War ended. As it was mentioned earlier, 
one of the strategic goals of the JK was the independence of Greater Kurdistan after the war. 
We should consider the change in the JK’s attitude towards armed struggle for the liberation 
of Kurdistan in light of their aim for the independence after the war. It is a given that the 
establishment of a regular military force is foreseen as part of an independent Kurdistan.397 
Following the end of the war, interestingly, the JK ceased its political activities and eventually 
renamed itself the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). Included in this transformation was a 
change in the JK’s principles toward a clearly defined programme. The following section will 
look deeper into this transformation as well as into the KDP. 
         
3   Formation of the KDP 
There are two different opinions about the exact date of the formation of the KDP.  
Ghassemlou398 and current leaders of the KDP all claim that the KDP was established on 
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August 16, 1945.399 They refer to the days and months of the founding of the JK and suggest 
that the KDP formed later as it was based on the initial groundwork of the JK. Another line of 
opinion, which is supported by the Soviets, Europeans, Iranians and some Kurds, contends 
that the KDP was founded under the leadership of Ghazi Mohammad after his second visit to 
Baku in September 1945. The formal declaration of the KDP took place in October 1945 at 
their first conference and their political programme was released soon after in November of 
that very year. The latter line of reasoning about the date is the most logical. In order to refer 
to this last quarter of 1945 in Iranian Kurdistan, it is first necessary to discuss some 
significant events that occurred from the beginning of 1945 until the proclamation of the 
KDP. In this period, there was tremendous growth in the political agenda of Ghazi 
Mohammad, the future president of the Republic of Kurdistan and also of the KDP.     
In February 1945, the last remaining policemen of the Iranian central government 
were disarmed in Mahabad and five of them were slain by the Kurds. As the British Consul-
General in Tabriz reported, ‘on February 15, crowds of Kurds attacked the police station in 
Mahabad and five policemen and one Kurd were killed.’400 After this incident, the Kurds had 
complete authority over the city. Following this, Hashimov, the Soviet Consul in Urumiyeh, 
visited Sari’ulkalam, the Mahabad Governor. The Governor may have claimed that the only 
powerful religious and political figure in Mahabad was Ghazi Mohammad. Sari’ulkalam 
claimed, ‘I am officially the governor but after the incident in February, Ghazi effectively has 
more influence in Mahabad.’401 Although Ghazi played an effective role in Mahabad and was 
respected in Kurdish areas, his role was mostly based on religious affinities. Gradually he 
became a political leader and became more inclined to govern the Kurdish community, 
especially when his official membership was proferred by the JK.  
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The fall of Nazi Germany was clearly slower than expected and the Allies were 
preparing their activities for international conferences to summon support for their cause, it 
relate to post-war reorganization in Europe and the Middle East. At the same time in 1945, the 
JK realized the imminent problem posed by the lack of an influential leader in their midst. 
The JK had already announced that Agha, Sheikh and the chieftains were not eligible for 
leadership,402 but circumstances dictated that tribal chiefs and religious components would 
indeed play a decisive role within Kurdish society in Iran. By the time the membership 
conferred on Ghazi, the JK leaders were already divided into two groups. Some leaders 
wanted to accept the membership of Ghazi because he was a famous figure, and the JK would 
progress well under him. The other group was reluctant because they saw Ghazi as a 
totalitarian leader and feared that the JK’s democratic character would disappear. Eventually, 
with conditional membership acceptance according to certain membership rules, Ghazi was 
elected as a member of the JK and he was attributed the secret name of Binayi.403 The 
admission of Ghazi to the JK also coincided with three significance events. While there are 
varying opinions on the exact date of Ghazi’s acceptance into the JK404 it can be safely 
estimated to have occured during the first quarter of 1945. Concurrent to the resolution of the 
membership date of Ghazi in the JK, it is also necessary to synchronize of following events: 
the accomplishment of the Kurdish opera called Daiki Nishtiman (the Motherland), the public 
announcement of the JK and the foundation of the Anjomani Farhangi Kurdistan u Shuravi 
(the Kurdistan-Soviet Cultural Relationship Society). 
The role of the theater in this case can be seen as one of the instruments for the 
propagation of the nationalist sentiment among the people. The Kurdish nationalist movement 
under the leadership of the JK produced a stream of cultural events with a strong Kurdish 
nationalistic flavour. One of the most famous was Daiki Nishtiman, the aforementioned opera. 
According to Bulourian, Zabihi presented the libretto of the opera to them and suggested that 
this text be used as a vehicle for national political agitation.  Thereafter the central committee 
of the JK turned more and more to the theatre as an important tool to encourage and stimulate 
the public participate in the political activity of the JK.405 Mir Haj thought that the origins of 
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this opera were most probably transported from the Iraqi Kurdistan.406 The opera had a simple 
story with a clear nationalist message and it was preformed for forty days in Mahabad and in 
some free zones in the Kurdish cities. It was particularly aimed at the general Kurdish 
population, of which the majority was illiterate (Ghassemlou pointed out that 95 percent of 
the Iranian Kurdish population in 1945 were illiterate).407 A brief description and summary of 
the opera is presented here. It featured a woman called Daiki Nishtiman, who was in danger 
and called for her sons to liberate her -- a coded nationalist message against the Iranian 
government. In March 1945408, a group of young party members performed the Daiki 
Nishtiman opera in the presence of many Kurdish leaders and Soviets politicians and officers. 
Bulourian played one of the roles in the five act opera, which went as follows: 
 
Act I: An angel in white and long wings enters and reads a poem of Haji Ghadir Koyi409. Act II: 
The 1937 complot when Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan signed a treaty in Sa’dabad is 
portrayed. The treaty crystalized cooperation against the Kurdish movements. In this act four 
actors represent the role of the Kurdish folk in these four countries by showing the oppressive 
circumstances of the Kurds in these different lands and the need for their defence. Act III: a 
white-haired woman called ‘Daiki Nishtiman’ [the Motherland], who is very weak, wears a 
black dress is held fast by an iron chain. While she remains motionless, she calls to her children 
in a plaintive voice to liberate her from cruel captivity. Daiki Nishtiman describes how she had 
been suffering agony and pain at the hands of the Kurdish enemies and, with a doleful groan yet 
nonetheless full of hope, reads the verses of Haji Ghadir Koyi. Act IV: Daiki Nishtiman still 
enchained continues to call upon her children. Suddenly, her children enter the stage with 
weapons in hand the Russian military at their side to liberate their mother from her iron chains. 
Daiki Nishtiman embraces her children in happiness. Act V: The vision of representative 
democracy in the new Kurdish state is dramatized by the people directly electing their president, 
prime minister and cabinet ministers.410                   
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Contrary to Bulourian’s accounts mentioned here, both Eagleton and Roosevelt, (most current 
writers use the sources of these two Western authors) fail to give a clear and accurate recount 
of the first performance of the Daiki Nishtiman opera. According to further accounts by 
Bulourian, Ghazi Mohammad came onto the stage at the end of the performance and made an 
historical speech voicing the aspiration for the liberation of the Kurdish people. He called for 
unity and cooperation among the various Kurdish groups. He also gave examples from 
Kurdish liberation movements before and after the First World War as precedent to stimulate 
and encourage the Kurdish society in the direction of freedom and self-government in Iranian 
Kurdistan.411 During and after this performance of Daiki Nishtiman, the JK announced its 
existence publicly for the first time since its formation in 1942. This was a direct consequence 
of their ability to remove the Iranian administration in Mahabad in February 1945. After 
Ghazi became a member of the JK and played a more active role within the party, the liberal 
sections gained a stronger footing versus tribal chiefs, bringing the party politics closer to 
ordinary Kurdish society.412 
The Soviet VOKS413, Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, had 
established several associations in Iran, and also had a Kurdish branch in Mahabad. The JK 
leaders had spent a lot of time plan a Kurdish-Soviet Cultural Relationship Society and finally 
completed it in early 1945. Hashimov reported, ‘on April 18, 1945, I and colleague Sharivov 
went to Mahabad to establish a cultural relations society.’414 His first meeting was with 
Sari’ulkalam, the governor of Mahabad, and after discussions about some issues of concern to 
them, (such as the role of Ghazi Mohammad in Mahabad and the JK activities), they visited 
Ghazi. Hashimov wrote that ‘our conversation with Ghazi covered several topics, but Ghazi 
mainly addressed the pivotal political issue of independence for Kurdistan.’415 Afterwards 
Ghazi said:  
 
We are pleased with the arrival of the Red Army in Iran because through their support the Kurds 
have obtained total freedom. All the people and nations in the world dreamed of ending this war. 
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But the Kurds were worried with the receding of the Allied forces and the termination of this 
war the Iranian government might once again control the Kurdish areas. We do not want the 
presence of the Iranian military in Mahabad.416 
 
The visit of Soviet representatives to Mahabad and their meeting with Ghazi Mohammad 
legitimized Ghazi as the absolute leader of the JK party. He was able to make an appearance 
as a superior representative of the JK, which was the only political party in the Kurdish area at 
the time. Ghazi explained that the JK needed a ‘strong and intellectual Soviet envoy to 
support and inform the Soviet government of the events in Kurdistan and of the JK 
activities.’417 However, the Soviets were not interested in the political issues of the Kurds, 
particularly not in Ghazi’s proposed political schemes, which can be gathered from their 
comment that ‘we cannot determine or decide your questions.’418 It was instead a cultural 
journey to Mahabad and they said that ‘our intention is towards an open cultural society.’419 
And eventually the Soviet Consul in Urumiyeh established a formal Kurdish-Soviet, and a 
‘not Iranian-Soviet’, Cultural Relationship Society in Mahabad on April 18, 1945 and elected 
Ghazi Mohammad as president and Mohammad Kaywanpor as vice-president. On this day, 
Kurdish poets composed verses, mostly praiseworthy, about the Soviet Union.420  
The second visit of the Kurdish delegate to Baku in September 1945 probably ended 
the political activities of the JK. This second visit of the delegates was organized by Capitan 
Namazaliev, a Soviet representative in Miyanduab (a town nearby Mahabad)421, together with 
General Atakchiov, the chief Soviet political officer in Azerbaijan.422 This second meeting 
had a political agenda, in contrast with the first visit which had an ostensibly cultural nature. 
Ghazi had conversations with Baqirov on various topics, including that of the Kurdish 
political question, maintenance facilities, military requirements, sending Kurdish students to 
Baku and the establishment of a printing press. Baqirov explained their stance on the question 
of the military facilities and some other related issues by saying that ‘we sent tanks, cannons 
and machine guns to Mahabad and promised to financially support and make place for some 
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Kurdish students on the Baku Military College.’423 A more sensitive political issue focused on 
the existence of the JK. According to Baqirov, ‘the JK was created by the British intelligence 
and was meant to operate as an instrument of British imperialism.’ With the triumph of 
democracy, the focus for Baqirov laid in the democratization processes and suggested the 
need for reform within the JK if it wanted to be a real democratic political party.424  
There is no official document to confirm the dissolution or the replacement of the JK 
by the KDP, but memoirs of some participants in the Republic of Kurdistan, like those of 
Hêmin’s, confirm that a replacement occurred. Reforms and a clear program for a new party 
were essential steps that the Kurdish leaders had achieved after the end of the Second World 
War. As stated by Hêmin, a group of the JK intellectuals agreed that the JK’s programs could 
scarcely be adjusted to the conditions that Kurdistan and world required at that time. It was 
common knowledge that the most important ideology or principle of the JK was the struggle 
for the independence of Greater Kurdistan. This was a thorny issue for the Soviets, which 
may have led them to adopt measures to weed out the JK. According to Komisarov, the Soviet 
Consul in Urumiyeh, the JK was an English protégé, therefore the Soviets aimed to stop such 
British influence so close to their national borders. In September 1945, Baqirov invited 
several Kurdish leaders, under the leadership of Ghazi Mohammad, to Baku. 
The journey of the Kurdish delegate to Baku could perhaps mark the beginnings of the 
dissolution of the JK and the creation of a new political party, which must be build more 
stronger connections with the Soviets. In October 1945, after the Baku meeting in September, 
Ghazi Mohammad and other Kurdish leaders proclaimed a new political party, named the 
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). On December 6, 1945, Kurdistan, which began as a 
journal, but after the proclamation of the Republic of Kurdistan, became a newspaper, 
confirmed the formation of the KDP and wrote as follows, ‘in the beginning of Khazalwer 
(Aban) 1324 [October 1945], the Kurdistan Democratic Party was formed in Mahabad.’425 
This resulted in the dissolution of the JK and the absorption of its members into the KDP. 
Hêmin also claimed that the KDP was formed on the JK’s principles and without hesitation or 
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opposition the majority of the JK members accepted the new party with the selection of Ghazi 
Mohammad as the president of the KDP.426               
On the same day as the formation of the KDP, a formal declaration, signed by Ghazi 
Mohammad, was published. The declaration especially underlined two points:  1. Request for 
the autonomy of the Kurdish people, which also called for a greater political participation by 
Kurdish people in Iranian political processes. 2. Request for the acceleration of full 
institutionalization of democracy in Iran, with special reference to the respect for the rights of 
ethnic groups. The second request was expressed in the light of the defeat of Nazis and the 
victory of the Allied forces. The declaration referred to the Articles of the Treaty of Atlantic 
Charter, especially Article three: ‘they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of 
government under which they will live.’ It was signed by the US and the Great Britain on 
August 14, 1941 (see appendix I for the Articles of this Treaty and chapter V for the 
discussion on this topic).  
One can easily identify traits of the primordial theory of nationalism in this declaration 
as it stressed the historical struggle of the Kurdish movements for freedom.  In general, it 
summarized the development of the Kurdish nationalist movement in Iran under the KDP’s 
eight principles and through the guidance of Ghazi Mohammad. The original declaration was 
published in Kurdish and Persian (see appendix III). The most recent translation, which was 
done by the British National Archives, may be a faithful translation, but it needs some 
tweaking from the original text to date. The declaration in its entirety went as follows: 
 
                 In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful 
                    Declaration of the Democratic Party of Kurdistan 
 Countrymen and Brethren: 
The valiant soldiers of our great Allies have extinguished the fire of the World War, lit by the 
enemies of freedom and antidemocrats. The democratic world was victorious and the fascist 
world which wanted to subdue and force all people and world nations under a few thugs for ever 
vanquished and defeated. This has opened the way for the liberation of the people and world 
nations.  
Today all world nations from great to small wish to take advantage of the way open to them and 
of the promises set forth in the historic Atlantic Charter to administer their affairs in the manner 
they choose. 
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We, the Kurds who live in Iran and who have fought for years and even for centuries in order to 
preserve our national and local rights, have sacrificed many lives to this end. Unfortunately, the 
despotic Iranian authorities have never been ready to listen to our arguments, even though they 
are reasonable. They have even prevented us from taking advantage of the rights set forth in the 
constitutional laws in connection with the Iranian provinces and cities and the answers to our 
questions have always come in the form of bullets, bombs, imprisonment, banishment, execution 
and captivity. This was especially the case during the twenty years reign of Reza Khan when we 
were not even free to put on our own tribal clothes. Our property was wrested from us by the 
dishonest and treacherous officers at the point of the bayonet and our women disgracefully 
attacked. They did not even refrain from taking savage steps for our extermination. After all we 
are also human beings. We have a history and a language, we too have customs and traditions 
and we are greatly interested in their upkeep. Why our rights must be trampled? Why are we not 
permitted to manage our own house as we desire? Why are we not allowed to bring up our 
children to speak Kurdish? Why do they not let Kurdistan become an independent province 
administered by a Provincial Council for which a provision was made in the Constitutional law. 
Dear Countrymen, it should be pointed out that rights are not given but taken. We must fight to 
receive our national and local rights. This struggle necessarily requires unity, organization and 
leaders.  
It is for this sacred aim that the Kurdish Democratic Party has been established in Mahabad and 
it is beginning to work towards attaining these goals. Our dear Countrymen, you should open 
your eyes and ears and gather round the Party that makes sacrifices for our legal rights. The 
Kurdistan Democratic Party is your leader and guide and it is only through the leadership of this 
Party that the Kurdish Nation will be saved from annihilation, and its wealth, women and 
national reputations would be protected. It is this Party which will be able to secure its national 
independence within the borders of Iran. 
Our countrymen, our only request is that of human rights, our slogans have been summarized in 
the points below. Read them and understand Kurdish nation.      
 
Our eight slogans: 
1. The Kurds must be free and independent in the management of their local affairs and they 
should receive Kurdish autonomy within the borders of Iran.  
2. The Kurds must be allowed to study Kurdish and to administer their affairs in the Kurdish 
language. 
3. Members of the Kurdistan Provincial Council should be elected immediately in accordance 
with the Constitutional laws, to supervise all public and Government works. 
4. Government officials should be appointed from among the local population. 
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5. By the passing of a general law, the grievances existing between the farmers and the 
landowners should be resolved and their future positions defined. 
6. The Democratic Party of Kurdistan should make special efforts to create complete unity and 
brotherhood between the nation of Azerbaijan and the different groups of people who live in 
Azerbaijan (Assyrian, Armenians, and so on). 
7. The Democratic Party of Kurdistan will fight to take advantage of the boundless natural 
wealth of Kurdistan and to improve the agriculture, commerce, education and health of 
Kurdistan, in order to secure economic and moral welfare for the Kurds. 
8. The inhabitants of Iran should be able to work for their freedom and for the welfare and 
progress of their country.427 
                            Long-live Kurdistan, Autonomous and Democratic   
           
The aims of the Kurdistan Democratic Party for the Kurdish society were clearly propagated 
in its program.428 For dissemination and communization of their program, the KDP organized 
a conference. As the journal Kurdistan pointed out on December 6, 1945, ‘in 1324-8-2 [24-
10-1945], the KDP had their first conference with the presence of some leading Kurdish 
representatives.’429 Many regional Kurdish leaders were present at this conference:  
 
Maku and Ararat, Salmas-Bradost-Dasht and Margawer, Ushnawiyeh, Sindos [Naqadeh], 
Lahijan, Piran, Bukan, Manguri, etc., and the local committee was elected at this conference.430  
 
The program of the KDP was proclaimed at this conference, and was disseminated 
afterwards. According to Mahmud Mulla Izzat, the KDP was the first Kurdish party at the 
time of the Kurdish struggle in the Iranian part of Kurdistan, that had a clear program which 
was in service of the Kurdish society.431 This program had four main parts and twenty-two 
articles and a summary, it went as follows:  
 
                                               
427 Saleh, Rafiq & Sadiq Saleh (eds.), Rojnameyi Kurdistan: Mahabad 1324-1325 Hetawi (1946) [the journal of 
Kurdistan, Mahabad, 1946], (Suleymani: Binkai zhin, 2007), 351-5; FO 371/45436, ‘Declaration of the 
Democratic Party of Kurdistan’, November 8, 1945. 
428 Mulla Izzat 2003, 115.  
429 Journal Kurdistan, No. 1, 6 December 1945, 11. For names of participants at this conference, see ibid. 
430 Ibid., 11-7. 
431 Mulla Izzat 2003, 116. 
 131 
Part one: 1- The name of party is the Kurdistan Democratic Party. 2- The party principles are 
based on these elements: truthfulness, fairness and civilization. 3- A pen and cornflowers is the 
symbol of the party. Part two: 4- At this moment, the party’s aim is protecting the people’s 
rights and autonomy within the borders of Iran. Consultation with the people in Kurdistan must 
be based on democratic principles and rights should be obtained without differences between 
religion and ethnic groups in order to elect memberships of the Provincial Council. 5- 
Development of democracy based on struggle for human victory is the goal of the party. 6- 
There is no enmity between the party and central government, but it fights for the Kurdish 
people to sustain peace, cultural development, wealth and agriculture. Part three: 7- Organize 
tax collection and its equal redistribution within Kurdistan. 8- First step of the national 
government is the construction of the country and for this reason, not more than three percent of 
the income obtained from the Kurdish regions should be given to the central government. 9- All 
officials in the Kurdish region must be Kurds and the official governmental language will be 
Kurdish. 10- The party fights for the development of new techniques for agriculture. 11- 
Construction and building motorways for villagers. 12- Protection of the economy, culture and 
political lives of the people of Kurdistan without discrimination. 13- Dissemination of the 
sciences and civilization among the people in Kurdistan and teaching Kurdish language at 
schools. 14- Improve the people’s lives. 15- Returning Kurdish officials, who work in other 
parts of Iran, back to the Kurdish region. 16- Conduct economic and cultural relations with other 
countries, especially with the Soviet Union, in the Kurdish natioinal interest.17- Participate if 
possible in United Nations meetings to defend the Kurdish rights and autonomy. 18- The 
Kurdish autonomous government has the right to use natural resources. Part four: 19- 
Guarantee the people ways to economically empower themselves in order to better the lives of 
the people in Kurdistan. 20- Develop the economy of Kurdistan and establish factories in all 
Kurdish cities. 21- Women have similar rights as men, in all political and economic aspects. 22- 
Give total rights to the minorities in Kurdistan, for example the Assyrians, Armenians and 
Azeris.432  
 
The proclamation of the KDP was synchronized with one of the most significant events in the 
entire history of the Republic of Kurdistan, namely the entrance of Mulla Mustafa Barzani 
and his followers into Iranian Kurdistan. It is known that Barzani’s struggle for the 
establishment of Kurdish rights between 1943-45 in Iraq not only had an effective role in 
Iraqi Kurdistan but it also appeared to be of crucial importance to the political and military 
issues in the Republic of Kurdistan.  
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According to the British and Soviet reports,  more than two thousand Barzani families 
under the leadership of Sheikh Ahmed and Mustafa Barzani crossed from Iraq to Iranian 
Kurdistan between 10-13 October 1945.433 Hashimov reported, ‘it was the British plan which 
stimulated Mustafa Barzani to enter Iranian territory.’434 The British also accused Barzani of 
carrying out espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union and they said that ‘Barzani may be [is 
an] instrument of the Soviet penetration and the raid into Persian territory may have been 
intended as dust in our eyes.’435 In the summer of 1945, Barzani was at war with the Iraqi 
government and in this period, he sent a letter to Stalin and Molotov asking for support for 
their movement against the central government. ‘It is clear for the Iraqi Kurds,’ according to 
Barzani, ‘that the British tried to remove the Iraqi Kurds, but the main aim of our struggle is 
to obtain Kurdish demands.’436 Zatisv, the Soviet Consul General in Bagdhad, at the time, 
also claimed that the British promise of the solution of the Kurdish issue with the Iraqi 
government was not implemented because the Kurds were suppressed.437 In a conversation 
that took place on October 17, 1945, between Barzani and Lobov, the Brigadier General of 
Soviet Fifteenth Army, Barzani claimed that the ‘struggle for our rights must be continued 
and your support is necessary for our liberation. After settlement of our children, we will 
continue the war against the Iraqi government.’438 Barzani placed special importance on 
participation in the KDP’s political activities and he asked the Soviet officers’ permission to 
do so. The settlements of the Barzanis accompanied by the Iranian Kurds in Ushnawiyeh, 
Naqadeh and other districts of the province Urumiyeh,439 were under the observation of 
Soviet officers. One of the motives behind close surveillance of Barzani by the Soviets was 
the Soviets’ suspicion of Barzani as a British spy.440 For about five months, Barzani was 
under the control of the Soviets. Colonel Bakir Hewezi, an Iraqi Kurd officer and commander 
of the front Sardasht-Baneh during the Republic of Kurdistan claimed that ‘in December 
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1945, I was with some Barzanis, including Sheikh Ahmed in Mahabad and had to leave 
Mahabad on Soviets orders.’441 There was also a lack of warm relations between Barzani and 
Ghazi Mohammad at that period, possibly due to Soviet pressure on Ghazi.  
Cold weather, illness, dreadful living conditions, and particularly reduced food 
supplies had a negative effect on the Barzanis. A request of Barzani was explained by Hewezi 
by saying that ‘Barzani called me one day and said that I knew that no one helped the 
Barzanis and that only Barzani himself had maintained them although now there was no 
money left.’442 The British Embassy in Bagdhad reported, ‘the Shikak are said to have 
collected 50.000 tomans for relief of Mulla Mustafa’s peoples.’443 Some claim that Barzani 
had requested amnesty from the Iraqi government for his return.444 According to Ibrahim 
Ahmed, Barzani sent a letter to Ali Baba, son of Sheikh Mahmud, to mediate with the Iraqi 
government for his return.445 The deteriorating situation of the Barzanis in Iranian Kurdistan 
called for a response from the Kurds in Suleymaniyeh. Sheikh Latif and many intellectuals in 
Suleymaniyeh and some Kurdish tribal leaders in Iraq and Iran put pressure on Ghazi 
Mohammad to offer help to the Barzanis. Ghazi would have done well to accept Barzani as a 
representative of all Iraqi Kurds, as someone who could play a decisive role in the Republic 
of Kurdistan.446 However, Barzani was not given any responsibility until March 1946 to 
organize political activity for the Barzanis or for the KDP under the leadership of Ghazi 
Mohammad. Barzani participated in the celebration of the proclamation of the Republic of 
Kurdistan on 22 January 1946, but afterwards he returned back to Ushnawiyeh. In March, 
Barzani entered to Mahabad and he promised to be a servant of the Republic.447 The 
newspaper Kurdistan, claimed that the first formal meeting of Barzani with Ghazi 
Mohammad took place in March 1946.448 In the beginning, Barzani offered support to the 
KDP. Three thousand men approximately twelve hundred of whom were directly under the 
command of Barzani, pledged allegiance to the Kurdish nationalist struggle in this first 
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meeting with Ghazi Mohammad in March 1946.449 With Barzani’s forces there were also 
several chieftains, teachers, intellectuals (Hamze Abdullah) and many Iraqi Kurdish officers, 
such as Mir Haj Ahmad, Mustafa Khoshnaw, Jalal Amin, Khayrollah Abdulkarim, Nuri 
Ahmad Taha and Mohammad Qudsi.450    
In November and early December of 1945, all Azerbaijani provinces of the west 
(Urumiyeh) and the east (Tabriz) openly rebelled against the Iranian central government. In 
Tabriz, under the guidance of the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan (DPA), the democrats 
attacked the Iranian military garrison and forced it to surrender. In December, eastern 
Azerbaijan and the capital of western Azerbaijan, Urumiyeh, were dominated by the newly 
formed ‘Autonomous Government of Azerbaijan’ (see chapter V). The establishment of the 
Azerbaijan government in Tabriz indicated, according to Roosevelt, that Ghazi Mohammad 
was going to declare his own autonomy.451 On 17 December 1945, the KDP representatives 
were driven out of the remaining Iranian municipal offices in Mahabad, and the Kurdish flag 
replaced the Iranian flag. The journal Kurdistan celebrated this day and stated: 
 
In Sarmaweze 26 [December 17], all Kurdish representatives were assembled at the central 
committee of the KDP in Mahabad at 10:00 o’clock. The Kurdish leaders raised the Kurdish flag 
in the presence of 10.000 people.452  
 
The Kurdish flag was hanging at full staff in several Kurdish towns, including Bukan, 
Naqadeh and Ushnawiyeh. This was one of the images of the political ideology of Kurdish 
nationalism which prepared the way for a self-ruling government. It is essential to know the 
socio-political meanings of the colours of this flag. In the newspaper Kurdistan, Mohammad 
Qudsi explained that the colours of the flag of Kurdistan stood for: 
  
Red colour is a symbol of the struggle and conquest for the Kurds, white symbolizes peace and 
human beauty for the Kurds, green stood for the devotion toward grain prevalent in Kurdistan, 
two gold and silver cornflowers symbolized the farmer’s importance towards the economic 
construction of the country, and a pen stands for education and science.’453  
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Between red and green was the white colour and in the middle of the white was the half of a 
sun, with a pen above it, covered on both sides with two yellow cornflowers and the words 
the government of the Republic of Kurdistan was written above all.454       
Kurdistan Democratic Party was moving towards political independence and 
organized and advocated for a possible struggle for Kurdish self-government. Around the end 
of December 1945, KDP leaders visited the British Consul General in Tabriz for the possible 
establishment of a Kurdish government and create a friendly relationship, but they returned 
empty-handed. On the other side of Tabriz, Ghazi Mohammad discussed the Kurdish 
aspiration with Ja’far Pishevari, Prime Minister of the Autonomous Government of 
Azerbaijan, and several Soviet officers.455 However, just before his return, Ghazi Mohammad 
collected the KDP leaders for the preparation of a historical day, namely the proclamation of 
the Republic of Kurdistan. 
 
4   Formation of the Republic of Kurdistan 
Before the end of the Second World War on May 9, 1945, the San Francisco Conference in 
April had been organized to explore the possibility of the establishment of the UN. This was a 
historical opportunity for Kurdish nationalism to present their national aspiration. A Kurdish 
nationalist group (the Kurdish League) in Beirut, the Badir Khan families, Dr. Nuri Dêrsimi, 
some Iraqi Kurdish intellectuals, among others, addressed a letter to the delegates of this first 
UN Conference. The core essence of the Kurdish nationalists’ message was the demand for 
Kurdish autonomy as the only solution to the Kurdish question in all parts of Kurdistan. 
However, until 1946 there were three main active locations of the Kurdish nationalist 
movement. 1- In Syrian Beirut (mostly Kurdish refugees from Turkey and some Iraqi Kurdish 
intellectuals). 2- In Iraqi Kurdistan (under leadership of Hiva party, but it divided into several 
parties including that of the movement of Mulla Mustafa Barzani). 3- In Iranian Kurdistan 
(with its centre being Mahabad).456 Even before the Anglo-Soviet invasion in 1941, Mahabad 
was a significant centre of Kurdish nationalist activities.457 The ideology of the modern 
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Kurdish nationalism in Iran had been born in the period of the formation of the JK political 
party in 1942. Actually, the JK had laid the basic foundations of the Kurdish nationalist 
aspiration and progressed further in Iran by the KDP in early 1946.  
Before exploring the event of the formal proclamation of the Republic of Kurdistan it 
is necessary to review and interpret some of the speech by Ghazi Mohammad, which was 
published in Kurdistan. The newspaper stated that in a public meeting in Mahabad on January 
19, 1946, in the presence of about 20.000 people, tribal chieftains and the KDP leaders,458 
Ghazi Mohammad claimed that the geopolitical conditions of the Kurds in Kurdistan did not 
divide the Kurdish people. He explained that ‘Kurdistan had a specific geographic situation 
and without division by other ethnic groups, it was the national right of the Kurds to have 
ownership over their land.’ The Kurdish struggle for control of their territory had a long 
history and the ancient overtones of Kurdish nationalism were clearly evident in Ghazi 
Mohammad’s speech when he said, ‘the past historical struggle of the Kurds for obtaining our 
rights is our symbol and it should be observed that the Kurdish nation defended their 
motherland when attacked it was attacked.’ For Ghazi, the oppression of the Kurdish culture 
began during the period of the modern governments based on nation-building in Turkey and 
Iran. According to Ghazi, ‘after the First World War, two dictatorial figures came to power in 
Iran and Turkey and forced us to eschew the Kurdish language, rituals, religion and the 
specific elements of the Kurdish nation.’ Thus for him, the occupation of Iran by the Allied 
forces in 1941 was a golden opportunity for the liberation of the Kurds and towards the 
establishment of their political institutions. It also enabled the inculcation of Kurdish 
nationalist sentiments via schools administered in the Kurdish language, the formation of the 
KDP, unity between Kurds, a flourishingg of Kurdish literatures and culture. Ghazi’s speech 
continued: 
 
In order to acknowledge the Kurdish intellectual state and publish materials in Kurdish on 
literature and culture, a printing press in Mahabad has been set up and we are printing a journal 
and newspaper to disseminate our ideas and requests. We are also going to build a national force 
to defend our motherland. There were some obstacles towards realizing our goals, among which 
the foremost was the disagreement between the different tribes, but this phenomenon has been 
resolved and we are continuing with our activities to achieve Kurdish liberation and 
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independence. The remaining dangers emanating from the external and internal factors should 
disappear soon with our continued efforts, and victory shall be ours.459       
            
Other Kurdish leaders from different parts of society also made their statements during this 
event, but the attention mostly fell on what the chieftains and the religious figures had to say. 
The following tribal leaders made formal statements: Emer Khan Shikak, Zêro Beg Harki, 
Ibrahim Agha Manguri, Mohammad FayzullaBegi, Mohammad Ghadir Mamash, Ahmed 
Agha Ilkhanizadeh Dehbokri and Hussein Khan Seif Ghazi (as representative of the Mukriyan 
territory). From the religious sector the following leaders made speeches: Mulla Hussein 
Majdi (opening of ceremony), Haji Baba Sheikh Siyadat, Sheikh Hassan Shamsi Burhan, 
Sayyid Abdullaziz Geyllani (son of Sayyid Abdullah Shamzini) and Sayyid Mohammad 
Tahazadeh. The spokespeople for the landed families included Ghani Khosrawi and 
Mohammad Amin Mo’ini and Mohammad Nanwazadeh. The intellectuals who also spoke at 
the event were Hêmin and Hadjar (Abddulrehman Sharafkandi, a famous Kurdish nationalist 
poet who was active during the Republic of Kurdistan). And finally, two women, Wilma 
Seyadyan, the head of a girl’s school, and Khadija Majdi, a teacher, also gave speeches. The 
celebrations started on the 19th of January 1946 and continued to the day of proclamation of 
the Republic of Kurdistan on January 22, 1946.460 The event included the glorification of 
Ghazi Mohammad, denunciations of the misery of the Kurdish people and the showering of 
fervent praise on Stalin and his Red Army in Iran. The poet Hadjar went on to say that for him 
that frigid liberation day in January was more significant than the most prominent Kurdish 
national holiday, Newroz (new day), or New Year’s Day, which is celebrated on March 21. 
He argued in his verses: 
 
 sad bihar nokari ew zistaneh__nishtiman ewro koranit jidjni azadi daken 461 
 
[A hundred springs become servant to this winter. Motherland, today your children     
celebrate liberation]. 
 
                                               
459 Ibid., 4; No. 11, 6 February 1946, 1. Kurdistan published Ghazi’s speech in two issues, No. 10 and 11.  
460 For the speeches of chieftains and religious figures, see Kurdistan, No. 10-15. For Zêro Beg’s speech, see 
Kurdistan, No. 24, 13 March 1946, 3. 
461 Ibid., No. 11, 6 February 1946, 4. 
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January 22, 1946 was the day of the formal proclamation of the Republic of Kurdistan. The 
newspaper Kurdistan published the assembly’s agreement by stating that ‘in a meeting in 
Mahabad on Rêbandani 2, 1324 [January 22, 1946], a resolution from the various northern 
parts of our land was accepted in the presence of 20.000 people.’462 Kurdistan followed: 
 
We know and believe that the members of the central committee of the Kurdistan Democratic 
Party can obtain victory by fulfilling their sacred duty. These are the representatives of all the 
Kurdish people in northern Kurdistan.463  
 
For the celebration on January 23, 1946, an oath was conducted by Ghazi Mohammad who 
commanded the central committee of the KDP to swear on the holy Koran, the Kurdish map 
and the Kurdistan flag. The upholding of the alliance between the Kurdish government and 
Azerbaijan was one of the significant parts of Ghazi’s oath. The Kurdistan reported the oath 
which went as: 
 
I swear by God, to the great word of God [Koran], on the motherland, on the honour of the 
Kurdish nation and to Kurdistan’s sacred flag. I swear to uphold the independence of Kurdistan 
and the continued presence of its flag untill the last drop of blood in my body and my last bit of 
property. I swear to honour and obey Kurdistan’s President and to be subservient and loyal to 
the unity of the Kurds and Azerbaijan.464  
 
In order to celebrate the proclamation of the Republic of Kurdistan, the Kurdish people 
carried out festivities from January 19-24, 1946 across the entire Kurdish region and 
especially in Mahabad (as it was the capital of the Republic). Kurdistan printed the headline 
‘Celebration of the independence and the introduction of the great president of the Republic 
of Kurdistan.’465 This provided an opportunity to formally claim the Kurdish government as 
the ‘Republic of Kurdistan.’ There was some disagreement between several authors about the 
formal name of the republic. In reality, the KDP and the Kurdish government occasionally 
used other terms in their official letters, such as the ‘National Government of Kurdistan’466, 
                                               
462 Ibid., No. 8, 28 January 1946, 3. 
463 Ibid., No. 14, 13 February 1946. 1. 
464 Ibid. 
465 Ibid., No. 15, 16 February 1946, 1. 
466 Farooqi 2008, 12.  
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‘Autonomous Republic of Kurdistan’467, and ‘Republic of Kurdistan of Mahabad’468. Many 
Kurdish authors opt for the first two names and most other authors use the name ‘the Republic 
of Kurdistan.’469 
The ceremony was official concluded by Khosrawi, the mayor of Mahabad, but the 
celebration continued throughout the land and some of the other ethnic groups also 
participated including, notably, the Jewish community in Mahabad. Kurdistan reported, ‘on 
January 26th 1946, the Jewish community in Mahabad organized a event to honour the 
Peshawa [leader] of Kurdistan [Ghazi].’470  
The Republic of Kurdistan was a de-facto government but national and international 
legal legitimacy of this Republic had not been formally recognised by either central 
government of Iran or by the international community. The using of the term ‘Republic’, see 
below document, by the Kurdish leaders to define their government raises questions as to the 
legitimacy of their entitlement to use the term as well as their understanding of the term. First 
of all, by the time the Republic of Kurdistan was declared Iran was a constitutional monarchy 
– and neither the constitutional nor monarchic aspects of Iran, however, could possibly 
accommodate a separate republic existing within its borders. Secondly, the term republic 
implies a sovereign country with clearly defined borders. Although the Kurdish government 
enjoyed a certain level of sovereignty within the geographical areas that it controlled, it was 
certainly not fully sovereign and it had border conflicts in the south and especially in the north 
and north-east with the Autonomous Government of Azerbaijan.471  
                                               
467 Emin 2007, 147.  
468 See the title of Eagleton (1963) and Roosevelt (1947); Jwaideh 1960.  
469 In many issues of Kurdistan, the name used was either the ‘the Republic of Kurdistan’ or the ‘National 
Republic of Kurdistan.’ The title of Mulla Izzat’s book is ‘the Republic of Kurdistan’, Mulla Izzat 2003.  
470 Ibid., No. 22, 4 March 1946, 1. The establishment of Israel in 1948 had led to a mass migration of Jews from 
around the whole world to Israel. The Jewish community in Mahabad was also slowly moving to Israel. It should 
be noted that during my last visit to Mahabad in late August 2009, I found out that there were no more Jews 
living in Mahabad. 
471 One possible explanation of the Kurds’ use of the term ‘Republic’ could be found in the Kurds’ view of the 
Soviet Union and their aspirations for a democratic Iran. It is probable that Kurdish leaders were taking the 
Soviet Union as a model for the prospective federation in Iran, where they compared Kurdistan, Azerbaijan, and 
other parts of Iran with the republics of the Soviet Union, such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan. In 
either case, the use of the term ‘Republic’ by the Kurdish leaders is highly indicative of their ignorance regarding 
political science, diplomacy, and governance. 
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This document is a contract of a marriage in which the ‘Republic of Kurdistan’ twice is referred to, 
and the married couple are claimed to have ‘citizenship of the Republic of Kurdistan’. Hassan Ghazi’s 
website, http://www.weneykk.blogspot.com 
 
Northern Iranian Kurdistan was under the control of the Republic, from Bukan (south 
Mahabad) or north Saqqiz to north Maku (on the Soviet border), which was populated by the 
Sunni Kurds. Southern Kurdistan, which ranged from Saqqiz, Baneh, Sardasht, Sanandaj and 
to south until Kermanshah and contained a mixed Sunni and Shi’ite population, did not fall 
under the Republic of Kurdistan. One of the major obstacles for the establishment of the 
Republic of Kurdistan was the question about the exact borders of the Republic. The Iranian 
government had separated south and north Kurdistan, by maintaining an Iranian military 
presence in Saqqiz-Baneh-Sardasht. Using this presence the Iranian military monitored the 
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Kurdish government and eventually mobilized to bring down the new nation. The creation of 
this north-south division also had a socio-political consequence on the Republic of Kurdistan 
since the southern Kurdistan could not participate in the so-called Republic. Meanwhile, a 
diplomatic crisis continued between the Republic of Kurdistan and the Autonomous 
Government of Azerbaijan about the borders between the two regions (see Chapter V). 
          
4.1.  Who was who  
The selection of the members of the central committee of the KDP or for the first cabinet of 
the Republic of Kurdistan was not based on an electoral system, rather it was clear in advance 
who would be given which posts. Within a short time after January 22, the KDP formally 
selected their representatives, all of whom except for the Ministry of Justice (Mulla Hussein 
Majdi) were members of the central committee of the KDP. Most of these members selected 
for Ghazi Mohammad’s cabinet were well-known figures from Mahabad. Although, 
according to Eagleton, their socio-educational background made them modernists by Kurdish 
standards,472 they were dominated by the traditionalism dictated by the tribal chieftains. Ghazi 
Mohammad appointed three ministerial posts from Bukan to Haji Baba Sheikh, Abdulrahamn 
Ilkhanizadeh and Ismail Ilkhanizadeh, in the hope of alleviating the alienation of his 
opponents, namely the Dehbokri tribe. Ghazi was the president of the Republic, leader of the 
KDP and had total control over the newly established Presidential National Assembly of 
Kurdistan (PNAK), the membership of which was determined by the central committee of the 
KDP.473 This recently formed committee was actually the Association of Ministries but they 
called it PNAK. According to Emin, PNAK imitated the structure of the Azerbaijan 
government in order to demonstrate to the central government that they were not a separatist 
movement.474 PNAK consisted of fourteen ministries475 and its structure was as follows:  
 
1. Haji Baba Sheikh: Prime Minister and Chief of PNAK (religiously he was a 
Sheikh of the Zanbil order, originating from nearby Bukan). 
2. Mohammad Hussein Seif Ghazi: Minister of War and assistant of the President 
(he was also a cousin of Ghazi from Miyanduab). 
3. Manaf Karimi: Minister of Education (he came from a reputable family in 
Mahabad). 
                                               
472 Eagleton 1963, 70. 
473 Emin 2007, 147. 
474 Ibid., 148; Mulla Izzat 2003, 146-7. 
475 Some sources refer to thirteen ministries, see Eagleton 1963, 134; Farooqi 2008, 14-5. 
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4. Sayyid Mohammad Ayubian: Minister of Health (he was from an upper-class 
family in Mahabad). 
5. Abdulrahamn Ilkhanizadeh: Minister of Foreign Affairs (from the Bukan 
region). 
6. Ismail Ilkhanizadeh: Minister of Roads (from Bukan and cousin of 
Abdulrahman). 
7. Ahmad Ilahi: Minister of Economy (a merchant from Mahabad).  
8. Khalil Khosrawi: Minister of Labour (from an old Mahabad family). 
9. Karim Ahmadiyan: Minister of Post, Telegraph and Telephones (he was related 
to Ghazi Mohammad’s spouse). 
10. Haji Mustafa Dawudi: Minister of Commerce (a merchant from Mahabad). 
11. Mohammad Amin Mo’ini: Minister of Interior (from Mahabad). 
12. Mulla Hussein Majdi: Minister of Justice (a religious personality from 
Mahabad). 
13. Mahmud Valizadeh: Minister of Agriculture (the youngest member of the 
cabinet from Mahabad). 
14. Sadiq Haydari: Minister of Propaganda (from Mahabad).476  
 
Mirza Mohammad Homam (Ghazi Mohammad) was born in 1900 in Mahabad. His father, 
Ghazi Ali, was the most famous religious leader in Mahabad and his mother, Gawhar Taj 
Khanom, was from a landed family from the Fayzullabeg’s tribe.477 Initially he learned to 
write and speak Persian from his father, but his main intellectual influences were his uncle 
Abulhassan Seifulghuzat Ghazi.478 During 1923-25 he became the head of the office of 
charity and culture, but by 1931 his charismatic personality had gained him prominence 
within Mahabad as well as in neighbouring areas. According to Mohammad Reza Seif Ghazi, 
after the death of his father in 1931, Ghazi was officially recognized by the central 
government as the judge in Mahabad.479 Ghazi Mohammad was a religious man, but at the 
same time felt the need as a politician to overcome difference in order to resolve issues 
between several tribes. In general, the relationship between Ghazi and his family and the 
central government was relatively stable. The peaceful activities of Ghazi were largely 
sanctioned by the government when he acted as mediator between rival tribes. For this 
purpose, he visited Tehran numerous times and negotiated tribal issues with the central 
                                               
476 Mulla Izzat 2003, 1467; Emin 2007, 147.  
477 Mohammad Reza Seif Ghazi, Nahinyekani Dadgayikerdni Ghazi Mohammad we Hawreyani [the secret court 
of Ghazi Mohammad and his colleagues], tra. from Persian by Ali Akbar Majidi, (Suleymani: Shvan Publishers, 
2008), 29.  
478 Ghazi, Khalil 2009, 90.  
479 Ghazi, Reza 2008, 30.  
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government.480 Ghazi’s nationalist reputation was cemented when he sponsored certain 
Kurdish publications, which were printed at the time between the two world wars in Iraqi 
Kurdistan. As Khalil Fettahi points out, due to its prominent religious background, Ghazi’s 
family was well known in Iranian, Iraqi and Turkish Kurdistan. During the reign of Reza 
Shah, Ghazi Mohammad secretly received Kurdish journals, such as the Zari Kurmanji 
(Kurmanji dialect), Gelawedj (August), and Hawar, which were then published by the 
Kurdish liberation movements in Iraq, Turkey, and Syria. Ghazi himself had financially 
supported the above-mentioned journals.481 
According to some Soviet diplomats in the Iranian Kurdish region, ‘Ghazi Mohammad 
was a farsighted man and a scholar. Although he should not be trusted, Ghazi Mohammad 
was an intellectual leader of the Iranian Kurdish national movement.’482 American authors 
refer to Ghazi Mohammad as someone who ‘exhibited a stubborn and dictatorial quality.’483 
Ghazi Mohammad only had one younger brother, Abolghasim Sadr Ghazi, who in 1943 
became the deputy of Mahabad in the Iranian parliament. He did not go to a modern school to 
become a scholar nor to the religious school to be a judge. The Soviet report asserted, ‘Sadr 
Ghazi is more open and friendly than his brother. He has a cultural personality, he does not 
understand the political issues and he is improvident, but he thinks less about power than 
Ghazi.’484 Mohammad Hussein Seif Ghazi was Minister of War and the cousin of Ghazi 
Mohammad. He was born in 1904 in Mahabad and had an intensive education and graduated 
from the Monarchical American College in Tabriz.485 Seif Ghazi was a domineering man in 
Miyanduab and he and his family were extremely wealthy and owned land in many 
villages.486 According to some sources, Seif Ghazi offered about two million tomans for the 
establishment of the Republic of Kurdistan.487  
                                               
480 Ghazi, Khalil 2009, 91-2. 
481 Ibid., 95. 
482Afrasiao Hewrami, Rodawekani Rojhalati Kurdistan le Balgenameyi Sovjet da: 1945-47 [the events of the 
Eastern Kurdistan in the documents of Soviet Union], (Suleymani: Binkai Zhin, 2007), 76. 
483 Eagleton 1963, 31; Roosevelt 1947, 253. For detailed notes on Ghazi Mohammad’s character, see Kurdistan, 
No. 25, 17 March 1946, 1 and 4. 
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A short biographical detour of another Kurdish Minister is pertinent since it sheds 
light on how pan-Islamism and nationalism came together in the formation of the Republic of 
Kurdistan. It is interesting to note that the Prime Minister and the chief of PNAK, Sheikh 
Abdulrahman Abdulkarim Zanbily (Haji Baba Sheikh), was solely an adherent of pan-
Islamism at the beginning of these events, but during the formation of the Republic of 
Kurdistan he increasingly mixed his religious affinity with the Kurdish nationalist ideology. 
Haji Baba Sheikh, together with several Kurdish Sheikhs including Byareh, Tawileh and 
Barzinji, cooperated in the First World War with the Ottoman Empire against the British and 
Russian forces. It was for the Kurdish leaders a holy war and they fought it with complete 
enthusiasm against the Allies.488 According to Farooqi, the Ottoman officers entered from 
Iraq to the Mukriyan region (Iranian Kurdistan) with some Kurdish Sheikhs, such as Sheikh 
Mahmud, to create an anti-Allied front. In the beginning, the Ottomans hanged and otherwise 
executed some Kurdish leaders when the Ottomans had won a victory, but that this had led to 
alienation of Kurds from the Ottomans. At that time, Haji Baba Sheikh was a Kurdish 
commander and he and the other Kurdish leaders withdrew their forces.489 Thus, up until the 
First World War, religious identity was more decisive than Kurdish identity. But, the 
formation of the new countries based on the principle of nation-state, as with Iran, Turkey, 
inspired the Kurds to build a self-ruled government. Baba Sheikh became a prominent 
Kurdish nationalist leader during the approximately one-year reign of the Republic of 
Kurdistan. The extent of Baba Sheikh’s political duality and opportunism regarding the 
Republic of Kurdistan is questionable. Haji Baba Sheikh was in the service of the ‘central 
Iranian government and he kept the Iranian regime informed about the relationship between 
the Kurds and the Soviets.’490 Farooqi claimed that after the decline of the Republic of 
Kurdistan Baba Sheikh was suspiciously arrested for nine months by the Iranian 
government.491 Hêmin claimed that Baba Sheikh’s role among the commanding forces was 
weak and he had no military capability. The Kurdistan Army, as a formal army, listened only 
to its own commander and thus would not listen to a powerless civilian like the Prime 
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Minister.492 Actually, it was the Kurdish chieftains who mostly managed the forces, as shall 
be explained presently. 
Different words were used for the idea ‘Ministry’ and this leads to a lack of clarity in 
the names of the several ministries of the Republic of Kurdistan. For example, many 
documents named Seif Ghazi as the ‘Minister of War’ and sometimes he was named as the 
‘Minister of the Kurdistan Forces’ or the ‘Minister of the Kurdistan Democratic Forces’.493 
The newspaper Kurdistan called some ministries as ‘offices’ and the Minister as the ‘Chief of 
Office.’ Alternatively it also used the following terms for several ministries: Chief of 
Kurdistan agriculture, Chief of Kurdistan Culture, Chief of Kurdistan Justice, while that for 
Post, Telegraph and Telephones was called the ‘Minister.’494 The above mentioned 
personalities were the leaders and members of the PNAK, but apart from this Chief of 
Committee, there were also other established Offices, such as: Chief of Income and Product 
under the leadership of Ahmed ‘Almi, Kurdistan Charity under Mohammad Lahijani, Youths 
Office under Ali Khosrawi and police office under the leadership of Sayyid Pire.495 In the 
case of the army, there were several military ranks in which four men had received General 
positions: (1) Mohammad Hussein Seif Ghazi, (2) Emer Khan Shikak, (3) Mulla Mustafa 
Barzani (from March onwards), and (4) Hama Rashid Khan Baneh.496   
 As mentioned above, the majority of the central committee members of the KDP and 
the members of the PNAK came from Mahabad, this city had a special role in the Kurdistan 
Republic. This northern town of Iranian Kurdistan located at the center of Mukriyan was an 
ancient cultural and economical center in the region. It had strong relations with Kurdish 
towns in Iraq, such as Suleymaniyeh and Arbil. In the beginning, this was a more cultural and 
economic connection, but after the First World War, political relations were also developed. 
The creation of the new Arab government by Britain in 1921 in Iraq encouraged the Kurds in 
Iraq to struggle for their own political rights, which was accepted at the Sèvres Conference 
one year before the formation of Iraq. Although the Iraqi government under the mandate of 
Britain made some provisions for the cultural rights of the Kurds, public dissatisfaction 
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continued to fuel the Kurdish fighters in their struggle for obtaining political privileges. These 
political movements, also in Turkey, were synchronized with the publishing of several 
Kurdish journals for the awakening and mobilizing of the Kurdish public opinion. The 
Kurdish political activities in Iraq, namely the Sheikh Mahmud movement and the Mulla 
Mustafa rebellion in 1932 and 1943-45, had been fomented as a direct consequence of the 
action of the Kurds in Iran, especially in the town of Mahabad. Mulla Izzat pointed out, the 
Kurdish magazines arrived from Iraqi Kurdistan to Mahabad.497 In large part these political 
and cultural activities of the Iraqi Kurds stimulated the Kurds in Iran, particularly in 
Mahabad, to develop their own Kurdish nationalistic sentiments unlike the other half of 
Iranian Kurdistan, where the Kurdish nationalism was weak.  
              
4.2.  Military or tribal forces    
During Reza Shah’s almost twenty-year reign, the focus was more on the tribal policy, 
particularly among the Kurdish tribes. For almost two decades the Kurds were oppressed by 
Reza Shah and his officers. In some cases, the Shah attained victory against various tribal 
rebellions during the early phase of his consolidation of power in Iran. The Shah wanted to 
destroy the tribal organization and implement forced sedentarization. Cottam points out, ‘no 
single aspect of the program of Reza Shah had more appeal for [Iranian] nationalists than his 
policy of disciplining the tribes.’498 The settled and disarmed tribes would strengthen the 
central government’s social, economic, and political organizations, which would in turn lead 
toward achieving the Shah’s dream of building of a modern nation-state. However, with the 
entry of the Allies into Iran, the Shah was overthrown and most of his policies discontinued, 
such as the policies towards tribes. Disarmament of the Iranian military meant that in their 
place tribesmen became armed and resumed their state of former glory. Cottam observed that 
‘Iran’s army evaporated, and the fleeing soldiers sold their arms to the eager tribesmen.’499 
Hêmin agreed by saying that ‘before the Red Army reached Mahabad, the Iranian army 
discarded their weapons. They sold each of their weapons for one loaf of bread.’500 In this 
way, a majority of the Kurds possessed a weapon, which they later used to fight for the 
Republic of Kurdistan. 
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The establishment of a modern and equipped army was a major goal of newly formed 
nation-states in the Middle East, as exemplified by the policies of Reza Shah of Iran and 
Atatürk of Turkey, since the army performed a crucial role in both the construction and the 
implementation of domestic and foreign policy. When the Kurds established the Republic, 
they took a necessary step to create a modern military to not only defend the Republic but 
also to maintain order within the Republic of Kurdistan. Ghazi Mohammad claimed, ‘we have 
established a National Army to defend our motherland.’501 Several elements were essential for 
Ghazi’s forming of a ‘National Army’ (NA)502. Firstly, all eyes were directed on the 
withdrawal of the Allied military in Iran and the subsequent recapture of Kurdistan by Iranian 
soldiers. Ghazi observed, ‘with the termination of war, the Allied forces will begin to recede 
their army and the Iranian government will once again control the Kurdish areas.’503 From the 
Iranian government’s perspective, the Republic of Kurdistan was illegitimate, thus to arm 
themselves in order to force recognition of their sovereignity was one of the prime national 
goals. For this reason, there were some military conflicts with the central government (see 
below). Secondly, the border issue affected the relations between the Kurdish and Azerbaijan 
governments, with Azerbaijan government claiming that Kurdistan was its territory. 
The anxiousness and hostility of several of the large Kurdish tribal groups, for 
example the Manguri, Mamash and Dehbokri, against the Kurdish government and their 
affinity with the central government in Iran was the third reason for which the Republic of 
Kurdistan set up a NA. After the establishment of the NA, some of the leaders of these tribes 
and their families found it difficult to remain in Kurdistan and exiled themselves to Tehran. 
Seif Ghazi, the Minister of War, was referring to them when he made the following statement: 
‘Some Kurdish leaders were untrustworthy and they should be dead.’504 Fourth, the existence 
of the Iraqi Kurds in Kurdistan, especially those who had been officers, was an important 
reason behind the thought to build a modern army. Hewezi pointed out that soon after the 
proclamation of the Republic of Kurdistan, ‘I asked Mulla Mustafa to start a military training 
academy in Mahabad, and one hundred fifty trained Barzanis were the bodyguards of Ghazi 
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Mohammad.’505 The confidence of the Republic’s troops depended for the greater part on the 
presence of Barzani and his forces. As Jwaideh pointed out, ‘after the withdrawal of the latter 
[Barzani] to Naqadah, the Iranian government’s army began to move in the direction of 
Mahabad.’506 Barzani tried to bring the opponents of the Republic under control of the 
Republic of Kurdistan.   
 With the help of several Iraqi Kurdish officers under the leadership of Barzani, Ghazi 
Mohammad encouraged the construction of a military academy for the training of new 
soldiers. The only military barracks in Mahabad was destroyed by the people after 1941 and 
four years after the incident, Ghazi explained: 
 
I had asked the people to watch this barracks, not annihilate its doors and windows. A day 
should come when will be able to use it again and that day is today and now we must reconstruct 
this barracks from our budget.507 
 
After Ghazi’s speech, the KDP representatives advertised in Kurdistan calling the youths to 
register with the NA. The following conditions for registration formed the basis of the 
establishment of the NA. New soldiers were required to be:  
 
(A) as much as possible unmarried and young, (B) eighteen years and older (C) of good 
behaviour and in good form. The Kurdish government provides the following services: 
maintenance facilities, infantryman got fifteen tomans and cavalry got twenty-five tomans 
monthly and when chosen, after four months military training, for joining the forces at the front, 
he got more income.508   
 
In a meeting of the NA commanders on February 22, 1946, which was published in the 
Documents509, it was concluded that it was necessary to organize an army of two thousand 
cavalryman and one thousand infantryman, and divide these forces over the whole territory 
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under the control of the Republic of Kurdistan. Most of this army was concentrated in the 
Saqqiz-Bukan line, where an Iranian military was positioned.510 In the same meeting, 
commandants argued about the symbols and the ranks of the Kurdistan military.511 As 
Kurdistan declared, military exercises were sometimes held outside the city of Mahabad, ‘on 
July 11, 1946, the Peshmargehs of the Kurdistan central forces departed for desert operations 
outside the town.’512 It was the intention of The Republic of Kurdistan to build a modern 
military based on new symbols and principles. But to what extent was this modern military 
effective in a region where traditions played a decisive role, and more importantly, was this a 
modern military?  
For the most part, the NA was composed of tribal forces. According to Borzowi, 
although, some of these tribal forces fought in clashes against the Iranian military,513 Ghazi 
was still suspicious of these tribal elements on because they also had maintained connection 
with the central government. Thus responsibility the military was given mainly to Barzani and 
the newly formed NA in Mahabad. After the withdrawal of the Red Army from Iran, the tribal 
chieftains changed their policy. These tribal leaders forced Ghazi to negotiate with the central 
government and they hoped for a confrontation. This idea came to most tribal leaders after the 
withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran.514 To what degree could tribalism and tribal leaders 
exercise pressure on Ghazi and the young, newly formed Republic of Kurdistan? The detailed 
discussion about some important tribes and their chieftains who participated in the forming of 
the Republic of Kurdistan, which is presented below, is necessary to understand the socio-
political circumstances of the Republic.                          
The Kurdish tribal attitude during the Republic of Kurdistan was mainly to protect 
their own individual interests. However, the Shikak tribe, in cooperation with the Harki tribe 
under the leadership of Zêro Beg Harki, represented the northern region of the Republic of 
Kurdistan and was, after Kalhur, the second largest tribe in Kurdistan. Because the Shikak 
tribe was so wide-spread and powerful, it was organized under several leaders, and was also 
divided into varying subsections. These differentiations, based on subsections or differences 
in leadership, led to competition and sometimes also conflict between the leaders. Concerning 
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the several groups within the Shikak tribe, Iraj Afshari Sistani explained, ‘The Shikak tribe 
had been divided into two major sections, Kardar and Avdoyi, and each group was also parted 
among other groups.’515    
Traditionally, the Shikak tribe was led by the family of Simko. Simko came from the 
family of Avdoyi, and this family was often vied forpower and dominance relative to the 
Kardar family. The assassination of Simko in 1930 by the Iranian army allowed Emer Khan 
from the Kardar section to revive his authority and power, according to Eagleton, and the 
Avdoyi section was led by Simko’s son, Tahir Khan.516 According to the Soviet Consul in 
Maku, Emer Khan was detained from his political activities for the Khoybun party for several 
years during the Reza Shah rule. Emer Khan was a rich businessman and his tribe was 
sufficiently mobilized.517 The dominance of Emer Khan after 1941 in the Shikak tribe was 
strengthened. This was because he was associated with the JK party, he was a member of the 
central committee of the KDP and he obtained the military position of General during the 
time of the Republic of Kurdistan. 
The third General of the Republic of Kurdistan was Mustafa Barzani. Barzan is a 
village in the mountains of north eastern Iraqi Kurdistan, in which the Greater Zab River was 
a boundary between the Sheikh of Barzan and the tribe’s fierce rival, the Zebari tribe, the 
majority of whom cooperated with the Iraqi central government. Political and religious 
conditions are usually cited to explain the spread out of the Barzani tribe. The religious 
Naqshbendi-order character of the Mustafa Barzani families connected them to several other 
tribes other than the Barzani tribes, such as the Shirwani, Dolamari, Mizuri and Barodji. 
These tribes looked at the Sheikh of Barzan as their religious leader.518 Politically, some of 
the tribes were linked to each other or organized as a strong and larger tribe to form a unity 
against their opponents. The political popularity of the Barzan Sheikhs had been renowned in 
the uprising in 1909-14 against the Ottomans of Sheikh Abdulsalam, an older brother of 
Mustafa Barzani who was hanged in 1914 in Mosul. Abdulsalam’s seven demands519 were 
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considered by some Kurdish authors as the kernel of the Kurdish nationalist movement.520 
After the First World War, the Barzani tribe came under the leadership of two men, Sheikh 
Ahmed (an older brother of Mustafa Barzani), who was a religious leader, and Mustafa 
Barzani, the military and political leader. However, the old tribal structure gave way to the 
formation of a tribal confederation, which called itself the national front. The national front 
became prevalent throughout Iraqi Kurdistan after the September military campaign of 1961 
against the Iraqi government and Mustafa Barzani became a national Kurdish leader while he 
directed the campaign.                 
After the proclamation of the Republic, the fourth General, Hama Rashid Khan Baneh, 
joined with Ghazi Mohammad and on February 15, 1946 entered into Mahabad from Iraqi 
Kurdistan. On the same day, in the presence of Hashimov and Seif Ghazi, he obtained the 
rank of General and he was also elected as a commander of the Bukan front, which consisted 
of roughly 3,500 forces.521 Like Emer Khan, Hama Rashid also left the Republic on August 2, 
1946 and went to Iraqi Kurdistan before the fall of the Republic.522 The Republic’s military 
control was left the hands of these four Generals: Seif Ghazi, a representative of Mukriyan 
tribes and the Minister of War; Emer Khan, the leader of the northern tribes of the Republic of 
Kurdistan; Hama Rashid, head of the southern tribes (Bukan Begzadeh) and finally, Mustafa 
Barzani, the leader of the Barzani tribe and of the Iraqi Kurdish officers. There is considerable 
debate about the exact number of soldiers the Republic had. According to Seif Ghazi, the NA 
had about 45,000 soldiers523, but the majority of the authors estimate the NA had around 
10,000 and 15,000 soldiers, which can be further differentiated as follows: 
  
Barzanis under Mulla Mustafa      1,200 infantry 
Barzanis under Sheikh Ahmad (not at the front)                   900 infantry 
Jalalis and Milanis          400 cavalry 
Shikaks under Emer Khan         800 cavalry 
Shikaks under Tahir Khan                                        500 cavalry 
Harkis under Rashid Beg and Begzadeh under  
   Nuri Beg        1,000 cavalry 
Harkis under Zêro Beg          700 infantry 
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Followers of Shaikh Abdullah Gilani’s family 
   under Sayyid Fahim          200 cavalry 
Zarza tribesmen under Musa Khan        300 cavalry 
Gharapapagh (Turki) under Pasha Khan and 
  Khoshravi Khan                       500 cavalry 
Mamash of Kaka Abdullah Ghaderi faction       400 cavalry 
Mamash under Kaka Hamza Nalos Amir al  
   Ashari                        500 cavalry 
Piran under Mohammad Amin Agha and  
  Gharani Agha           300 cavalry 
Manguri under Abdullah Bayazidi        300 cavalry 
Manguri under Salim Agha Ojaq                     200 cavalry 
Manguri under Ali Khan and Ibrahim Salari       400 cavalry 
Sardasht Gawurk under Kak Ala                     200 cavalry 
Mahabad Gawurk under Ali Javanmardi, Mamand 
   Agha, and Haji Ibrahim Agha         400 cavalry 
Miscellaneous Sardasht tribes         500 cavalry 
Suesni tribe           100 cavalry 
Mahabad Dehbokri under Ja’far Karimi        400 cavalry 
Bukan Dehbokri under the Ilkhanizadeh Aghas       500 cavalry 
Fayzullabegis of Bukan and Saqqiz        800 cavalry 
Saqqiz Bedaghi family          200 cavalry 
Miscellaneous Mahabad and Shahindezh tribes       300 cavalry 
Followers of Hama Rashid Khan Baneh        300 cavalry 
Recruits from the Javanrud and Auroman areas 
   south of the Republic          150 cavalry   + 
            Total:                      12,750524 
 
The dominance of tribal forces in the NA can be clearly noticed in the list. The majority of the 
forces in the list were cavalry-based, which according to Eagleton, ‘could still terrify an ill-
armed or badly organized force, but it could not prevail against trained infantry carrying 
automatic rifles and concealed by the rugged terrain of Kurdistan.’525 Thus, it is clearly 
illustrated how much of the manpower was provided by tribes in Saqqiz-Baneh front. For 
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example, Barzani forces were divided in four different fronts526 and Harki and Shikak tribes 
also had separate fronts. It should be noted that the Shikak tribe was in itself a confederation 
of several tribes. In a letter of General Hama Rashid, the tribal character of the Republic’s 
military can be identified when he said that, ‘it is necessary to send the forces of the Shikak, 
Mamash, Dehbokri and more Barzanis to the front.’527 As Eagleton also explained, ‘the 
Republic overcame the most disruptive factor in large-scale tribal movements.’528 On the 
front of Saqqiz-Baneh, there was no military mixture of the tribes, but the troops were based 
on kinship. Although the Republic had sufficient forces, according to Ghassemlou, it also had 
several weak elements: 
  
Republic forces had a total tribal character, the commanders were the tribal chieftains, there was 
no unity between the tribal leaders (individual interests were more important) and there was an 
inexperienced and undisciplined military training compared to the Barzanis forces.529  
 
There were no fundamental norms within the NA, and for example, somebody could climb 
several military ranks without experience or investigation into their background. The 
competition between various tribal chieftains to obtain higher military ranks was an everyday 
problem. For example, Ghassemlou had an interesting story of the tribal leaders who asked 
Ghazi Mohammad to acquire for him another military rank, which when he returned to his 
village, would create more respect for him.530              
The military confrontation between the Iranian government and the Republic exploded 
for the first time on April 29, 1946. At the time, Colonel Hewezi (formerly of the Iraqi 
military) was a commander of one of the fronts of the Barzani forces and reported that Iranian 
forces had attacked their base in Ghahrawa (a village near Saqqiz), which led to a dramatic 
defeat for the Iranian military. On the battlefield, the Iranian military left behind many dead 
and wounded and forty-two soldiers were captured.531 The Jabha (front) newspaper, organ of 
the Iran Party, reported that, ‘rebellion was armed with new weapons.’532 Although short-
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lived, the ambush was considered the first military victory for the Republic of Kurdistan. As 
the Iranian prisoners arrived in Mahabad, Eagleton claimed, ‘they happened upon a public 
ceremony that turned into a celebration.’533 These prisoners were delivered to the Azerbaijan 
government and newspaper Azad Millet (national freedom), organ of the national parliament 
of Azerbaijan, interviewed these prisoners.534 Kurdistan also reported this battle and titled it 
‘the day of shame and disgrace for the Persian government.’535 It encouraged the Kurds to 
mobilize and unite the different parts of Kurdish society to defend the Republic of Kurdistan. 
After the withdrawal of the Red Army from Iran on May 1946, the second largest and 
the last Iranian offensive against the Republic’s forces was in the battle of Mamashah a long 
the line connecting Saqqiz-Baneh-Sardasht. Because the Iranian military’s transport of goods 
to garrisons in Baneh-Sardasht was blocked by the Kurdish troops, General Razmara came to 
Saqqiz to organize a plan for the Iranian military. Razmara first tried to find a way for 
bringing supplies to the Iranian military base in Baneh-Sardasht and then drew up a plan to 
attack the Republic’s forces. Kurdistan reported that the Kurdish-Azerbaijan delegation and 
the Iranian military representatives in the region had signed an agreement on May 26, 1946. 
According to the conclusions reached in this meeting, both sides decided to discourage major 
attacks, promote withdrawals and allow each side to further equip their forces in the region 
and not to interfere with the traffic on the roads.536 The result of the agreement was ultimately 
in the interests of the Iranian military. However, the Iranian opportunism could be seen in the 
words of actions of Hassan Arfa, Chief of Staff of the Iranian Army 1944-46. According to 
Arfa, Iranian officers wanted to gain time ‘to create a strong defensive line in order to then 
start a general offensive in the direction of Mahabad.’537 Between the meeting and its 
agreement on May 26 and until June 15, Razmara saw a great opportunity to gather troops for 
a massive and comprehensive southern attack against the Republic. As Arfa observed:  
 
General Razmara ordered several battalions stationed at Hamadan to go to Saqqez. The Takab 
garrison was also reinforced as it was being threatened simultaneously from the east by the 
Azerbaijan Democrats and from the west by the Feyzollahbegi Kurds. The Iranian army forces 
in Kordestan consisted of eight infantry battalions, three of them being at Saqqez, some cavalry 
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and three mountain pack batteries, with five to six thousand men between all of them and half of 
them being stationed in the Saqqez area.538      
                           
On 15 June 1946 the communications between the Iranian army in Baneh-Sardasht was 
continually interrupted leading to the preparation and concentration of both sides near the 
Mamashah battlefield. According to Barzani, the Kurdish regiment at Mamashah was 
attacked by two Iranian battalions supported by artillery, tanks and aircraft.539 Iranian military 
offensive had two purposes. One of them was to occupy the strategically positioned hills of 
Mamashah and the other was to stop the Kurdish forces from attacking Iranian supply 
vehicles. About this military confrontation, Ghazi Mohammad claimed: 
 
This conflict was a result of misunderstanding because I instructed via telegraph to open the 
road of Miredeh-Baneh-Sardasht, through which the Iranian military got its supplies. I am not 
sure whether my telegraph managed to reach on time.540  
 
The Iranian offensive did achieve a partial victory. As a result of the Kurdish military defeat, 
the Iranian military was able to seize the highland of Mamashah, where they erected military 
watchtowers and ensured a military presence in the area. The Kurds tried to recapture 
Mamashah but the Kurdish counter-attack was repelled, which led to a negotiation between 
Ghazi Mohammad and Razmara in the village of Sara near Saqqiz.541 According to Sajadi, 
this agreement was composed of four points:  
 
1. The Iranian army in Saqqiz had the possibility to send military clothing and food to the 
Iranian military in Miredeh-Baneh-Sardasht, which was besieged by the Kurdish forces. 2. The 
beleaguered region must not obtain weapons, military supplies, or exchange military forces 
unless somebody is ill or wounded. 3. The food and military dress convoy after being checked in 
by the Kurdish forces would be able to move to the besieged region with a Kurdish government 
representative. 4. Just like the above mentioned points for the Iranian army, the Kurds also had 
the right to block the road to the Miredeh-Baneh-Sardasht.542  
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Despite the proceedings of this agreement, both sides remained watchful to each other until 
December 1946.        
 
4.3.  Socioeconomic basis  
Concerns regarding wartime and post-war economic crisis contributed to the growth of 
economic and social problems.543 The economic problems included inflation, famine, and 
disruption of government finance. Further, according to Alias H. Tuma, Iran felt a lot of 
pressure on its infrastructure but had no concurrent investment to maintain it.544 The 
increasing size of the Iranian population and the increased urbanization from 1941 until 1946 
(see table 2 and 3),545 and the increasing number and power of indigenous landowners 
affected the character of urban life in multiple ways. Social and economic problems, as 
indicated by Nikki R. Keddie, fuelled the growth of political organizations. Various political 
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Table 2:  
The total population of Iran, 1941-1946 (in millions). Julian Bharier, 
Economic Development in Iran 1900-1970 (London: Oxford University Press, 









The percentage breakdown of the total urban and rural population for the 




While the socioeconomic situation of the central government worsened, the situation was 
certainly more dire in distant Kurdistan and its villages. In order to highlight just how 
impoverished the economic conditions were in Kurdistan, Ghassemlou pointed to a story from 
his own childhood. When he was eleven years old and his father went to Baku with a Kurdish 
delegation, their poverty was so dire that he had to bring back sugar with him, since at that 
time there was little sugar available in Kurdistan.547 Figures in Table 4 indicate the sharp price 
increases of some basic food products from 1938 to 1943 as sold in Tabriz. It must be noted 
that Tabriz was a major commercial centre for Kurds as well as for the entire north-west 
region of Iran. At the time, prices of most commodities available in Tabriz and Mahabad were 
roughly the same. Table 5 indicates the prices of commodities listed in Table 4 for the year 






                                               








Year Urban Rural 
1901 21 79 
1934 21 79 
1940 22 78 
1956 31 69 
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Table 4:  
Prices of some 





Table 5:  
Prices of some commodities in Mahabad, April 1946. Kurdistan, 
No. 34, 10 April 1946, 4. 
 
 
After the establishment of the Republic of Kurdistan on 22 January 1946 and the formation of 
its economic, social and political departments, two institutions played a pivotal role in the 
region under the control of the Republic: the Ministry of War and the Ministry of Propaganda. 
In general cooperation between the several offices of the new polity was not coordinated as 
they were merely formed in imitation of the Azerbaijan government structure. Ghazi 
Mohammad put little energy into ordering and improving of the Republic’s affairs. During his 
administration there was no general constitutional law to order the functioning of the political, 
economic, social and academic associations of the new country.548 Since the freedom of the 
Republic of Kurdistan depended on Tabriz and Tehran, the PNAK could not prepare the 
                                               











Wheat                             0.59                  1.65                   1.11                      13.0
Bread                              0.69                  1.50                   1.10                      12.0
Rice                                3.00                  3.50                   6.00                      32.0
Sugar (moist)                 4.00              5.95                    7.50                    100.0 
Sugar (loaf)                    4.50                7.00                    8.50                    113.0 
Mutton                            2.60             5.20                    6.00                      16.0
Ghee                             10.80                  16.0                    36.0                      68.0





Wheat                               20.0 
Rice                                  19.0 
Sugar (moist)                 145.0    
Sugar (loaf)                    140.0  
Mutton                              30.0
Ghee                                 95.0       
Tea (moist)                     360.0 
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constitutional law.549 The Ministry of War, which was responsible for the protection of the 
Republic, has already been discussed, thus, the following section will focus on the Ministry of 
Propaganda. This office was accountable for disseminating propaganda and publishing the 
policies of the Republic, which was at that time of paramount importance. 
The Republic of Kurdistan most important goals were economic and social reform. 
These hindered not only by external elements but by some internal obstacles as well (for 
external elements of the Republic of Kurdistan, see chapter V). The relation between the 
landlords and peasants was one of the internal complications of Ghazi’s reform plan. Principle 
no. 5 in the KDP’s programme read as follows: ‘by the passing of a general law, the 
grievances existing between the farmers and the landowners would be amended and their 
future positions defined’. This reform had never been implemented as it had been by the 
Azerbaijan government. Many of the settlements in the areas controlled by the Republic were 
populated by tribes and landlords and each measure of land reform would meet with some 
form of opposition from the competing interest groups.550 Several Kurdish representatives, 
like Seif Ghazi, were the landlords in many villages. These powerful landlords not only 
exploited the tribal people and peasants, but also sought short-term profits at the expense of 
both the land and peasants.551 According to Ghassemlou, 87 percent of the land was owned by 
the landlords while the peasants occupied a mere 8 percent.552 It must be concluded that the 
majority of the population had no land and they had to serve the landlord’s interests. The 
landlords were determined to manipulate the government’s internal policy so as not to allow 
any drastic land reform which could harm their interests. On the other hand, the middle-class 
was first anticipating their own liberation from the tribal leaders in order to form the newly 
constituted bourgeois.553 However, due to the region’s strong tribal influences and the kinship 
relations within and between the tribes, land reform could not be implemented by Ghazi 
Mohammad. 
The majority of the Kurdish peasants and villagers had obligations to the landlords, or 
Aghas, and they constantly depended upon and were indebted to them. Ghazi appreciated the 
power of the landlords and thus took precautions before adopting the reforms, no doubt a sign 
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of his political acumen. Besides this, needed to overcome the suspicion that his reform plan 
was the product of the atheist Soviet regime. In general, Kurds were practising Muslims and 
Ghazi needed to find a way to present the reform as being in line with Islamic norms.554 In the 
past, the Kurds, the majority of whom were Muslims, proclaimed jihad against Soviet in the 
First World War. Concerning the landlords and farmers, Kurdistan published some requisites 
of the land registration office, which stated that ‘it distinguishes the situation and kind of 
relations between the farmer and the landlord.’555 Ghazi also claimed that the ‘adjustment of 
the revenue of the landlords in order to alleviate the hostility between villagers and landlords 
was completely finalized.’556 But still, land reform, which was supposed to define and 
distinguish the rights of the farmers and peasants, had not taken place. 
Women’s rights also posed another dilemma for the reform plan of the Republic of 
Kurdistan. The Kurdish government actively endeavoured to promote some of the women’s 
interests in the Kurdish community, which at that time was a courageous plan but also an 
alienating proposal from the perspective of Kurdish traditions in general. Kurdistan published 
the following announcement in the name of Haji Baba Sheikh which stated that ‘it was 
forbidden for a man to make a girl or women elope and the punishment for such an act would 
be from three months up to three years of imprisonment.’557 This prohibition was 
incompatible with the Kurdish norms and values because within the dominant traditional 
lifestyle, the elopement of a girl, particularly in tribal areas, was a normal action in Kurdish 
society in the period of the Republic. And in some cases, a man was considered as a hero 
when he managed to elope with a girl. The enforcement of this law, according to Mirza 
Mohammad Amin Manguri’s memoirs558, was incongruous with the traditions and customs of 
marriages in the region. Thus, most people would have found this proclamation of Haji Baba 
Sheikh as unacceptable since it was a hindrance to pledged lovers.559                  
The penal code of the Republic was not based on codified law but more on religious 
and common traditional laws.560 According to Borzowi, the powerful Kurdish tribal chieftains 
did not formally recognize the Justice Office of the Republic. The local disputes between the 
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tribes and farmers were resolved by decisions taken by the chiefs and the Justice Office was 
not yet strong enough to replace the traditional legal system.561 However, there were three 
different courts in the Republic: military, national committee (which supervised all courts and 
was under the leadership of Ghazi Mohammad) and the civil courts. The last court was 
established by a committee consisting of three Mullas (Mulla Hussein, Mulla Ibrahim and 
Mulla Mohammad) to judge and decide on the punishment and rights of the accused.562 
Because of the issue on the elopement of women, there were many prisoners in the prison of 
Police office of the Republic headed by Sayyid Pire Nizami. Amin Manguri was a prisoner of 
the Republic from August through September 1946 for sixteen days and claimed that the 
living conditions of these prisoners were appalling and they obtained one toman per day for 
food, clothes, etc., and they were treated like animals. The cases of thirty-eight prisoners, 
according to Amin Manguri, all had to do with the elopement issue and they spent about four 
or five months in prison without having been summoned by the court. For these detainees, 
Amin Manguri asserted that he wrote a petition against the charges to the civil court and 
fortunately, they were all set free. He added that they were not acquitted because of his 
intervention, but rather because of the complete lack of legitimacy of Baba Sheikh’s 
‘elopement law’.563   
Polygamy and endogamy were religious and cultural norms and often traditional laws 
regarding these practices were esteemed within Kurdish society, especially given the tribal 
traditions. In this way, people passed on their social position and status to their children so 
that the traditional social hierarchy was maintained. Exogamy, at the time of the Republic, 
was not popular or widespread and had not yet developed those facilitating contacts between 
different communities which in turn stimulate the spread of cultural elements. In the period of 
the Republic, if a man had several wives, he was expected to provide comparable privileges to 
all of them. If someone was convicted of being unfair to his wife, he faced economic 
sanctions or imprisonment. Kurdistan reported that Ahmad Babanzadeh, the head of the 
customs house in Khaneh (Lahijan), was dismissed from the bureau because he abused and 
abandoned his second wife.564 The Central Committee of the KDP had published several laws 
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under the title ‘taswibi qanoni mojazat’ (approved penal code) in Kurdistan and a summary of 
these codes are presented below:  
 
1- A successful espionage agent will be hanged and in case of special circumstances, the agent’s 
wealth will be seized or the agent will be sent to jail. 2- Drunkenness can result in imprisonment 
ranging from one to ten months in prison accompanied by fifty until two hundred whippings. 3- 
Stealing or demolishing government property, depending on their crime, will be punished by 
hanging or submission of their property. 4- Those who oppress women will get one year in 
prison. 5- Opium smokers will be deprived of their civil rights. 6- Running away from the 
enemy and submission of his weapon to the enemy will be penalized by hanging till death. 7- 
Those who committed treason against their own country will be executed. 8- The violation of a 
women’s honour will be punished by national committee following norms and regulations. 9- 
Corruption will have the same penal code as previous one [as by number 8].565  
 
The laws mentioned above were only theoretical and it was not easy to practice these codes 
within the Kurdish community. One of the pivotal reasons was that the Kurdish leaders were 
desperate after the withdrawals of the Red Army. There was strong evidence for this claim as 
only one person was killed from the time of the proclamation of the Republic until the end. 
The second obvious reason was that the duration of the Republic was too short to enforce 
these regulations. It is necessary to describe and distinction between the following three 
important socioeconomic reforms of the Republic: prohibition of weapons for unauthorized 
use in civil areas, shelter for children without parents and the mourning period. As noted, after 
1941 the acquiring and carrying a weapon was popular and customary in the Kurdistan. It was 
the traditional method Kurdish tribes employed to legitimize and enhance their power. The 
Republic of Kurdistan had tried to restrict the quantities of weapons via a registration code. 
Kurdistan published a declaration as follows: 
 
It shall be noted for all the inhabitants that carrying a weapon in the cities without a licence is 
forbidden and if somebody fires a gun in the town, a firm line of action will be taken.566 
 
Before proclamation of the Republic of Kurdistan, the KDP representatives had engaged in 
action for the support of unattended children in order to find regular guardians for them. On 
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January 1, 1946, Kurdistan Cultural Committee published in Kurdistan the following 
declaration: 
 
It was decided to collect the orphans and accommodate them amongst the families in the town. 
The municipality gathered the children and they were sent to Galawedj school daily. The 
children were to have been between Six to fourteen years old.567 
 
The requirements of those in mourning, the final issue of reform, were different for every 
region due different cultural traditions, though in general, the mourning period continued 
between one to three weeks. This was a heavy financial loss, particularly for the poor people. 
On January 24, 1946, Baba Sheikh acknowledged that the mourning period must be based on 
Islamic law and stated that: 
 
Mourning has no business making people undertake the trouble and expenses that it generally 
does. The mourning gathering for men must be near mosques and entertainment for the 
condolence session is not allowed. As Islamic law claims, the mourning gathering should be 
limited to one day only and it applies to all towns and villages.568              
 
Part of Reza Shah’s efforts to modernize Iran was to industrialize the country with the 
construction of factories. While many factories were built in Iran during the reign of Reza 
Shah, only one factory was built in the Kurdish region. The KDP attempted to open factories 
in Kurdistan, according to article twenty of the KDP political program, which stressed the 
need for economic development in Kurdistan and opening factories in all Kurdish cities. But 
lack of any industrial centres in Kurdistan, save for a sugar factory in Miyanduab, meant that 
it lacked a working-class. The majority of the population was concentrated in the villages569 
and the products of this rural community were the important ones of the Republic. From the 
urban middle-class came the mainstream representatives of the Republic, which was 
supported by the traders, the richest and therefore the main taxpaying section of the 
Republic’s population. 
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On January 10, 1946, the KDP established a tax committee with fifteen members.570 
For national development and to increase prosperity, the tax committee issued a declaration 
and demanded that the people pay their taxes as obligated by the law. In this way, the KDP 
tried to raise awareness in Kurdistan for payment of taxes. Kurdistan reported: 
 
According to the tax law, landlords, merchants and traders should pay taxes for the fiscal years 
of 1944 and 1945 and it must be remembered that the tax is the spirit of the nation and as long as 
the tax situation is unstable, the [government] administrations can not be developed.571  
 
The new Republic’s policy provided the inhabitants with a much freer society than before. As 
Eagleton points out, the people were could ‘listen to radio broadcasts from all parts of the 
world, and they took advantage of this, something which was not experienced by the 
Azerbaijani Turks.’572 The citizens were free to travel outside the Republic. Many of the 
people were traders and merchants, who utilized this opportunity to travel to Turkey and 
particularly to Iraq, and managed to smuggle goods and supplies and sell them in Kurdistan 
and even in the whole of Iran. The government tried to imposes on those who brought goods 
illegally to Kurdistan,573 but the smuggling was unstoppable. Smuggling of social, political, 
economic and military goods (newspapers, books, sugar, oil, wheat, clothing, weapons, 
aluminium and narcotic substances) between Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey became a popular 
trade and many people become rich, while others were killed or imprisoned after getting 
caught.574  
The largest source of income of the republican government was based on sugar and 
tobacco. These products were manufactured and exported by the Taraqi (progress) company, 
which was established by the Ministry of Economy. The company took a leading role in 
managing commercial links with Azerbaijan, Iran, and the Soviet Union. It was estimated that 
the capital of this company was ‘one million tomans’575 and in several reports of Kurdistan, it 
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asked the farmers to sell their tobacco crop to the Taraqi company.576 The farmers were 
compensated with ‘one quarter cash and two quarter deposit bill for tobacco products.’577 
Thus, the economic situation of the Republic was not so bad, but while its treasury was not 
empty, it still could not afford the salaries of its officials. The monthly income of Ghazi 
Mohammad, according to Eagleton, was 3,000 tomans or about $700 and the cabinet 
ministers were each paid 280 Tomans or $65.578 Tobacco products were a fundamental source 
of the Republic’s income and this product was so important that Ghazi saw it necessary to 
clarify that: 
  
The only way the enemy can attack us is through an assault on our economy and in this way 
they always tried to bring conflict within the people. For example, the tobacco issue was a way 
for the Iranian government to divide the Kurdish society. It is thus necessary to strengthen our 
economic structure. So, the Taraqi Company must be developed and commercial relations must 
be established in the whole of Kurdistan. Transformation of the farming culture is a priority for 
the Kurdish government together with the development and progress of the manufacturing 
sector.579  
 
The Friendship and Alliance Treaty between the Kurdish and Azerbaijan governments, signed 
in April 1946, had been formed on seven important points. The third point referred to the 
economic relations between the two governments, Kurdistan published this agreement (see 
the following chapter for detailed discussion) and the third point went as follows, ‘a Joint 
Economic Committee will be formed between the two nations to deal with the related 
economic problems and the decisions of the Committee will be attended to by the heads of 
both states.’580 Based on this agreement the Kurdish government borrowed 20,000 tomans 
(about $4,400) from the Azerbaijan government and a few months later was able to repay its 
debt in the form of Kurdish sugar from the Miyanduab refinery.581 
The Taraqi Company set the tone of the economic relations of the Kurdish government 
with the three governments of Azerbaijan, Iran and the Soviet Union. The establishment of 
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the price of Kurdish tobacco was something that raised disagreements with the Iranian 
government. According to Borzowi, Ghazi Mohammad and Seif Ghazi always strove for an 
increase in the tobacco price. Sadr Ghazi, some Mahabad merchants and several Kurdish 
chieftains met in November 1944 with the Shah of Iran and a decision was taken to increase 
the price of Kurdish tobacco, but it was probably never implemented.582 After signing a 
contract with Azerbaijan, Iranian government boycotted all Kurdish goods. With the 
withdrawal of the Red Army from Iran in May 1946, the Iranian government initiated a 
boycott of Kurdish products, which openly showed their feelings of resentment against the 
Republic’s government. Taraqi, among others who were to export the products of the 
Republic, especially tobacco, and whose market largely depended on the Iranians, suffered 
serious financial losses when the boycott cut them off from the rest of Iran. Another difficulty 
suffered by the inhabitants within the Republic was that they had to share their already 
depleted food supplies with a large number of Barzanis.583 
The Soviet Union was another economic collaborator of the Taraqi Company. One of 
the motivations for the formation of the Taraqi Company was the existence of the Soviet 
military in the Iranian Kurdish region. In March 1945, Ghazi stressed economic relations with 
Soviets as a requisite in a discussion with Qoliyov, the then Vice Soviet Consul in Tabriz. 
Ghazi asserted that ‘in Tehran, I meet the Soviet Ambassador and I stated my four intentions’, 
the third of which was for ‘a strong relation with the Soviets in order to bring their industrial 
instruments to Mahabad to be sold there and likewise for selling Kurdish products in the 
Soviet Union.’584 For the next months, the Soviets exported military and other goods to the 
Republic of Kurdistan and imported tobacco from the Republic regions. This trade relation 
continued until the withdrawal of the Soviet Red Army from the Iranian territory in May 
1946.   
It is also worthwhile to point out a major mistake that Eagleton commits in an 
argument on this topic, which many other authors have also made by following him. Eagleton 
writes that the ‘Iranian government paid for 10 per cent of the tobacco to the Kurds but made 
no move towards completing the purchase.’585 More importantly, Eagleton does not clarify 
that the Iranian government purchased thousands of kilos of tobacco from the Kurdish areas, 
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especially in the district of Mahabad. In the Iranian archives of the Muzakirati Majlis, the 
Eagleton’s error can be demonstrated with the following historical account: 
  
On December 13, 1945, Sadr Ghazi, the representative of Mahabad in the Iranian parliament 
demanded in a parliament session that the central government must refund the money for the 
tobacco purchase to the Mahabad farmers. The minister of economy answered to this by saying 
that the government had no money to do so.586 
 
This reaction disappointed Kurds and was one of the reasons for the severance of economic 
relations with the Iranian government. After this event, Ghazi Mohammad saw another 
possible buyer of their tobacco, namely the Soviets. In the beginning of May 1946, trade 
between Soviets and the Republic reached relatively high levels. Kurdish tobacco was bought 
for the sum of approximately $800,000, which was remunerated through the transaction of 
Soviet goods, such as sugar, cotton clothing and china glassware, but the price paid was lower 
than that fixed by the Iranian government.587  
 
4.4.  Political stand 
During the period of the two Empires (Ottomans and Qajars), the Kurdish tribal chieftains, 
landlords, merchants, and religious leaders had the majority of the power and until the First 
World War Kurdish society was split, particularly along sectarian lines. The majority of the 
works of leading Kurdish authors, namely Sharaf Khan Shamsaddin Bidlisi, were about the 
history of the principle Kurdish leaders and thus, they were not about the Kurdish society as a 
whole. Sharaf Nameh, probably the first Kurdish history from an authentic Kurdish source, 
was completed in 1596 and had originally been written in Persian. This is because until the 
eighteenth century Persian literature was widespread in the Ottoman Empire. While there 
were some Kurdish writers (i.e. Haji Ghadir Koyi) who presented their work in Kurdish, this 
act of writing in one’s own language only became popular in the first half of the twentieth 
century in the Middle East with the tide of the sentiment for self-determination based on one’s 
own culture and language. During the reign of the Empires before the First World War, power 
was mostly disseminated to the different classes and regions (i.e. it was centripetal in nature). 
After the First World War, the collapse of the Empires led to the formation of governments 
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which based their policies on centrifuging power towards the centre consisting of a ruling 
class. Integration and assimilation of the ethnic minority groups, such as the Kurds, into the 
newly established governments, which were dominated by a majority ethnic group, was an 
important program of the new nationalist government’s leaders. Reza Shah and Atatürk were 
such nationalist leaders who tried to shape Persia and Turkey respectively into ‘one country, 
one nation’. Therefore, in both countries, the symbols of a separate Kurdish identity 
(language, clothing and literature) were systematically prohibited.  
Constitutional laws made during the Constitutionalist Revolution (1905-09) 
proclaimed Persian as the standard language of Iran, but it was not forbidden to practice the 
local languages, such as Kurdish. However, during Reza Shah’s reign, it was not only the 
local languages which were prohibited, but also several other cultural aspects of the ethnic 
minorities. Vali asserted that the main target of Reza Shah in attempting to forbid the local 
languages was to consolidate a national identity for the Iranian people, which was to be 
manifested in a European style that ignored the country’s cultural and ethnic diversity.588 This 
policy of Reza Shah prepared the background for the growth of Kurdish nationalism in Iran. It 
also gave the most significant reason for the Kurds to mobilize themselves within political 
organizations to gain self-rule and protect the Kurdish identity. The systematic and long 
standing politico-cultural suppression of a minority group is not a simple process that can be 
quickly reversed. The Republic of Kurdistan did endeavour to revive the Kurdish identity, but 
its reign of only one year was too brief to cause a thorough transformation. For example, the 
first issue of Kurdistan had many Persian characters in it, but this was steadily reduced to a 
state until later issues, which were purely in Kurdish. In most issues of Kurdistan, a list of 
suggestions for language reform was published, which included the replacement of Persian 
vocabulary with Kurdish equivalents. 
Printing in the Kurdish language and eliminating influence from foreign languages, 
particularly from Persian, were key nationalist techniques for standardization of the Kurdish 
language, something close to the heart of Ghazi Mohammad. Zabihi and Ghazi asked the 
Soviet representatives in Kurdistan about procuring a printing machine for them. According 
to Shapasandi, the printing press eventually arrived in Mahabad in October 1945 and two 
Soviet engineers spent two busy weeks to install it.589 This led the Kurdistan to print its first 
headline ‘opening of Kurdistan newspaper office’. In celebration of this event Baba Sheikh 
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proclaimed that ‘the presence of this machine was a great opportunity to liberate the ship of 
Kurdistan from political tidal waves in order for it to safely arrive at the shore.’590 Another 
printing facility was installed in Bukan. On February 13, 1946, Kurdistan reported that the 
Bukan Print House was established and it should be of national service.591 These printing 
houses in Mahabad and Bukan published several magazines and one newspaper. The journal 
Kurdistan was firstly published in December 1945 and it probably ended with its thirteenth 
issue. The first issue of newspaper Kurdistan was published on January 11, 1946, and had 113 
issues. The journal Hawari Nishtiman (Support the organ of the Kurdistan Democratic Youth 
Union) published five issues and the mouthpiece journal of the KDP’s branch in Bukan called 
Halale (tulip) published three issues, while the only children’s journal, Garogali Mindalani 
Kurd (voice of Kurdish children) published three issues.592 With the presence of a printing 
press and the prominence of publishing in Kurdish, Ghazi Mohammad observed that the 
‘printing press would broadcasted our ideas, opinions and demands to the world.’593     
Print language is fundamental for the dissemination of nationalist ideology and 
according to Anderson, who ennumerates three ways it becomes the basis for a national 
consciousness. Two of these ways are as follows: 1- Print language creates a united avenue 
for networking and communications. 2 – It gives the language a new solid form, which in the 
long run would take a central place in the subjective idea of the nation.594 It should be noted 
that one of the Kurdish nationalist aspirations under the Kurdish liberal movements between 
the two world wars was to maintain, formalize and increase published material in Kurdish. 
Many magazines, journals, newspapers and pamphlets, were published in Kurdish (Kurmanji 
and Sorani) and distributed. The JK party and in particular the program of the KDP was very 
clear in stating that Kurdish was the official and approved language in the Kurdish territories. 
The second slogan of the KDP referred to endorsement of schools taught in the Kurdish and 
the administration of all affairs in Kurdish. This idea of the official government language 
being Kurdish was suggested by article nine of the KDP political program.          
According to Bulourian, the population of Mahabad at the time of the Second World 
War was about twenty thousand, with only primary schools and only one girl school with an 
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education higher than the sixth grade. University diplomas were nonexistent and the majority 
of the teachers were from the Azerbaijani and Persian ethnic background. Bulourian claims 
that Reza Shah blocked all political activities in Kurdistan and due to this political awareness 
within Kurdish society was very low.595 In these circumstances, a major challenge was faced 
by Ghazi Mohammad when he proclaimed the Republic of Kurdistan. The establishment of a 
modern education system based on the Kurdish language was one of the leading programs of 
Ghazi’s policy. With regard to the establishment of schools and a proper education system, 
Ghazi answered a question from the Rahbar (guide) newspaper in Tehran by stating that 
‘development and establishment of schools, print-capital, publishing of newspapers and 
journals, training military and politic, etc. had been improved.’596 The building and opening 
of the Galawedj School in some private houses and the opening of various other schools were 
all part of the policy of the Republic.597 
Because of the lack of high schools, teachers and the absence of a university in the 
areas under the control of the Republic, the KDP leaders sent many students to Tabriz and 
Baku with the hope that they would soon graduate with a high level of education and return 
back for the service of the Republic. One of the major goals of the Kurdish leaders in the 
second visit to Baku was the access of Kurdish students to various universities in Baku. After 
the declaration of the Republic, KDP sent more than fifty Kurdish students to Baku. 
Bulourian was one of these students and on this topic he said that: 
 
We [Kurds] consisted of fifty students in total, while the Azeris numbered to three hundred fifty 
and some Azeris were even allowed to follow pilot training, which was not the case for the 
Kurds. Thirty people were in one unit and three officers were selected to teach us military and 
weapons training, war strategy and political theory. All political officers were members of the 
Soviet Communist Party.598 
 
Thus, modern education was for Ghazi Mohammad fundamental for building a Kurdish state. 
The Republic initiated stringent measures to make children actively participate in education 
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within the domestic territories. It was compulsory for every child to register for school. 
Kurdistan published the following announcement:  
 
With the order of Peshawa [leader, Ghazi] and according to the policy of the democrat party, the 
official school language in Kurdistan will be Kurdish and everybody must send their children to 
school and the failure to do so would be grounds for punishment.599 
 
Women’s participation in political activities during the Republic was another significant 
political goal of the Kurdistan Democratic Party. On February 6, 1946, Kurdish women, 
under the leadership of Ghazi Mohammad’s wife Mina Khanum and the spouses of some 
members of the KDP central committee organized the first Kurdish women’s conference at 
the Kurdish-Soviet Cultural Society in Mahabad. At this conference, Mina Khanum 
proclaimed that the progress of Soviet women must be a model for the women in Kurdistan 
and she indicated the importance of education for women.600 Ghazi encouraged women to 
participate actively in the governmental institutions of the Republic of Kurdistan, and in 
particular, in political activities. He first encouraged his wife and daughters to set an example 
for the whole Kurdish community. Under the inspiration of Ghazi’s wife and with the support 
of the KDP central committee, a women’s organization was established on February 13, 
1946.601 The second conference was organized by Kurdish women in March 8, 1946 at the 
Kurdish-Soviet Cultural Society. The majority of the speeches at the conference claimed that 
women, like men, should contribute to political activities and the modern education was 
essential for humanity’s progress. Mina Khanum said in her speech that nowadays she saw 
parents sending their sons and daughters to school with enthusiasm and she hoped that in the 
future, under the guidance of the Kurdish government, illiteracy will be eradicated from 
Kurdistan.602 
Another section within the KDP was the Youth Union of Democratic Kurdistan. This 
organization even predated the formation of the KDP. With the encouragement of Soviet 
officers, Bulourian proclaimed the importance of the formation of the youth organization:  
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Throughout the whole of the world youth have their own organizations and in order to 
disseminate the voice of our nation and win Kurdish rights, it is necessary to establish such a 
youth organization.603  
 
Eventually, they formed the Kurdish Youth Organization (KYO) by the end 1942. In 1944, 
KYO entered the political activities of the JK party and their name was changed to the JK 
Youth Society. With the dissolution of the JK party and the formation of the KDP, the youth 
organization again changed its name to the Youth Union of Democratic Kurdistan. Kurdish 
nationalist awareness was an important target of this organization, particularly between 1942 
and 1946.604 
As a political institution, the KDP was a modern phenomenon in the Iranian Kurdish 
movement. The Kurdish people, according to Ghassemlou, were not very comfortable with 
the idea of formal institutions in no small part because of the previous institutions’ restrictions 
and obligations were the main ways for the state suppressed the Kurdish people. It was 
necessary to serve in the military and pay taxes for the maintenance of law and order and the 
growth of government institutions.605 These two phenomena (taxes and military) could be 
clearly marked as two of the problematical issues during the Republic of Kurdistan. Although 
the Republic had ruled no more than one year, it established a tax committee. Kurdistan wrote 
that ‘on 10 January 1946, the Kurdistan Democratic Party formatted a tax committee which 
would collect taxes first from the cities and then in the villages.’606 Kurdish representatives 
published several statements in different issues of Kurdistan asking the people to pay taxes, 
but their calls fell on deaf ears. And military participation, the second point, was problematic 
because the army was more based on tribal allegiances since it was under the control of the 
tribal chieftains. 
 Clarification of an important point is necessary regarding the building of NA by the 
Republic of Kurdistan. The main goal of the formation of such an army was not to expand 
armed struggle for liberation of other part of Iranian Kurdistan or against the central 
government, but it was only for defending the Republic of Kurdistan. The KDP’s principle 
goal was to obtain autonomy for the Kurds within the territorial sovereignty of Iran. In other 
words, to obtain Kurdish rights according to the Provincial Council Code in which self-rule 
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by the indigenous population was required and as it was also written in the third point of the 
KDP slogans. From 1944 onwards, demanding the implementation of the Provincial Council 
Code, particularly articles 90-3 which were related to the privileges of the provinces to have 
local assemblies, was a popular topic for most of the political organizations in Iran.607 The JK 
party was also one of the political parties behind this cry for the implementation of the 
Provincial Code (only during the Second World War since after the end of the war, they 
proclaimed the independence of Kurdistan) and their goal was to obtain a peaceful solution to 
the Kurdish question in Iran without involving themselves in armed struggle.  
 The KDP, under the leadership of Ghazi Mohammad, followed this proposal of the JK, 
but it was not a supporter of the independence of Kurdistan. In contrast to independence, the 
KDP had a clear message, which was the autonomy for the Kurds within the boundaries of 
Iran (the first of eight slogans of the KDP). For this reason, Ghazi Mohammad preferred a 
peaceful political dialogue rather than armed conflict for reaching a solution to the Kurdish 
question. Independence of Greater Kurdistan or even for Iranian Kurdistan was an unspoken 
issue for Ghazi. In several of his speeches, it can be surmised that he was a supporter of 
autonomy for the Kurds in Iran. Ghazi Mohammad claimed, ‘we ask the Iranian government 
to enforce the constitutional law and we will live in autonomy under the flag of Iran.’608 
Actually from a political perspective, since the beginning of the formation of the Republic of 
Kurdistan until its end, there were two different opinions on this, which divided the Kurdish 
leaders into two fervent groups. One side aimed for the expansion and liberation of other parts 
of Iranian Kurdistan, such as Hama Rashid Khan Baneh, while the other side, under the 
leadership of Ghazi, was for a nonviolent solution to the Kurdish question in Iran. This split 
between the Kurdish leaders was further exacerbated and exploited during and after the battle 
of Mamashah.     
 That battle in June 1946 poisoned the political atmosphere in the Republic of 
Kurdistan. In it could be said that this battle caused the beginning of the political decline of 
the Republic by discouraging both the people and some Kurdish leaders. But the Kurdish 
forces were ready for further expansion to other parts of Iranian Kurdistan, such as Saqqiz, 
Baneh and Sardasht. This message was clear in Ghazi’s speech on May 21, 1946 when he said 
that ‘Kurdish forces will go on to occupy as far as Kermanshah when they obtain permission 
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from the national government.’609 But this expansion was not in the interests of the Soviet 
policy in the region. Hashimov observed that if the Kurdish forces occupied Saqqiz and 
Kermanshah, they would be entering to the regions under the British sphere of influence. And 
if there were a sabotage of the motorway to Iraq and British oil interests near Kermanshah, 
Britain might conclude that the Soviets were behind the Kurdish expansion and that they were 
seeking oil conquests in the south of Iran, which was against the treaty between the two Great 
Powers. Thus, Hashimov made it clear that if Kurdish forces spread out to the south of Iranian 
Kurdistan, they would no longer enjoy Soviet support should the Iranian army attack the 
Republic on some other front.610 The Republic’s leaders had three choices. First, accept the 
Soviet consul’s proposal in Urumiyeh and give up all attempts intentions of offensive 
operations to liberate the other parts of Iranian Kurdistan, especially in the south. Second, 
refuse the proposition of Hashimov and attack Saqqiz-Baneh-Sardasht front. Third, look for a 
solution to the Kurdish question in Iran through diplomatic means with the central 
government. 
 Baba Sheikh, the Kurdish Prime Minister was ready to pursue the second option and 
spoke up in approval of the offensive.611 Several Kurdish leaders, such as Hama Rashid Khan 
among others, also supported the proposal of Baba Sheikh. In a letter to Ghazi Mohammad, 
Hama Rashid explained that the Iranian army was gathering forces and preparing for a 
possible attack and that for this reason he had requested permission to get the Kurdish troops 
ready to remove the enemy from the region.612 In large part, the Barzanis also approved of 
this proposal.613 However, there were three obstacles, which were also that motivated Ghazi 
Mohammad and his alliances to choose the third option, that of diplomatic resolution. Among 
these reasons, the first was that the Azerbaijan government had negotiated with the central 
government and legally reunited Azerbaijan back with the Iranian nation. Second, the Soviet 
military left the Iranian territory without showing any support for dual government’s future. 
Third, there were all the indications that some tribal leaders would withdraw their support and 
not assist with the Republic’s affairs.614 The end of the Second World War changed the 
atmosphere of international relations and political alliances between Great Powers. Soviet 
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soldiers under pressure from the UN, particularly the US and UK, departed from Iran and 
claimed it as a defeat for the Soviet policy in international, especially Iranian, affairs (see 
chapter V). Ghazi Mohammad realized that the Iranian central government was now allied 
with the victorious powers, US and UK, who in turn supported the central government. In a 
letter to Hama Rashid, Ghazi explained his stance by stating these reasons and cautioning that 
‘every small action must be taken with regard to the contemporary international situation’,615 
which now dictates that the Kurdish question be resolved peacefully with the central 
government.’616  
 Adherence to democratic principles in Iran was one of the significant motivating 
factors for the KDP leaders. Article five of the KDP political program referred to this topic, 
‘development of democracy based on the struggle for human rights is the goal of the party.’ A 
solution of Kurdish question in Iran based on democratic principles and guaranteeing rights 
regardless of religion and ethnicity was also one of the KDP’s fundamental goals. For the 
KDP leaders, the presence of a real democratic process in Iran would be a way to solve the 
problems of the various ethnic groups in the state, especially that of the Kurds. But this did 
not mean that the Republic of Kurdistan would separate from Iran. Ghazi claimed, ‘we have 
independence but we are proud to be a part of Iran and our struggle is against the dictatorial 
administration in Tehran.’617 Ghazi recalled several examples of European democratic 
countries with different ethnic groups who live together within the territorial unity that 
accepts the norms and values of its ethnically diverse citizens. Ghazi’s belief in democratic 
values is clear when he said that ‘nothing about the Azerbaijan nation is comparable with us, 
but they also changed their target from that of a liberation movement towards accepting the 
principles of democracy.’ According to Ghazi, ‘both nations [Kurds and Azeris] could reach 
unity and live together with each other and set an example for the Iranian government to 
recognize the norms of democracy.’ Even if the Iranian government were not ready to accept 
the values of democracy, it was still not a reason for Ghazi to quarrel with central 
government.  Rather, Ghazi observed that ‘we are all humans and have the right to live as 
human beings.’618  
                                               
615 Mulla Izzat 2003a, 194; Anwer 2001, 163. 
616 Kurdistan, No. 47, 15 May 1946, 3. 
617 Ibid., No. 51, 29 May 1946, 1. 
618 Ibid. 
 176 
To what extent was the Iranian government was prepared to take serious steps to 
accept and implement Ghazi’s proposal for a peaceful solution to the Kurdish question in 
Iran? If Ghazi claimed that the Iranian government was a despotic regime, in what manner 
was the central government ready to choose diplomatic channels for the solution of the 
Kurdish issue? On May 29, 1946, Ghazi proclaimed, ‘the Kurdish and Azeris question is 
sabotaged by Ahmad Ghavam os-Saltaneh (Iranian Prime Minster), which must be solved by 
a peaceful dialogue.’619 In the letters of several Kurdish officers on the Saqqiz-Baneh front, 
they explained that the Iranian government was not ready to support Ghazi’s proposal because 
Iranian military was increasing their forces on Saqqiz front on a daily basis620 in preparation 
for an offensive attack against the Republic forces. However, several signs pointed to the 
apathy, weakness and disunity of the central government, which kept the Iranian government 
from paying attention to the Republic. First, the Azerbaijan government was in a strong 
partnership with Kurdish government and the decline of Azerbaijan would mean that the 
conquest and control of the whole of Iran by the central government was inevitable. Second, 
some tribes in southern Iran, Bakhtiyari and Qashqayi, were in an uprising against Iranian 
government. Third, disarray and division of the ruling political parties within Iranian 
government was also an important weakness. According to Hewrami, the first steps taken in 
Iran after the departure of the Soviet army were the elimination of the governing coalitions of 
different political parties of Ghavam between early August to 17 October 1946. In the third 
new cabinet of Ghavam, which was established on October 19, the representatives of the 
Tudeh and several parties were not in government. Expulsion and dismantling of the three 
Tudeh’s ministries also provide an opportunity for the southern tribes to feel themselves 
prepared to accommodate the Iranian government. On October 1946, Ghavam returned the 
political balance and could now send the military to Azerbaijan, who wanted to separate from 
Iran.’621 
If Ghazi wanted a military offensive in the period from June to October (period of 
weakness of the Iranian government), particularly in the southern Iranian Kurdistan, it was a 
promising time. According to Hewrami, if the Kurdish government put pressure on the central 
government by moving from a defensive position to an offensive stance for the liberation of 
other parts of Kurdistan, in particular Saqqiz-Baneh-Sardasht, it would also have been a basis 
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for the liberation of other parts of Iranian Kurdistan. Hewrami states that the following factors 
would be in favour of the Kurdish authorities if they wanted to fight against the Iranian 
military along the Saqqiz-Baneh-Sardasht line:  
 
(A) the Iranian military offensive from the southern line against Kurdish government would be 
eliminated; (b) it would be a response to the Iranian government against their failure to resolve 
the Kurdish issue through dialogue; (c) it would show to the US, UK and Iranian government, 
that the Kurds were determined to get their rights and the withdrawal of Soviet military had no 
effect on the Kurdish government; (d) Kurdish troops would gain access to weapons and 
ammunitions which were not possible to be received from the Soviets; (e) Kurdish forces would 
capture strategic areas to build a future military base; and, (f) Kurdish troops would increase in 
maturity and grow in number with the preparation and implementation of this offensive.622  
 
Frankly though, the Kurds had no strategic plan for an offensive and the Kurdish military plan 
was dictated in large part by the Soviets. As Eagleton pointed out, ‘Russians were content 
with influencing major policy decisions along lines favourable to their larger tactical and 
strategic interests.’623  
 The majority of the subjects and articles in the newspaper Kurdistan praised the Soviet 
government, Stalin and the socialist bloc. After the withdrawal of the Soviet military from 
Iran, such praiseworthy statements were drastically reduced and it seemed that the Kurds were 
disappointed, which was obvious in a long speech by Ghazi on May 29. With the absence of 
the Soviet support, there remained two possibilities to strengthen the political position of the 
Republic of Kurdistan: the formation of an alliance with the government of Azerbaijan and 
the establishment of coalitions with various democratic parties in Iran, which was already too 
late as well. Ghazi declared through a telegraph, ‘the Kurdistan Democratic Party is pleased to 
announce the formation of a coalition with democrat movements in Iran (the Democratic 
Party, under the leadership of Ghavam, the Iranian Tudeh and Azerbaijan Democratic 
Party).’624 Thus, the successful diplomatic policy of Ghavam satisfied Ghazi Mohammad and 
hindered him from a possible Kurdish military offensive. However, it would have been 
impossible for Ghavam to alienate all the plots of central government simultaneously. 
Ghavam’s first step was to pacify the southern rebels and establish political unity for the 
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ruling government. When the execution of the so-called steps of Ghavam was frustrated, the 
leader focused all his attention on Azerbaijan. Without help of the Azerbaijan government in 
the face of military offensive by central government, the failure of the alliance between 
Azerbaijan and Republic of Kurdistan in December 1946 was fast becoming a reality. 
 
5   The fall of the Republic of Kurdistan 
The collapse of the Republic hinged on several internal and external elements, with the 
former getting more attention in this section. Rivalry between Kurdish leaders and different 
tribal chieftains and, who were the important for planning and implementing of policy within 
the Republic lead to an unbalanced policy among Kurdish towns and villages. These 
imbalances are the key elements leading to the collapse of the Republic, to be discussed in 
this section. The essential research agenda is to find answers to the following question: which 
dominant internal factors lead to the collapse of the Republic of Kurdistan? 
     
5.1.  Opponents of the Republic of Kurdistan within the Kurdish community 
The Republic of Kurdistan, during its short reign, remained mostly a city-based administrative 
institution, which was mostly concentrated in Mahabad. According to Vali, the Republic 
could not implement its power outside the cities and it was also rather incapable of spreading 
the nationalist message to all parts of the society, including the farmers.625 Landlords were an 
important component of the policy formulation class within the Republic and in many cases, 
they were also the ones in charge of the villagers, particularly in matters of tax collection. 
Vali asserted that inhabitants outside the cities did not donate and support the administration, 
because the farmers still continued to pay their taxes to the landlords.626 Some of the 
landlords, such as Seif Ghazi and Ghazi Mohammad, channelled funds to the Republic, but it 
was purely based on their own self interests. Although the Republic established a tax 
collection system, called the Tax Committee, it was inefficient. This was due in part, 
according to Vali, to the institution (Republic) not taking steps to force the landed class to 
adhere to its directives. The government feared theresistance and friction such measures might 
cause since its very existence depended on the political and military support of this class.627 
Landlords controlled not only the social, political and especially economic aspects of the 
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villages, but they also contributed greatly to the political environment of their communities, 
with the majority of the landlords maintaining city-based lifestyles. Tribal chieftains, some of 
whom were also landlords, were also another constituency that sometimes competed with 
landlords for political power since they were largely concentrated in the countryside.  
During the occupation of Iran by the Allies from 1941 until 1946, the political 
consensus between several Kurdish chieftains for the leadership of the Kurdish society was a 
hot topic. Ghazi Mohammad from the Mukriyan district, Amir Asad of the Dehbokri, 
Mamash and Zarza tribal chieftains in the Naqadeh and Ushnawiyeh areas, Zêro Beg Harki 
and Emer Khan Shikak were the significant leaders of the Kurds at that time. They did not 
cooperate with each other as their own individual political interests were more important. 
Soviet political agents wanted to appoint a strong Kurdish leader for the protection of Soviet 
political interests (and there were no powerful leaders in Iranian Kurdistan at that time). 
Obviously, the Soviets sought a Kurdish leader who would be the most favorable to the Soviet 
perspective. According to Roosevelt, the most acceptable candidates were Gharani Agha, 
chief of the Mamash tribe who originated from the Naqadeh region and was eminently 
qualified, and Emer Khan Shikak. Amir Asad Dehbokri was another suitable person for the 
Soviets as he was, in Roosevelt’s judgment, a conservative and honorary chief of the 
municipality, a position to which he had been appointed by the Iranian government in order to 
maintain the security of the area. Eventually, the Soviets chose Ghazi Mohammad, a religious 
man coming from a respected family in the Mukriyan region.628  
Ghazi Mohammad’s leadership was for some chieftains unacceptable due to a 
traditional rivalry of some of the chieftains with Ghazi’s family. Fettahi Ghazi points out, 
Mohammad Agha of the Dehbokri tribe and major parts of the Manguri tribe had strong 
enmity with Ghazi’s family.629 Before the proclamation of the Republic, this hostility between 
tribal chieftains was not attended to by Ghazi Mohammad. Several important tribal chieftains 
of Dehbokri, Manguri and Mamash were openly in the service of the central government. 
Marzban, the Iranian governor in Tabriz, told Maksimov that ‘it’s straightforward to remove 
them [Ghazi Mohammad and their family] by Gharani Agha Mamash or by Ali Agha and 
Abdullah Agha Manguri.’630 According to Fahimi, an emissary of central government to 
Mahabad prior to the Republic, ‘Gharani Agha informed me weekly via letters about the 
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events in Kurdistan.’631 With regard to open hostility between several chieftains of Manguri, 
and of Mamash and Dehbokri against the Republic, Kurdistan published a speech by Seif 
Ghazi, Minister of War, who said that the ‘treachery of some Mamash, Manguri and Dehbokri 
chieftains should be scrutinized in this democratic atmosphere of the Kurdish society and 
their stratagem must be publicized.’632 However, antagonism of these chieftains against the 
Republic continued until the Republic’s fall. When Ghazi surrendered himself to the Iranian 
military, it was even one of his conditions that these chieftains be declared inadmissible in 
Mahabad, so that they do not plunder the city in the name of revenge.633                 
Political and ideological divisions among tribal chieftains a significantly weakened the 
political power of the Republic. The KDP leaders were unable to unite themselves in the 
service of the Kurdish nationalist aspiration. The political and personal polarization of the 
Kurdish leaders grew in various directions. From an ideological perspective, some Kurdish 
leaders had been attaching themselves to British-American interests, while the majority opted 
for the Soviets. The public mouthpiece of both the Republic and the KDP, Kurdistan, 
published many praiseworthy messages and photographs of the Soviet leaders. Ghazi 
Mohammad was optimistic and had faith in the Soviet Union, whose communist 
representatives, he thought, would liberate the small nation of Kurdistan. This argument has 
been illustrated in the following poem:  
 
reyi nacatman pana bu Ithadi Shorawi__reyi (Stalin) beji bu lagri mazlomekan634  
[shelter with Soviet Union is our road to liberation. Stalin’s way is supporting the 
suppressors].  
 
The withdrawal of the Red Army, the essential factor behind the fall of the Republic, 
devastated Kurdish leaders and left the Kurdish people to face the offensive of the Iranian 
military alone.    
The Republic’s support of the Soviet communist ideology had two negative effects on 
some tribal leaders. Their individual interests and, more importantly, their power over the 
proletariat farmer class was bound to be reduced if the communist ideology gained a foothold. 
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Ghassemlou claimed that the development of democracy and friendly relations with Soviet 
Union would put the interests of chieftains and landlords at risk. Thus, they only outwardly 
supported the Republic due to their fear of its Soviet ally. However, their secret contacts and 
relationships with the central government were never broken, even when they were 
supposedly pledged in the service of the Kurdish movement.635 Another view of many Kurds 
who opposed the Soviets was the fear that under communist leadership an atheist regime 
would be implemented, which would be abhorrent to the devout and practicing Kurdish 
Muslim community. Ghassemlou stated that Rashid Beg told his father that although it was 
right to exploit Soviets support to the Kurds, it would indeed be bad for the Kurds if in the 
future Kurdish society turned into something akin to that of the Soviet society.636     
Employment of Emer Khan as the General forces of the Republic, as per the American 
intelligence service’s directions, was another manifestation of division of the Kurdish 
leadership during the Republic. The double spy nature of Emer Khan rescued him from life 
imprisonment, exile or even death by hanging when the Iranian military crushed the Republic 
of Kurdistan. Britain claimed that Emer Khan was in the service of the US. In a letter to 
Consul General in Tabriz, the then British Ambassador in Tehran claimed that ‘Arram [Emer] 
Khan, head of the Shikkak Kurds, is a friend of the Americans.’637 As Jwaideh also pointed 
out, Emer Khan appeared to have been close with George Allen, US Ambassador in Iran.638 
When Emer Khan remarked that the fall of the Republic was only a matter of time, his 
political and individual opportunism was obvious. He had, Roosevelt asserted, withdrawn his 
support from the Republic in anticipation of forthcoming developments.639 Emer Khan’s 
individual interest for joining the Republic became clearer a few years later after the fall of 
the Republic when he claimed that he ‘had done so in order to save his neck.’640  
The Kurdish leaders’ focus their individual interests and the weakness of their 
nationalist sentiments can be concluded from the following report of the Soviet 
representatives in Iranian Kurdistan. The membership of tribal chiefs in the JK, according to 
the Soviet report in Urumiyeh, could be divided in three categories. First, some became 
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members only for their own economic interests. Second, several famous Kurdish leaders 
obtained membership of the JK to show support its Soviet allies of whom they were afraid. 
For this reason, the JK’s political ambition for the independence of Kurdistan rested on the 
assistance of the Soviets. And third, a few Kurdish leaders entered the JK for their nationalist 
feeling as they wanted to liberate their nation.641 
Inexperience in running governmental institutions within the Kurdish society was in 
general a substantial defect for support of the Kurdish nationalist project. That much was 
clear in the governmental institutions of the Republic. Ghassemlou claimed that the Republic 
of Kurdistan inexperience in comparison to the central government was one of the causes of 
the fall of the Republic.642 One of the reasons behind the incapacity of Kurds to manage their 
own affairs was the central government’s longstanding policy towards the ethnic group. As 
previously noted, Turkey, Iraq and Reza Shah of Iran obstructed the advancement of basic 
human rights for the Kurds, which is the proximate cause of a lack of schools in Kurdistan (or 
a complete absence of schools in some areas, especially in villages), the absolute prohibition 
on the creation of political parties, and the prohibition of Kurdish language. Dictation errors 
and the dominance of Persian words in the reports and writings of the newspaper Kurdistan 
not only illustrated the undeveloped state of the Kurdish language, but the newspaper also 
confirms the political inexperience of the authorized officials and Kurdish successors, since 
its political messaging was also very weak. Ghassemlou stated the leaders of the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party generally had no experience in politics, and were equally ignorant in 
matters of establishing and administering a civil government.643  
Regardless, one year was too short a time to properly build a functioning public 
administration for the Republic. Strengthening and enhancing the formation of political 
parties and government is a lengthy process. Time is needed for polity to setroots into a 
society. But the KDP was not allowed that time, because it ruled only briefly. The KDP had 
but a few political and educational cadres, which are the necessary building blocks for 
functioning political parties. Within the one-year reign of the Republic, it was also impossible 
to build strong confederate government institutions. According to Ghassemlou, the tragedy of 
the Republic of Kurdistan might have been averted had it been given more time, but that was 
                                               
641 Hewrami 2008a, 134-5. 
642 Ghassemlou 1988, 135-6. 
643 Ibid., 136. 
 183 
not possible due to other elements contributing to its fall.644 Thus, lack of time can be viewed 
as a key factor in explaining the weakness of the Republic, which was really little more than a 
political party attempting to be a government. The KDP managed the Republic, but the 
division of responsibility among the officials was not clear. The Central Committee 
sometimes supervised functions of the government institutions and at other times, the 
government officials played important roles within party. In some cases, there were figures 
who interfered with both government and party activities, while holding no official post at 
all.645                             
As mentioned above, the lack of support among Kurdish leaders for an offensive to 
liberate the southern part of Iranian Kurdistan was the main reason for the fall of the 
Republic. According to Ghassemlou, Kurdish interests pointed to liberating and defending the 
Saqqiz front, which was an Iranian military stronghold.646 Even the Republic’s representatives 
were unaware of the significance of problems in the northern parts of the Republic’s 
Kurmanji territory. In several reports of Muradiyan, the Soviet Consul in Maku, he concluded 
that ‘Mahabad leaders had not realized the requests of the local committee [of the KDP] many 
times.’647 Although, Ghazi Mohammad visited Kurdish districts in Maku in August 1946 to 
examine and bring unity between several conflicting Kurdish chieftains, and especially those 
between Kurds and Azeris, it seemed that he was unsuccessful. As Muradiyan explained, 
Ghazi Mohammad visited Maku and Khoy from August 1 - 6 of 1946 to find a solution for 
some of these important issues, such as disagreement between the Kurds, cooperation 
between local committees, but this was not fruitful either.648 Because of the mixed population 
of Azeris and Kurds in the region of Maku, Khoy and Salmas, which were the boundaries of 
these districts, these disputed regions became a crucial point of disagreement between 
Kurdish and Azerbaijan governments (see following chapter).                        
Ghazi Mohammad’s surrender to the Iranian military was also pivotal for the decline 
of the Republic. According to several authors, Ghazi’s meeting with the Iranian officer, 
Major-General Fazlullah Homayuni, the Commander of Iranian Kurdistan’s Fourth Army, in 
Hamamiyan near Bukan was an historical mistake. It would have been more appropriate and 
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logical to send one of his own men from a military rank to negotiate with the Iranians rather 
than going himself.649 However, the downfall of Azerbaijan also suggested a definitive 
collapse of the Republic of Kurdistan. Hêmin brought the massage of the collapse of 
Azerbaijan to Ghazi by saying that ‘Tehran’s radio read the victorious telegraph of Dr. Jawid, 
Azerbaijan Minister of Interior, who accepted the return of Shah’s military [to Tabriz].’650 
After the surrendering of Azerbaijan government in December 11, 1946, Kurdish leaders of 
the Republic, under the leadership of Ghazi Mohammad, made their historical decision. 
Hêmin explained this as follows:  
 
The Kurdistan Democratic Party’s leaders gathered in the house of Ghazi that night and the 
everyone’s morale was good. The War Council, presided by Baba Sheikh, planned and signed 
the first chapter of the outcome of the meeting, which decided to defend [the Republic]. But, the 
following day, one of members in the meeting ran away and they no longer defended the 
decision. They instructed Peshmargeh to withdrawal [from Saqqiz front] and this opened the 
way for the Iranian military.651  
 
In another public meeting at the Abbas Agha Mosque, according to Mulla Izzat, they were 
deciding to establish a Defence Council to resist against the Iranian army.652 Kurds attempted 
to find a common solution despite the large divisions of opinions present in the meeting. 
Several Kurdish leaders, such as Mirza Rahmat Shaf’i, Sheikh Hassan Shamsi Burhan, Ali 
Amir el-ashair, and others urged reconciliation with the Iranian government. Others, such as 
Mulla Abdulla Mudarresi and Mulla Hussein, declared that resistance to the Iranian army 
would be useless.653 Ghazi himself saw no other option than to surrender to Iranian soldiers. 
A day before the departure of Asadov, the Soviet Trade ambassador in Mahabad, on 
December 16, 1946, Ghazi Mohammad, Seif Ghazi and Baba Sheikh went to Hamamiyan to 
surrender themselves to Homayuni.654 Homayuni instructed Ghazi to return to Mahabad, 
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which would pacify not only the general Kurdish population but also the Barzanis and other 
tribes who had not yet surrendered to Iranian military.655 
When Ghazi returned to Mahabad, Mulla Mustafa Barzani reached him and tried 
desperately to overturn Ghazi’s decision to surrender to the Iranian government. The 
discussion between Ghazi and Barzani, according to Fettahi Ghazi, whom was present there 
himself, went as follows:  
 
Barzani repeatedly asked Ghazi to not surrender as he thought he would regret it later on. 
Barzani wanted Ghazi to go with them and they would always care for him. Ghazi’s presence 
with the Barzanis under the shadow of Kurdistan flag would thus continue the liberation 
movement. And, if Ghazi stayed there, he would be killed.656 
 
Ghazi answered by saying that ‘the best for me is to be martyred in my motherland and not to 
leave my people alone in these dire conditions.’ After Ghazi’s determinate decision to stay in 
Mahabad, Fettahi explained that: 
 
Ghazi gave important and honest counsel to Barzani, and he gave him some books, the map [of 
Kurdistan], the special flag of the leadership of Kurdistan Republic and a picture of Salahaddin 
Eyyobi. Ghazi also told Barzani that he should not let this national flag fall low and he should 
keep it for use in the future.657  
 
After one day of this last meeting between the two leaders, on December 17, 1946, Iranian 
troops captured the capital of the Republic of Kurdistan and officially brought an end to the 
story of the Republic. 
Barzani’s troops had not surrendered themselves or handed over their weapons to the 
Iranian military. Their responsibility was to protect the Barzani families, mostly women and 
children, and they gathered all the Barzani kin, distributed throughout Iranian Kurdistan, at 
Ushnawiyeh and Naqadeh. Barzani had three possible options. First, he could flee to the 
Soviet Union and ask for asylum. Second, he could accept the proposal of Shah of Iran to 
settle in the region of Hamadan or leave the Iranian territory immediately. Third, he could 
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return to his country of origin, Iraq.658 Barzani wanted to chose the first option, but it was too 
dangerous (the road from Ushnawiyeh to the Soviet border), as can be seen from his statement 
that ‘Tahir Khan, Simko’s son, stressed that they (the chiefs of the Harki, Begzadeh, Shikak) 
would betray him because they were in touch with the Iranian government.’659 The second 
option was equally impossible for Barzani so he demanded that the Iranian government allow 
more time that winterin order that he and his people might safely cross the Iraqi border. But, 
Iranian government refused the proposal of Barzani and began a violent military conflict 
against his faction.660 
From February until April of 1947, the military confrontation continued in west 
Urumiyeh between the Barzani forces and the Iranian military. Murtaza Zarbakht said that in 
several of these confrontations, the Barzani forces won large victories by capturing many 
soldiers and some officers.661 In April 1947, when the snow melted and roads to Iraq opened 
up, all Barzanis crossed the border to Iraq. However, Ali Hijazi, the director general of the 
Iraqi police, was waiting on the Iraqi side of the Gader River.662 The Iraqi government 
evacuated the Barzani families to the several cities and four Iraqi Kurdish officers, Izzat 
Abdul Aziz, Mustafa Khoshnaw, Khairullah Abdul Karim and Mohammad Mahmud Ghudsi, 
who were the leaders of the Barzanis forces on the Saqqiz front, were hung on June 19, 1947. 
Barzani anticipated his execution in Iraq and to avoid it, he chose another historic escape 
towards the Soviet border. On April 15, 1947, Barzani along with more than five hundred 
elite fighters passed through the Turkey and Iranian borders toward the Soviet border. Finally, 
after some confrontations with the Iranian military, the Barzani fighters, in June 1947, crossed 
Aras River and surrendered to the Soviet Army.663 Later, Barzani and his colleagues returned 
to Iraq for the coup d’áte of Abdul Karim Ghasim in 1958. 
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5.2.  Imprisonment, trial and hanging of Ghazi Mohammad 
The Iranian government’s plan was to control and occupy Kurdish areas without taking 
violent military confrontation. A couple of days after the Iranian military’s entry into 
Mahabad, the government engaged a pacification policy meant not only to prevent a possible 
insurrection by the Kurdish people, but also to prolong the humiliating surrender of its 
chieftains, such as that Zêro Beg, to the Iranian army. This pacification policy clearlhy 
worked as no Kurdish uprising was forthcoming and some important figures like Zêro Beg 
fled to Iraq. Nevertheless, this pacification policy was soon replaced by a policy that was 
especially harsh on the previous Kurdish leadership. Several authors claimed that when Ghazi 
Mohammad accompanied Homayuni in Hamamiyan, he was promised that his life and the 
lives of his colleagues were vouchsafed.664 On December 21, 1946, according to Ghassemlou, 
Homayuni captured twenty eight representatives of the Republic of Kurdistan, including 
Ghazi Mohammad and Seif Ghazi.665 Sadr Ghazi, the Kurdish deputy in parliament, with 
assurance from Ghavam, returned from Tehran to Mahabad. Mohammad Reza Seif Ghazi 
pointed out that Ghavam told Sadr Ghazi that ‘Kurdistan Democratic Party will become a part 
of our Democratic Party and I guarantee that after a court process, the three Ghazis will be 
banished to ‘Kashan’ city. So, you have to first go back to Mahabad to finish the court 
process.’666 After Seif Ghazi’s arrival in Mahabad, the Iranian military imprisoned him, where 
he met some of his supporters who were also waiting for their court proceedings. 
In early January 1947, a special military court, called ‘Court Martial’, sat in Mahabad 
and began to consider Ghazi’s case.667 Under the leadership of Colonel Parsi Tabar, 
prosecutor-General Colonel Fiuzi and several Iranian officers, the court process began. The 
court was a totally secret process and nobody had the right to be informed about what went on 
inside there. Ghazi also had no right to choose an attorney.668 Ghazi tried to bring two lawyers 
from Tehran to defend his case, but the judge refused and told Ghazi that he could only accept 
a lawyer from the current council. Finally, Ghazi elected Captain Mohammad Sharifi of the 
garrison Mahabad as his lawyer.669 On 9 January, Ghazi addressed a long speech in his own 
defence and criticized the court on the following grounds: 
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I object to the proceedings on the grounds that the special court-martial in Mahabad was not 
competent to deal with my case since as a civilian, I should appear before a civil court, and not 
before a military court in Tehran. Further, the court had not given me sufficient time to choose a 
lawyer.670  
 
The requests of Ghazi were rejected by the court and prosecution cited an indictment that was 
summarized in twenty-two points. Two key factors were essential to bring a charge against 
Ghazi: trampling of the Iranian constitution and the engagement in which Iranian lives had 
been lost during the reign of the Republic. The first indictment referred to the establishment 
of the Republic of Kurdistan, attempts to secede and fracture Iranian territorial integrity, the 
formation of the NA and award military ranks, to bring down the flag of Iranian government 
and replace it with the Kurdish flag, relations with outsiders (Soviets) and the visit to Baku. 
The second accusation was related to the attack on the Mahabad police post in 1943, where 
five policemen were killed and occupation of Mahabad municipality in 1945, Ghahrawa and 
Mamashah battlefields. Until today, there is no complete version or original indictment report, 
but several elements of this condemnation had been published in 1952 by the journal 
Itila’at.671 Some of the answers of Ghazi Mohammad have been summarized as follows:  
 
In our place you should be apprehended and tried. You denounce us now but it was you who 
attacked and imprisoned us in our own homes and now, have imprisoned us. The source of all 
these disputes lies in the political despotism of your government, which does not even allow the 
people to choose their own representatives for the parliament. If the government says all Kurds 
are traitors, then you should leave these areas. And if you believe in patriotism, accept the right 
of indigenous self-rule.672 
 
Ghazi Mohammad defended himself against the accusation of the military court and criticized 
the political and administrative apparatus of central government, which he claimed ‘had 
conquered our country and attacked us.’673 When Ghazi was asked whether he was helped by 
foreign countries to organize a rebellion, he replied that: 
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You do not want to understand the reality. I was the founder of the democratic movement in 
Kurdistan and no foreign power forced me to do so. I am the leader of this movement and I did 
it for the love of my nation and country. Even if you execute me without due process, the cause 
of my nation will not be lost.674  
 
The accusations applied to all three Ghazis. A specific indictment was made against Seif 
Ghazi for wearing a general’s uniform and participating in the fighting. Kurdish resistance 
against the Iranian military was an important reason for charging Sadr Ghazi.675 Eventually, 
the special court council sentenced the three to death on January 23, 1947.  
 Although, all three of them had their cases sent to a ‘review court’, it seemed that the 
Iranian government had already made its decision. Indeed, under command of the Shah and 
according to article 114 of the Iranian military code, an appeal was not possible.676 One of the 
important reasons the Shah of Iran and several high ranking Iranian officers wanted to have 
Ghazi Mohammad hanged was the content of a letter of Ghazi to General Razmara during the 
Mamashah battle. In the letter Ghazi had referred to the famous couplet by Abul-Ghasim 
Firdawsi Tusi:  
 
    Hama sar be sar tan bekoshtan dehim__Az an beh keh keshvar be doshman dehim 
    (We would much rather die one by one. Than give our country to the enemy).677 
 
Ghazi claimed in the letter to the officers of the Iranian army, who were at that time fighting 
and risking their lives for the country? To take to their heels and traduced the following great 
lines of Firdawsi’s poetry, Ghazi claimed: 
 
    Hama sar be sar posht be doshman konim__Az an beh keh khodra be koshtan dehim 
    (We turn our backs to the enemy one by one. Rather than die for our country).678 
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After the fall of the Republic, the Shah of Iran proclaimed an amnesty but it was not for 
everybody and certainly not for Ghazi and his two companions.679 On March 31, 1947, the 
three of them, Ghazi Mohammad, Seif Ghazi and Sadr Ghazi, were hanged on three separate 
gibbets at the Chwar Chira circle. According to Eagleton, it happened in the middle of the 
night (3 a.m.) and in the same place here fourteen months earlier the Republic of Kurdistan 
had been proclaimed.680 Ghazi’s execution was also synchronized with the hangings of 
several other Kurdish leaders and chieftains who had engaged in planning the political 
activities for the Republic.681 According to Ghassemlou, the decision to suspend Ghazi’s 
execution for more than two months from January 23 to March 31, could be due to many 
obstacles faced by the Iranian government in implementing the death-sentence. Ghazi was a 
popular personality within Kurdish community and it was not so simple for Iranian 
government to hang him. Therefore, he was executed in the middle of the night and then in 
the early next morning the Iranian military besieged the whole of Mahabad. Thus, not only 
was Ghazi’s court process kept secret, but also his execution was also implemented covertly. 
Another important factor was the conflict between the Iranian military and the Barzanis 
troops.682 Between February and late March, the Barzani fighters had some successful 
military victories, but in late March and early April, they were slowly returning to Iraq. So 
ensuring military order and stability in Kurdish areas was a high priority for the Iranian 
government before they could safely execute the Republic’s leaders per the Shah’s orders. 
The execution of Ghazi and his colleagues did not end the Kurdish nationalist movement in 
Iran, but as Eagleton claims, the stream of Kurdish nationalist thought that arose in Iran 
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6   Conclusion 
The conquest of Iran by Allied Forces in August 1941 not only ended the rule of Reza Shah 
but it also made the modernization process for the most part unsuccessful. Numerous tribes, 
nomadic families and especially chieftains, were forced to return back to their original 
regions. 1941-46 saw the rise of political parties in Iran. During this period, two major 
political parties, the JK party and the KDP, were founded in Iranian Kurdistan. Although the 
first two years of the JK’s political activity was done in secret, because they distrusted the 
Aghas, chieftains and Iranian officials who were still in Mahabad, it was a successful political 
party. The popularity of the JK under the leadership of the central committee grew among a 
majority of the ordinary urban population of the city of Mahabad. The fundamental principle 
of the JK party, which was independence for Kurdistan, had an imperialist (English) character 
for the Soviets and this was a reason for the Soviets to suppress the JK, eventually fusing its 
elements into the Soviet-approved KDP, which was established in 1945. The political 
program of the KDP was very clear compared to that of the JK, which had never published a 
complete and clear agenda. The JK journal, Nishtiman, and other official statements referred 
to some basic principles, but the KDP was much more open and comprehensive. Elites and 
tribal leaders were the central figures within the KDP, with a figurative religious leadership, 
namely that of Ghazi Mohammad. But, Ghazi’s religiosity did not clash with his work as a 
politician.  
The establishment of the Republic of Kurdistan was a political and nationalist project 
under the leadership of the KDP. Although the Republic of Kurdistan lasted only a brief 
period, it had tremendous success insofar as establishing Kurdish schools, developing the 
Kurdish language, improving the status of women and youths, socio-political and economic 
reform, etc. The Republic had a nationalist urban elite movement, which could not bring all 
layers of Kurdish society under its umbrella. The tribal aspect of Kurdistan dominated 
everything and even the decisions of the security council of the Republic and its forces were 
made by tribal chieftains. During the reign of the Republic there were no bureaucratic and 
inefficient officials of the central government and there were no authoritative institutions as 
those of Pahlavi’s to forcefully collect taxes. All administrators belonged to the indigenous 
Kurdish population and they had total freedom to choose own political agenda, which in the 
majority of cases was in tune with their cultural, political, social aspirations. In general, the 
Kurds were proud of the achievements of the Republic and as Roosevelt points out, ‘Mahabad 
itself, from a typically drab Persian provincial town, had become picturesque and colourful, 
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its streets thronging with Kurds in national costume, free for the moment from the hated 
Iranian soldiers and gendarmes.’684 
But, the Republic ended dramatically. In the second half of the reign of the Republic, 
it began to disappoint several Kurdish leaders, especially after the withdrawal of the Soviet 
Army, and the divisions between Kurdish leaders were exploited with devastating effect after 
the battle of Mamashah. Ghazi Mohammad tried through political negotiations to solve the 
Kurdish question with the central government, while other leaders wanted a military offensive 
to liberate other parts of Iranian Kurdistan. This division led to the withdrawal of two of the 
Republic’s generals, with Hama Rashid Khan Baneh going to Iraq and Emer Khan going back 
to his homeland. However, it was Ghavam’s diplomatic efforts that actually brought an end to 
the Republic of Kurdistan. This along with the extirpation of the southern insurgency 
movements, led to the decline of Azerbaijan government and eventually, the capturing of 
Mahabad, the capital of the Republic, by the Iranian troops without any military resistance in 
December 17, 1946. It was a dramatic historical event for many Kurds, especially because 
Kurdish president and several leaders of the Republic were executed. The Kurds continue to 
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CHAPTER V. THE INFLUENCE OF THE IRANIAN CENTRAL 
GOVERNMENT, AND AUTONOMOUS GOVERNMENT OF 
AZERBAIJAN, AND THE GOVERNMENTS OF IRAQ AND TURKEY, 
AND THE GREAT POWERS ON THE REPUBLIC OF KURDISTAN 
 
For the purpose of the discussion in this chapter, the factors influencing the Republic of 
Kurdistan are divided into three general categories: 1. The situation within Iran (Iranian 
government and Autonomous Government of Azerbaijan). 2. The role of neighbouring 
countries, Turkey and Iraq. 3. Presence of the Great Powers in Iran (the Soviet Union, Great 
Britain, and the United States). 
 The relationship between the governments of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan warrants 
deeper consideration as they both challenged Iranian territorial integrity. And because of this 
challenge, relations between the Republic of Kurdistan and the Iranian central government 
must be examined. While exploring these relations, answers to key questions will be sought, 
such as: What were the most important friction points between the central government and the 
Republic of Kurdistan? Did the Iranian government and Autonomous Government of 
Azerbaijan ever take the Republic of Kurdistan seriously? What led to the disagreements 
between the Azerbaijan and the Kurdish governments? 
The positions of Turkish and Iraqi governments vis-à-vis the Republic of Kurdistan 
are discussed in light of the obstacles that these governments attempted to raise in front of the 
fledging nation-state. 
The presence of the Great Powers in the region is examined in terms of their influence 
on the Kurds from the emergence of the Kurdish nationalist movement in Iran to the collapse 
of the Republic of Kurdistan. Moreover, the beginnings of the Cold War shall be reviewed 
here from the perspective of the conflict of interests in the region among the Great Powers. 
What were the policies of Great Powers, especially those of Soviet Union’s, towards the 








1   Situation within Iran  
      
1.1.  Iranian Government  
Although the door leading to democracy was cracked open with the presence of Allies in Iran, 
for the Iranian intellectuals, political parties, religious figures, and the Iranian society in 
general, the issue was not the advent of democracy itself. Rather, it was about dealing with 
the beginning of a transtion toward democracy. One reality was the fact that the Iranian 
parliamentary government, which was resumed in 1941, was still unstable (Although the 
Iranian parliament was originally established during the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 
1905-9, it had, practically disappeared until the Allies occupied Iran in 1941). From August 
1941 until December 1946, Iran’s ruling governments changed eleven times. So many 
changes in government can be interpreted positively or negatively. On the positive side, 
without a violent confrontation the government was able to change hands eleven times. On 
the other hand, eleven times within five years is not the sign of a healthy democracy – in 
general, the optimal period of parliamentary elections is once every four years. The shah of 
Iran complained that Iranians would need another forty years before they could get used to 
democracy.685 It is also no wonder that Fakhreddin Azimi has chosen to give his book the 
title, Iran: the crisis of democracy from 1941 to 1953. For the purpose of discussion in this 
section, of the eleven ruling governments in Iran that took place between 1941 and 1946, 
there are only two that are significant for this study:  The first is the government of Ibrahim 
Hakimi from October 1945 until January 1946 and the second is the Ghavam government, 
which stayed in power from January to December of 1946. During these two periods, Kurds 
founded two important political institutions in the Kurdish region, the KDP and the Republic 
of Kurdistan. No study of Iranian Kurdistan would be complete without considering them in 
depth.  
Before the proclamation of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, the demands of some 
Kurdish representatives on the Iranian government mainly focused on development and 
improvements in the areas of education and health in the Kurdish region. In October 1944, 
Ghazi Mohammad visited Tehran for about four months, meeting with the Iranian 
representatives, including the Shah and Mohammad Sa’id, Iranian Prime Ministry. In these 
meetings, Ghazi pointed out that ‘the Iranian government paid insufficient attention to the 
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education and health issues in Kurdistan.’686 Ghazi Mohammad’s agenda gained a more 
political perspective after he entered the JK party. As mentioned before, the normalization of 
the Kurdish language was an important political agenda item for the JK. This can be 
illustrated by three of four formal requests presented by the JK to Fahimi, an advisor to the 
Iranian Prime Minister, when he had visited the Kurdish areas. These three requests were 
centred on the recognition of Kurdish as the official language in Kurdistan and the necessary 
steps to elevate Kurdish language up to an official standard. Meanwhile, in 1945 the language 
issue was one of the most important topics of debate in the Iranian parliament, defining lines 
of division among the parliament members. According to Abrahamian, for some members the 
democracy of Switzerland with its four official languages demonstrated that language by itself 
did not necessarily create a separate national identity.687 But for many Iranian 
parliamentarians and intellectuals, the standardization and formal recognition of some 
languages in Iran, such as Kurdish and Azeris, as languages to be used in education, was a 
sign of the division of the country. 
Many central government representatives were convinced that Kurds, led by the JK 
party, were preparing for the establishment of an independent Kurdistan. Both Shah and Sa’id 
were in the opinion that the Kurds were organizing a secessionist movement.688 Fahimi, 
however, described the situation differently. On 28 January 1945, after his visit to the Kurdish 
region, he presented a report to the parliament, stating that Razmara, while he was the Army 
Chief of Staff, made mistakes and presented exaggerated information about the incidents in 
Kurdistan and certain Kurdish personalities, such as Ghazi Mohammad, in his reports to the 
governmental council.689 The intention of Razmara’s proposal was a military expedition to the 
Kurdish area, composed of units that were not controlled by the Allies. Furthermore, Fahimi 
accused some high ranking Iranian military officers of being responsible for the dissemination 
of incorrect information about Kurds and Kurdistan. Fahimi claimed that the Army Chief of 
Staff, the Defence Minister, and Hoshmand Afshar, the Brigadier General Commander of 
Kordestan Province, were disseminators of unfavourable statements about Kurdistan.690 
Fahimi’s speech at the parliament not only contained comments about the military approach 
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to Kurdistan but also about the socio-cultural situation in the region. He described the Kurdish 
region as poor, without adequate educational and health-care services and facilities.691 The 
Mahabad deputy, Sadr Ghazi, also presented several reports in 1945 to the Iranian parliament 
that blamed Iranian newspapers for spreading incorrect and slanderous news and reports about 
Kurds and thus causing provocations between the central government and Kurds.692  
Even after having raised the Kurdish flag at the Mahabad municipality building on 
December 17, 1945, Ghazi Mohammad still underlined the importance of national unity and 
solidarity with the Iranian people. Ghazi rejected the rumours spread by the Iranian media that 
Kurds were trying to secede from Iran. He claimed, Kurds desire to remain under the Iranian 
territorial integrity and under the flag of Iran.693 For Ghazi, Kurdistan had autonomy, a status 
that emerged since the occupation of Iran by the Allied forces. He claimed, ‘it has been four 
years that we have had internal autonomy.’694 In fact, the administration of this internal 
autonomy had been formed in an election in Mahabad, sometime in 1943, when nine 
members, led by Ghazi Mohammad, were elected to head the government.695 In the 
meantime, through negotiations with the central government, Ghazi was striving to enlarge 
the Kurdish autonomous government’s territorial power. As mentioned earlier, the Iranian 
military bases were centred along the line of Saqqiz-Baneh-Sardasht and Ghazi’s aim was to 
get Iran to withdraw its army from these regions. Referring to a discussion that took place 
among Ghazi, Sarchikov, the Soviet Ambassador in Iran, and Muzaffar Firuz, a political 
advisor to the Prime Minister, Firuz noted that Ghazi was demanding that Saqqiz and Baneh 
belong to Mahabad. On the other hand, again according to Firuz, in its attempt to solve the 
Kurdish question, the Iranian government’s proposal was to divide Kurdistan into three 
separate governorates: Sanandaj, Mahabad and Saqqiz-Baneh.696                                                               
Overall, three major political problems played roles in the 1945 - 46 Iranian Crisis:  
 
1- The movement for reviving Constitutionalism in Iran (supported by some conservatives 
headed by Premier Ghavam, by the progressive sections of middle classes led by Mossadeq, and 
by the labour movement led by the Tudeh Party).  
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2- The occupation of Iran by the Great Powers: national independence became a high priority 
when Iran was occupied by the Soviet Union and Great Britain.  
3- Ethnic conflicts: especially with the presence of the Great Powers in the region, certain ethnic 
groups such as Azeris and Kurds made attempts at autonomy.697  
 
The last point was a national and international hot topic in the Iranian political agenda, which 
had to be dealt with by Hakimi as the prime minister. Hakimi’s second term in office, which 
lasted from October 1945 to January 1946, was marked by the beginning of the Iranian Crisis. 
According to many Iranian authors, it was a crisis of Iranian territorial integrity.698 The crisis 
led to new political developments in the north and northwest of Iran, namely the proclamation 
of the Azerbaijan government and the Republic of Kurdistan. Initially these two governments 
launched themselves as reformist movements, aiming at provincial autonomy and respecting 
the Iranian territorial integrity.699  
Iranian constitutionalism and constitutional laws were a moral principle for the 
Republic of Kurdistan’s leaders, they engaged their political affiliation with the constitutional 
laws. In their perspective, solving the Kurdish issue within the constitutional codes presented 
moral principle and a rational method. In December 1945, for example, Ghazi Mohammad 
stated that the establishment of constitutional law and democracy are the Kurdish demands, as 
well as the protection of autonomy ‘that we currently maintain.’700 On a similar line, Seif 
Ghazi praised the constitutional revolution in Iran on the occasion of its forty-first anniversary 
as a reasonable framework to address the Kurds’ demands. He pointed out that all Iranians, 
including Kurds, are equal before the constitutional law and that the Constitution’s Code on 
the establishment of Provincial Council afforded Kurds the same civil rights as Persians, the 
dominant group in Iran.701 The KDP programme also affirmed the importance of the 
Provincial Council. As the third article of the KDP programme states, ‘members of the 
Kurdistan Provincial Council are immediately elected in accordance with the Constitutional 
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Laws.’ The decentralization of policy-making was an important aspect of the Constitution, 
which indicated that indigenous people are entitled to govern themselves through regional 
administration. In fact, the Republic of Kurdistan never came up with its own set of formal 
constitutional laws, mostly accepting implicitly the general Iranian constitutional laws as 
fundamental laws for the Republic of Kurdistan. Seif Ghazi pointed out, ‘Iranian 
constitutional law is our most fundamental law, the changing of which is unacceptable. Even 
parliament, government and shah can not change an article.’702  
Several statements by Ghazi Mohammad, as well as views expressed by a number of 
tribal chieftains and members of the KDP Central Committee, confirm that most Kurdish 
leaders insisted on autonomy from the proclamation of the Republic of Kurdistan on 22 
January 1946, until the withdrawal of the Soviet military from Iran in May 1946 (afterward 
they downgraded their demand to maintaining a provincial council instead). At the ceremony 
for the proclamation of the Republic, for example, some leading participants went further 
with their enthusiasm for the new situation and claimed that Kurdistan was now 
independent.703 Ghazi’s sentiment for Kurdish autonomy was largely due to the presence of 
the Soviets in Kurdistan and to the signing of Friendship Treaty and Alliance with Azerbaijan 
government in April 1946. Cooperation with the Azerbaijan government was vital for the 
Republic of Kurdistan, as it stood as a buffer against a possible Iranian military offensive 
against the Republic of Kurdistan. Kurdistan published numerous reports about the friendly 
relations with and in respect of Azeris and the Azerbaijan government. Ghazi observed: 
 
The Iranian government thinks that with the withdrawal of the Soviet Union troops from Iran, 
the Kurdish government will fail to maintain its friendly attitude towards Azerbaijan. This is a 
wrong assessment. The unity between the Kurdish and Azeri nations is strong.704 
 
Soon after the withdrawal of the Soviets, Ghazi’s optimism lost its footing as the relations 
between Azerbaijan and the Republic of Kurdistan gradually deteriorated. One of the sources 
of the friction between the two governments was Azerbaijan’s unilateral political negotiations 
with the central government. This was in violation of the Azeri – Kurdish agreement not to 
hold unilateral negotiations with the central government. According to this agreement any 
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negotiations held with the central government would be mutual and both the Azeri and 
Kurdish and autonomous governments were to be kept informed of any proceedings. The fifth 
article of the Alliance Treaty between the Kurdish and Azerbaijan governments specifically 
related to the dealings with the Iranian government, ‘any negotiations conducted with the 
Iranian government should be carried out with the approval of Azerbaijan National 
Government and Kurdistan.’705 The implementation of the agreement, however, as well as the 
general cooperation between both governments depended on several factors that challenged 
each of them (see the following section). In the meantime, this political discord between 
Azerbaijan and Kurdish governments presented an ideal opportunity for the Iranian central 
government to formalize and implement of their own political agenda. The disagreements 
which deepened their problems and ultimately the weakened of Azerbaijan and Kurdish 
governments, meant more favourable conditions for the supremacy of the central government 
over both local governments. 
 Actually, the supremacy of central government over both local governments was clear 
when an agreement has been signed on April 4, 1946 between Ghavam and Sadchikov. They 
agreed on three points and summarized as follow: Firstly, the withdrawal of the Red Army 
would be completed in May. Secondly, their agreement on a joint Irano-Soviet oil company 
would be presented to the Fifteenth Majlis for ratification, no later than seven months after 
March 24. Thirdly, that the Azerbaijan’s government question is an internal matter of Iran.706 
According to Atabaki, this agreement opened the way for the Iranian government to deal with 
the Azerbaijan question and an oil concession to the Soviets ratified by yet non-existent 
Fifteenth Majlis. In return for this, both sides accepted that the Azerbaijan question is an 
‘internal Iranian matter’. Atabaki observed that Soviet offered Ghavam ‘exactly what he 
needed to accomplish his “Long March” on the road to Azerbaijan.’707                                             
The first formal meeting between the central government and both local governments 
took place in Tehran on April 28, 1946 and was headed by Pishevari.708 According to Ghazi, 
Kurds were represented by Seif Ghazi and Sadr Ghazi.709 The Iranian government presented 
seven points that related to the Iranian Constitutional Codes, none of which, by the way, had 
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anything directly to do with the Kurdish question. All points were narrowly focused on the 
Azerbaijan government and refer to certain cultural rights.710 The Azeri and Kurdish 
delegates’ requests were formulated in thirty three points, which did not clearly mention any 
claim to Kurdish aspirations, either. The meeting ended inconclusively.711  
It is possible that the Iranian government solely focused on the issues related to 
Azerbaijan with the aim of inflaming division between the Kurdish and Azerbaijan 
governments. The Friendly Alliance Agreement between Kurds and Azeris meant cooperation 
between them and that posed a grave threat to the Iranian government. Moreover, the central 
government viewed the agreement as illegal, as such an agreement could take place only 
between sovereign states. For the Iranian central government both Azerbaijan and the 
Republic of Kurdistan were integral parts of the Iranian territorial. Therefore, putting distance 
and discord between Azeris and Kurds was a priority in Ghavam’s political agenda. 
According to Mulla Izzat, Ghavam took immediate actions in line with his agenda. He 
exploited, for example, points of friction between Azeris and Kurds, such as border disputes. 
On the other hand, he tempted each provincial government with the promise to hold separate 
meetings, which led to an agreement in Tabriz that took place between the central government 
and Azerbaijan government, without the presence of representatives from the Republic of 
Kurdistan.712  
In difference by the Iranian government towards the Kurdish question compelled Ghazi 
to declare, ‘the Kurds’ enemies [Iranian government] have concluded that the Kurdish 
government does not exist.’713 Referring to the homecoming of disappointed and humiliated 
Kurdish delegate, Ghazi also stated that the Iranian government has not taken the Kurds 
seriously, ‘our representatives returned with disappointment.’714 At about the same time as 
this frustrating experience for the Kurdish delegation in Tehran, the Red Army was 
withdrawing from Iran. Afterward, a pessimistic mood dominated Ghazi’s political activities. 
Clearly incensed by the situation, Ghazi asked the following questions in one of his speeches: 
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What are we to do presently? What advice is [there] for the nation? Is it not our right to tell 
Tehran enough with your palaces built on our properties? I am asking you, the Kurdish leaders, 
commanders, farmers, and toilers, what can we do? What suggestions do you have?715  
 
On June 11, 1946, Firuz met with the government of Azerbaijan representatives in Tabriz. 
Without consulting with the authorities of the Kurdish government, they came up with a 
decision to allow Kurds in Azerbaijan to be educated in Kurdish until the fifth grade, the end 
of primary school. This decision officially put Kurds within the same category as other ethnic 
minority groups in Azerbaijan, such as the Assyrians.716 In other words, they were 
categorizing Kurds as a minority within the Iranian territorial unity and specifically belonging 
to the Autonomous Government of Azerbaijan. It is interesting to note that Ghazi was actually 
delighted with this decision. On June 21, 1946, at Mosque Soor (red), Ghazi explained:  
 
Article thirteen of the agreement states that the [Iranian] government acknowledges that Kurds 
living in Azerbaijan should enjoy the benefits of this agreement, as well. And according to the 
article three, [Kurds] are allowed to continue education in their own language until the fifth 
grade of primary school.717         
 
Ghazi saw the inclusion of these articles in the agreement as an improvement of the situation 
for the Kurds in Azerbaijan and was hopeful that it might have positive implications for the 
entire Iranian Kurdistan. He expressed his approval and hope with the following words:  
 
In this article, the [Iranian government] confessed to our legitimacy and existence and of course 
we would like to see that all of Kurdistan enjoys such rights and freedom.718    
 
According to Sadchikov, Soviet Ambassador in Tehran, the agreement between Iran and 
Azerbaijan induced Kurds to deal with the Iranian government as a separate party rather than 
as a partner with Azerbaijan.719 After the humiliation of the Tehran negotiations, when Kurds 
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were simply ignored, Ghazi lost trust in the Azerbaijan leaders and the relationship with 
Azerbaijan began to cool. As Roosevelt pointed out the Kurds reacted unfavourably to the 
agreement and they ‘felt that their wishes had been largely ignored.’720 Kurdish leaders made 
new attempts to seek a solution to their questions by dealing with the central government 
directly. Roosevelt noted that Ghazi Mohammad ‘went to Tehran to voice his disapproval to 
Premier Ghavam.’721 On June 26, 1946, Ghazi Mohammad went to Tehran with a delegation 
and began separate negotiations with the representatives of the central government.722 Iran-e 
Ma reported also that Ghazi entered Tehran in June 27, 1946.723 
Regarding this visit, Iran-e Ma published a report and recommended that the Iranian 
government not obstruct Ghazi’s visit to Tehran for negotiations. The newspaper report 
argued that direct negotiations with Iranian authorities will remove misunderstandings 
between Kurds and the central government. The report further suggested that some reliable 
government representatives negotiate with Ghazi724 Iran-e Ma’s report summarizes Ghazi’s 
intentions as follow:  
 
The Kurdish society believes that in essence the Kurdish leader [Ghazi] aspires for agreement 
and peace. The meaning of holy democracy is to advance towards sacred peace. Ghazi himself is 
optimistic that solving the Kurdish question peacefully will be a benefit to all of Iran, as well as 
the Kurdish people and the progress of liberation and democracy.725        
 
However, Ghazi’s attempt to directly negotiate with the central government did not produce 
any satisfactory outcome either. Rahbar, an Iranian newspaper that conducted an interview 
with Ghazi about the negotiations, relayed Ghazi’s summary of the affair:  
 
I negotiated several times with Muzaffar Firuz, Ghavam (the Prime Minister) and Razmara, the 
Chief of Staff. Ghavam has good intentions but unfortunately he became sick and postponed our 
negotiation.726  
                                               
720 Roosevelt 1947, 259. 
721 Ibid. 
722 Kurdistan, No. 65, 5 July 1946, 1.   
723 Iran-e Ma, No. 567, 27 June 1946, 1/4. 
724 Ibid., No. 577, 11 July 1946, 1. 
725 Ibid., 4. 
726 Rahbar, No. 762, 9 July 1946, 6. 
 203 
 
Postponing the meetings and provoking hostility and polarization between Azerbaijan and 
Kurdish governments were a part of Ghavam’s policy towards Azeris and Kurds a policy that 
in fact proved effective. Due to several ongoing internal and external problems, Ghavam was 
not yet ready to declare a clear position with respect to Kurdistan. There were growing 
disturbances in the south of Iran, Azerbaijan was a still a major issue, and the Soviets kept 
pressing Iran for a possible oil treaty. These were among the issues that posed serious 
challenges to the Ghavam administration. Rahbar asked Ghazi whether he was worried about 
the progress of the negotiations. Ghazi answered, ‘I am hopeful for a good future and that the 
central government will succeed in spreading democracy throughout the whole of Iran.’727 
Ghazi’s optimism was partly due to the fact that Ghavam was making efforts to establish a 
democratic movement, namely through his newly established Democratic Party (DP). On this 
note, Ghazi pointed out: 
 
Ghavam said to me that we are now democrats and founded the Iranian Democratic Party. It is 
necessary to change the name of the Kurdistan Democratic Party and call it the Iranian 
Democrat Party.728  
 
Ghavam had established the DP in the summer of 1946,729 in order to, according to Mo’tazed, 
counter the attempts of separatist movements in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan as well as the 
growth of the Tudeh Party.730 Ghavam identified his movement as a democratic one, 
indicating that he was a supporter of democracy in Iran. It was a calculated move to 
delegitimize both democratic parties in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. He introduced a 
progressive party program that included eleven articles to capture the public’s attention. Two 
of these articles especially underline several characteristics of the democratic movement in 
Iran, which at that time was not under the direct control of the central government. Article one 
refers to the ‘respect of the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Iran.’731 This 
article was also the first article of the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance that was signed in January 
1942 by the Allied Forces with the Iranian government. National unity was an important 
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political priority for Ghavam. Iranian territorial integrity and sovereignty were going through 
fragile times during the period of the Iranian crisis in 1945 and 1946.  
The second article refers to securing the principles of democracy. According to this 
article, the socio-political and economic issues of the Iranian people could be solved within 
the parameters of provincial councils. This article was composed of two clauses. The first 
clause was about treason and dealing with traitors. The later trial and hanging of Ghazi 
Mohammad and several Kurdish leaders of the Republic exemplified the implementation of 
this clause by the Ghavam administration. The second article of the Ghavam’s political 
party’s programme is as follows: 
  
Politically, economically, and judicially secure the independence of Iran by dissemination of 
freedom and stabilization of the principles of democracy.732  
 
Two of the clauses of this article were: 
 
A) Gradually break off relations with traitors and eventually bring them before the court. B) 
Consignment of provincial and district affairs to the inhabitants by the establishment of 
Provincial and District Councils.733                
 
During the Hakimi administration, relations of both the KDP and Azerbaijan Demokrat 
Ferqehsi (Azerbaijan Democratic Party, ADP) with the central government were thorny. 
Hakimi, convinced that they meant to break away from Iran, considered both parties illegal, 
labelling them ‘anarchists’, and refused to negotiate with them.734 Answering a question asked 
by a journalist working for Rahbar about the state of relations between the KDP and the 
central government, Ghazi replied that he does not have any of the optimism that he 
harboured during the Ghavam administration as the current Hakimi administration makes it 
impossible to go further with the negotiations.735 Hakimi considered the Kurds as a part of the 
Iranian family group. In his eyes, special attention to the Kurdish question was superfluous. 
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As Abrahamian noted, Hakimi claimed that ‘the Kurds had no genuine grievances because 
they were members of the Iranian race.’736 
Ghavam’s ambition to form a Democrat Party that was united across Iran, 
encompassing other democrat parties established in several provinces, was achieved in early 
August of 1946, after Ghazi’s visit to Tabriz. Kurdistan reported that Ghazi Mohammad 
returned to Mahabad on August 10, 1946 after his eight-day visit to Tabriz.737 In the same 
issue, Kurdistan published a formal declaration by Ghazi, which had been sent also to 
Ghavam via a telegraph. According to the telegraph, the KDP and some other democrat 
parties, such as the ADP, had announced a readiness to join the Progressive Front composed 
of Ghavam’s DP.738 By October Ghavam formed a strong new cabinet. Ghavam’s intention 
was to solve the Kurdish question within the bounds of a provincial council and appoint 
Ghazi as the governor. This proposal, for the most part, was acceptable to Ghazi, as it allowed 
a special status for the Kurdish region under one governorate with Ghazi as the leading figure. 
The boundaries of this governorate were, according to Roosevelt, a territory that would 
stretch from the ‘Russian border to a point half way between Kermanshah and Sanandaj.’739 
However, Ghavam had three conditions for Ghazi for the implementation of his proposal:  
 
1- The Governor must be under the control of the central government. 2- Forces from the Iranian 
Army must based within the governorship, especially along the borders with Turkey, Iraq and 
the Soviet Union. 3- The consent of the Governor of Azerbaijan, Dr. Javid of the ADP, must be 
obtained.740 
 
Ghavam included the last condition most probably knowing that Dr. Javid would not endorse 
the proposal of the Kurdish governorship – a situation that would amplify the tensions 
between the Azerbaijan and Kurdish leaders. 741 As Eagleton acutely observed, Ghavam was a 
master in diplomatic negotiation and had perhaps foreseen that his proposal would fail to win 
the acceptance of all parties concerned.742 In his new cabinet in early August, Ghavam sought 
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the approval of the Soviets by offering three ministries for the Tudeh Party in his cabinet. 
Accordingly, the Tudeh Party appointed Iraj Iskandari for the Ministry of Commerce, Mortiza 
Yazdi for the Ministry of Health, and Firaydun Kishavarz for the Ministry of Education.743 
The new government, however, provoked a political crisis in Iran. The Allies of Iran, England 
and America, were discontented by the idea of a pro-Soviet government. In the meantime, the 
southern tribal confederations, Bakhtiyari and especially Qashqayi, were staunchly anti-
Tudeh, and began a rebellion against Ghavam’s government. As the situation reached critical 
levels, the Shah called on Ghavam to resign. Ghavam proposed to form a new cabinet but this 
time without any ministers from the Tudeh Party and he promised to restore the Iranian 
central authority in Azerbaijan, Kurdistan and in other Iranian regions that were insubordinate 
to the Iranian government. 
Ghavam eventually removed the ministers that were Tudeh members and went on 
dealing with the rebellions in the south. He pacified them mainly by offering the rebel leaders 
posts in his new cabinet. As Ghavam did not receive any overwhelming reaction from the 
Soviets after the removal of Tudeh members from the government, he would gain some space 
to deal with Kurdistan and Azerbaijan as he planned without much interference from the 
Soviet Union. In the first half of October 1946, Ghavam ordered the military to enter 
Azerbaijan and Kurdistan under the pretext of maintaining law and security during the 
fifteenth round of parliamentary elections. Internal security on Iranian territory was an article 
(article 3 section a) of the Tripartite Treaty. According to this article, the Iranian Government 
could send armed forces to the whole Iranian regions (including Azeri and Kurdish regions) 
without opposition from the Great Powers. Relying on this background, Ghavam sent a 
telegraph to both local governments towards the end of November 1946 informing them that 
military units are being sent for the maintenance of order and security during the 
parliamentary elections.744 Although Ghazi attempted to make clear that Kurdistan possessed 
enough security forces of its own, Ghavam paid no heed to his objections.745 Ghavam was set 
on his objective to remove both governments and restore the Iranian territorial integrity. 
Ultimately, Ghavam succeeded in bringing the two governments down by mid-December 
1946 and put his signature under a huge diplomatic and political victory. He owed a good deal 
of his success to being able to plant unsolvable discord between the Azerbaijan and Kurdish 
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governments. The following section shall delve deeper into the issues between the Republic 
of Kurdistan and Autonomous Government of Azerbaijan.             
 
1.2.  Autonomous Government of Azerbaijan   
The Iranian Azerbaijan issue during the Iranian crisis of 1945 and 1946 was the center of 
attention in both national and international agendas. In comparison, the Kurdish issue 
received much less notice. By 1945, Eastern Azerbaijan, with Tabriz as its capital, was 
rapidly building towards autonomy. The Iranian government considered the autonomist 
inclination of Azerbaijan a serious threat to its territorial integrity and sovereignty. Similarly, 
the Allied Powers in Iran (Great Britain and the United States) were putting their efforts into 
maintaining the territorial integrity of Iran, as well. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, was 
supportive of Azerbaijan’s autonomist tendency and was trying to keep the Red Army in Iran 
as long as possible. The Soviets’ support for an autonomous Azerbaijan and their insistence 
on remaining in Iran, despite the fifth article of the Tripartite Treaty of the Allied Powers, 
which required the withdrawal of military forces in no later than six months after the war’s 
end, was exacerbating the already fragile situation and pushing it towards an international 
crisis. Thus Azerbaijan, having developed an ethnic nationalism, challenging the Iranian 
government to take serious steps to defend its territorial integrity, as well as posing a 
challenge to the Great Powers in Iran in terms of protecting their interests in the region, saw 
itself at the centre of national and international crisis in Iran 
 The establishment of the Azerbaijan Democratic Party (ADP) was proclaimed on 03 
September 1945. Three months later, the ADP formally opened the Azerbaijan Milli Majlisi 
(the National Assembly of Azerbaijan). The following step was the formation of the structure 
of the executive power, Azerbaijan Milli Hükumati (the National Government of 
Azerbaijan).746 It is very likely that this series of developments in Azerbaijan influenced the 
Kurds to follow the same policies. In other words, it could be claimed that the institutions 
launched within the Republic of Kurdistan were a hasty imitation of what had taken place in 
Azerbaijan. According to Ghassemlou, preparations for the establishment of the Republic of 
Kurdistan were not yet mature. It was not the culmination of the natural transformations and 
historical plans of the long Kurdish struggle. According to this perspective, the KDP’s rush to 
proclaim the Republic of Kurdistan was a not-thoroughly-thought-out reaction to the 
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circumstances surrounding it in Iran and in the international arena, especially the formation of 
the National Government of Azerbaijan.747 
 The formal declaration of the establishment of the KDP took place in October 1945 at 
the first conference of the party, only about a month after the establishment of the ADP. In 
December 1945, the National Government of Azerbaijan was founded and one month later the 
Kurds proclaimed the Republic of Kurdistan on 22 January 1946. This chain of events in 
Azerbaijan and Kurdistan suggests that the developments in the latter largely depended upon 
the socio-political developments in the former. One justification for such a reaction by the 
Kurds can be traced back to the attempt by the Azerbaijan and Iranian governments to solve 
the Kurdish issue within the parameters of Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijan government claimed 
that the Mahabad region was a part of Azerbaijan. Pishevari, the Prime Minister of 
Azerbaijan, was ready to accept a cultural autonomy for the Kurdish population in both East 
and West Azerbaijan – a position confirmed by what he had said to the US Consul in Tabriz, 
Robert A. Rossow: 
  
I do not believe that Kurds can have their own government. We advise to establish their Majlis, 
namely only provincial council under control of Azerbaijan Government.748  
 
By the time the Azerbaijan government was established, the relations between the KDP and 
the ADP had already deteriorated. Nevertheless, in the beginning of the Azerbaijan Majlis, 
five Kurdish representatives also had participated. Shortly afterward, however, they were 
disappointed with the ADP policy towards the Kurds and they returned to Mahabad. 
According to Derk Kinnane, the Azerbaijan government tried to negate the political power of 
the Kurds.749 As retaliation, the KDP leaders dismissed the Azeri officials in the Kurdish 
region, especially in Mahabad, and refused to sell tobacco to the Azerbaijan government. 
Similarly, the Kurds blocked the transport of Miyanduab’s sugar to market in Tabriz.750 Soon 
after the proclamation of the Republic of Kurdistan, relations between both sides deteriorated 
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even further. By mid-February 1946, a crisis erupted in some areas that had a mixed 
population of Kurds and Azeris. Events rapidly escalated towards a possible large-scale 
armed conflict. Through the Soviet mediation, however, both sides accepted to seek a 
peaceful solution to their issues through negotiation.751  
 From the proclamation of the Republic of Kurdistan until April 1946 newspaper of 
Azerbaijan, organ of the Azerbaijan Democratic Party, mentioned no issue about the Kurds 
and the Kurdish government. On April 23, 1946, after a series of negotiations, high-ranking 
representatives from both sides signed a treaty of seven articles in Tabriz, which was called 
the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance. Under the pressure of Soviet Consul in Urumiyeh, both 
parties agreed to ‘strengthen their friendship.’752 The question relating to the ethnic Kurdish 
and Azeri minorities in both territories was dealt with in articles 1, 2 and 6. Article 6, for 
example, stated that the Azerbaijan government ‘will take steps to contribute to the cultural 
and linguistic progress of the Kurds living in its territory, and vice versa.’753  
One of the ambitions of this treaty was to form a bilateral delegation to undertake 
future negotiations with the central government.754 Soon after the signing of the treaty, on 
April 28, 1946, a delegation composed of representatives from both parties arrived in Tehran. 
But, Azerbaijan government saw Kurdish delegate as the representatives of the Azerbaijan 
government. Azerbaijan, organ of the ADP, published, ‘Azerbaijan representatives were 
included: Pishevari, Padgan, Ibrahimi and Seif Ghazi.’755 On the eve of the sending of this 
delegate to Tehran, newspaper Azad Millet published a speech of Ghazi Mohammad, it went 
as follows: 
 
I cannot speak well of the Azeris and I hope that Pishevari can solve Kurdish and Azerbaijani 
question with the Iranian government. We shall entrust Pishevari to accompany these 
delegation.756 
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As mentioned earlier, the Iranian government had proposed its seven-point solution while the 
delegation arrived with a proposal that included thirty-three demands. Besides the fact that 
these demands were rejected by the Iranian government, it is interesting to note that the thirty-
three points had almost exclusively to do with the relation between Iranian and Azerbaijan 
governments, disregarding almost entirely the Kurds’ presence in the equation. In all of thirty-
three demands, there is no specific reference to Kurds and Kurdistan. Only the twelfth point 
mentions something about the rights of Kurds as a minority.757 As the second demand 
suggested, Azerbaijan government in fact considered the Kurdish geography in question to be 
a part of Iranian Azerbaijan.758 As for the Friendship Treaty between Kurdish and Azerbaijan 
governments, Pishevari divulged a secret when explained to Rossow that the ‘purpose of the 
friendship with the Kurds is to ensure that the central government could not use them against 
Azerbaijan.’759 However, ADP leaders were not entirely hostile to the idea of a possible semi-
autonomy for Kurds within Azerbaijan.760                  
Autonomy for the Kurds within Azerbaijan was inspired by the Soviet Azeri 
representatives in Iranian Azerbaijan. Hassan Hassanov, a Soviet Azeri politician in Iranian 
Azerbaijan, relayed on 13 February 1945 to Baqirov, the president of Soviet Azerbaijan, the 
following message, ‘after solving the Azerbaijan question, comes the question of granting 
autonomy to the Kurds.’761 At the second visit of the Kurdish representatives to Baku, in 
1945, Baqirov advised the Kurds to form a democratic party and work together with the 
Azerbaijan Democrat Party. Cooperation between both parties probably did make their 
demands on the Iranian government somewhat stronger, but in the eyes of Baqirov and 
Pishevari, the Republic of Kurdistan was a part of Azerbaijan Government. Baqirov clearly 
proclaimed to the Kurds that Kurdish areas belong to the National Democratic Government of 
Azerbaijan.762 For Baqirov, the national identity of Iranian Azerbaijan as the same as Soviet 
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Azerbaijan. He viewed them as a nation that several decades earlier had been divided between 
to empires (Qajars and Russian Tsarists). Baqirov explained that ‘south Azerbaijan [Iranian 
Azerbaijan] is a territory of our original people.’763    
 Strategically, Iranian Azerbaijan had special importance for Baqirov and for the Soviet 
Union. Since the first presence of the Soviet military in the north of Iran, Baqirov had far 
reaching political plans for Iranian Azerbaijan. Baqirov’s grand ambition was to remove the 
boundaries between the Soviet Azerbaijan and Iranian Azerbaijan, and build a Greater 
Azerbaijan. In several of his speeches, Baqirov claimed that the Iranian Azerbaijan is the 
southern part of this larger Azerbaijan’s nation. Responding to Stalin’s question, ‘what do you 
want?’, Baqirov answered, ‘we want to help our brothers who live in South Azerbaijan 
[Iranian Azerbaijan].’764 For the Soviet Union, Iranian Azerbaijan had geo-political and 
economical significance. Geo-politically, the Iranian Azerbaijan offered a path towards the 
warm water ports as well as blockade before the British expansion towards the north. 
Economically, the area north of Iran and south of Caspian Sea, abundant in gas and oil 
reserves and other natural resources, had exceptional attractiveness for the Great Powers in 
Iran. Again, due to the above-mentioned reasons, matters relating to the Republic of 
Kurdistan were of much less importance to the political agendas of Baqirov and the Soviet 
Union. 
 Baqirov offered support to the Azerbaijan government, which further strengthened the 
position of this newly formed government. Besides Baqirov’s active support of the Azerbaijan 
government in Iran, there were also many other factors that put Azerbaijan in a more 
favourable position compared to that of the Republic of Kurdistan. Azerbaijan had played an 
important role during the period of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. The Council of 
Tabriz (Anjomane Tabriz) had helped from the idea of the Provincial Council in Iran.765 After 
about fourteen years of struggle, Sheikh Mohammad Khiyabani led an uprising against the 
central government in April 1920 in Tabriz. Although, it was not a separatist movement, it 
supported the demands for the role of the Provincial Council.766 The uprising also laid the 
groundwork in terms of experience and perspective for the upcoming Azerbaijan government. 
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Pishevari, the leader of the Azerbaijan government, was a veteran communist and his political 
activities between the two world wars gained him a considerable reputation. He was a leading 
figure in the Gilan movement in 1921. Another important corroborating factor behind 
Azerbaijan’s more favourable position was nationalism. The Azeris’ deep-rooted nationalism 
and their ethnic identification were more widespread and developed than those of the Kurds in 
Iranian Kurdistan. Tribalism and ethno-tribal loyalties were the predominant norms in 
Kurdistan. As Rossow reported to the US Foreign Affairs, the manifestation of national 
awareness among Kurds had not yet developed. Loyalties were invested in chieftains and 
aghas and their loyalties in return were to the national Iranian government.767    
 The fact that Azeri and Kurdish communities were ethnically and culturally dissimilar 
did not help the situation either. Azeris and Kurds belong to different ethnic-family groups. 
The Azeri language belongs to the Turkic family of languages, while Kurdish is an Indo-
European language. The majority of Azeri are Shi’ites whereas the Kurds in this region are 
Sunni Muslims. Religious differences were a source of friction for centuries, especially in 
areas where both communities lived in close proximity to each other, as was the case in the 
Urumiyeh Province. According to Mobley, had the Azeris more comparable elements of 
ethnicity with Kurds, then the conflict between both would have been reduced. Although 
Pishevari was warm to the idea of cultural rights for Kurds, in practice these rights were 
arbitrarily manipulated by the Azerbaijan government.768 Additionally, socio-economic 
differences and unclear boundaries between the both regions were also causing tensions. 
 The Azerbaijan government had achieved considerable economic transformation 
through a series of reforms. One notable example was the land reform, which distributed 
among small farmers large swaths of lands formerly belonging to landlords. Azerbaijan’s 
regime had distributed, according to Soviet representatives in Maku, more than 1,500 till of 
land pieces among farmers and people who had no till land previously.769 The Republic’s 
government, on the other hand, had planned but never implemented a similar land reform. 
Economically, Azerbaijan was immensely better off than Kurdistan as it harboured abundant 
reserves of natural resources. Azerbaijan produced much of the grain that was consumed 
                                               
767 Kaveh Bayat, Kurdha ve Firgih Dimocrate Azerbaijan: Gozarishhayi az Consolgariye America dar Tabriz 
Dey 1323- Esfand 1325 [the Kurds and Azerbaijan Democratic Party: reports from US Council in Tabriz January 
1945- March 1947], (Tehran Publisher, 2010), 38. 
768 Mobley 1979, 51. 
769 Hewrami 2008b, 76-7. 
 213 
throughout Iran. As Mobley notes, the Azerbaijan region under the control of the ADP was 
home to 35 percent of the tobacco, 25 percent of the grain, 20 percent of the sugar, and 22 
percent of all the sheep and goats produced in whole of Iran.770 Azerbaijan was an important 
economic partner not only for the other regions in Iran but also for Iranian Kurdistan.                         
For similar reasons, the Iranian government paid more attention to the ADP’s region 
than to the KDP’s region. Strategically, the north-western Iranian territory, where the Azeri 
population was predominant, was like a defensive wall against the attacks of traditional 
enemies from the north and the northwest, Russians and Turks respectively. Because of its 
importance as a conduit between the Iranian central government and its aforementioned 
neighbours, Azerbaijan became a commercial hub, an important centre of industrial and 
agricultural production. As a vibrant international gateway, the economy and commerce in 
Azerbaijan were dramatically more developed in comparison with the other Iranian provinces. 
Accordingly, the participation of the Azerbaijani middle-class in the Iranian government 
during the reign of Reza Shah was larger than that of other Iranian provinces.771 In contrast to 
the Azerbaijan region, the Kurdish area was under-developed in many respects.  
As mentioned earlier, one of the most contentious points between the governments of 
Azerbaijan and Kurdistan was the issue of territorial boundaries. The importance of this issue 
was clearly pointed out in several reports by the representatives of the Great Powers in Tabriz, 
especially in those of the US and the Soviet Union. Rossow reported that differences between 
Kurds and Azeris were heightened when ‘Kurds claimed authority on the entire border region 
[between both sides] from Mahabad to Maku, such as Miyanduab, Rezaiyeh and Khoy,’772 
which were a part of the Urumiyeh province. In 1930s, as part of Reza Shah’s reconfiguration 
of provincial administration throughout Iran, Urumiyeh was assigned as part of West 
Azerbaijan with the city of Urumiyeh as its capital – beforehand Urumiyeh was a gray area in 
terms of dominance between the Azeri and Kurdish population. Kurdish leaders laid heavy 
emphasis on the inclusion of Urumiyeh within the Republic of Kurdistan for symbolic reasons 
as well as for economic and geo-strategic reasons. Urumiyeh was a vibrant regional 
commercial centre and rested on an important throughway between Iran and Turkey. The US 
Consul noted that Kurds have in mind to choose Rezaiyeh in place of Mahabad for their 
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capital.773 The most contentious areas were the northern and western regions of Lake 
Urumiyeh: Salmas, Khoy and Urumiyeh. In February 1946, Ghazi Mohammad and Pishevari 
met to reach a solution for the issue of boundaries. According to Rossow, the meeting ended 
inconclusively and the border conflict continued.774 Reports by the Soviet representatives 
were more or less along a similar line as those of the US representatives. The tensions finally 
gave way to an armed confrontation on September 20, 1946 in Salmas. The Soviet Consul in 
Maku reported that Kurdish fighters tried to capture the city Shapor (Salmas) but after armed 
confrontation with local inhabitants and with the arrival of Azerbaijan government’s forces 
from Tabriz, the Kurdish fighters under the command of Taher Khan Shikak were forced to 
retreat from the region.775 However, disputes regarding territorial boundaries continued 
between both parties without any clear conclusions.  
Mamadov, a Tas newspaper correspondent in Tabriz, reported on the crisis between 
both governments and Pishevari’s policy toward the Republic of Kurdistan. During the early 
days of its establishment, the Azerbaijan Democratic Party concentrated only on their own 
interests, without taking the cooperation with the Tudeh Party and Mahabad into 
consideration. Pishevari had no serious plans for uniting with the Kurds. It was only near the 
end of both their governments that Pishevari broached the possibility of more cooperation 
with the Kurds. But by then it was too late for any decisive resistance, as the Iranian military 
forces entered Azerbaijan in December 1946. According to Mamadov, Pishevari’s 
government, lacking any significant support from democrats in Iran, was vanquished and the 
Iranian central government gained the control of Azerbaijan.776  
 
2   Role of neighbouring countries  
Clearly, a formally established and recognized the Republic of Kurdistan would have been a 
source of inspiration in many regards for the Kurds living within the countries neighbouring 
Iran. Realizing that the establishment of a Kurdish autonomy or independence would be 
dangerous to their national security, Turkey and Iraq in particular took diplomatic steps 
against the establishment of a Kurdish government in Iran. Below is a more detailed account 
of these countries’ policies in this regard. 
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2.1.  Turkey 
From the very outset of the Kemalist regime in the Republic of Turkey, a hard-line policy was 
pursued against the Kurds. This policy considered Kurds ‘Mountain Turks’ and sought to 
militarily crush any move to assert ethnic or national rights. Similarly, the regime was more 
than willing to support and cooperate with any neighbouring country in order to eliminate all 
Kurdish activity in the region. Turkey was one of the signatories of the Treaty of Sa’dabad 
(Reza Shah’s summer residence in the northern suburbs of Tehran), which was signed on July 
8, 1937, by four Muslim countries:  Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan. Border disputes were 
the central concern in this treaty.777 
 The occupation of Iran by the Allied Powers in 1941 had caused considerable anxiety 
to the regime in Turkey. As the political crisis in Iran gave way to the bold ethnic and 
nationalist movements, Iranian Kurds living along the eastern border of Turkey, were no 
longer contained as they had been during the reign of Reza Shah. In fact, by August 1941, 
Ghazi Mohammad was proclaiming Kurdish liberation.778 Calculating that any improvement 
in the national liberation movement of Kurds in Iran would mean trouble for them as well, the 
Turkish government was anxious to take precautions. As the British political officers in Iran 
reported, Kurdish success in Iran in liberating themselves from the Iranian government has 
‘influence on the Kurdish movements in Iraq and Turkey.’779  
 Kurdish political activities from 1941 to 1946 were closely observed by the Turkish 
representatives in Iran. Exaggerating even the slightest events to the point of making an 
international issue, the Turkish government went to great lengths to stop or at least limit the 
scale of these political activities and to a large extent it succeed in securing its interests in the 
region. It was the Turkish consul in Urumiyeh, for example, who informed the British and the 
Americans about the Kurdish leaders’ visit to Baku in 1941. The Kurds’ first trip to Baku in 
November 1941 became an international political issue. As British Foreign Office noted, 
‘there is a real danger least these developments should lead to an estrangement between the 
Russians and the Turks.’780 The Turkish government showed, according to British Foreign 
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Office, ‘increasing anxiety regarding developments in Persian Kurdistan.’781 Turkish 
government officials worried that the Soviets would be supportive of the possible formation 
of a Kurdish state. Subsequently, the Turkish government pressed the British government (at 
the time Great Britain and the Soviet Union were still allies) for a clarification of the Kurd’s’ 
visit to Baku, which was organized by Baqirov.782 As it was important for the British to draw 
Turkey into the Alliance, the British government sought to assuage the Turkish government. 
Bullard explained: 
 
I urged him [the Turkish consul in Tabriz] to do everything in his power to ensure that nothing 
shall be done in Kurdish areas which might arouse the suspicion of the Turkish government 
whose friendship is [of] importance.783 
 
The Kurds’ visit to Baku prompted the Turkish government to seek a guarantee from the 
British government that the Allied Forces in Iran would not support the Kurdish movement in 
Iran, or better still, extract a promise that the British would publicly oppose it. The British 
responded positively to the Turks’ requests and made it clear to the Kurds in Iran that they 
should not count on any support from the British government. Moreover, the British pressed 
the Soviet government for a clarification of the meaning of the visit by the Kurdish leaders to 
Baku.784 Although, the Soviet ambassador in Iran claimed that the trip was organized for 
cultural purposes, the Turkish regime was convinced that the trip had a political aim as well, 
namely the eventual the establishment of an independent Kurdish state. On December 2, 1941 
the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed that the Kurdish movement was aiming at the 
‘establishment of an independent Kurdish state’ and ‘were alleged to have been encouraged 
and materially helped by “the occupying forces in Persia”.’785 Eventually, the anxiety of 
Turkish government was replaced by reassurance. The British reported, ‘we [Britain] have 
had to urge the Soviet government not to encourage a separatist movement in Persia.’786 And 
the Soviets gave the following explanation in terms of their stance vis-à-vis Kurds and the 
Kurds’ visit to Baku: 
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The Soviet Army in Iran was not only against the supporting of the Kurds but it also actively put 
effort into disarming Kurds. The region where Kurds were armed did not belong to our sphere of 
influence. As for some notable Kurds visiting Baku, the trip was a solely cultural affair and had 
no political meaning.787        
 
It is interesting to note that the news of the formal declaration of the Republic of Kurdistan 
did not reach the US consul in Tabriz for several weeks, until they received a message from 
the Turkish consul in Urumiyeh. Rossow noted that Turkish consul in Urumiyeh reported that 
the Republic of Kurdistan ‘three weeks ego was established, though the news of the formal 
proclamation was never disseminated in Tabriz.’788 In March 1946, the Turkish General Chief 
of Staff reported that the news of the institutional establishment of the Kurdish government 
had been circulating and that indeed the Kurds did proclaim their government. The report 
further informed that Turks still had the control of the borders.789 With the following note, the 
British political officers in Iran confirmed the Turkish Ministry’s opinion: 
  
The Turko-Iranian frontier is very strongly guarded. The Turko-Iraqi frontier is strongly guarded 
as well, with the close collaboration of the Iraqi frontier authorities with the Turkish 
authorities.790   
 
The Turkish government implemented stricter policies throughout the Kurdish areas that fell 
within its borders and tried to tightly survey any Kurdish movements, particularly at the 
borders with Iran. The Turkish government’s reaction to the establishment of the Republic is 
described in a long report by Finogradov, the Soviet Ambassador in Turkey. According to 
Finogradov, the Turkish government took certain measures in order to prevent any spread of 
the Kurdish nationalist movement either from Iranian Kurdistan or from Iraqi Kurdistan, 
especially from Mustafa Barzani’s struggle against the Iraqi government.791 One of the 
greatest fears of the Turkish regime was the cooperation and participation of the Iraqi, 
Turkish and Syrian Kurds in the Republic of Kurdistan. Although not at a massive scale, there 
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were Kurds from other parts of Kurdistan that did participate in the Republic of Kurdistan. 
Kadri Beg, for example, grandson of Jamil Pasha, head of the elite Kurdish family in 
Diyarbakir, was actively assisting.792 On July 16, 1946 the US general consul in Tabriz visited 
Mahabad and reported, ‘I became acquainted with some Iraqi and Iranian Kurds who speak 
English or Kurds from Syria that could understand French.’793 
On April 5, 1946 Finogradov reported the Turkish newspapers’ assertion that the 
establishment of the Kurdish government in Iran could cause anxiety for countries such as 
Turkey, Iraq and Syria.794 Following the developments in Iranian Kurdistan, in November 
1945 the Turkish government came up with a Provincial Law especially for the Kurdish 
region in Turkey. According to this law, a Turkish army general became the governor of the 
region with special authorities. As Finogradov noted, ‘this officer had exclusive authority, 
especially over political matters in the Kurdish region.’795                         
In 1945 and 1946, the Kurdish question was one of the major discussion topics for the 
countries among which the Kurdish populace was divided. According to Finogradov, for 
example, the Kurdish issue was one of the major agenda items during the recent negotiations 
between the Iraqi and Turkish governments. They signed a treaty for cooperation toward 
security and peace.796 Another agenda item for the Turkish government was the presence of 
Barzani’s forces in Iranian Kurdistan. Turkey requested that the Iraqi government press the 
British for the return of Iraqi Kurds from Iran to Iraq, hoping that it would fatally weaken the 
Republic of Kurdistan as Barzani’s troops composed the backbone of the Republic’s forces. 
Barzani’s uprising during 1943-45 against the Iraqi government had ended with many fighters 
taking refuge in the neighbouring countries, particularly in Iran. Turkish and Iraqi 
governments decided to exchange Kurdish deserters, as they claimed, between both sides.797 
This protocol was also a part of the Sa’dabad Treaty, which was to be extended every five 
years or reviewed as made necessary by any developments in the Middle East region. If the 
national security of the signatory parties of the Sa’dabad Treaty stood in danger, then they 
were directed to convene in order to assess matters of the implementation of the Treaty. Both 
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the Iraqi and Turkish governments tried to guarantee the security of the border between both 
sides.798  
 
2.2.  Iraq   
Shortly before the British invasion of Iran in August 1941, the Iraqi government that was 
established in 1921 by the direct involvement of the British had collapsed due to a military 
coup led by Rashid Ali al-Gilani. Aiming to strengthen its hold on Iraq before venturing into 
Iran, the British removed al-Gilani from power and established a new Iraqi government that 
was more tightly controlled by the British forces. Iraq, after Egypt, became an important 
British military base for the preparation of the Second World War in the Middle East. The 
British troops entered into Iranian territory from Iraq in August 1941. The southern part of 
Iranian Kurdistan fell under the sphere of Great Britain. In Iranian Kurdistan, British 
representatives followed the same policy as they had with the Iraqi Kurds, which respected 
the territorial integrity of the countries where the Kurds inhabited and considered the Kurdish 
question as an internal issue.       
As mentioned earlier, Barzani and his fighters were an important part of the Republic 
of Kurdistan’s military force. Expelling Barzani’s troops or returning them to Iraq would have 
meant the end of the Republic. For this reason, the Iraqi government, through British 
representatives in Iran, tried to extradite Barzani’s troops to Iraq.  
By the time Barzani’s uprising started in 1943, Iraq was under the political control of 
Great Britain. Eventually repelling Barzani’s forces and forcing them to retreat into Iran took 
the active support of the British politicians and military. At the time, the JK was a significant 
nationalist Kurdish political party in Iranian Kurdistan and had developed several plans for 
cooperation and solidarity with other parts of Kurdistan, especially with the insurrection of 
Barzani in Iraq. The JK’s letter to Barzani, for example, as discussed earlier, fell into the 
hands of the Iraqi government and it led to a series of efforts by the Iraqi government to cut 
ties between the two sides. After having studied the letter, the Iraqi Ministry of Interior asked 
the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs to bring the JK’s political activities to the attention of 
the Iranian government and urge it exert more government control over Mahabad.799 
Similarly, after the full staff of the Kurdish flag at the municipal building of Mahabad, the 
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Iraqi government expressed their dissatisfaction about the development in the region. In 1945 
Hamid Pachachi, the Iraqi Prime Minister, stated, ‘Iraq was worried about the events in 
Iranian Kurdistan.’800 Iraqi government feared that, especially with the presence of Barzani’s 
forces there, Iranian Kurdistan might develop into a political and military base also against 
the Iraqi central government. As mentioned earlier, Barzani had presented a proposal to the 
Soviet representatives in Iranian Kurdistan, where he requested from the Soviets not obstruct 
their struggle against the Iraqi government. Although, the Soviet officers did not respond 
positively to Barzani’s request, Barzani nevertheless went on with efforts to further develop 
his movement. While in Iranian Kurdistan, Barzani sent representatives to Iraqi Kurdistan to 
organize political activities. The formal proclamation of the KDP in Iraq is an illustration of 
such activities.  
The governments of Iran and Iraq pressed the Soviet government to take serious 
actions against Barzani and his followers in Iran. Both governments wanted to see the leading 
figures of Barzani’s forces returned to Iraq. The answer of the Soviet government was simple 
and clear. Zatisv, the Soviet Ambassador to Iraq, explained that the issue of denying entry for 
Barzani into Iranian territory is a domestic issue of Iran and Iraq. In accordance with the 
principle of not interfering in matters of domestic affairs of sovereign states, the government 
of the Soviet Union can not instruct its army to disarm and discharge Iraqi Kurds in Iranian 
territory.801 By this principle, Zatisv was referring to the article two of the section seven of the 
UN Charter, which was signed, with the Soviet Union among the signatories, in San 
Francisco in 1945. The concerned article stated:  
 
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in 
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.802 
 
The presence of Barzani’s forces in the Republic of Kurdistan clearly was a factor that 
strengthened the standing of the Republic. It was also a factor that facilitated a quicker and 
stronger institutionalization of the Kurdish political activities. In a letter dated 17 November 
1945, the Iranian Foreign Minister informed the Soviet government of the existence of the 
units of Barzani fighters, along with other uprisings in province four, Urumiyeh and Mahabad 
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region, will cause instability.803 If the Great Powers had not been present in the region then it 
would had been simpler for signatory parties of the Sa’dabad Treaty to cooperate against the 
Kurdish movements. Referring to this matter, the Iraqi ambassador to his Iranian collaguet on 
August 15, 1946, explained that: 
 
According to a treaty between Iraq and Iran the entering Iraqi Kurds, especially Mustafa 
Barzani, whose hanging is waiting for him in Iraq, must be arrested by the Iranian government 
and returned to the Iraqi government. But Barzani and other fugitives are under the sphere of 
control of the Soviets and can not be captured.804 
 
When the Republic of Kurdistan collapsed, Barzani and his troops did not surrender 
themselves to the Iranian government. Barzani sent a protocol to the Soviet consul in 
Urumiyeh requesting of them to be mediators between Barzani and the governments of Iraq 
and Iran. According to this protocol, in a general on January 15, 1947 Kurdish 
representatives, led by Sheikh Ahmad and Mustafa Barzani, relayed the following conditions 
to the Iranian and Iraqi governments. 1 – Amnesty for everybody that participated in the 
Barzan uprising (1943-45) and for every fighter that fought for freedom and liberation in Iraq 
and Iran. 2- Compensation from the Iraqi regime for the damages sustained by the Barzanis. 
3- Autonomy for Kurdistan and freedom for all political movements. 4- Permission for the 
Barzanis to keep their weapons.805 This protocol was left without answer and archived by the 
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3   Presence of the Great Powers in Iran 
Many books and articles have been published about the Cold War between the United States 
and the Soviet Union, and especially its origins in Eastern Europe and especially in Poland. 
However, less interest has been shown to the conflict between the US and the Soviet Union in 
the Middle East, particularly with regard to the Iranian crisis (1945 – 1946). This crisis 
revealed a historical background of rivalry between the Great Powers in the Middle East. This 
section will discuss the nature of the traditional rivalry in the Middle East, which existed 
between Russia and Britain, with US playing the role of a new Great Power. Special attention 
will also be given to the period of the Second World War in Iran. The discussion in this 
section will be based on the questions that were posed in the introduction of chapter V, which 
is mostly related to the Republic of Kurdistan. Before analyzing the international rivalry of 
the Great Powers in Iran, it is fitting to evaluate some important theories on international 
relations, which could be helpful to understanding the Great Powers’ ‘practised’ political 
agenda. International relations theories are statements which explain the associations of 
variables relating them as causes and effects, as stated by Kenneth N. Waltz, one of the 
important realist scholars. These theories depict how a domain or system is organized and 
how its parts are connected, indicating the factors which are more important than others.806 
     
3.1.  International Relations Theory  
The Cold War and the conflict between the two superpowers after the Second World War 
were central to the study of the theory of International Relations. While from the second half 
of the 1950s, an increasing interest of the great powers in the problems of the Third World 
countries can be seen, the conflict of interests between these great powers in Iran started a bit 
earlier, dating back to 1945. After the Second World War, the theories of international 
relations shaped the context of the cold war between 1945 and 1991 and it is necessary to 
study the different phases of the battle by using various international relations theories. In this 
study, the various schools offering interpretations of international relations can be categorized 
into three general phases: (1) competition between (neo)realism vs. (2) 
(neo)idealism/liberalism, and (3) structuralism after the Second World War. The first two 
phases should be discussed with regard to several important elements, because these two 
schools, especially realism, were dominant during the Second World War.  
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In general, two important elements within (neo)realism and (neo)idealism will be 
discussed, which are directly or indirectly relate to the events in the Middle East, particularly 
in Iran during the period of the Second World War. Also, due attention will be given to the 
political environments and the political policy of the Great Powers during this time. The two 
elements within (neo)realism and (neo)idealism are: (1) the concept of Sovereignty and Non-
intervention, and (2) the Balance of Power. Eventually, the third phase, structuralism, will be 
described. 
 
3.1.1.  (Neo)realism vs. (neo)idealism/liberalism    
Between the two world wars (1920-1940), a competition of schools of thought took place 
between realism and idealism. The debate between these two theories was generally 
constructed along the following question: how can the international order best be maintained? 
Making the world safer through the establishment of democratic regimes and dissemination 
and division of political power in the whole world with the creation of specific organizations 
were the main political demands of the idealist school. After the end of World War I and 
under the leadership of President Woodrow Wilson, these demands and the related principles 
were institutionalized into international organizations like the League of Nations, which was 
later replaced by the UN.807 An establishment of collective security was the essential principle 
within the League of Nations as well as for the school of idealism. This also an essential 
principle within the UN, which tried to protect the coalition states against any state which 
committed aggression.808 Another focal point within the League of Nations and for the school 
of idealism was the Permanent Court of International Justice. Idealism claimed that all 
international disputes could be resolved through the legal process of international law. The 
solution of the Mosul question (see chapter III) between Turkey and British-Iraqi 
governments in 1926 can be cited as an example of this resolution process.809 However, the 
eruption of the Second World War led to the triumph of the realist school. Thus, it is 
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interesting to examine some of the essential international relations’ elements between the two 
world wars, which weakened the idealist school and tilted the scale towards the realist school. 
The outcome of the First World War can be seen as the cause of the World War II. 
This relationship can be explained in three ways. First, the First World War was a strong 
nationalist war. More than ever before, soldiers had the strong gut feeling of being part of a 
nation that was superior to, or in any case, had to compete with other nations. The soldiers’ 
extremely strong identification with their countries of origin was, in both the First and the 
Second World War, harnessed by their warring nations. Hitler understood the power of this 
feeling and his National Socialist policies were used to fully exploit it. A second link came 
from the fact that Germany suffered tremendous economic and infrastructural losses in the 
First World War. Germany was unable to bear these further losses after the long years of 
struggle in the trenches, and the immense destruction of its cities and horrific massacres of its 
people. Looking for scapegoats, they came to see the Jews, Socialists and Bolsheviks as the 
primary reason behind the great defeat of Germany. This intense dissatisfaction led Germany 
to see themselves as victims of the war. This is the emotion which Hitler used to gather 
suppport within the country for going into the Second World War.810  
A third relationship between the two wars stemmed from the Treaty of Versailles after 
the First World War, which was signed between Germany and the Allies. This treaty was 
extremely punitive for Germany: its army was strongly constrained, large tracts of land were 
to be ceded and huge economic recovery payments had to be made. The treaty was aimed at 
immediately halting Germany’s international conquest ambitions, rather than taking into 
account the possible long-term consequences. The treaty’s measures did immense damage to 
the German economy and led to widespread unrest and discontent among the German 
population, which made the rise of the Nazi Party possible. At the same time, the Treaty of 
Versailles only had weak mechanisms for reprisal if Germany violated the rules. Thus, there 
was no obstacle in Germany’s way once it moved to wartime footing.811   
With regard to the Great Powers in Iran, the following question is important: how 
should the Great Powers behave towards one another and towards weaker states? The realists 
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believed that the best guarantee for peace lay in a balance of power between the Great 
Powers. Because the system of the League of Nations failed and then the Second World War 
broke out, the idealist school became discredited after the war and the realist’s school 
prevailed.812 The realist, or power politics school, was represented by E.H. Carr and Georg 
Schwarzenberger in Britain and by Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau in the US. The 
existence of the state system was for abovementioned scholars the main goal of arbitrage in 
political power, in which there was no common authority above the sovereign state, and 
where there was international anarchy in the sense of a lack of government at the 
international level.813 Perhaps the most famous member of the realist school is Morgenthau, 
author of the classic called Politics among Nations (1960). The three major elements that 
typify Morgenthau’s writings are the beliefs that nation-states are the most important actors 
in international relations, that there is a clear distinction between domestic and international 
politics, and that international relations is predominantly about the struggle for power and 
peace.814 Morgenthau represented the first or rational approach, focusing on the rational 
assessment of interests and power resources to reach value-maximizing choices.815 This 
Rational Actor Model remains useful as a quick approximation to predict choices by policy-
makers in states such as the Soviet Union, where the detailed process of decision-making was 
hidden from public view.816  
The national security of the boundaries of a state is one of the central themes of the 
realist school. In other words, safeguarding the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state 
is an important task for the realist doctrine. This political theory, according to Staden, reached 
its highest point in the 1950s.817 According to the realist school, the state is the highest 
political actor and dominates the population. Sovereignty of a state depends on whether and to 
what level it is weak or powerful, which in turn means that a weak state is less sovereign. The 
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sovereignty of states has been a solid principle since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and it 
spread from Europe to the whole world. This widely accepted concept of sovereignty led to 
the creation of the idea of a territorial state, which is one of the most important political 
landmarks of our times.818 Despite all the violence of the First and Second World War, 
according to many authors, it created the apotheosis of the modern state, the modern state 
system and the related principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. This was especially the 
case in the non-Western world in the second half of the twentieth century.819 Nevertheless, 
these new states were often dependent in many respects, and not sovereign, according to one 
of its definitions by Krasner, who operated within the realist theories.820 
Daniel Philpott, a neoidealist supporter, attempted to explain that universally states 
respected each other’s territorial sovereignty.821 The importance of institutionalization of the 
states, that is when they are recognized jointly by the members of the international 
community, came to the attention of the (neo)idealist school. This was officially the founding 
principle of the United Nations. The member states were maintaining their credibility and 
demonstrating their mutual respect for sovereignty by adhering to mutual agreements, 
understandings and treaties. These included the prohibition to intervene in matters of other 
sovereign states, with states being accepted as a global norm.822 This principle of sovereignty 
and non-intervention, was laid down in article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations 
and widely accepted by UN in article 2(4, 5 and 6) within the Charter of the United Nations. 
The (neo)realist school is critical of this and believes that the sovereignty and non-
intervention is not an unyielding principle, and there are many reasons that these principles 
could be violated, for the sake of humanitarian causes, for example. The most important 
conceptual notion of (neo)realism is its view of international politics as a system of sovereign 
states, in which each state’s behavior principally results from its relationship to other states. 
However, as the title of his book, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, suggests, Krasner had a 
highly critical opinion about territorial sovereignty and its value in the current era. Krasner 
had a very realistic view of the political world, the principles of territorial sovereignty and 
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even the frequent violations thereof. To illustrate his point, Krasner gives the arbitrary 
interpretation of the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention by the European Great 
Powers, who acted by adapting these principles as per their interests.823 The violation of the 
territorial integrity of Iraq in 1991 in the second Persian Gulf War and the establishment of a 
‘safe haven’ for the Kurds is a potent example to describe the violation of sovereignty of a 
state. 
The concept of the balance of power is the second aspect of contention within 
(neo)realist and (neo)idealist school and is defined by Waltz as what, ‘explained the results of 
states’ actions, under given conditions’,824 which can be either conflict leading to instability 
or that of cooperation leading to a stable balance of power. In order to maintain stability and 
balance, power was divided between the Great Powers to form an alliance. However, despite 
cooperation being the main slogan, competition for individual state interests continued to play 
a dominant role. This led to a state of events where there was a lack of political interest on 
part of the United States to maintain international order and enforce the Versailles Treaty. 
Concurrently, after the United States pulled out of the world political arena, the only 
remaining Great Powers were Britain and France. In the background, the US continued to 
play a vital role in international political decision-making, despite it not being a member of 
the League of Nations. The US could not remain silent in global political arena for long, 
however, because one of the key elements in the balance of power theory is the unilateral 
formation of more powerful states. As Waltz points out, they are unitary actors who, ‘at a 
minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination.’825 
In the third decade of the twentieth century, for example, only a collective security 
pact of the League of Nations could achieve success in implementing effective sanctions, but 
this success would threaten the monopoly of the Great powers. For example, when Italy 
entered Ethiopia in 1935, the Council of the League of Nations claimed that Italy had violated 
the pact and the Assembly established a committee for the imposition of sanctions on Italy. 
These sanctions included an embargo on exports of war materials from Italy, prohibition on 
all Italian exports and the cancellation of all loans to Italy. The oil-embargo was not imposed 
out of fear of escalation of events in Europe, especially keeping in mind the growth of Nazi-
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Germany.826 But instead was an example of ‘external efforts’ by the states constituting the 
League of Nations to weaken the power of Italy and thus maintain a balance of power within 
Europe. The category of ‘external efforts’ was defined by Waltz as the move to strengthen 
and enlarge one’s own alliance or to weaken and shrink an opposing one.827 The invention of 
collective security through separate systems of the states can be cited as another example of 
‘external efforts’. This separate system of Alliances was created not only to guarantee the 
French security, but also provide protection against the tyrannies of Nazism. On the other 
hand, another means for states to obtain a balance of power is through ‘internal efforts’, 
which Waltz describes as the ‘move to increase economic and military capability’ within 
one’s own state.828  
Since 1945 there was an emphasis on international arbitration as a solution to 
international relations issues. The United Nations also saw this as an instrument for 
determining disputes between nations. For example, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 
1968 can be considered as a milestone in multilateral arms control, which was negotiated 
through the help of a UN body.829 These agreements were intended to ensure peace and 
security. It could be achieved by the intervention of the UN, Inter-Non-Governmental 
Organizations (INGOs), NGOs, IGOs and powerful governments. In the late twentieth 
century, some Third World countries showed resistance against the superpowers and 
maintained a non-aligned stance in international politics. The balance of power was primarily 
a product of the old regime in Europe and was a motivating power in nineteenth century’s 
diplomacy. Until 1945, the standard character of world political arena was multipolar, as it 
always consisted of five or more powers.830 During the Cold War this changed to a state with 
just two world powers, symbolized by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and 
the Warsaw Pact, with increasing tensions between the two blocks. As Waltz observed, ‘with 
only two great powers, a balance-of-power system is unstable.’831 With the collapse of the 
                                               
826 Armstrong 2004, 27-30. 
827 Ibid. 
828 Waltz 1979, 118. 
829 Jordan 2001, 51-6. 
830 Waltz 1979, 163. 
831 Ibid. 
 229 
bipolar world in 1989 due to the fall of the Soviet Union, the concept of a balance of power 
dismantled hastily.832     
 
3.1.2.  Structuralism 
After the Second World War, a third theory called structuralism was a major intellectual 
movement in France and also proved to be internationally influential. The common goal for 
this theory was to define different aspects of human culture (politics, habits, etc.), primarily 
‘language’, and to draw a system based on the language theory. As S.F. Nadel pointed out, 
‘ordinary language obscures a distinction that is important in theory.’833 Structure is an 
abstraction and is not something we see. It is in the realm of grammar and syntax, not of the 
spoken word.834 Structure must instead be defined by the ‘enumerating of the system’s parts 
and by the principle of that arrangement.’835 Within the structuralist school, two important 
approaches were essential for the study of human behaviour: individualistic and holistic. The 
first examined an individual’s behaviour, which is an important part of structural theory and, 
according to Waltz, ‘is now a social-science favourite.’836 An example of this approach is that 
many political and economic phenomena are due to individuals trying to maximize their 
surplus at the micro level, which is also a pivotal assumption of many social science theories. 
The second or holistic approach emphasizes on macro level phenomena with multiple 
individuals interacting, which leads to the emergence of a social system with some level of 
stable structure. The approach aims to explain the reasons for changing patterns of social, 
economic, political and cultural structures and also predict how these transformations would 
affect human behaviour. Since the changing of the social environment played a significant 
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role on the human behaviour, the social environment was also studied along with individual 
characteristics in the structuralist system.837          
Structuralism had been concerned with the division between societies such as between 
the rich and poor, both within countries and at the global scale. This led to an interest in 
transnational relations and inter-governmental links. According to this school, the structure of 
world politics was defined by economic factors and thus, (Neo-) Marxism-Leninism also 
belonged to this school. For structuralism the division of labour is crucial for the nature of 
social control and solidarity and thus it determined the manner in which individuals 
interacted. Structuralism not only attended to the economical relations between states and 
world politics, but it also concerned itself with the divisions within and between societies. 
Marxism, which is a part of the larger structuralist school, predicted that capitalist modes of 
production would ultimately lead to a classless society. This is another example of 
structuralism providing a direction about individual behaviour. Important topics of research 
within structuralism were the historical development of capitalism and the interdependence of 
the relations of the ‘Third World’ with respect to the ‘First World’.838 
 
3.2.  Soviet-Union’s policy towards Kurds in Iran 
Iran was a strategically important region for the Great Powers. Thus, Iran automatically 
became a part of international political strategies, with the Great Powers using the country as 
an instrument for their political and economic ambitions. This fact became more clearly 
particularly in the nineteenth century, when conflicts emerged between Britain and Russia in 
the Middle East. Russia’s expansionist policies and their need for warm-water ports clashed 
with Britain’s need to maintain their line of communication in the Eastern Mediterranean and 
their desire to protect a vast area, which stretched from the Persian Gulf to Tibet.839 
According to Kesrayi, the influence of the Great Powers in the Middle East from beginning of 
the nineteenth century began with the oppression of the Russian military and ended with the 
oppression of the British military.840   
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In the treaty of Gullistan in 1813, Iran renounced Derbent, Baku, Jerevan, Shaki, 
Karabakh and the surrounding areas to Russia, as well as any of its claims to Georgia, 
Dagestan and Mingrelie. Again outbreak of the Russo-Persian hostilities ended with the 
Treaty of Turkmenchai in 1828 and Iran surrendered the remaining part of Armenia to the 
Russians. The expansion of Russian to the south, especially in the first half of the nineteenth 
century, is related to the Kurdish question. Initially it was based on the military relationship 
between some Kurdish elites with Russian officers in order to form alliances against both the 
Ottoman and Persian empires. For this reason and because Kurds had obtained more freedom 
in the Tsarists region, many Kurdish families immigrated to the Caucasus.841 With the 
conquest of Northern provinces of Iran, several Russian orientalists, particularly after the 
second half of the nineteenth century, focused on the study of the Kurdish literature, culture, 
politics and history. In this period Kurdish studies in Russia became popular and many books 
were published in different areas.842   
The Russian advance in the Islamic world was under way and came at the expense of 
Turkey, Iran and the Central Asian states. However, Central Asia had undergone major 
economic changes since the Russians introduced cotton cultivation. The Russians kept their 
eye on the potential resources of Central Asia. When the American Civil War (1861-65) 
began, the Russians had a shortage of cotton fabrics,843 which made the conquest of Central 
Asia rather necessary. The Russians and the British did not want a war with Iran and they 
mutually agreed that Iran was a buffer between their own areas of strategic importance. 
Russians, however, were concerned about the continued development and expansion of Great 
Britain in India. Atabaki and Versteeg suggest the following:  
 
The British knew how to enforce the control of the Afghan foreign policy. This ended the 
Russian expansion. The Great Game between the two superpowers was sealed in 1895 with a 
treaty in which the boundaries and spheres of influence of the Russian and British empires were 
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strictly defined. Afghanistan became a buffer state and got the finger-shaped strip up to Pamir, 
with Russia and Britain remaining on its two separate sides.844 
 
Until post-World War I, Pan-Islamism was an important de-facto ideal within the Kurdish 
community and also for the majority of the Kurdish leaders. In contrast, Pan-Kurdism was a 
weak sentiment, but still some Kurdish nationalists, such as Kamil Badir Khan, were hopeful 
for and striving towards the prospective growth of Pan-Kurdism.845 Russian policy towards 
Kurds in post-World War I is illustrated in declaration by the Russian Foreign Affairs Office 
made on April 18, 1923. According to this formal declaration, the Russian should not support 
the Kurdish movement against the Turkish government and also not support the Turkish 
government against the Kurds. Compassion must be showed to the Kurdish struggle as an 
instrument against Britain.846 After the establishment of the modern nation-states in Turkey, 
Iran and Iraq, the Soviet government tried to strengthen its position by building connections 
with these new central governments, especially with the new Iranian government under the 
leadership of Reza Shah. After the negotiation of the Treaty of Friendship in 1921 between 
Russian and Iranian representatives,847according to Mo’tazed, the Iranian military was able to 
reconquer the north of Iran and end the movement of Jangali.848      
As mentioned in chapter III, Reza Shah executed strict policy programs in Iran. 
According to these programs, the administration, education and legal system, among other 
infrastructure, were modernised. His goal was to design a centralised modern state based on a 
secular-oriented public administration. Kuniholm argues that Reza Shah turned his attention 
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to the realisation of three great objectives: a centralized government, modernisation, and 
freedom from foreign influence.849 Since the economy of Iran, in particular the oil industry, 
was heavily dependent on the super powers, the dissatisfaction of the Iranian people with the 
Shah and the foreigners increased. In the meantime, the rivalry between the Great Powers also 
increased. In the Treaty of Petersburg in 1907, Iran was divided into three zones, putting north 
of Iran under Russian control, south and southwest under the Great Britain, and a kind of 
neutral zone in between. History repeated itself when the Allied Powers occupied Iran in 
August 1941. In order to guarantee military supplies for the Soviet Union’s fight against 
Germany, Iran was divided again into three zones. This recurring division of Iran by the Great 
Powers was a sign of the continuous struggle for political and economic domination in Iran.850  
Kurdish nationalists in Iran saw this as an opportunity to organize themselves within a 
political institution when the Allied entered Iran in August 1941. After formation of the JK, 
the leaders of this party approached the Allies and referred to the fourth article of the Atlantic 
Charter by saying that ‘they [US and UK] respect the right of all peoples to choose the form 
of government under which they will live.’ A few months following the occupation of Iran, 
the Allied Powers collaborated with Iran in January 1942 to create the Tripartite Treaty of 
Alliance (see appendix II), which strengthened the position of the Iranian central government 
towards ethnic groups who tried to obtain their autonomy. The treaty consisted of nine articles 
and three annexes, all of which were compatible with the principles of the Atlantic Charter 
(see appendix I). In this agreement Britain and Soviets agreed to defend Iran against 
aggression by Germany or any other power.851 The treaty also promised respect for Iran’s 
political independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty (article 1) and that Allied forces 
would be withdrawn from Iranian territory no more than six months after an armistice or 
peace between the Allied Powers, Germany and her associates, whichever came first (art. 5). 
According to article 1 and 7, Iran was to be provided with economic support by the Great 
Powers. These two articles were also repeated in the agreements coming out of the conference 
of Tehran, which lasted from November 28 to December 1 of 1943.852     
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Subsequent to the Tripartite Treaty, Iran cooperated with the Allies and promised the 
free passage of the Allied forces and facilities. The Allies were permitted to maintain military 
forces in the territory of Iran. Iran was an important military base for the eventual victory of 
the Allied Powers and it was strategically important for the transportation of military goods to 
the Battle of Stalingrad. Kuniholm pointed out that more than 2,000,000 tons of supplies had 
been delivered to the Soviet Union, with 350,000 tons delivered through the Persian 
Corridor.853 The Battle of Stalingrad, which lasted from August 1942 until February 1943, 
was one of the bloodiest conflicts in history. Despite the spotless record and overwhelming 
power of the German’s Sixth Army prior to Stalingrad, the Soviet troops launched a counter-
offensive program on November 19, 1942 and succeeded in breaking through German lines. 
Eventually, the German troops were surrounded by the Red Army. Thus began the Soviets’ 
slow process waiting for the of the German’s definitive decline.854 With this defeat, the 
German military realised that they were not invincible and it was surely crushing for Hitler’s 
confidence. The overthrow of the Germans troops in the Battle of Stalingrad enabled the 
following victories for Allied forces in Normandy in 1944 and Ardennes in early 1945, which 
brought an end to Hitler’s dream of ‘world domination’. 
Before and during the Battle of Stalingrad, the Soviets had a clear policy towards 
Kurds: maintain security in the region and not encourage the Kurds to obtain any kind of 
autonomy. As Sir Bullard, British Ambassador in Tehran, suggested to the British Foreign 
Office: 
 
I believe that it is not correct to say that the Soviet authorities are encouraging an autonomous 
Kurdish movement. I have even heard of instances where they assisted the Persian Government 
against the Kurds. For example they are sending some Red Army soldiers to reinforce the 
Persian gendarmerie at the Miandoab sugar factory, which Kurds are believed to be threatening 
to loot.855 
  
A letter by Molotov, the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Smirnov, the Soviet 
Ambassador in Tehran, dated August 31, 1942, clearly illustrated the updated policy of the 
Soviets towards the Kurds. According to this official letter, polarization intensified between 
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the two ethnic groups, the Kurds and the Azeris. The priority was given to the Azeris and the 
Kurds were considered unreliable and in the service of the British imperialism. According to 
Molotov:  
  
On May 13, 1942 we had asked our ambassador and consulates in Iran not to cause obstruction 
to the Iranian military in the region. Iranian forces should be in control of the Rezaiyeh area to 
protect people and Kurds must respect and listen to the Iranian government. Our consulate and 
military officers did not correctly understand our goal. Therefore, the Iranian government 
believes that we offered help to Kurds, which irritated many of our Azeri and Iranian friends. 
Kurds have rebelled against the Iranian authorities and they looted properties of innocent people. 
They are a cause of insecurity in Iran and terrorise the Azeri people. We [the Soviets] must 
prioritize help for the Azeris, as they are the majority in Azerbaijan and ethnographically and 
historically they have a strong relation with the Soviet Azerbaijan. This does not mean that we 
turn against the Kurds. We just need to provide more support to Azeris to promote our interests 
in northern Iran. There is no unity between Kurds. They are divided among backward tribes and 
in the service of the imperialists [British]. The Soviet Union refuses a sovereign state or 
autonomy for Kurdistan.856         
 
Two factors could easily be identified as reasons behind the adoption of the abovementioned 
policy by the Soviets: (a) the Soviet Union was busy with a war against Germany in the Battle 
of Stalingrad, and (b) while this war raged, support by the Allies for the Soviet forces was 
necessary. That support as forthcoming, as can be seen in the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance, 
article 3 (section b), which states: 
 
To secure to the Allied Powers, for the passage of troops or supplies from one Allied Powers to 
the other […], the unrestricted right to use, maintain, guard and, in case of military necessity, 
control in any way that they may require all means of communication throughout Iran.857 
 
Iran was an important route that had to be secured for the victory of the Allied forces in the 
Battle of Stalingrad. Accordingly, it was incumbent on the Soviets not to encourage the Kurds 
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towards the fulfilment of any national ambitions but rather to do everything to bring about a 
peaceful coexistence between the Kurds and the Persian government.  
After the distribution of Molotov’s letter amongst the high ranking Soviet officers in 
Iran, Soviet representatives travelled to the areas of the northern Iranian Kurdistan to obtain 
guarantees from Kurdish leaders for maintaining peace and security in the region. Most tribal 
chieftains of the northern Iranian Kurdistan obeyed the Soviet policy to preserve security in 
the region. The organization by Kurdish leaders, who were mostly tribal leaders, of an 
inclusive political conference was one of the important events at that time. The wedding feast 
of a son of Gharani Agah, chieftain of Zerza in Ushnawiyeh, in September 1942 was a good 
occasion to hold a conference. Almost all Kurdish leaders, from Salmas to Saqqiz, were 
invited to this party.858 As planned, the meeting took place after the wedding. The participants 
decided on the following key positions: (1) to remain loyal to the government of Soviet Union 
and to take no action against this country and their army in Iran and consent to no agreements 
between Kurds and other powers without support of the Soviet Union, (2) put an end to the 
plundering and come up with a solution against looters, and (3) to protect the Kurdish unity 
and abide by the principle of ‘everybody for one and one for everybody’. The regional leaders 
were also elected in this meeting. Emer Khan Shikak was elected as leader of Khoy, Salmas 
of the region up to the Soviet border (Jalali’s tribe), and west and south Urumiyeh was put 
under the leadership of Gharani Agah Mamash.859  
The Soviets were not directly involved in the proceedings of this conference. As 
Maksimov, Soviet consular in Urumiyeh, notes, ‘it is not true that we organized and 
participated in this meeting’.860 However, they had an indirect role in this meeting. After the 
completion of the conference, for instance, according to Maksimov, some Kurds, under the 
leadership of ‘Zêro Beg, went to the Soviet consulate in Urumiyeh to convey the results of the 
conference.’861 This type of indirect control on the Kurdish activities was an example of the 
Soviet policy towards the Kurds. At that time, the leaders of the JK Party visited the Soviet 
representatives several times in Urumiyeh and Tabriz to seek support for their activities, but 
all of their attempts were meet with silence. However, after the Soviet victory at Stalingrad, 
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the matter of rights of ethnic groups and minorities became a major agenda item in the Soviet 
foreign policy. 
In the period of the Battle of Stalingrad, the traditional conflict between Great Britain 
and Russia in Iran was less important, and it was more important for the two super powers to 
cooperate with each other to eliminate their mutual enemy. But as the war progressed, 
especially after the Allied victory in the Battle of Stalingrad, the historical conflict between 
Great Britain and Russia in Iran surged forth once again. Kuniholm wrote that their 
cooperation in Iran became less important. As the war moved west across the steppes of the 
Soviet Unioin, it became increasingly apparent that Allied actions in Iran were not in 
accordance with the terms of the Tripartite Treaty.862 In this period, the British, and more so 
the Soviets, looked after their own interests and showed less respect for the territorial 
integrity, sovereignty and political independence that Iran had been promised in the Tripartite 
Treaty. After the Battle of Stalingrad, Soviet policy was aimed at achieving its political and 
economic goals by helping ethnic groups to fight against the incumbent Iranian government. 
The concept of the ‘right of nations to self-determination’ marked the foreign policy of the 
Soviets and led to the strengthening of the identities of the ethnic groups under the slogan 
‘liberty for the Kurds and the Azeris from the oppression of the Persians.’ Pressuring the 
Iranian Government to obtain economic compromises was high on the political agenda of 
Soviet Union. 
After the triumph of Stalingrad, the Soviet position in world politics was strengthened. 
International influence and credibility of the Soviet military and policy was noted. And these 
were strengthened for furthering their economic and political interests, which included 
support for many governments and movements in the world political arena.863 With regard to 
the Kurds in Iran, the Soviets had no long-term political plan. Gerald Dooher noted that the 
only option remaining for the Kurds was to join the movement that the Soviets had 
established in the form of a protégé Kurdish government under leadership of Ghazi 
Mohammad.864 The Soviet support for the Kurds was limited and by no means was meant to 
give a green-light for the establishment of a Kurdish state or autonomy. To this day, no 
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official Soviet document has surfaced to give evidence to any plans by the Soviets to establish 
an independent Kurdish state in Iran. When the Republic of Kurdistan was proclaimed, the 
Soviet representatives in Tabriz received the news with discomfort and disapproval. 
According to Eagleton, two prominent KDP leaders visited Dr. Samadov at the Russian 
Hospital in Tabriz to explain why the Kurds had proclaimed their independence and formed a 
government without first having obtained Soviet approval.865 
The short-term political plan of the Soviets for support of the Kurds, which was 
mainly operative between 1944 and 1946, had the following goals: to prevent Iranian military 
offensive on the free-zone Kurdish area, form a Kurdish-Soviet Cultural Society, supply 
weapons to the Republic of Kurdistan, etc. In connection with this, Baqirov’s opinion was 
relevant to the claim that the Soviet policy towards Kurds was not to establish a Kurdish state. 
Baqirov stated that the Soviet representatives in Iranian Kurdistan once again warned Ghazi 
Mohammad that ‘he must keep to the instructions, which had been given to him before, and 
that he must not undertake any actions against Iranian troops.’866 These short-term 
collaborations were meant to prevent the Iranian central government for reaching key 
economical goals, with an especial Soviet eye especially being on the creation of a lucrative 
northern Iranian oil treaty. By the end of 1944, the Soviets were disappointed when Iranian 
government refused to grant that oil concession. This was the reason for the first major 
conflict on Iranian oil between the Great Powers, which formed the basis of the Iranian crisis 
of 1945-46.    
The United States’ increased cooperation with Britain in Iranian affairs added a new 
and important dimension to the Iranian crisis of 1945-46. As the end of the Second World 
War gradually drew nearer, the influence of Britain diminished in the Middle East, 
particularly in Iran. The US took a dominant position as a third force to counterbalance the 
two major powers. The US concerned itself, especially after 1944, with Iranian issues but still 
cooperated with Britain to form a strong united front against the Soviet Union. However, an 
important test of Anglo-America cooperation was the enforcement of the fifth article of the 
Tripartite Treaty. The cornerstone of this article was that Allied forces would be withdrawn 
from Iranian territory no more than six months after an armistice or peace between the Allied 
                                               
865 Eagleton 1963, 74. 
866 Natalia I. Yegorova, ‘The “Iran Crisis” of 1945-46: A View from the Russian Archives’, Institute of 
Universal History Russian Academy of Sciences (Working Paper No. 15, Washington: Woodrow Wilson 
International Center for Scholars, May 1996), 13. 
 239 
Powers, Germany and her associates, whichever came first. This principle was an important 
point for the conflict between the Soviet Union and Anglo-America in Iran because 
withdrawal proved to be problematic for the Great Powers. The Soviet Union, in particular, 
showed every intention of establishing itself permanently in Iran. The issue of the withdrawal 
of Allied military forces from Iran and the Iranian crisis, which planted the seeds of the Cold 
War in Iran, are two essential aspects that will be described in following section. 
 
3.3.  Anglo-American policy towards Kurds in Iran 
The political and economic influence of the British government on the Middle East dates back 
much further  than that of the United States, which had only become an international Power  
since World War I. The following were four significant elements of British foreign policy in 
the nineteenth century: (1) to protect the route to India, (2) to safeguard the communication 
lines between the metropolis and their empire, (3) to promote their trade, and (4) to guarantee 
respect for a minimum of humanitarian standards. These were important reasons for the 
defence of the independence and integrity of both the Ottoman and the Persian Empires 
against the threats of Tsarist Russia.867 This policy continued after the First World War when 
the new states, which were formed by the dismantling of the two Empires, continued to 
oppose the new Soviet regime. Anglo-American policy supported the Iranian central 
government, especially when Britain maintained security in the oil fields in the south and 
south western regions of Iran. In contrast, the Soviets encouraged regionalist movements 
against the Iranian central regime to pressure the Iranian government into possible oil 
concessions. According to Mo’tazed, from the beginning of 1921 two obstacles were faced by 
the Iranian government to liberate themselves from the influence of outsiders. The first had to 
do with attempts of Soviet government to establish a secessionist communist regime in the 
Gilan province and the second was related to the British government. The monopoly on oil 
exploration concessions was maintained by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company868 and due to the 
presence of oil fields, Iran was strategically an important country in the Middle East. 
 Since the discovery of oil fields in southern Iran in the early twentieth century, the 
major powers’ aspirations in Iran heightened even further. As a result of Britain’s special role 
in the oil industry, British influence in Iran was even greater than the considerable Russian 
influence. Oil was a factor in Anglo-Iranian relations from as early as 1901, when Iran 
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granted a concession to the Australian William D’Arcy. The shares of D’Arcy were sold to 
the British in 1908 and in 1909 and the Anglo-Persian (later Anglo-Iranian) Oil Company was 
founded. Indeed, adiplomatic conflict between Britain and Persia was exacerbated because of 
this sale of shares from D’Arcy to the British government. In 1931, the Iranian government 
was highly dissatisfied due to the lower rates of profit it was receiving. In 1932 the Persian 
parliament declared the Convention of 1901 invalid. The British government answered this 
move with an ultimatum. Britain then brought the matter to the League of Nations in Geneva. 
Negotiations resumed in Tehran through the agency of the League of Nations, but they did not 
lead to any results.869 
In the beginning of the twentieth century, especially in the period between the First 
and Second World Wars, Britain and the Soviet Union were actively trying to spread their 
influence in the Middle East. While the impact of the Great Powers was present after the First 
World War throughout the Middle East, the role of the US in Iran rose to that of an important 
power in the Second World War. Lenczowski divided the US relations with the Middle East 
into three distinct periods: (1) until 1941, (2) during the war period from 1941-45, and (3) 
after 1945.870 The first phase included the beginnings of the American Protestant missionaries 
paying serious attention to the Middle East, particularly in the nineteenth century. For 
example, they established the American University in Beirut (as Syrian Protestant College in 
1866), American University at Cairo, secondary schools, known as ‘colleges’ in Tehran and 
Bagdhad. This thesis deals with the second phase of US foreign policy towards Iran in the 
Second World War. Because the influence of the Allied Powers in Iran increased between the 
two World Wars, the Shah of Iran sought a third power as a competitor to other Great Powers. 
Mohammad Reza Shah, Reza Shah’s son and successor from 1941-79, formed a relationship 
with the US. This gave the US, after the weakening of Britain, a free hand in its struggles as 
the new Great Power against the Soviets. 
After the Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran, the Iranian government invited the 
American advisers to organise its disordered public and government finances. US civilian and 
military personnel assumed influential positions as advisers to the Iranian government and 
began to direct reforms in such key areas as financial administration, domestic security, and 
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military organisation.871 In the period of the Battle of Stalingrad, the American military 
arrived in the Persian Gulf as the Persian Gulf Command (PGC). Suddenly after the Battle of 
Stalingrad, according to K.S. Lambton, the British handed over the administration of the 
Iranian railway to American personnel, who were able to further increase quantity of carriage 
supplies.872 An important American military base was stationed in the Persian Gulf from 
where the US troops patrolled and guarded not only the oil fields in Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait, but also observed the Soviet expansion in the Middle East. Offner explained that 
the US sent two noncombat military missions of 5,000 men to advise Iran’s army and the 
police.873 The majority of the US Army that arrived in the Persian Gulf came between 1942 
and 1943 and according to Lenczowski, it was composed of about 30,000 troops of non-
combatant character.874 The main purpose of these troops was to speed up the transportation 
of supplies to Russia and for the construction of military bases. Lenczowski points out that the 
US non-combatant troops were in charge of building and reorganizing the harbours on the 
Persian Gulf coast and Shatt-al-Arab, construction and reparation of highways, building of 
airports, and operation of the Trans-Iranian Railway.875        
The first major conflict of Great Powers in Iran was in the period of the last quarter of 
the year 1944. This was termed the Iranian oil crisis and it formed the basis of the origins of 
the Cold War in the region. The Cold War (1945-1991) was the continuation of the political 
conflict between Western World states, with one side under the leadership of the United 
States, and the other being the Communist World, which was under the leadership of the 
Soviet Union. This political conflict was evident across various international domains, such as 
military tension, economic competition and domination in world politics. Although the 
military forces never officially clashed between the two blocs, they manifested the conflict 
through military coalitions, strategic conventional force deployments, extensive aid to states 
deemed vulnerable, propaganda dissemination and espionage.876 With regard to the 
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intelligence operation of Soviet Union towards the capitalist bloc, Vasili Nikitich Mitrokhin 
divided the Cold War into three distinct phases. The first phase was of the Soviet intelligence 
operations in Britain from the 1930s until 1951. This period was popular as the Golden Age, 
during which the Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopastnosti (KGB, the Soviet security and 
intelligence service) collected better intelligence than any other power. The second phase 
during the 1950s and 1960s was aptly called the Silver Age, during which substantial 
intelligence successes were still maintained. The third phase was from the 1970s until the 
1980s and was known as the Bronze Age, markede by few major successes and, eventually, 
the fall of the Soviet Union.877    
According to Paul Kennedy, there were four main political features of the Cold War 
after 1945. The first was the intensification of the split between the two blocs in Europe. The 
second was its steady lateral escalation and spread from Europe to the rest of the world. The 
third was the increasing arms race between the two blocs, along with the creation of 
supportive military alliances. The final element was the competition to find and create new 
partnership across the globe by both the Soviet and the Western alliances.878 These four 
elements greatly affected international relations.  
The region comprising the countries of Iran, Turkey and Afghanistan in the Middle East 
and its strategic location on the borders of the Soviet Union, made it an area of high interest 
for the United States defence planners and their allies during the Cold War. The second 
feature of the Cold War, as suggested by Kennedy, can be clearly seen during the period of 
the Iranian oil crisis in 1944 and also during the period of 1945-46. The conflicts of interest 
between the Anglo-American and Soviets became heated during this period. In one document, 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) stated:  
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        The Soviet Union views Iran not only as a possible base to attack the vital Caucus oil fields of 
the Russians, but also a Soviet base for political penetration and possible military operations 
against areas of vital importance to the security of the Western Powers.879 
 
Through this document the CIA tried to understand the motive behind of Soviet troops in Iran 
and advised the US government to take action. As the CIA stated in the following paragraph:  
  
If the USSR occupied or dominated Iran, it would: (a) gain control of the oil resources now 
exploited by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company; (b) threaten the oil fields in nearby Iraq, Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain; (c) acquire additional bases for carrying on subversive activities or 
actual attacks against Turkey, Iraq, Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan; (d) control continental air 
routes to Iran, threaten those crossing Turkey, Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Persian Gulf, 
and menace shipping in the Persian Gulf; (e) undermine the will of all Middle Eastern countries 
to resist aggression; and (f) acquire a base 800 miles nearer than any held at present to potential 
British-US lines of defence in Africa and the Indian Ocean area.880 
 
The rivalry between Anglo-Soviets guided the United States’ growing interest in Iran. One of 
the important ideological figures of America’s anti-imperialist mission was General Patrick J. 
Hurley.881 Because of the conflict of interest that the British and Soviets had in Iran, he 
advised President Roosevelt to take action. For the monopoly over their oil resources, the 
British tried to stay in Iran while the Soviets wanted warm-water ports and northern oil 
concessions. Kuniholm, who viewed this conflict in terms of Britain’s declining influence in 
the Middle East, suggested that the United States either play a strong independent role in Iran 
or coordinate its efforts with those of the British, but under American leadership.882 General 
Donald Connolly explained that the State Department saw two US interests in Iran: the need 
to protect the Gulf in order to safeguard the oil fields in Saudi Arabia, and the desire to 
protect small nations’ rights through the Atlantic Charter.883 The Soviets, however, showed 
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every intention of establishing themselves permanently in Iran. The Soviets had two strategies 
to attain this goal. First, they placed their men within the leadership of the Tudeh Party. 
Secondly, they encouraged both Kurdish and Azerbaijan governments, with the idea of 
separating the northern provinces from Iran and weakening the central government enough to 
place it at the mercy of the Tudeh Party.884  
The existence of the Great Powers in Iran during the oil crisis in 1944, especially 
during the Iranian crisis of 1945-46, exacerbated not only the Iranian political, economic and 
social movements, but it also led to a conflict of interest between the Great Powers. As Fred 
Lawson explained:   
 
         From Washington’s perspective, an American presence in Iran could provide a vital buffer zone 
between the USSR and the oil-producing regions along the southern Gulf littoral; from 
London’s, continued control over Iranian oil and the air route to India represented primary 
components of British post-war planning; and from Moscow’s, US attempts to promote ‘open 
door’ policies in the [Persian] Gulf provided little more than window-dressing for American 
imperialism and demanded firm countermeasures to prevent the spread of US hegemony into 
areas bordering the southern republics of the USSR.885   
 
The Iranian crisis in 1945-46 probably began in the period of the Iranian oil crisis in 1944. On 
August 16, 1946, Lavrenty Beria, Deputy Chairman of the Council of the People’s Soviet 
Commissars and a key figure behind the Kremlin’s designs to obtain an oil concession in 
northern Iran, signed a report on the issue of the Anglo-American policy towards Iranian oil 
reserves and production. The report specifically referred to Anglo-American contradictions in 
the struggle for the northern Iranian oil fields.886 In September 1944, an agreement between 
Anglo-Iran and Standard Oil was signed for joint exploration in Iran, which led the Soviets to 
take further steps. They made an official request for the creation of a mixed Soviet and Iranian 
company to look for and eventually exploit deposits in the northern region of the country. 
Two weeks later, the Soviet Vice Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Sergei Ivanovich 
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Kavtaradze, asked the Shah for oil exploration rights in an area of northern Iran.887 Such a 
proposal could only alarm the western oil companies and the Shah decided it was necessary to 
consider the proposal of Kavtaradze with the advice of the American and British. When the 
Iranian Prime Minister Sa’id asked the American oil expert Herbert Hoover for a model 
petroleum contract with the Soviet Union, he saw no objection to such a concession.888 But in 
reality the US Oil Companies began to pressure the Iranian government for oil concessions 
for the US. Britain had little difficulty in persuading the authorities in Iran to refuse the 
request of Soviet. The Iranians had gained enough experience with the Russians to know that 
such a pact would mean a complete Soviet takeover of the oil region. Therefore, Iran was in 
no rush for an oil concession with the Soviets. Kavtaradze returned to Moscow disheartened 
and empty handed. This situation around the issue of granting oil concessions revealed a new 
tendency in Iranian foreign policy and illustrated the conflict of interests between the Great 
Powers in Iran.   
Thus on the December 2, the parliament almost unanimously passed a law forbidding 
the granting of a concession to a foreign country for the duration of the occupation without a 
prior agreement. The author of the law was Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq, who a few years later 
would become famous as the head of the Iranian government that nationalised the Iranian oil 
fields. This law surprised everyone and especially angered the Soviets.889 After the Iranian 
decision to terminate all negotiations over oil concessions with the Soviets, the Russians went 
against the Iranian government in three ways. First, Soviet soldiers stopped all commercial 
rail shipments northward from Tehran and all grain shipments to Tehran from the north.890 
Second, through the Tudeh party, which was an important instrument of the Soviet policy in 
Iran, according to Kuniholm, the Soviets kept pressuring the Iranian government for the 
possibility of an oil concession.891 The supporters of the Tudeh Party organized 
demonstrations against the central government in almost every major Iranian city and also 
took over factories in Tehran, Isfahan and other major cities.892 And in northern Iranian 
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Kurdistan, the JK party proclaimed an official declaration for granting the northern Iranian oil 
concession to the Soviet Union.893 The third way was fracturing Iranian territorial integrity, 
and this was realized with the formation of the Azerbaijan government in 1945 and the 
Republic of Kurdistan in January 22, 1946. 
Gradually the US became concerned with these events. Charles Bohlen, Chief of the 
State Department’s Division of East European Affairs, warned that it was necessary to pay 
‘close attention’ to Soviet-Iranian relations in the north.894 Kuniholm asserted the US had no 
intentions of using force to maintain Iranian independence, the real question was whether the 
United States intended to back the Atlantic Charter in more than just theory.895 Roosevelt still 
respected the principles of the Atlantic Charter and the Allied Powers respected the Iranian 
territorial integrity and political independence. Further, the Charter increased the protection of 
America’s interests in Iran. Because of these interests in Iran, particularly in the Persian Gulf, 
some diplomats, including George Kennan, US Ambassador in Moscow, and Secretary of 
State Edward Stettinius, asked Roosevelt to take a harder line with the Soviets. When Harry 
Truman became the American president, after the death of President Roosevelt in April 1945, 
he took an increasingly harder stance against the Soviets all around the globe. Under 
Truman’s direction the State Department began to pursue a more active policy regarding 
Iran.896 
Step-by-step the period of the Iranian oil crisis ended and the Iranian crisis of 1945-46 
began and led to the intensification of the diplomatic conflict between the Anglo-Americans 
and the Soviets. By the beginning of 1945, the Soviet intervention in the north of Iran was 
increased to protect its allied ethnic groups. For example, the Red Army blocked Iranian army 
operations against Kurdish dissidents, supported the other ethnic minority groups such as the 
Azeris, Armenians and the Orthodox Church increased their political influence. Soviet 
pressure on the Iranian government to grant oil concessions was heightened in 1945, when the 
Politbureau of the Central Communist of Soviet Communist Party ordered Baqirov to take 
further steps towards building an autonomous government in Iranian Azerbaijan. The formal 
document focussed mostly on the Azerbaijan issue, with only one of the thirteen points 
related to the issue of northern Iranian Kurdistan, and the essence of the document was to: 
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Take necessary action that the inhabitants of the northern Iranian Kurdish region be adscribed 
into an autonomy movement that would lead to the establishment of a Kurdish national 
autonomous state.897  
 
The aim of the Soviets was not to establish a Kurdish state, but was to use the threat as a 
leverage to obtain its economic ambitions, such as winning an oil concession, in Iran. The 
Soviets saw the solution of the northern Iranian Kurdish question within that of the larger 
issues pertaining to the breakaway Azerbaijan government, and Baqirov especially claimed 
this to be the main purpose. Actually, this was a short-term political plan, which became 
evident when the Soviets agreed with Ghavam on a possible oil agreement and the 
Azeris/Kurdish question was then pushed to the background. The withdrawal of the Allied 
military from Iran, which was an important element of the Iranian crisis of 1945-46, should be 
thoroughly discussed and for this it is necessary to refer to some important issuess from the 
Yalta (February 4 to 11, 1945), Potsdam (July 17 to August 2, 1945), London (September 
1945) and Moscow (December 16 to 26, 1945) Conferences, which were treated the policies 
of the Great Powers towards Iran.  
The increasing intensity of the political interests of the Allied Powers became manifest 
after the end of World War II on May 1945, resulting in increasing enthusiasm for Iranian 
political, economic and social movements. The Iranian population was being split between 
pro-British, pro-American and pro-Soviet groups. The Soviets were supporting the leftist, 
socialist and working-class elements of the population, and the British were supporting the 
conservative and landowning elements.898 The US government tried utmost to maintain the 
central government in Iran. This political polarisation not only brought Iran into a crisis, but it 
was also an important factor in the origins of the Cold War. Truman, Churchill, and Clement 
Attlee, during the Potsdam Conference, had not only sanctioned against the Sovie domination 
of Poland, but the question of the removal of foreign troops from Iran became more urgent. 
Before the Potsdam Conference and shortly after the end of World War II, the Iranian king 
Mohammad Reza Shah requested that the British and Soviet governments evacuate their 
troops. The Iranian government reminded the Allied Powers of the Tripartite Treaty of 1942, 
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which promised the Iranian government that the Allied forces would withdraw their troops 
within six months of the ending of the war.                    
At the Yalta Conference, the Allied Powers had agreed to meet following the 
surrender of Nazi-Germany to determine the post-war borders in Europe. Germany 
surrendered on May 8, 1945, and the Allied Powers agreed to meet over the summer at 
Potsdam to continue the discussions that began at Yalta. Although the Allies remained 
committed to fighting a joint war in the Pacific, the lack of a common enemy in Europe led to 
difficulties reaching a consensus concerning post-war reconstruction on the European 
continent. The Iranian government was just as disappointed with the results of Potsdam 
Conference as of the Yalta Conference. The Iranians thought that the option to withdraw the 
foreign troops from Iran was on the agenda at the Yalta Conference, but this did not come up 
for discussion. This was however the most important subject at the Potsdam Conference. 
American troops were already being withdrawn and the US Persian Gulf Command 
terminated its mission on June 23, 1945.899 At Potsdam, the British urged the Soviets to agree 
to an accelerated timetable for mutual withdrawal of the troops from Iran. Truman supported 
the British proposal and said that he expected US troops to leave Iran within sixty days.900  
Stalin did not show any interest in this subject. He believed that World War II was not 
over in May 1945, as it still continued against Japan. Stalin claimed that the Allied troops 
should be withdrawn from Iran after the war against Japan ended, but he promised the Iranian 
government that he would withdraw his troops from Tehran. After the Anglo-Americans 
pressed for a stronger commitment from the Soviet leader, Stalin agreed that the foreign 
powers had six months to withdraw their troops after the end of the war with Japan. 
Evacuation of the troops from the capital of Iran was clearly agreed on at the Potsdam 
Conference, but a withdrawal of the Allied Powers’ troops from the whole country was due to 
be discussed further at the foreign ministers meeting in the London Conference. 
After the termination of the Second World War, the Iranian government tried 
everything to ensure that the Allies would withdraw their troops from Iran. Iran saw the 
presence of foreign troops, particularly that of the Soviets, as a danger to their sovereignty. 
Meanwhile, on September 6, four days after Japan’s surrender, Anushiravan Sipahbodi, Iran’s 
Foreign Minister, made a formal statement to the effect that Iran was responsible for its own 
internal security and was being prevented from accomplishing this task. He stressed that the 
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end of the war had removed the need for special authorisation to assume this responsibility 
and evacuation within six months was now certain.901 The Iranian government asked the 
American government if Iran could be represented at the London Conference. At the London 
meeting the Americans quickly agreed that all foreign troops would be evacuated by March 2, 
1946 at the latest, but one may well wonder if Molotov had any intention of honouring that 
agreement. Between the time of the London and Moscow Conferences, the Soviets in 
northern Iran were actively helping some ethnic groups struggle against the central 
government of Iran. Lawson claimed that the Soviet activities in the north of Iran were 
followed as:   
 
        On the one hand, Soviet actions in northern Iran have generally been seen as part of a larger 
program of expansionism. [Russian] support for the autonomous government in northern Iran in 
the face of stiff American opposition, expressed in the firm US demands that the United Nations 
censure the USSR for its policies in the region. On the other hand, Soviet actions in Iran’s 
northern provinces in 1945-1946 can also be viewed as a reaction to American initiatives 
throughout the Middle East in general, and along the southern [Persian] Gulf littoral in 
particular.902 
 
The Moscow Conference coincided with Iran’s attempts to solve its two major problems with 
the Soviet Union: the events in Azerbaijan and northern Iranian Kurdistan, and the 
determination on part of the Soviets not to withdraw their military and thereby strengthen 
their position in Iran. Approximately one week before the Moscow Conference, the Iranian 
Ambassador to the United States, Hussein ‘Ala, sent a message to the US, which 
recommended that the questions related to Iran be on the agenda at the Moscow 
Conference.903 The Iranian question was an essential topic at the Moscow Conference in the 
following two regards: the withdrawal of Allied forces from Iranian territory and the 
formation of Provincial Councils in Iran. Anglo-American representatives, Bevin and 
Harriman, discussed with Stalin on December 19, 1945, the possible withdrawal of military 
forces from Iran. Stalin’s reaction included the following concerns: 
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The first concern was about the hostility of the Iranian government towards the Soviets. Second, 
this hostility caused sabotage of the Baku oil fields. Third, the Soviet-Persian Treaty of 
Friendship of 1921 should be honoured, especially article 6. Fourth, the Soviets would later 
consider whether it would withdraw their troops under the Tripartite Treaty or keep them there 
under the 1921 treaty. Fifth, Soviet military was not interfering in Azerbaijan. Sixth, the Iranian 
government was trying to stir up trouble between Russia and the Anglo-Saxon powers.904  
 
The first issue was discussed without a formal conclusion and it was decided to continue the 
topic of the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Iran at the informal level during the 
subsequent sessions.905 But the Anglo-American-Soviet representatives established a 
commission to further investigate the Iranian issues, amongst which the withdrawal of the 
Allied troops from Iran was the first of eleven points being on the commission’s agenda.906    
 The establishment of Provincial Councils was also an important issue at the Moscow 
Conference. Article 4, 6 and 11 of the commission’s agenda referred to this issue and it also 
formed a significant focus of the Allied Commission in Iran. According to article 4: 
 
The commission should try to bring a solution to the problems between the central government 
and the regions with which it has a problem. [The commission] should help the Iranian 
government for the establishment of Provincial Councils based on Iranian constitutional law.907  
 
Article 11 states that, ‘the first provincial election must be under observation of the 
commission.’908 The commission of the Allied forces in Iran also investigated and supported 
the issue of the linguistic rights of the ethnic minorities in Iran, which was the third factor that 
was discussed at the Moscow Conference. Educational-linguistic rights for ethnic minorities 
in Iran were accepted by the Allied Commission in article 7, which stated that the ‘ethnic 
minorities, including Arabs, Turks and Kurds, must be able to use their language for 
education and other purposes.’909 But, to what extent was this commission successful?   
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 On the one hand, it was unsuccessful because the Soviets were not interested in this 
commission. According to Molotov, Anglo-Americans formed the commission illegitimaely 
without the presence of the Iranian government, and so it could not do anything.910 The 
Soviets, however, had not yet achieved any northern Iranian oil concessions and were 
concerned with the Anglo-American presence in Iran and the Persian Gulf. Therefore, in the 
last quarter of 1945 and the first quarter of 1946, the Soviet Union tried to strengthen its 
presence in northern Iran to maintain the buffer zone as protection against attacks from the 
south. Fearing expansion from the south, Soviets saw the presence of the American military in 
the Persian Gulf as a threat, which might have been one of the leading causes for the Soviets’ 
attempt to retain its troops in northern Iran. Thus by helping two governments, Azerbaijan and 
Kurdish, the Soviets were intent on strengthening its position in northern Iran.911 Another 
reason that the Allied Commission’s proposal was unsuccessful was because the Iranian 
parliament eventually refused it. An important Iranian politician in the Majlis was 
Muhammad Mossadeq, who rejected the proposal of the commission, and ultimately Hakimi, 
the Prime Minister, also refused the proposal of the Allied Commission towards Iran.912      
The final element of Paul Kennedy’s features of the Cold War after 1945 was the 
competition to find new partners after the the Second World War. The Soviet recognition of 
Syria and Lebanon, the promotion of the Communist parties in Iraq and Syria, support for the 
Armenians, Iranian Azeris, Tudeh Party and the Kurds of Iraq and Iran, were examples of the 
active Soviet policy towards the Middle East, particularly in Iran. According to Rubin, the 
success of these Soviet activities would largely depend on how well Great Britain would be 
able to maintain its traditional position in the Middle East, particularly in Iran, and how much 
the US would undertake to support Britain.913 From 1946 there is an indication that the US 
and Englandbegan to cooperate for their own interests, namely by blocking the expansion of 
the Soviets to the south and protecting the oil fields in the region of the Persian Gulf. Their 
cooperation not only strengthened the hand of the Anglo-Americans, but it also strengthened 
the political position of the Iranian government against the Soviet Union with regard to 
withdrawing their troops from Iran. 
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After Stalin’s hard hitting and critical election speech on February 9, 1946 against 
capitalism914, Churchill visited Truman to work together against the Soviet expansion around 
the world.915 Approximately two weeks after Stalin’s election speech, George Kennan, US 
Ambassador in Moscow and an important ideological figure of America’s anti-communist 
mission, sent a long telegram to the State Department. It was concerning the Soviets’ 
behaviour and it advised the Truman administration to take a hard line against the Soviet 
Union. Kennan alerted the ‘congressional committees to the dangers of the Communist 
conspiracy.’916 Kuniholm concluded that:  
 
        The Truman administration eventually came to the conclusion that bilateral diplomacy between 
the Soviet Union and Iran was not a desirable method of solving the Iranian question. Even 
when sanctioned by the United Nations, bilateral diplomacy created too many opportunities for 
coercion. Such a course made it difficult to uphold the principles of the United Nations and 
threatened the security interests of the United States.917       
 
Via the United Nations, the Iranian government together with the US and British governments 
pressured the Soviet Union to withdraw their troops from Iran. Eventually on March 22, 1946, 
Stalin released a statement to an American press agency expressing his faith in the UN. On 
March 26, his ambassador to Tehran informed Ghavam that Russian troops would evacuate 
the whole country by May 9 if he would agree to a joint oil company, with 51 percent of the 
stakes for the Soviet Union and 49 percent for Iran, and if he would reach an understanding 
with the leaders of Azerbaijan. The Prime Minister gave his consent with the one condition 
that it would have to be ratified by a parliament that was to be elected within seven months 
following the end of foreign occupation.918 After withdrawal of the Soviet troops from 
northern Iran, the Iranian government dissolved the two autonomous governments of 
Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. The Iranian parliament that was elected in July 1947 promptly 
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refused to ratify the oil pact with Soviet. The Soviets, who had been roundly beaten, did not 
even attempt to intervene because Truman’s administration took a hard line against them. On 
March 12, 1947, Truman issued, according to Abdulreza Hoshang Mahdawi, an important 
declaration against the expansion of communism in the international arena and called for the 
protection the small nations, such as Turkey and Greece, against the dangers of communism. 
This policy of the Truman administration played a significant role during the period of the 
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CHAPTER VI. FINAL CONCLUSION   
 
The sociological nationalist discourse in the case of the Kurdish nationalist movements of the 
twentieth century did not transform the broad outline of the Kurdish question. It did not 
enable the Kurdish nationalist movement to integrate all of its ethno-religious (Sunnis, 
Shi’ites, Yezidis, etc.) and ethno-linguistic (Kurmanji, Sorani, Zazaki, Hewrami, etc.) groups 
or form a unitary community across state borders.920 Before World War I, cultural and 
religious aspects were the most important components of Kurdish identity and the precise 
boundaries of Kurdistan were not a subjective issue. But this drastically changed after the 
First World War when the new modern nation-states were established throughout the Middle 
East. These new polities particularly Turkey, Iran and Iraq, had influenced the Kurdish 
nationalist movements to look forward to their own self-rule government in two ways. First, 
the modern nation-state was formed according to the identity of the dominant group and this 
inspired the Kurds, jparticularly the nationalists, to locate a Kurdish political identity to be 
realized through their own nation-state or autonomy. Second, integration and assimilation 
within the dominant group and more importantly, denial of the Kurdish identity, was a 
significant policy of these new modern nation-states in the Middle East. Therefore, the 
Kurdish struggled to protect their own identity and eventually this struggle organized a 
political party which rooted itself within the Kurdish society. Abbas Vali rightly argued that 
‘Kurdish national identity is unmistakably modern.’921 
 During the World War I, Kurdistan was a battlefield and with the formation of the new 
states in place of the Ottoman Empire, one might well have expected that the Qajars would 
also disintegrate into a number of smaller states. But, the Iranian government’s territorial 
integrity and sovereignty was unharmed, especially when Reza Shah came to power and built 
a centralist and strong modern state. The main factor behind the social mobilization of the 
Kurds after 1941 lay in Reza Shah’s policy towards Kurds between the two world wars. 
During the twenty years of Reza Shah’s reign, modernization was an important policy to build 
a modern nation-state in Iran. For this reason, Reza Shah radically transformed the socio-
political and economic situation of the traditional lifestyle of the Iranian inhabitants, where 
tribalism had been dominant. Forced migration and sedentarization of nomads and tribes in 
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the Iranian plateau, especially of the Kurds, was an important policy of Reza Shah, through 
which many families became alienated from their original environment and the tribal leaders 
were exiled, imprisoned or killed. Establishment of modern education, reform and 
standardization in Persian language, prohibitions on the use of local languages, such as 
Kurdish, at schools throughout the country, and curtailment on the cultural rights, such as 
traditional dress, were implemented as parts of the main goal of Reza Shah’s modernization 
policy. In other words, the foundation of a modern state was accomplished at the cost of 
suppressing political development and all manifestations of democratic aspirations. In short, 
this policy forced the national Kurdish identity to be integrated and assimilated in the 
dominant identity which was Persian. But, World War II had ruptured the process of 
modernization via the authoritarian policies of Reza Shah.      
The intervention of the Allied Powers in Iran in August 1941 was seen by many 
Iranian Kurds as not only an opportunity to accomplish some measure of autonomy for 
Kurdistan, but after the exile of Reza Shah, it was also seen as way for the restoration of 
political, cultural, economic and units of the Kurdish tribes. The presence of the Great Powers 
in Iran changed the socio-political atmosphere. A part of Iranian Kurdistan, the territory from 
Mahabad to Saqqiz, was located between the territories controlled by the two Great Powers, 
Britain and the Soviet, and in this region the Kurdish cultural and especially political 
institutions were established. The JK party, which had a leftist ideology, is often considered to 
be the first Kurdish nationalist political party in the modern history of Iran. The JK party 
strived for the national independence of Greater Kurdistan. Unity among Kurds, more 
political power for the middle-class and the right to Kurdish education based on the Kurdish 
language were the major political demands of the JK party, which was the base for the 
establishment of the KDP and the Republic of Kurdistan. 
Independence for Greatr Kurdistan or just for Iranian Kurdistan was not the political 
ambition of the nationalists at the outset, when they strived for autonomy within Iranian 
territory. But it seemed that in the second half of its existence, the Republic of Kurdistan gave 
up the cause of autonomy and fight for it in the provincial councils. This demand was also 
problematic for the Kurdish leaders because Mahabad, the capital of the Republic, itself was 
not a province, but a part of the West Azerbaijan Province. Therefore, the Iranian and 
particularly Azerbaijan governments did not take the formation of the Republic seriously and 
considered it as a part of the Azerbaijan government. For this reason, although the 
negotiations between Azerbaijan and Iranian government representatives were on a formal 
level, the Iranian government did not seriously consider the demands of the Republic of 
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Kurdistan’s leaders, when they visited Tehran for similar negotiations. Ghavam invited the 
Republic’s leaders separately to Tehran, which was merely for provocative political purposes 
as it would increase the distrust and division between the Azerbaijan and Kurdish 
governments; Ghavam never had any serious intentions to discuss the Kurdish question.  
Although the majority of the Kurdish community, including intellectuals and writers, 
considered the Republic of Kurdistan of 1946 as a nationalist project with a national 
character, it was a form of nationalism that was limited in its scope. Moreover Kurdish 
nationalism was not widespread and was more regional in its outlook. In 1946 it could not be 
defined using the generalized concept of nationalism. The maturity and development of 
nationalism depended on the existence of an increasingly industrial society. Agricultural 
transformation to the industrial society is, for Gellner, necessary for the development of 
nationalism, which spread its roots in the second half of the nineteenth century throughout 
Europe. To what extent was the Kurdish society in 1946 industrial? There was only one 
factory in all of Iranian Kurdistan -- it was predominantly an agricultural society during the 
period of the Republic of Kurdistan. The majority, more than 90%, of the Kurdish society in 
1946 was illiterate, which is another reason that the Kurdish society in 1946 cannot be 
properly called a nationalist movement. Although the Republic printed a newspaper and 
several journals, it still failed to influence the tribal and agricultural nature of Kurdish society 
due to this high rate of illiteracy.                           
For Smith, three fundamental elements agitated the ideological movement of 
nationalism: national autonomy, national unity and national identity. The first two aspects are 
problematic with regard to the ideology of the Kurdish nationalism in 1946. The resoluteness 
of self-government, which is the substance of national autonomy was absent from the 
Republic’s leadership. National unity could be interpreted in two ways: geographically only 
one third of Iranian Kurdish territory was under the control of the Republic of Kurdistan and 
more importantly, politically there was no unity within the Kurdish leadership. Military and 
political decision-making was managed mainly by the tribal chieftains and for the individual 
interests of those tribal leaders, rather than on behalf of a national agenda. In short, there was 
neither national unity among the Kurdish leaders nor collaboration between several Offices or 
Ministries of the Republic. The political identity of the Republic of Kurdistan was a product 
of modernity and it was created by distinguishing Kurdish identity from the emergent 
Turkish, Persian and Arab identities in the region. In other words, the separation of ‘us’ 
(Kurdish) from ‘them’ (i.e. Turkish) was necessary for the formation of the Kurdish political 
identity after the First World War. 
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This dissertation has argued that an important reason for the establishment of the 
Republic of Kurdistan was a ‘reaction of the self’ in response to the ‘action of the other’. The 
formation of the Autonomous Government of Azerbaijan affected the northern Iranian Kurds 
both politically and psychologically causing them to hastily proclaim the Republic of 
Kurdistan. The first political influence had to do with the relationship between ‘self’ and 
‘other’. When a neighbouring ethnic group managed to prepare themselves and eventually 
declare their own government, it encouraged the Kurds to concentrate on their own state 
building efforts. On the other hand, the rapid proclamation of the Republic, only a few weeks 
after proclamation of the Azerbaijan government, was a clear message to the Azerbaijan 
leaders that the Kurds are prepared to cooperate and have a friendly relationship with them 
but would not accept their leadership in Kurdistan. Yet another important reason for the swift 
formation of the Republic was that of fear. The establishment of the Azerbaijan government 
had caused serious political anxiety among the Kurds when they realized that not only would 
the Kurdish region come under the control of the Azerbaijan leaders, but the autonomy they 
enjoyed from 1941 onwards would also disappear.      
All testimonials and resources related to this event provide evidence that the system of 
the Republic of Kurdistan, in comparison with the Azerbaijan government, enjoyed the 
support of the mass population. The Azerbaijan government was popular among needy 
section of the population, but due to its radical land reform measures it alienated the 
landowners. The Republic was popular amongst the Kurdish inhabitants and also protected 
the rights of other ethnic groups, such as Jews, Azeris, and Armenians. The Republic of 
Kurdistan was not a revolutionary movement meant to transform economic and social 
principles. Unlike Azerbaijan, it made no serious moves towards land reform, had neither 
Marxist indoctrination nor Soviet-rained military and political cadres. But its foremost 
aspiration was to secure the Kurdish nationalists’ aim to eventually establish an autonomous 
government. The Republic was not only less experienced, less organized, and had a less 
sophisticated administration, but it also was founded in a society which still respected the 
tribal affiliations, kinships, family ties and religious brotherhood of elder times. The Kurdish 
society in 1946 was deeply influenced by tribalism and tribal relationships.  
 During the short reign of the Republic of Kurdistan some changes within Kurdish 
society were brought about. A central aspect of nationalism is language and this was an 
important part of one of the main political goals for the Republic. The Kurdish leaders of the 
Republic started several new Kurdish schools which taught in the Kurdish language. The 
Republic’s leaders also attempted to increase the participation of women in political activities. 
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The first women’s organization, which was supported by Ghazi Mohammad’s wife, 
encouraged many women to take part in socio-political events of the Republic, particularly in 
the areas of education. Economic and social reform was the most important program of the 
Republic of Kurdistan, but in both of these aspects, the Republic fell short of its goals. In 
terms of development, the Republic was not very successful. This is to be expected, however, 
since it was the case that the economic situation of the central Iranian government worsened 
in the wartime and post-war periods, causing even harder times in Kurdistan and its 
surrounding regions. Although there were some cases of social reform, such as the Republic’s 
establishment of a different civil court system, in general, their plan of social reform failed, 
especially with respect to the relations between peasants and landlords, since chieftains and 
landlords were the key policy-makers of the Republic. The Republic of Kurdistan also spent 
quite some effort on the formation of the national army. Although the leaders of the Republic 
tried to construct a modern Kurdish army, right until the end of the Republic their military 
retained its tribal character. In its short existence, the Republic did succeed in the field of 
communications by promoting Kurdish culture and language, by publishing and producing a 
range of materials, such as newspaper, journals, radio, cinema and theatre. These publications 
were undoubtedly made possible with the support of the Soviet government.      
 The increasing demand of the Republic’s leaders for democracy, one of the most 
important principles of modernity, did not lead to the formation of the Republic of Kurdistan. 
Before, during and after the Second World War, the Iranian government never formally 
accepted the political or even the cultural rights of the ethnic Kurds in Iran. As a solution to 
the Kurdish question in 1946, Ghazi Mohammad demanded democracy from the central 
government, but the Iranian government did not pay heed to this. However, one of the 
significant factors that did lead to the formation of the Republic of Kurdistan was the events 
of World War II in Iran. The Republic was a product of hasty reactions to the larger events 
enveloping it, such as the presence of Great Powers in Iran. Thus, the existence of the Great 
Powers in Iran was another cause for the formation of the Republic of Kurdistan. Because of 
the collapse of the totalitarian regime of Reza Shah and the disarming of the military 
government in northern Iranian Kurdistan, there arose a possibility for the majority of the 
indigenous people to choose and determine their own fate by establishing their own 
government. 
 The Anglo-American policy towards Kurds in Iran was clear. From the beginning of 
the occupation of Iran in 1941, they did not support or encourage Kurdish political ambitions. 
The central policy of the Anglo-Americans was based on its relationship with the Iranian 
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central government whom they supported and advised. In contrast to this, the Soviet Union 
supported the regional powers against the Iranian government. One of these regional powers 
in Iran was the Kurds and the Kurdish government. The Soviets had not developed and were 
not planning to develop a long-term policy for Kurds and Kurdistan. Soviet politicians 
realized that the possible formation of a Kurdish state was not desirable for the Soviet policy 
in the region. The Soviets in fact saw the stabilization of a Kurdish government as more 
worrying, because for a long time after the First World War, the Soviets thought that the 
formation of a Kurdish state was the political project of British imperialists and they wanted 
to halt the British expansion. Therefore, Soviets had not only rejected a possible formation of 
a Kurdish state but also opposed any kind of autonomy. In 1945 and 1946, the Soviet’s 
created a short-term policy for Kurds in Iran, which was mainly to provide them with printing 
press services, military facilities to the Republic of Kurdistan, maintain economic relations 
with the Republic, etc. The Soviet government intention was to use the Kurdish government 
as an instrument against the Iranian government for realization of their political and economic 
targets. These two antagonistic policies, which illustrate the conflicting of interests of the 
Great Powers, with the Anglo-American support of the Iranian government on the one hand 
and the Soviets supporting the regional movements on the other, especially the Azerbaijan 
government, lead to the post-war ‘Iranian Crisis’. In the international context, this was known 
as the origins of the Cold War in the Middle East.        
Traditionally, Russia tried to annex the lands accessing the southern open sea. In the 
nineteenth century, with the conquest of Central Asia and some northern provinces of Iran, 
the warm-water ports were coming closer for the Russians. Across this plausible expansion to 
the south, England was a strong power defending the route to India. For the British and 
Russians, oil was the economically and strategically vital commodity in the beginning of the 
twentieth century and there was plenty of oil in Iran. During World War II, the growing 
importance of Middle Eastern oil largely caused the ‘conflict of interests’ between the Soviet 
and the British governments. As World War II ended and weakened the British role in the 
Middle East, Britain’s military presence in the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East, which 
were quickly losing force, existed purely to protect essential British imperial interests. 
Besides, whatever pretensions Britain still had of being a powerful state, the brutal truth was 
that the war-crippled British economy could not bear the cost of the global projection of its 
will. In reaction to Soviet actions in Iran, England found it necessary to cooperate with the 
United States against the Soviet Union to protect its oil interests in the Middle East. Britain 
continued to act as major player in the protection of ‘The West’, essentially of American 
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interests, in parts of the Middle East, even during the Truman administration. This time 
marked a crucial phenomenon in the twentieth century, when the US took Britain’s place as 
the most dominant Great Power. 
Most historians claim that political and economic interests motivated the presence of 
Soviet troops in northern Iran: the political case being Russia’s pursuit for Iran as a buffer for 
its weak southern border, and the economical case being its interests in oil production in the 
Northern provinces. The national interests of the Great Powers were clearly on the agenda in 
the period of the Iranian crisis of 1945-46: the Americans appealed to Atlantic Charter’s 
principles (see appendix I), the British protected their traditional empire, and the Soviets went 
as far south as possible. The Iranian crisis illustrated the conflict of interests of the Great 
Powers and thus marked the beginning of the origins of the Cold War in the Middle East. In 
the case of the Iranian crisis, the Anglo-American coordination against the Soviet Union 
required the Soviets to withdraw their troops from Iran. When Soviet troops were pulled back, 
it was mainly due to the fact that Soviet political strategies towards the Iranian crisis had 
failed. Yet, there are probably four more important factors that can explain the failure of 
Soviet policy during the Iranian crisis. First, the United Nations was an instrument for 
arbitration of disputes between nations. Second, from 1945 onwards, the US became an 
increasingly powerful counterforce against the Soviet presence in the Middle East. Third, the 
Soviets thought that the creation of two autonomous governments, Kurdish and Azerbaijan, 
had been enough to reach its goal of getting concessions of oil, but this plan had failed. And 
finally, the bilateral negotiations proved more effective than using open confrontation or 
unilateral action.      
The development of the US policy towards Iran was to become the Western powers’ 
‘front line’ against the Soviet penetration into the Middle East. The whole question of Soviet-
American relations is greatly confused by ‘ideological baggage’. The Soviet Union is thought 
to be the aggressor throughout: obstinate, intransigent and expansionist. In describing 
American diplomacy towards Iran, Kuniholm highlighted the importance of local 
nationalisms. At the end of the First World War, nationalism in the Middle East represented 
little more than an inconvenient irritant to the great powers. By the end of World War II, it 
had become a major factor in policy-making. Powerfully reinforced by the development of the 
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                                                     Appendix I 
                                  Atlantic Charter, August 14, 1941 
The President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, 
representing His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, being met together, deem it 
right to make known certain common principles in the national policies of their respective 
countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world.  
First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other;  
Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed 
wishes of the peoples concerned;  
Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which 
they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self government restored to those 
who have been forcibly deprived of them;  
Fourth, they will endeavour, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the 
enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the 
trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity;  
Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic 
field with the object of securing, for all, improved labour standards, economic advancement 
and social security;  
Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace 
which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, 
and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in 
freedom from fear and want;  
Seventh, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without 
hindrance;  
Eighth, they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual 
reasons must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be 
maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, 
or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment 
of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is 
essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will 
lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.  




                                             Appendix II 
             Tripartite Treaty of Alliance between the United Kingdom and the  
                                               Soviet Union and Iran,  
                                     Signed at Teheran, January 29, 1942  
 
His Majesty The King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, 
Emperor of India, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on the one hand, and His 
Imperial Majesty The Shahinshah of Iran, on the other. 
Having in view the priciples of the Atlantic Charter jointly agreed upon and announced to the 
world by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United 
Kingdom on the 14th August, 1941, and endorsed by the Government of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics on the 24th September, 1941, with which His Imperial Majesty The 
Shahinshah declares his complete agreement and from which he wishes to benefit on an equal 
basis with other nations of the world; and being anxious to strengthen the bonds of friendship 
and mutual understanding between them; and considering that these objects will best be 
achieved by the conclusion of a Treaty of Alliance; having agreed to conclude a treaty for this 
purpose and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries; His Majesty The King of Great Britain, 
Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India,   
    For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
           His Excellency Sir Reader William Bullard, K.C.M.G., C.I.E., 
                  His Majesty’s Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Iran. 
    The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 
          His Excellency M. Andre Andreewich Smirnov, Ambassador Extraordinary and          
          Minister Plenipotentiary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Iran. 
    His Imperial Majesty The Shahinshah of Iran, 
          His Excellency M. Ali Soheily, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due from, have agreed as 
follows:      
Article 1 
His Majesty The King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, 
Emperor of India, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (hereinafter referred to as the 
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Allied Powers) jointly and severally undertake to respect the territorial integrity, sovereignty 
and political independence of Iran. 
Article 2 
An alliance is established between the Allied Powers on the one hand and His Imperial 
Majesty The Shahinshah of Iran on the other. 
Article 3 
(i) The Allied Powers jointly and severally undertake to defend Iran by all means at 
their command from all aggression on the part of Germany or any other Power. 
(ii) His Imperial Majesty The Shahinshah undertakes-  
(a) To co-operate with the Allied Powers with all the means at his command and in 
every way possible, in other that they may be able to fulfil the above undertaking. 
The assistance of the Iranian forces shall, however, be limited to the maintenance 
of internal security on Iranian territory;      
(b) To secure to the Allied Powers, for the passage of troops or supplies from one 
Allied Powers to the other or for other similar purposes, the unrestricted right to 
use, maintain, guard and, in case of military necessity, control in any way that they 
may require all means of communication throughout Iran, including railways, road, 
rivers. Aerodromes, ports, pipelines and telephone, telegraph and wireless 
installations; 
(c) To furnish all possible assistance and facilities in obtaining material and recruiting 
labour for the purpose of the maintenance and improvement of the means of 
communication referred to in paragraph (b).  
(d) To establish and maintain, in collaboration with the Allied Powers, such measures 
of censorship control as they may require for all the means of communication 
referred to in paragraph (b). 
(iii) It is clearly understated that in the application of paragraph (ii) (b), (c) and (d) of 
the present article the Allied Powers will give full consideration to the essential 
needs of Iran.  
Article 4 
(i) The Allied Powers may maintain in Iranian territory land, sea and air forces in such 
number as they consider necessary. The location of such forces shall be decided in 
agreement with the Iranian Government the relations between the forces situation allows. 
All questions concerning the relations between the forces of the Allied Powers and the 
Iranian authorities in such a way as to safeguard the security of the said forces. It is 
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understood that the presence of these forces on Iranian territory does not constitute a 
military occupation and will disturb as little as possible the administration and the security 
forces of Iran, the economic life of the country, the normal movements, of the population 
and the application of Iranian laws and regulations.  
(ii) A separate agreement or agreements shall be concluded as soon as possible after the 
entry into force of the present Treaty regarding any financial obligations to be borne by 
the Allied Powers under the provisions of the present article and of paragraphs (ii) (b), (c) 
and (d) of Article 3 above in such matters as local purchases, the hiring of buildings and 
plant, the employment of labour, transport charge, etc. A special agreement shall be 
concluded between the Allied Governments and the Iranian Government defining the 
conditions for any transfers to the Iranian Government after the war the of building and 
other improvements effected by the Allied Powers on Iranian territory. These agreements 
shall also settle the immunities to be enjoyed by the forces of the Allied Powers in Iran. 
Article 5   
The forces of the Allied Powers shall be withdrawn from Iranian territory no later than six 
months after hostilities between the Allied Powers and Germany and her associates have 
been suspended by the conclusion of an armistice or armistices, or on the conclusion of 
peace between them, whichever date is the earlier. The expression ‘associates’ of 
Germany mains all other Powers which have engaged or may in the future engage in 
hostilities against either of the Allied Powers.  
Article 6 
(i) The Allied Powers undertake in their relations with foreign countries not to adopt an 
attitude which is prejudicial to the territorial integrity, sovereignty or political 
independence of Iran, nor to conclude treaties inconsistent with the provisions of the 
present Treaty. They undertake to consult the Government of His Imperial Majesty The 
Shahinshah in all matters affecting the direct interests of Iran.  
(ii) His Imperial Majesty The Shahinshah undertake not to adopt in his relations with 
foreign countries an attitude which is inconsistent with the alliance, nor to conclude 
treaties inconsistent with the provisions of the present Treaty.  
Article 7 
The Allied Powers jointly undertake to use their best endeavours to safeguard the 
economic existence of the Iranian people against the privations and difficulties arising as 
result of the present war. On the entry into force of the present Treaty, discussions shall be 
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opened between the Government of Iran and the Governments of the Allied Powers as to 
the best possible methods of carrying out the above undertaking. 
Article 8 
The provisions of the present Treaty are equally binding as bilateral obligations between 
His Imperial Majesty The Shahinshah and each of the two other High Contracting Parties. 
Article 9  
The present Treaty shall come into force on signature and shall remain in force until the 
date fixed for the withdrawal of the forces of the Allied Powers from Iranian territory in 
accordance with article 5. 
In witness whereof, the above-named plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and 
have affixed thereto their seals.  
Done at Teheran in triplicate in English, Russian and Persian, all being equally authentic. 
On the 29th day of January, 1942.  
(L.S.) R.W. Bullard 
(L.S.) A.A. Smirnov 
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Nederlandse samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 
De sociologische discussie aangaande nationale eenwording heeft in het geval van de 
Koerdische nationalistische bewegingen van de twintigste eeuw niet tot een positief resultaat 
van politieke transformatie geleid. Het is de Koerdische nationalistische bewegingen niet 
gelukt om alle etnisch-religieuze (Soennieten, Shi’ieten, Yezidi’s, enz.) en etnisch-
linguïstische (Kurmanji, Sorani, Zazai, Hewrami, etc.) groeperingen te integreren en daarmee 
de vorming van een eenheidsstaat binnen eigen territoriale staatsgrenzen te bewerkstelligen.922 
Vóór de Eerste Wereldoorlog waren deze culturele en religieuze aspecten belangrijke zaken in 
Koerdistan en de etnische grenzen waren geen subjectieve aangelegenheid. Maar dit alles is 
na de Eerste Wereldoorlog drastisch veranderd in een strijd van politieke verschillen, toen de 
nieuwe natiestaten in het Midden-Oosten werden gesticht. Deze nieuwe natiestaten, 
voornamelijk Turkije, Iran en Irak, hadden op twee manieren invloed op de Koerdische 
nationalistische bewegingen wat betreft hun strijd voor zelfbeschikking met een eigen 
regering. Ten eerste was de natiestaat gevormd naar de identiteit van de dan dominante groep. 
Deze nieuwe identiteit zonder Koerdische trekken heeft invloed gehad op de gevoelens in de 
Koerdische gemeenschap en vooral op het Koerdische nationalisme. Met het oog op de 
Koerdische politieke identiteit, te realiseren door middel van de stabilisatie van een eigen 
natiestaat of door autonomie, liet deze druk zich gelden. Ten tweede was integratie en 
assimilatie binnen de aanwezige dominante groep en, nog belangrijker, de ontkenning van de 
Koerdische identiteit, een kenmerkende politiek van deze nieuwe natiestaten in het Midden-
Oosten. Als gevolg daarvan werd het belang van de Koerdische strijd om de eigen Koerdische 
identiteit te beschermen dominant. Uiteindelijk heeft deze strijd geleid tot oprichting van 
politieke partijen binnen de Koerdische gemeenschap. Abbas Vali heeft terecht verklaard dat 
de Koerdische nationale identiteit onmiskenbaar een moderne is.923 
Gedurende de Eerste Wereldoorlog was Koerdistan een slagveld. Met de vorming van 
nieuwe staten die in de plaats kwamen van het uiteengevallen Ottomaanse Rijk, was er de 
verwachting dat misschien de dynastie Qajars ook uiteen zou vallen in een aantal kleinere 
staten. Maar de territoriale integriteit en de soevereiniteit van de Iraanse regering bleek 
ongedeerd gebleven. Zeker toen Reza Shah aan de macht kwam en bouwde aan een sterke, 
                                               
922 Bozarslan, ‘Some Remarks on Kurdish Historiographical Discourse in Turkey (1919-1980)’, in Vali 2003, 
38. 
923 Vali 2003, 104. 
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centralistisch bestuurde moderne staat. De belangrijkste drijfveer achter de sociale mobilisatie 
van de Koerden na 1941 lag in het gevoerde beleid van Reza Shah in de periode tussen de 
twee wereldoorlogen. Gedurende de twintig jaar van het bewind van Reza Shah was 
modernisering een belangrijk beleidsinstrument om een moderne natiestaat in Iran op te 
bouwen. Ter effectuering van dit beleid heeft Reza Shah grondige veranderingen aangebracht 
in de sociaal-politieke en economische situatie van de traditioneel levende Iraanse bevolking. 
Gedwongen migratie en toegewezen vestiging van de nomaden en stammen, in het bijzonder 
van Koerden, werd een belangrijk beleidsinstrument van Reza Shah. Vele gezinnen werden 
door dit beleid vervreemd van hun oorspronkelijke omgeving, en hun tribale leiders werden 
gevangen gezet, verbannen en in het ergste geval gedood. Inrichting van modern onderwijs, 
de hervorming en standaardisatie van de Perzische taal, het verbod op het gebruik van lokale 
talen zoals het Koerdisch op scholen door het hele land, en de inperking van de culturele 
rechten zoals streekgebonden folkloristische klederdracht enz., werden geïmplementeerd. Dit 
alles als onderdeel om Reza Shahs moderniseringsbeleid te doen slagen. Anders gezegd, de 
totstandkoming van een moderne staat onder Reza Shah werd bereikt door het onderdrukken 
van en dus ten koste van de politieke ontwikkeling en alle andere manifestaties van 
democratische aspiraties van de volkeren binnen de nieuwe modern staatsgrenzen. Kortom, 
dit beleid beoogde door dwang de nationale Koerdische identiteit te integreren en te 
assimileren met de gewenste dominante identiteit, namelijk de Perzische. Door de Tweede 
Wereldoorlog werd dit moderniseringsproces van Reza Shah echter getemperd en beëindigd. 
De fysieke interventie van de geallieerden in Iran in augustus 1941 werd door vele 
Iraanse Koerden gezien als een voorbode om een zekere mate van autonomie voor Koerdistan 
te kunnen bereiken. Na de verbanning van Reza Shah werd deze omstandigheid ook gezien 
als een middel voor het hernieuwd herstellen van de macht van de Koerdische stammen. De 
aanwezigheid van de militaire grootmachten in Iran veranderde de sociaal-politieke 
atmosfeer. Een deel van het Iraanse Koerdistan, van Mahabad tot Saqqiz, was gelegen tussen 
de invloedssferen van de grootmachten Engeland en de Sovjet-Unie. Vanuit deze regio 
maakten de Koerdische culturele en vooral politieke instituties opgang. De JK-partij, 
gebaseerd op een linkse ideologie, was een van de politieke instituties die kan worden 
beschouwd als de eerste Koerdische nationalistische politieke partij in de Iraanse 
geschiedenis. De JK-partij streefde naar de nationale onafhankelijkheid van het Groot-
Koerdistan. De eenheid van de Koerden, politieke macht voor de middenklasse en het recht 
op Koerdisch onderwijs gegeven in de Koerdische taal, werden de belangrijkste politieke 
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eisen van de JK-partij. Het werd mede de basis voor de oprichting van de KDP en de 
Republiek van Koerdistan.  
Onafhankelijkheid van een Groot-Koerdistan of zelfs van een Iraans Koerdistan was 
niet de eerste politieke ambitie van de Republiek van Koerdistan. Vanaf het begin van haar 
oprichting werd gestreefd naar autonomie binnen de Iraanse territoriale eenheid. Het leek erop 
alsof in de tweede helft van haar bestaan de Republiek haar autonomie op zou geven door te 
streven naar de instelling van Provinciale Raden. Dit streven bleek echter ook problematisch 
voor de Koerdische leiders, omdat de stadsregio Mahabad zelf niet de status had van een 
provincie, maar deel uitmaakte van de West-Azerbeidzjan-provincie. Daarom namen de 
Iraanse en zeker de Azerbeidzjaanse regeringen de mogelijke oprichting van deze Republiek 
niet serieus en beschouwden zij Mahabad als deel van het Azerbeidzjaanse territorium. Om 
deze reden heeft, omdat de onderhandelingen tussen de Azerbeidzjaanse en de Iraanse 
vertegenwoordigers op een formeel hoog niveau werden gevoerd, de Iraanse regering de 
leiders van de Koerdische Republiek niet serieus bejegend toen zij Teheran bezochten voor 
soortgelijke onderhandelingen. De onderhandelaar Ghavam nodigde de leiders van de 
Republiek afzonderlijk uit naar Teheran te komen. Hij deed dit om te provoceren en om de 
verdeeldheid tussen de Azerbeidzjaanse en de Koerdische regering aan te wakkeren. Ghavam 
had kennelijk geen enkele serieuze bedoeling om de Koerdische kwestie te agenderen.  
Hoewel de meerderheid van de Koerdische gemeenschap, met inbegrip van 
intellectuelen en schrijvers, de Republiek van Koerdistan als een nationalistische beweging 
beschouwden, bleek deze vorm van nationalisme beperkt in zijn mogelijkheden. Het was niet 
de ‘nationale’ vorm van Iraans-Koerdisch nationalisme. Het kan eerder worden beschouwd 
als een vorm van gelokaliseerd nationalisme. Deze vorm van gelokaliseerd Koerdisch 
nationalisme in 1946 is ingewikkeld en kan niet worden gedefinieerd met behulp van het 
algemene concept van nationalisme. De ontwikkeling en de volwassenheid van het 
nationalisme hingen samen met het stimuleren van de industrialisatie. De agrarische 
transformatie ten gunste van de industriële samenleving is voor Gellner de voorwaarde voor 
de ontwikkeling van het nationalisme. Het was dit nationalisme dat wortelschoot in de tweede 
helft van de negentiende eeuw in Europa. In welke mate was de Koerdische gemeenschap in 
1946 een industriële? Welnu, er was slechts een suikerfabriek in Iraans Koerdistan, de 
agrarische samenleving was de dominante in de periode van de Republiek van Koerdistan. De 
meerderheid van de Koerdische bevolking, meer dan 90%, was in 1946 nog analfabeet. 
Hoewel de Republiek een gedrukte krant en enkele tijdschriften voortbracht, bleef het 
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analfabetisme voortbestaan. De Republiek slaagde er niet in om het tribale en agrarische 
karakter van de Koerdische maatschappij te beïnvloeden en te veranderen. 
Voor Smith bewerkstelligen drie fundamentele elementen de ideologische beweging 
van het nationalisme, te weten: de nationale autonomie, de nationale eenheid en de nationale 
identiteit. De eerste twee aspecten blijken problematisch met betrekking tot de ideologie van 
het Koerdische nationalisme in 1946. Het vastberaden streven naar zelfbeschikking vormt de 
kern van de nationale autonomie. Dit was niet het streven van de toenmalige en latere leiders 
van de Republiek. Ging het om streven naar onafhankelijkheid, streven naar autonomie of de 
vorming van provinciale raden? Dit aspect kan als volgt worden uitgelegd. Een derde van het 
Iraans-Koerdische gebied was onder de controle van de Republiek van Koerdistan, waarin bij 
de Koerdische leiders geen eensgezindheid bestond over het toekomstige beleid. Militaire en 
politieke besluitvorming werd voornamelijk beheerst door de persoonlijke mening van de 
stamhoofden. Individuele belangen van deze tribale leiders speelden een dominante rol in het 
bepalen van de beleidsdoelen, en niet de zoektocht naar de voorwaarden voor het bereiken 
van een nationaal streven. Kortom, er was geen nationale en gedeelde visie bij de Koerdische 
leiders en ook geen vruchtbare samenwerking tussen verschillende gouvernementele kantoren 
en ministeries van de Republiek. De politieke identiteit van de Republiek van Koerdistan was 
een product van de heersende Koerdische leiders en was voortgekomen uit de tegenstelling 
tussen de Koerdische identiteit en de opkomende Turkse, Perzische en Arabische identiteiten 
in dezelfde regio. Anders gezegd, de scheiding tussen het ‘mij’ en ‘jij’ en het ‘wij’ 
(Koerdisch) en ‘zij’ (Turks) was de voedingsbodem voor de vorming van de Koerdische 
politieke identiteit na de Eerste Wereldoorlog. 
Dit proefschrift betoogt dat een belangrijke reden voor de oprichting van de Republiek 
van Koerdistan een ‘reactie van het zelf’ is als respons op de ‘actie van de ander’. Aldus heeft 
de vorming van de Autonome Regering van Azerbeidzjan, de noordelijke Iraanse Koerden 
zowel in politieke als in psychologische zin aangezet tot een overhaaste afkondiging van de 
Republiek van Koerdistan. Een eerste politieke reden lag in het scheppen van de tegenstelling 
tussen ‘wij’ en de ‘anderen’. Toen een naburige andere etnische groep erin slaagde zich voor 
te bereiden op zelfstandigheid en overging tot het proclameren van een eigen regering, 
moedigde dit de Koerden aan om zich te richten op de vorming van ook een eigen staat. Als 
tweede politieke statement maakte de snelle afkondiging van de Republiek, enkele weken na 
de eerdere afkondiging van de Azerbeidzjaanse regering, duidelijk dat de Koerden het door de 
Azerbeidzjaanse leiders geclaimde leiderschap in Koerdistan niet zouden accepteren. Een 
geheel andere maar ook belangrijke reden voor de snelle vorming van de Republiek was die 
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werd ingegeven door ‘angst’. Een angst die ontstond uit het besef dat door de oprichting van 
de Azerbeidzjaanse regering niet alleen de Koerdische regio onder de controle van de Azeri-
leiders zou komen te staan, maar ook dat de autonomie die Koerden genoten vanaf 1941 
hiermee zou verdwijnen.  
Alle getuigenissen en vastgelegde meningen in verband met deze gebeurtenis duiden 
erop dat het bestaan van de Republiek van Koerdistan, in tegenstelling tot die van 
Azerbeidzjan, de grote steun genoot van de meerderheid van de bevolking. De Republiek was 
populair onder de Koerdische bevolking en zij beschermde ook de rechten van andere 
etnische groepen, zoals die van de joden, de Azeri’s, de Armeniërs, etc. De regering van de 
Republiek was geen revolutionaire beweging om de economische en sociale principes om te 
gooien, geen serieuze stap in de richting van de herverdeling van land onder de boeren en had 
geen marxistische ideologie. Men beoogde niet een systeem van bijvoorbeeld Russische 
getrainde militaire of politieke kaders. Het voornaamste nationale doel was daarentegen de 
Koerdische nationalistische doelen veiligstellen en uiteindelijk het stabiliseren van een 
zelfbeschikkende nationale overheid. De Republiek was niet alleen minder politiek ervaren, 
los georganiseerd en minder bestuurlijk georganiseerd, ze was ook onderdeel van een 
samenleving die nog steeds de tribale voorkeuren respecteerde in verwantschap, 
familiebanden en religieuze broederschap. Onomstotelijk feit is dat de Koerdische 
gemeenschap in 1946 sterk werd beïnvloed door eeuwenlang ontwikkeld tribalisme en tribale 
verhoudingen. 
Tijdens de korte regeerperiode van de Republiek van Koerdistan vonden een aantal 
veranderingen in de Koerdische gemeenschap plaats. Een belangrijk aspect van het 
nationalisme is het gebruik van de eigen taal, en dit was een van de voornaamste politieke 
doelstellingen van de Republiek. De Koerdische leiders van de Republiek stimuleerden 
Koerdische scholen tot het geven van onderwijs in de Koerdische taal. Het vergroten van de 
deelname van het aantal vrouwen aan politieke activiteiten was ook een speerpunt van de 
leiders van de Republiek. De oprichting van een vrouwenorganisatie, met medewerking van 
de vrouw van Ghazi Mohammad, in het bijzonder met als doel onderwijs te faciliteren, 
steunde veel vrouwen en moedigde hen aan om deel te nemen aan sociaal-politieke 
manifestaties van de Republiek. Economische en sociale hervormingen waren de 
belangrijkste kwesties van de Republiek van Koerdistan. Op geen van beide gebieden kon de 
Republiek echter genoeg resultaten bereiken. In termen van economische verworvenheden 
bleek de Republiek niet erg succesvol. Toen de economische situatie van de centrale Iraanse 
regering verslechterde in oorlogstijd en in latere naoorlogse periodes, bleek de economische 
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ontwikkeling in Koerdistan en de omliggende regio’s nog zorgwekkender. In sommige 
gevallen werd als onderdeel van sociale hervormingen door de Republiek een burgerlijk 
rechtssysteem ingevoerd, maar de uitvoering van het grote plan van sociale hervorming 
mislukte. De relatie tussen boeren en hun landheren werd niet verbeterd, stamhoofden en 
grootgrondbezitters bleven de belangrijkste actoren voor het verzegelen van het beleid van de 
Republiek. De Republiek van Koerdistan gaf ook veel aandacht aan de vorming van het 
nationale leger, waarbij de leiders van de Republiek een modern Koerdische leger probeerden 
op te bouwen. Aan het einde van de Republiek bleef ondanks deze inspanning het tribale 
karakter in deze krijgsmacht de boventoon voeren. In haar korte bestaan heeft de Republiek 
wel overwinningen geboekt op het gebied van communicatie, cultuur en taal. Er werd een 
scala aan middelen geproduceerd, zoals kranten, tijdschriften, radiovoorzieningen, 
bioscoopinfrastructuur, enz. Deze media werden alleen mogelijk gemaakt door de financiële 
steun door de Sovjetregering. 
De democratie als een van de belangrijke principes van de moderniteit heeft vóór, 
tijdens en na de Tweede Wereldoorlog in dit geval niet geleid tot de vorming van de 
Republiek van Koerdistan. De Iraanse regering heeft nooit officieel ingestemd met de 
eerbiediging van de politieke of zelfs de culturele rechten van de etnische Koerden in Iran. De 
oplossing van de Koerdische kwestie in 1946 door meer gedelegeerde democratie vanuit de 
centrale overheid was een belangrijke eis van Ghazi Mohammad. De Iraanse regering heeft 
geen rekening gehouden met deze verlangens. De gebeurtenissen als gevolg van de Tweede 
Wereldoorlog in Iran waren echter wel belangrijke redenen voor de vorming van de 
Republiek van Koerdistan. Het ontstaan van de Republiek bleek een product van overhaaste 
reacties op de grotere gebeurtenissen eromheen, zeker door de aanwezigheid van de legers 
van de grote mogendheden in Iran. Aldus heeft deze nabije aanwezigheid van de grote 
mogendheden in Iran mede geleid tot de vorming van de Republiek van Koerdistan. Immers 
als gevolg van de ineenstorting van het totalitaire regime van Reza Shah en de ontwapening 
van de militaire regering in het noorden van Iraans Koerdistan, kreeg de meerderheid van de 
inheemse Koerdische bevolking de kans het lot in eigen hand te nemen door het grondvesten 
van hun eigen regering.  
Het Anglo-Amerikaanse beleid ten aanzien van de Koerden in Iran is duidelijk. Vanaf 
het begin van de bezetting van Iran in 1941 hebben de betreffende staten geen ondersteuning 
of stimulering aangeboden aan de Koerdische leiders voor het in stand houden van het 
Koerdische streven. Het centrale beleid van de Anglo-Amerikaanse macht was gericht op een 
goede relatie met de Iraanse centrale overheid en men ondersteunde en adviseerde het Iraanse 
 290 
regime. In tegenstelling hiermee steunde de Sovjet-Unie de regionale machten die tegen de 
Iraanse regering waren. Een van deze regionale machten in Iran waren de Koerden en de 
Koerdische beweging. De Sovjets waren echter niet van plan om een langetermijnbeleid voor 
de Koerden en Koerdistan te ontwikkelen. Sovjetpolitici beseften dat de mogelijke vorming 
van een Koerdische staat geen wenselijke politieke ontwikkeling voor de Sovjetpolitiek in de 
regio zou zijn. De Sovjets zagen de stabilisering van een Koerdische regering als des te 
verontrustender omdat zij zelfs tot lang na de Eerste Wereldoorlog dachten dat de vorming 
van een Koerdische staat een politiek project van het Britse imperialisme was. De Sovjets 
wilden met hun buitenlandse politiek de Britse imperialistische expansie tegenhouden. 
Daarom hadden de Sovjets niet alleen een mogelijke vorming van een Koerdische staat 
geweigerd en tegengewerkt, zij waren tegen elke vorm van autonomie. In 1945 en 1946 
voerde de Sovjet-Unie een kortetermijnpolitiek ten aanzien van de Koerden in Iran. Zij 
voorzagen in drukpersfaciliteiten en militaire faciliteiten voor de Republiek en onderhielden 
goede economische betrekkingen. Voor de realisatie van hun politieke en economische doelen 
gebruikte de Sovjetregering de Koerdische beweging in Iran als instrument tegen de Iraanse 
regering. Dit gaf twee operatieve antagonistische beleidsdoeleinden binnen het conflict van 
belangen van de grote mogendheden: de Anglo-Amerikaanse steun aan de Iraanse regering en 
Sovjetondersteuning aan de regionale bewegingen, vooral de Azerbeidzjaanse regering. Deze 
tegenstelling leidde tot de naoorlogse ‘Iraanse Crisis’. In de internationale context werd deze 
bekend als oorsprong van de Koude Oorlog in het Midden-Oosten. 
Al gedurende zijn gehele bestaan tracht Rusland over land de toegang tot de zuidelijke 
open zee te annexeren. In de negentiende eeuw, met de verovering van Centraal-Azië en 
sommige noordelijke provincies van Iran, kwam voor de Russen dit doel dichterbij. Deze 
waarschijnlijke wens tot uitbreiden naar het zuiden werd tegengewerkt door een sterke macht 
die zijn zeeroute naar India verdedigde: Groot-Brittannië. Voor zowel Britten als Russen was 
het in het begin van de twintigste eeuw economisch en strategisch belangrijk grondstoffen te 
verkrijgen en er was volop olie beschikbaar in Iran. In de periode van de Tweede 
Wereldoorlog gaf deze noodzakelijke olie een ‘belangenconflict’ in het Midden-Oosten tussen 
de Russische en de Britse regeringen. Als de Tweede Wereldoorlog eindigt, verzwakt de 
Britse rol in het Midden-Oosten en wordt de militaire aanwezigheid van Groot-Brittannië in 
het oostelijke Middellandse Zeegebied en in het Midden-Oosten teruggebracht tot louter 
essentiële Britse en imperialistische belangen. Hoewel Groot-Brittannië nog steeds de 
pretenties van een machtige staat had, was de harde waarheid dat de oorlog de Britse 
economie kreupel had gemaakt en dat het land niet meer de kosten van de internationale 
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politiek kon dragen. In reactie op de Sovjetacties in Iran moest Engeland uit noodzaak gaan 
samenwerken met de Verenigde Staten om zich tegen de Sovjetoliebelangen in het Midden-
Oosten te beschermen. Groot-Brittannië bleef als belangrijke macht handelen in het belang 
van de bescherming van westerse waarden. In wezen echter ten gunste van de Amerikaanse 
belangen in delen van het Midden-Oosten, en dit zelfs tijdens Trumanregering. Deze regering 
markeert het omslagpunt in de twintigste eeuw vanaf waar Amerika de plaats van Groot-
Brittannië overneemt als overheersende grootmacht. 
De meeste historici beweren dat de aanwezigheid van Sovjettroepen in het noorden 
van Iran politieke en economische motieven had. Politiek, want Rusland streeft ernaar dat 
Iran een buffer voor zijn zwakke zuidelijke grens wordt. Economisch, want Rusland 
beschermt zijn belangen in de olieproductie in de noordelijke Iraanse provincies. De nationale 
belangen van de grootmachten stonden duidelijk op de agenda in de periode van de Iraanse 
crisis van 1945-1946: de Amerikanen deden een beroep op Atlantic Charter principes (zie 
appendix I), de Britten beschermden hun traditionele imperium en de Sovjet-Unie ging zelfs 
zo ver zuidelijk als mogelijk. De Iraanse crisis illustreerde het conflict van belangen van de 
grootmachten en markeerde aldus het begin van het ontstaan van de Koude Oorlog in het 
Midden-Oosten. In het geval van de Iraanse crisis richtte de Anglo-Amerikaanse 
samenwerking zich tegen de Sovjet-Unie om de Sovjets te dwingen hun troepen terug te 
trekken uit Iran. Dat de Sovjettroepen terug werden getrokken was voornamelijk toe te 
schrijven aan het feit dat de Sovjetpolitieke strategieën voor de Iraanse crisis hadden gefaald. 
Waarschijnlijk zijn er vier belangrijke factoren die het mislukte beleid van de Sovjet-Unie in 
de Iraanse crisis verklaren. Ten eerste: de Verenigde Naties waren het instrument voor het 
beslechten van geschillen tussen naties, en zij handelden aldus. Ten tweede traden de VS 
vanaf 1945 steeds krachtiger op tegen de Sovjetaanwezigheid in het Midden-Oosten. Ten 
derde dachten de Sovjets dat de oprichting van twee autonome regeringen, Koerdistan en 
Azerbeidzjan, genoeg was om hun doel van het krijgen van olieconcessies te bereiken; dit 
plan had echter gefaald. Ten slotte werd de voorkeur gegeven aan bilaterale onderhandelingen 
boven gewapende confrontatie of eenzijdige gewapende actie. 
De ontwikkeling van het Amerikaanse beleid ten aanzien van Iran was om de 
Westerse mogendheden een ‘frontlinie’ tegen de Sovjetpenetratie in het Midden-Oosten te 
verschaffen. De hele kwestie van de Sovjet-Amerikaanse betrekkingen wordt sterk 
vertroebeld door een ‘ideologische bagage’. Van daaruit wordt de Sovjet-Unie gezien als 
alleen een agressor: koppig, onverzettelijk en expansionistisch. Bij de beschrijving van de 
Amerikaanse diplomatie ten aanzien van Iran heeft Kuniholm gewezen op het belang van het 
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lokale nationalisme. Aan het einde van de Eerste Wereldoorlog vertegenwoordigt het 
nationalisme in het Midden-Oosten weinig meer dan een ongemakkelijke en irritante 
omstandigheid voor de grote mogendheden. Tegen het einde van de Tweede Wereldoorlog 
was het nationalisme een belangrijke factor in de beleidsvorming. Het werd krachtig versterkt 
door de ontwikkeling van de olie-industrie en is sindsdien uitgegroeid tot een cruciale 
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